124. JUDGMENT Nonsult.-On non-compliance by one party with an order for production of papers, the remedy is restricted to a judgment of nonsuit or by default.-Bloede Co. of Baltimore City v. Bancroft & Sons Co., U. S. C. C., D. (Del.), 110 Fed. Rep. 76.

125. JUDGMENT — Res Adjudicata.-A suit construing certain deeds and the rights of the parties thereunder will not be considered res judicata of an action of ejectment founded on an alleged breach of the condition of the deeds.-King v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., Va., 39 S. E. Rep. 701.

126. JURY-Constitutional Guaranty.-Const. U. S. Amend. arts. 5, 6, relating to trial by jury, apply to federal, and not to state courts.-Williams v. Hert, U. S. C. C., D. (Ind.), 110 Fed. Rep. 166.

127. JUSTICE OF THE PEACE Criminal Jurisdiction. -A justice of the peace is without authority to review an order of the circuit court remanding one accused of crime to await investigation by grand jury, or to change the amount of bail bond fixed by the order.Hall v. State, Ala., 30 South. Rep. 502.

128. JUSTICE OF THE PEACE Examination.-Under Code, ch. 156, § 12, a justice must examine any person brought before him for an offense, if demanded, as soon as may be.- Harper v. Harper, W. Va., 39 S. E. Rep. 661.

129. LANDLORD AND TENANT - Liability of Lessor for Defects. Lessors of a building, not having known of a defect therein whereby the celling fell, held not liable to persons present therein by license of lessee, and injured thereby.-Dyer v. Robinson, U. S. C. C., S. D. (Ohio), 110 Fed. Rep. 99.

132. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS Destroying Timber.Under Gen. St. 1888, § 1379, suit brought for destroying timber under section 1345 is not barred within one year.-Plumb v. Griffith, Conn., 50 Atl. Rep. 1.

133. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS Negligence of Attorney.-Limitations held not a bar to action against attorney, who had collected money for the estate of a non-resident, because of failure to acquire knowledge of such collection at an earlier date.-Bromberg v. Sands, Ala., 30 South. Rep. 510.

134. LIS PENDENS-Subjecting Debt.-An action upon a judgment and return of no property, seeking to subject a debt owing to the judgment defendant by one who was made a party, created a lis pendens as to such debt.-Hacker v. White, Ky., 64 S. W. Rep. 446.

135. LOGS AND LOGGING-Conclusive Measurements. -A contract for the sale of logs construed as not mak. ing conclusive the measurements taken by the buyer alone after delivery of the logs.-Southern Lumber Co. v. Asher, Ky., 64 S. W. Rep. 462. 136. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

Indictment

Pre

138. MANDAMUS

Council Ordinances.-Mandamus lies to compel the mayor and council of a town to pass an ordinance striking certain territory from the town, in accordance with Ky. St. § 3493, as amended in March, 1899, where the requisite petition has been presented.-Steele v. Willis, Ky., 64 8. W. Rep. 417.

139. MASTER AND SERVANT-Fellow Servant.-PlaintIff, employed by defendant railroad company, injured by the negligence, if any, of himself and his fellow workmen, held not entitled to recover.-Martin v. Louisville & N. R. Co., Ky., 64 S. W. Rep. 417.

140. MASTER AND SERVANT- -Sufficient EmployeesRisk. A railroad company cannot set up as a defense to an action by a section master assumption of risk on fallure of company to furnish a sufficient number of employees.- Bodie v. Charleston & W. C. Ry. Co., S. Car., 39 S. E. Rep. 715.

141. MASTER AND SERVANT - Telegraph CompanyInjury to Lineman.-A telegraph company is liable for an injury to a lineman caused by the falling of a decayed pole on which he was working, the unsafe condition of which would have been discovered by a proper inspection.-Tracy v. Western Union Tel. Co., U. S. C. C., W. D. (Pa.), 110 Fed. Rep. 103.

