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plea.34 Adverse possession, to be available, the judge towards Carrie Nation and three othmust be clearly proved and not left to mere
ers, who were brought before him upon proceed
ings wherein they were held to give bond to keep conjecture. 35
the peace, the cbarges being substantially the What constitutes an adverse possession is
same as those contained in the information a question of law for the court ;36 but the against the appellant, to-wit, the destruction of facts, necessary to establish that possession, property. The latter, however, was not a party are to be determined by the jury.37
to that prosecution. In addressing Mrs. Nation
and the tbree others, the judge stated that the A. L. Tipp.
action of the parties was wholly unwarranted by
any construction to be placed on the law, and 34 Durham v. Holeman, 30 Ga. 619; Smith v. Pow.
further said: "I want to say to you people who ers, 23 Tex. 29; Bolden v. Sherman, 101 Ill. 483; Wilkerson v. Thompson, 82 Mo. 317; Doberty v. Matsell,
appear charged with baving aided and abetted 119 N. Y. 646; Rowland v. Williams, 23 Oreg. 515; her that this is a court of law, and not one of McDermott v. Hoffman, 70 Pa. St. 31.
sentiment. Having broken the law, you have no 35 Weaver v. Wilson, 48 III. 125; Ambrose v. Raley, more rights in this court than the jointist. Your 58 III, 506.
contempt of the law is as great as his. Mrs. 36 Macklot v. Dubrenil, 9 Mo, 447, 48 Am. Dec. 550 ; Nation and her followers made an atttack Sunday Paxson v. Bailey, 17 Ga. 600; Harper v. Morse, 114
upon a perfectly legitimate business in which Mo. 817.1
$100,000 is invested. They have repeatedly broken 39 Anderson v. Boek, 56 U. S. 323; Gardener v. Gooch, 48 Me. 487; Eaton v. Jacobs, 52 Me. 445; Tru.
the law, and destroyed property, and gone unfant v. Hudson, 99 Ala. 526; Webb v. Richardson, 42
hindred and unpunished. The time has come in Vt. 592.
this community when people are demanding that something be done. I want to say to you that
this unwarranted destruction of property must COMMON NUISANCE-ABATEMENT-CHANGE
stop. Have people no rights that a crazy woman OF VENUE-MISDEMEANOR.
and her deluded followers are bound to respect? STATE v. STARK.
There is not a lawyer in this room who will not
tell you that you have no right under the law to Supreme Court of Kansas, Division No. 1, October 5, 1901. do these things. * * You have no right to
1. All places where intoxicating liquors are sold or attempt to abate a nuisance except through the kept for sale, or places where persons are permitted regular channels. Reputable men in this comto resort for the purpose of drinking the same, are
munity have given sanction to a movement that declared by statute to be common puisances. This
has led to riot, and may lead to bloodshed. I fact, however, does not justify their abatement by
want to say to you people who have been placed any person or persons without process of law. They can be abated only by a prosecution instituted
under bond that if you go out on any more raids in behalf of the public by the proper officer. The
your bondsmen will be compelled to forfeit the destruction or injury to property used in aid of the
amount to the last penny. I want to make this maintenance of such nuisances, except in the manner proposition clear to you. Property must and provided by the statute, is a trespass.
will be defended." The information was filed 2. A change of venue in a criminal prosecution is a February 17th, and the case called for hearing wrong to the public unless the necessities of justice February 20th, and thereon passed until Febto the accused require it. Prejudice on the part of a
ruary 25th. A motion was then made by appeljudge must clearly appear. A prima facie showing
lant for a postponement on account of the sickness of predjudice is insufficient. The case of City of Em. poria v. Volmer, 12 Kan. 622, followed.
of Mr. Stone, one of his counsel, and for the 3. In the commission of a misdemeanor there are
reason that Mr. Martin, his other attorney, had no accessories. All persons aiding or counseling are
been unable to prepare for trial. The applicaprincipals.
tion was made by Mr. Troutman and Mr. Bain, Balfe H. Stark was convicted of malicious tres who appeared on behalf of the appellant, and pass, and he appeals. Afirmed.
showed that they had made no preparation for The appellant, with Carrie Nation and six the trial. The application was overruled, a jury others, was charged by information with mali impaneled, and a verdict of guilty returned, fol. sious trespass, under section 2053 of the General lowed by a fine imposed on the defendant of $25, Statutes of 1899. The offense alleged was that | with the costs of the prosecution. defendante dia, on or about the 17th day of Feb-1 SMITH, J. (after stating the facts): The court the appellant was not connected. Had the lan ployed it as an aid to the maintenance of a comguage coming from the bench been directed to mon nuisance, the appellant was justified in beStark, he might have had reason to complain. ing a party to its destruction without process of His case was not, however, before the court at law. Under our statutes all places-wbere intoxithat time. It has been held that a cbange of cating liquors are sold, or where persons are pervenue is a wrong to the public unless the inter mitted to resort for the purpose of drinking inests of justice to the defendant require it, and toxicating liquors as a beverage, or where such that prejudice on the part of a judge towards a llquors are kept for sale, barter or delivery in defendant must clearly appear. It is not suffi. violation of the prohibitory liquor law, are decient that a prima facie case only be shown. City clared to be common nuisances; and upon the of Emporia v. Volmer, 12 Kan. 622, 627. The judgment of a court having jurisdiction that such record shows that the district judge tried the places are nuisances the sheriff or constable or case with fairness, and the punishment imposed marshal of any city where the same are located was exceedingly moderate, considering tbat the sball be directed to shut up and abate such maximum for such offenses is imprisonment in places by taking possession thereof, and of all inthe county jail not exceeding one year, and by toxicating liquor found therein, together with fine not exceeding $500, or by both such fine and all signs, screens, bars, bottles, glasses and other imprisonment.
in overruling the application for a
property used in keeping and maintaining said The granting a continuance was largely a mat nuisances, and the same shall be forthwith pubter within the discretion of the court. The licly destroyed by such officer. It is further prooffense charged was a misdemeanor. We do not vided that the attorney general, county attorney, think any of the rights of the defendant were or any citizen of the county where such a nuiprejudically affected by the absence of attorneys sance exists may maintain an action in the name who had prepared for the trial. He was repre of the state to abate and perpetually enjoin it. sented by counsel of high standing and ability, Here is a complete legal remedy, easy to obtain, and we find nothing in the record to indicate that which was open to the appellant or any of his any point favorable to him was overlooked. associates. Indeed, we believe it to be more
There was some confusion in the answers made drastic and summary in its application to the by the juror Hale Ritohie touching his opinion of subject than the law of any other state in the the guilt or innocence of the defendant, but his Union. The existence of such common or pubwhole examination, taken together, does not lic nuisance as appellant offered to show was show him to have been disqualified.
kept by the prosecuting witness, in violation of Complaint is made that several of defendant's law, injuriously affected all other persons in the witnesses on cross-examination were subjected to city of Topeka equally with himself. It is not rigid inquiries as to the existence of a certain or- claimed that he was specially injured, or pecuganization formed for the purpose of destroying liarly or individually hurt, in any other manner property. Nothing was extracted by the state or degree than in common with all others in the from such witnesses than the defendant bimself community. He could not have maintained an confessed concerning such organization. He ad action in his own name to abate the nuisance. mitted that he was a member of a company Jones v. City of Ohanute, 62 Kan. —, 65 Pac. which assembled on the state house steps, and Rep. 243. In case of Brown v. Perkins, 12 Gray, from there moved to the place where the prop. 89, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts had beerty in question was injured, and that he took an fore it a similar question. In an action of tort for ax along because he thought he might be called breaking and entering the plaintiff's shop and on to use it.
carrying away and destroying a barrel of vineThere was no error in the instruction that if the gar and other goods, the answer of the defenddefendant was present, advising, counseling or ant alleged that the building was kept for the encouraging the breaking of the doors and wine sale of intoxicating liquors, and was a public dows, he was equally as guilty with those actually nuisance; that a large number of persons assemcommitting the offense, although he may not in bled to abate the same, and destroyed or injured person bave injured said property. In misdemean no article of merchandise, but only spirituous ors all concerned, if guilty at all, all are principals. liquor, unlawfully kept for sale, and did no other State y. Gurnee, 14 Kan. 111; Sharpe v. Williams, act and used no more force than was 41 Kan. 56, 20 Pac. Rep. 497.