142. MORTGAGE - Contest by Bondholders.-Individual bondholders, in suit by trustee to foreclose mortgage, can contest validity of certain of the bonds. — Central Trust Co. of New York v. California & N. R. Co., U. S. C. C., N. D. (Cal.), 110 Fed. Rep. 70.

143. MORTGAGES-Omission of Redemption Clause.Where a grantee and his devisees have been in undisturbed possession for years, and there is no evidence that the clause of redemption was omitted through mistake or fraud, the conveyance will not be declared a mortgage.-Frazier v. Frazier, N. Car., 39 S. E. Rep

634.

144. MORTGAGES-Right of Junior Mortgagee.-Right of junior mortgagee to have lands sold in inverse or der of alienation held destroyed by foreclosure of prior mortgage and purchase of lands by a third party. Threefoot v. Hillman, Ala., 30 South. Rep. 513. 145. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - Highways -- Abut ting Owners Assessment.-Abutting property in cities of the first class cannot be charged with the cost of reconstructing a street, though the original con. struction may not have been at the cost of abutting owners.-City of Louisville v. Tyler, Ky., 64 S. W. Rep.

415.

146. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Highways-Improvements.-That a railroad company is in possession of wharf property owned by the city and derives revenue therefrom does not render it liable for Improvement of a street on which the property abuts.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Nehan, Ky., 64 S. W. Rep. 457.

147. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - Improvements.-A city will not be restrained from executing a plan of its trustees as to the construction of a sidewalk, though the improvement may be limited to one piece of prop. erty.-Trustees of Hazelgreen v. McNabb, Ky., 64 8. W. Rep. 431.

148. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - Survey of TownNotice.-Plan and survey of town, when duly recorded, held notice to all abutting real estate owners as to location of lines of streets and alleys.-McClellan v. Town of Weston, W. Va., 39 S. E. Rep. 670.

149. NEGLIGENCE-Repair After Accident.-Repair of railing by defendant after accident held not an admission that its having been torn away by it was the cause of such accident.-Town of Waterbury v. Waterbury Traction Co., Conn., 50 Atl. Rep. 3.

150. NEW TRIAL-Comments of Judge.-Comments of judge which are deductions only of truth based on general experience are not subject to exceptions.State v. Means, Me., 50 Atl. Rep. 30.

151. NEW TRIAL-Disturbance of Verdict.-Judgment by court without intervention of jury will not be disturbed, where there is evidence to support it.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Solomon, Ala., 30 South. Rep. 491. 152. NEW TRIAL Evidence.-Refusal of new trial, where there is evidence tending to sustain the ver dict, held not error of law.-Hagen v. Anderson Co., S. Car., 39 S. E. Rep. 712.

153. OBSTRUcting JustICE Resisting Special Constables.-A person arrested for resisting special constable, appointed by justice, under Code, § 978, cannot question his appointment.-Parish v. State, Ala., 30 South. Rep. 474.

154. OFFICERS-Buying Jurors' Claims.-For the of fense of buying or contracting for the claims of jurors for services, a county officer is subject to a fine of $50. -Commonwealth v. Dockery, Ky., 64 S. W. Rep. 460.

155. OFFICERS-Drunkenness.-Under Ky. St. § 8749, any officer who at any time is so drunk as to disqualify him from discharging the duties of his office is guilty, though he may never be drunk while attempt. ing to perform any official act.-Johnson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 64 S. W. Rep. 467.

156. PAUPERS-Pauper's Property.-The directors of a county poor house were not authorized to apply property acquired by a pauper inmate after entry to the payment of his board prior to the acquisition of such estate.-Board of Directors of Mason County Infirmary v. Smith's Committee, Ky., 64 S. W. Rep. 466. 157. PERPETUITIES-Limitation of Devise.-To avoid the common-law rule against perpetuities, a limitation of a devise must be so made that the estate not only may, but must, vest within the prescribed period.Hanley v. Kansas & T. Coal Co., U. s. C. C. W. D. (Ark.), 110 Fed. Rep. 62.