necessary to abate such nuisance. By statute in The appellant offered to prove that the prose force in Massachusetts at that time all intoxicatcuting witness, at the time the trespass was com ing liquors kept for sale, and the vessels and immitted and his property injured and destroyed, plements actually used in selling and keeping was the keeper of a place where intoxicating the same, were declared to be common nuisances, liquors were sold as a beverage in violation of and were to be regarded and treated as such. By law, and that the property in question was un another statute all buildings or tenements used lawfully used as an accessory thereto. This offer for the illegal keeping or sale of intoxicating was reiected by the court, and the testimony ey. | | liquors were declared to be common nuisances.
taining them and articles used in their sale, being declared by law to be a common nuisance, it was lawful for any person to destroy them by way of abatement, and that such action would be the exercise of a common and lawful right. This instruction was held to be erroneous. . The opinion was delivered by Shaw, C. J., one of the ableşt of American jurists, and we extract from it such portions as are most pertinent to tbe question before us: “It is not lawful by the common law for any and all persons to abate a common nuisance merely because it is a common nui. sanee, though the doctrine may have been sometimes stated in terms so general as to give countenance to this suppositon. This right and power is never intrusted to individuals in general, with out process of law, by way of vindicating the public rigbt, but solely for the relief of a party whose right is obstructed by sucb nuisance." Page 101. "The true theory of abatement of nuisance is that an individual citizen may abate a private nuisance injurious to him when he could also bring an action; and also, when a common nuisance obstructs his individual right, he may remove it to enable him to enjoy that right, and be cannot be called in question for so doing. As in the case of tbe obstruction across a highway, and an unauthorized bridge across a navigable water course, if he bas occasion to use it, he may remove it by way of abatement. But this would not justify strangers, being inbabitants of other parts of the commonwealth, having no such occasion to use it, to do tbe same. Some of the earlier cases, perhaps, in laying down the general proposition that private subjects may abate a common nuisance, did not expressly mark this distinction; but we think, upon the authority of modern cases, where the distinctions are more accurately made, and upon principle, this is the true rule of law." (Pages 101, 102.) "The keeping of a building for the sale of intoxicating liquors, if a nuisance at all, is exclusively a common nuisance; and the fact tbat the husbands, wives, children, or servants of any person do frequent such a place, and get intoxicating liquor there, does not make it a special nuisance or injury to their private rights, so as to authorize and justify such persons in breaking into the shop or building where it is thus sold, and destroying the liquor there found, and the vessels in which it may be kept; but it can only be prosecuted as a public or common nuisance in the mode prescribed by law." (Page 102.) This enunciation of the law finds approval in all the text-books upon the subject, so far as we have examined them. Wood, Nuis. (3d Ed.) pp. 966, 968; Webb's Palaton 'K1K noto See also Carthall v
A fence across a public road is a common nuisance, which a person journeying along the highway may legally abate by reinoving the obstruction. This is so because his progress is impeded, and particular injury is sustained by him not shared in by the community generally. This right of abatement, however, cannot be lawfully exercised by one living at a distance from the obstructed way, with no immediate occasion to use it, who goes out for the express purpose of removing the impediment in the interest of the traveling public, for fear that he or his neighbors might receive injury from it. The appellant and his associates proceeded on the erroneous belief tbat, because the prosecuting witness was a violator of the law, they might right the wrongs the public was suffering by bis acts, and this in a summary manner, by resort to physical force, guided only by the counsels of a mob. It was a congregation of law-breakers on one side retaliating upon an individual law-breaker on the other for lawless acts of the latter which affected not them alone, but hundreds of others (the public), whom they assumed to represent. Courts of justice cannot approve or countenance such disregard of the law. To do so would create and encourage disrespect for all governmental restraint, which is the beginning of anarchy. The judgment of the district court will be affirmed. All the justices concurring.
NOTE.-Right of Individual to Abate a Nuisance.-Carrie Nation's sensational attack upon the saloons of Kapsas, and her insistence upon a right to abate them as public nuisances has created widespread discussion in which a variety of opinions have been expressed. However, as the trial court expressed it in the principal case, this question is not one to be looked at from any standpoint of sentiment, but upon clear reason and sound law.
There is much in the old common-law decisions to justify the position taken by Mrs. Nation and her followers as to the right of the individual to abate a nuisance, either public or private. As to private nuisance the rule bas been well settled that the indi. vidual may abate it if injurious to him, and if he also have the right to bring an 'action therefor. State v. Parrott, 71 N. Car. 311, 17 Am. Rep. 5; Mayhew v. Burns, 103 Ind. 328; Amoskeag Co. v. Goodale, 46 N. H. 56; Ropayne v, Loranger, 63 Mich. 373; Manbattan Mfg. Co. v. Vap Kueven, 23 N. J. Eq. 251; Calef v. Thomas, 81 III. 478. In abating a nuisance, however, no more injury must be done to the property than is absolutely necessary to effect the object. Calef v. Thomas. 81 Ill. 478; Heatb v. Williams, 25 Me. 209; State v. Moffett, 1 Greene (Iowa), 247; Wright v. Moore, 38 Ala. 593. Thus, an owner of ground in abating a private nuisance, as shocks of corn left in.
cumbering the ground by a tenant, is bound to use 1 moann
action thereon, and where no breach of the peace will result. In such cases, however, the abatement must be attended with no more injury than is abso. lutely necessary to effect the object. There is also a further limitation to tbis rule, tbat in cases of nui. sances from omission rather than commission, notice of abatement must be given. This limitation, however, does not apply to cases of extreme emergency requiring immediate action. In the case of public nuisances, abatement can only be secured through legal process in the mode designated by law, except in cases where the right of the individual seeking to abate the nuisance bave been injured to an extent greater than the rest of the public. In all other eases appeal should be made to the courts.
his rights to an extent greater than the rest of the public. Brown v. Perkins, 12 Gray (Mass.), 89; Bowden v. Lewis, 13 R, I. 189; Gray v. Ayers, 7 Dana (Ky.), 375; Coast Co. v. Borough of Spring Lake (N. J. 1896), 36 Atl. Rep. 21; Brown v. De Groff, 50 N. J. L. 409; Graves v. Shattuck, 55 N. H. 257; Tissot v. Telegraph Co., 39 La. Ann. 996; Shaubut v. Railroad, 21 Minn. 502; School District v. Neill, 36 Kan. 617; Ruff v. Phillips, 50 Ga. 130; Finley v. Hershey, 41 Iowa, 389; Larson v. Furlong, 63 Wis. 323; Bright. man v. Bristol, 65 Me. 426; Jarvis v. Santa Clara R. R., 52 Cal. 438; Turner v. Holtzman, 54 Md. 148. In Dimes v. Petley, 15Q. B. 276, Campbell, C. J., says: "It is fully settled by the recent cases that, if there be a puisance in a public highway a private individ. ual cannot, of his own authority, abate it, unless it does him a special injury, and then only to the extent necessary to enable him to exercise his right of pass ing over the highway. And we clearly think he can not justify doing any damage to the property of in. dividuals who have improperly placed the nuisance there, if avoiding it he could have passed on with
reasonable convenience.” In the very recent case of • Griffith v. Holman, 23 Wasb. 317, 63 Pac. Rep. 239, it
was held tbat a public puisance, can be abated only by a public officer, except in case of a person having some special interest in the abatement different from and greater than the interest of the community. In the case of Gray v. Ayers, 7 Dana (Ky.), 375, 32 Am. Dec, 107, the defendants set up the defense that the house thrown down by them was a place of resort for felons; but the court held the defendants liable, they not being particularly damaged, and therefore hay. ing no right to abate the nuisance. lo Brown v. De Groff, 50 N. J. L. 409, the defendant, in fisbing for clams, injured the plaintiff's oysters, and when sued, set up the defense that plaintiff's oyster bed was a common nuisance. The court beld, however, that the defendants were liable even if their defense were absolutely true. In the recent case of Coast Co. v. Borough of Spring Lake (N. J. 1896), it was held that the power of a municipal off cer to abate a public nuisance without statutory or judicial process stands upon the same footing as the power of a citizen.
As the court intimated in the principal case, there are some autborities which in the expressions used seem to vindicate the right of the defendants in this case, and which hold, generally, that the individual has the right to abate a public nuisance. In nearly all these cases this statement of this rule was pure dicta. As was stated by Shaw, C. J., in Brown v. Perkins, 12 Gray (Mass.), 89, some of the earlier cases, in laying down the general proposition that private citizens might abate a common nuisance, did not expressly mark the distinction between private and public nuisances. Thus, in Harvey v. Dewoody, 18 Ark. 255, the court said: “It seems that any person may abate a common nuisance." This same statement was made in Wetmore y. Tracey, 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 250. The case of ferocious beasts or other impending dangers seems to be held an exception by some courts. Thus, in Dunlap v. Snyder, 17 Barb. (N. Y.) 561, it was held that if a dog is so ferocious that of his own disposition he will bite men in the street, and is at large, he is a nuisance, and may be killed by any one, See also Brown v. Carpenter, 26 Vt. 638; Meeker v. Van Rensselaer, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 397.