158. PLEADING-Demurrer.-Where plea is not friv. olous, but defective, its sufficiency should be tested by demurrer, and not by motion to strike.-Karter v. Fields, Ala., 30 South. Rep. 504.

159. PLEADING-Non Est Factum.-A plea of non est factum and a plea of no consideration are not incon. sistent.-Spencer v. Society of Shakers, Ky., 64 S. W. Rep. 468.

160. POWERS-Reference.- In execution of a power in trust given by a deed, a direct reference to the power is unnecessary.-Gulf Red Cedar Co. v. O'Neal, Ala., 30 South. Rep. 466.

161. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-Power of Attorney.-One claiming under a power of attorney to recover land, whereby he is to have one-half of what he recovers, has not an interest coupled with the power, which prevents death from terminating the agency.-Wain. wright v. Massenburg, N. Car., 39 S. E. Rep. 725.

162. PROCESS-Insurance Companies.-In an action against a foreign insurance company, held, that the defendant could not avoid service of process on the Insurance commissioner on the ground of no liability to plaintiff.-Moore v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assn., N. Car., 39 S. E. Rep. 687.

163. PROHIBITION-When Issued. Where there is objection to jurisdiction, prohibition will not be issued until party complaining of abuse of power shall have sought redress in the court below by proper ob jection, and failed to obtain it.-Hill v. Tarver, Ala., 30 South. Rep. 499.

164. PUBLIC LANDS-Patents.-The fact that a patent embraces older grants or surveys renders it void only

to the extent of such prior grants.-Nickels v. Com monwealth, Ky., 64 8. W. Rep. 448.

165. PUBLIC LANDS-Timber Lands.-An applicant for the purchase of timber lands under 20 Stat. 89, is not required to make a personal examination of the land before making the declaratory statement, so as to be able to verify the same from personal knowl edge. - Hoover v. Salling, U. S. C. C. of App., Seventh Circuit, 110 Fed. Rep. 43.

166. QUIETING TITLE-Evidence.-Where an action is brought to determine the title to land, a grant from the state is admissible in evidence to show such title. -Midgett v. Midgett, N. Car., 39 8. E. Rep. 722.

187. QUIETING TITLE-Remedy at Law.-A federal court of equity held without jurisdiction under the allegations of the bill, on the ground that complain. ant's remedy was at law.-Hanley v. Kansas & T. Coal Co., U. S. C. C., W. D. (Ark.), 110 Fed. Rep. 62.

168. QUIETING TITLE-Sufficient Allegations.-In an action to quiet title, a petition alleging that defendant claims the land, by stating that he is the owner of the land and has trespassed thereon, sufficiently states the facts showing the defendant is setting up the claim of hostile title.-Campbell v. Campbell, Ky., 64 S. W. Rep. 458.

169. QUIETING TITLE-Sufficient Averments.-In an action to quiet title, an answer setting forth defend. ant's adverse title cured any lack of sufficient averment in the petition.-Campbell v. Campbell, Ky., 64 8. W. Rep. 458.

170. QUO WARRANTO-Authority-Burden of Proof.In quo warranto, where respondent admits that he is holding the office, the burden is on him to show his anthority.-State v. Foster, Ala., 30 South. Rep. 477.

171. RAILROADS-Bridge.-Though defendant raised the bridge to remove the danger to brakemen on freight trains, it was liable if it failed to comply with its contract with plaintiff. -Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Pittman, Ky., 64 S. W. Rep. 460.

172. RAILROADS-Defective Bridge.- As the defect in the bridge was due to the fact that defendant, after it was constructed, raised it in the center, defendant was not entitled to notice of its insufficiency before the bringing of suit.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Pittman, Ky., 64 S. W. Rep. 460.

173. RAILROADS-Failure to Give Signals.-Railroad company held liable on failure to give statutory sig. nals at crossing, whereby person on the crossing was injured.-Hutto v. South Bound R. Co., S. Car., 39 S. E Rep. 710.

174. RAILROADS-Lien for Injuries.-No lien exists upon a railroad for damages for temporary injuries resulting from negligent failure to construct a suffi. cient culvert under an enbankment.-Tolle v. Owens. boro, F. of R. & G. R. R. Co., Ky., 64 S. W. Rep. 455.

175. RECEIVERS-Sale-Acquiescence.-In a suit to set aside the confirmation of a receiver's sale, held, that the affidavit of the principal stockholder object ing to the sale would not be considered, because of his acquiescence to the sale.-Rogers v. Rogers, Locomotive Co., N. J., 50 Atl. Rep. 10.

176. REFORMATION OF INSTRUMENTS-Mistake.-A contract cannot be reformed on the ground of mis. take, unless it is clearly shown that the mistake was mutual.-Fulton v. Colwell, U. S. C. C., D. (N. J.), 110 Fed. Rep. 54.

177. REMOVAL OF CAUSES -Not Separable.-An action commenced in a state court, against two corporations of that state, on a cause of action not separable as to defendants, cannot be removed to the United States court on the petition of one defendant.-State Trust Co. v. Kansas City, P. & G. R. Co., U. 8. C. C., W. D. (Mo.), 110 Fed. Rep. 10.

tuting a proceeding.-Satterthwaite v. Ellis, N. Car. 39 S. E. Rep. 726.

179. SALES - Confirmation of Condition. Where salesman inserts condition that sale shall be subject to confirmation, no action for non-delivery can be main. tained without showing confirmation.-Gilman v. Stock, Me., 50 Atl. Rep. 31.

180. SALES-Recovery of Goods. -Placing of goods in car with goods delivered to railroad in accordance with contract two days previous, held not to prevent recovery for the original goods.-Bowers v. J. B. Worth Co., N. Car., 39 S. E. Rep. 635.

181. SALES-Refusal to Deliver.-For the refusal of the seller to deliver goods to the buyer, the measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and the market price at the time and place of delivery.-Parry v. Mfg. Co. v. Lyon, Ky., 64 S. W. Rep. 436.

182. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS-Levying Taxes. -A county board of supervisors has authority to levy a tax for county public school purposes on all property within their jurisdiction; and hence Acts 1895-96, p. 290, exempting property in a certain town from school taxes is void.-Supervisors of Washington County v. Saltville Land Co., Va., 39 S. E. Rep. 704. 183. SCHOOL AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS-Taxation.-Ky. St. § 4458, providing that, when lines dividing districts divide the lands of any person, the tax shall be levied and paid to the district where the homestead may be situated, applies only to common school districts and not to free graded school districts.-Trustees of Paintsville Graded Free School Dist. v. Davis, Ky., 64 S. W. Rep. 438.

184. SHIPPING-Crowding Passengers.-A steamship company is responsible for damages to its passengers occasioned by crowding beyond the accommodations provided for them.-The Valencia, U. S. D. C., D. (Wash.), 110 Fed. Rep. 221.

185. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-Relief-Parties.-Where bill to enforce specific performances is filed by sev. eral persons, all of the complainant must be entitled to relief, or none will be granted.-Davis v. Williams, Ala., 30 South. Rep. 488.

186. STARE DECISES-Land.-Decisions acted on for many years, and upon the faith of which large bodies of land have been bought and sold, will not be overruled.-Nickels v. Commonwealth, Ky., 64 S. W. Rep.

448.

187. STATUTES-Construction.-Where the language of the statute is ambiguous, resort may be had to sur. rounding circumstances to determine its meaning.— Daniel v. Simms, W. Va., 39 S. E. Rep. 690.

188. STATUTES Construction. When words in a statute have acquired well understood meaning, it is presumed that they were used in that sense in a subsequent statute on the same subject.-Daniel v. Simms, W. Va., 39 8. E. Rep. 690.