JETSAM AND FLOTSAM.
A UNIQUE DIVORCE PETITION. A correspondent from Kansas sends us a copy of a remarkable divorce petition filed at Gay City, Kansas, n which the plaintiff is 72 and the defendant 68. Thompson and Thompson represent the plaintia and drew up the papers which are certainly unique in text and in the matter which they set forth. Our astonisbment would have been igreater, bad such a thing come out of any other state but Kapsas. That state seems to insist on being the state of surprises, and delights in doing what no one else would think of doing. Usage and custom have certainly a hard road in Kansas. The beginning chapters of the petition referred to read thus:
“Comes now the plaintiff to the altar of justice, bearing bis burden of sorrow and of woe wbich be humbly lays down before the Ermine and the Wool. sack.
“He declares with solemn truth that he bas been for more than one year last passed an actual resident in good faith of the state of Kansas, wbose valiant sons swam the Bag Bag; that state pointed out by all the world as being the deserted bome of Carrie Nation and Mary Ellen Lease; and that he is now a resident of Allen county, same state, wbere the roar of natural gas wells and the whistle of great indus. tries bave become as familiar to its inhabitants as was the croaking of frogs to the people of Posey county, Indiana, in the days of Auld Lang Syne.
"It was 'back east' in the good old state of Ohio, that has given birth to statesmen and politicians. It was long years ago and in the sultry summer time, when the dog fennel blossomed in the lane and the wood pecker peeked bis peck on the decaying trunk of the hollow Sycamore tree. It was at the spring 'neath the bill close by the spreading beech, a youth and maiden met and, meeting, loved and, loving, plighted their troth."
It was in the fall, the melancholy days, the saddest of the year, when they met again, but parted not in love but in anger. He married another girl and lived in Ohio. She married Mr. Walker of Texas and removed there. They were divorced. Then she married a man whose name is unknown to the doctor. He died. Then she married Mr. Baker and moved to California. He died. She had two children by her second marriage.
He early knelt at the feet of Esculapius and learned to heal. Came to Kansas in 1899 and his wife died shortly later, leaving him alone at the tender age of
seventy Two He wrote this all weetheart in
good practice and was prospering and kuew many jects. A corporation whicb as such has 'no such men of note. They moved to Gas City.
duties cannot be guilty in these cases, but they may But his dreams were not realized. From tbe altar be guilty as a body corporate of commanding acts to vows she turned forgetful and showed him a warm be done to the nuisance of the community at large. time thenceforth. Her supposed honey sweetness Individuals who concur in voting the order or in of disposition looked to bim like a spray of vinegar. executing the work may be made answerable for it She began to knock on Kansas and then knock on also by criminal proceedings. But there can be no him. Among bis titles bestowed by her were. effectual means for deterring from an oppressive "bigot, back number, loafer, idiot, crank, fool tyrant, exercise of power for the purpose of gain, except the no gentleman, filthy, low, indecent, old curmud remedy by an indictment against those who truly geon." Privately and publicly she hailed bim thus. commit it, that is, the corporation acting by its Was she a belp mate to bim? Nay. Nay. Did she majority. In 1850, in case of The King of the Two love, honor and obey? Not on your tiltype. Nor Sicilies v. Wilcox, I Sim. (N. S.) 334. an incorporated did she cook, wash or sew, althougb in good health company demurred to a bill in equity, on the ground and mighty spry for a lady of 68 summers. He is not that the discovery thereby sought might subject it to an epicure but likes good things to eat and always a criminal prosecution under the Foreign Enlistment provided plenty, but she refused to cook, declaring Act (59 Geo. III., ch. 69), but Shadwell, V. C., overthe house empty and forgetting the text: Rev. XII, ruled the demurrer, holding that the language of the 8. Once he went to the cupboard when she declared act referred to individuals only. The general rule for there was no butter in the house and brought forth the construction of statutes on this point is now laid a hunk which was not strong enough to walk to the down by section 2 (1) of the Interpretation Act, 1889 table alone. She was angered by it as a bull flagged (52 and 53 Vict. ch. 63), re enacting part of 7 and 8 with a red flag. Shaking her finger in his face she Geo. IV, ch. 28, $ 14, that in the construction of every declared “would shoot him, bad she a gun." At enactment relating to an offense punishable on indict. other times he showed tbis improper desire to do ment or on summary conviction whether contained in murder. And she hobnobbed with evil companions an act passed before or after the 1st of January, 1890, much to bis annoyance. She antagonized his religion. the expression of "person" sball, unless a contrary He bad plenty and she bad none, professing a disbe. intention appears, include a body corporate. Practi. liet in heaven and bell and a Creator. He knew there cally the same rule has been laid down for the con: is a hell, but she couldn't see it. She snorted about struction of penal statutes by the house of lords in his politics. He is an American, loyal and true. She the case of Pharmaceutical Society v. London and is an anarchist and insisted on keeping papers of that Provincial Supply Association, Limited, 5 App. Cas. breed about the house. And she annoyed him by 857, where it was held that in sections 1 and 15 of the talking of ber religion and political faiths. Then sbe Pharmacy Act, 1868, probibiting under penalty any left him, alone, with none to love and none to caress. person not being a registered pharmaceutical chem. He could bear that but she took valuable papers with ist from keeping a shop for the sale of poisons, the her, including an autograph letter of Job J. Ingalls word “person" does not include a corporation. In and a handsome specimen of tape worm, easily 74 that case Lord Blackburn said: "I quite agree that a feet long. He asks for divorce and possession of wbat corporation cannot in one sense commit a crime-a is left of his property. The result will be awaited corporation cannot be Imprisoned, if imprisonment with interest.
be the sentence for the crime; a corporation cannot
be hanged or put to death if that be the punishment CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS IN ENGLAND. for the crime; and so in those senses a corporation
The importance of this subject is quite modern. cannot commit a crime. But a corporation may be The old books contained very little about it. Its fined, and a corporation may pay damages; and prominence in modern times is due, no doubt to the therefore I must totally dissent, notwithstanding what enormous growth of joint stock companies, and to the Bramwell, L.J., said, or is reported to have said consequent legislation, some of its penal, affecting (5 Q. B. D. at p. 313), upon the supposition that a those corporations. The first decision of importance body corporate or a corporation that incorporated on the subject is that in Reg. v. Birmingham and itself for the purpose of publishing a newspaper Gloucester Railway Company (1842), 3 Q. B. 323, could not be tried and fined, or an action be brought where it was held that at common law an incorporated against it for a libel; or that a corporation which company might be indicted for non feasance in omit. commits a nuisance could not be convicted of the ting to perform a duty imposed by statute, such as nuisance or the like. I must really say that I do not that of making arches to connect lands severed by the feel the slightest doubt upon that part of the case." company's railway. There Patteson, J., delivering More recently still, the judgment of Bowen, L. J., in the judgment of the court, stated on the authority of Reg. v. Tyler (1891), 1 Q. B. 588, contains a valuable 1 Hawk. P. C., ch. 66, § 18, that a corporation may be review of the law, summing it up as follows: "I take indicted for breach of a duty imposed by law, tbough it, therefore, to be clear that in the ordinary case of a not for a felony nor for crimes involving personal vio duty imposed by statute, if the breach of the statute lence, as for riots or assaults. Tber in Reg. v. Great is a disobedience to the law punishable in the case of North of England Railway Company (1846), 9 Q. B. a private person by indictment, the offending corpo. 315, it was further held that an incorporated company ration cannot escape from the consequences which could be indicted for a misfeasance, such as cutting would follow in the case of an individual by showing through and obstructing a bigbway by works per that they are a corporation. That seems to me to be formed outside of their statutory powers. There Lord common sense and good law." Kay, L. J., in the Denman, C. J., in delivering the judgment of the same case entirely agreed. He puts it even more court, pointed out that crimes consisting in acts of tersely: "I take it to be clear that where an act immorality derive their character fron the corrupted imposes upon a company a duty to perform a partic:
**tine then and are viola. I ular act. the camnany thousche corneration may hp