189. STATUTE-Passage.-Where a statute does not appear from the journal of the houses to contain any provisions which the same did not contain in passing, and none were omitted, and all constitutional steps are shown to have been taken, it is valid.-Robertson v. State, Ala., 30 South. Rep. 494.

190. STREET RAILROADS.-It is not necessary for the charter of a street railway company to limit the number of tracks to be constructed on the streets, or, to designate their exact location.-Baker v. Selma St. & S. Ry. Co., Ala., 30 South. Rep. 464.

191. STREET RAILROADS-Public Conveniences.-On application to approve location of street railroad by municipal officers, the latter may consider the con. venience of the public, and whether a bridge which the railroad desires to cross is of sufficient strength.Appeal of Cherryfield & M. Electric R. Co., Me., 50 Atl. Rep. 27.

192. TAXATION-Injunction.-A mortgage trustee, in whose hands funds due non-resident bondholders are

sought to be attached to pay taxes on the mortgage and bonds, may enjoin the collection of the taxes.— Board of Councilmen of City of Frankfort v. Fidelity Trust & Safety-Vault Co., Ky., 64 S. W. Rep. 470.

193. TAXATION-Void Levy-Void Sale.- Where assessment of land for taxation is illegal, a sale for nonpayment of taxes is void.-State v. Tavenner, W. Va., 39 S. E. Rep. 649.

194. TRESPASS-Denial.-Where, in an action under Gen. St. 1888, § 1345, defendant denied cutting any trees a claim that he was misled is untenable.-Plumb v. Griffin, Conn., 50 Atl. Rep. 1.

195. TRIAL-Admission of Evidence.-The court has a wide discretion of the admission of evidence in rebuttal.-Spencer v. Society of Shakers, Ky., 64 S. W. Rep. 468.

196. TRIAL-Selection of Jurors.-One who has formed an opinion as to guilt of accused held not competent, unless he can state unequivocally that his opinion will not affect his judgment.-State v. Johnson, W. Va., 39 8. E. Rep. 665.

197. TROVER And ConversioN-Extent of Recovery.-In action for conversion of cotton subject to land. lord's lien, plaintiff cannot recover more than the amount of his demand existing at the time of the trial.-Karter v. Fields, Ala., 30 South. Rep. 504.

198. TRUSTS- Chargeable with Interest.-A trustee was not chargeable with interest where he paid out money as fast as it was collected and there were no credits of interest on sums paid out.-Doom v. Howard, Ky., 64 S. W. Rep. 469.

199. TRUSTS-Compensation of Trustee.-Where no extraordinary services were rendered by a trustee, he was not entitled to any compensation in excess of 5 per cent. commission.-Doom v. Howard, Ky., 64 8. W. Rep. 469.

200. TRUSTS-Suit for Beneficiaries.-Where executor in will is trustee for beneficiaries, and in breach of his trust executes a mortgage, beneficiaries cannot sue purchaser at foreclosure to enforce the trust without accounting for the proceeds.-Marx v. Clisby, Ala., 30 South. Rep. 517.

201. VENUE-Where Land is Situated.-Under Code, § 190(3), held error to refuse to remove to the county where the land was situated an action brought in the county of the defendant's residence to enforce the payment of a purchase money bond.-Connor v. Dillard, N. Car., 39 S. E. Rep. 641.

202. WATERS AND WATER COURSES Navigable Waters. It is fundamental law throughout the United States that all navigable waters are common highways, forever free to the use of all citizens of the United States, without any tax, imposts, or duty therefor.-Leverich v. City of Mobile, U. S. C. C. C., S. (Ala.), 110 Fed. Rep. 170.

203. WILLS-Conclusiveness of Probate.-A judgment probating a will devising land held binding, not only on the heirs, but as a proceeding in rem on all the world.-Davies v. Leete, Ky., 64 S. W. Rep. 441.

204. WITNESSES- Assignor of Judgment. The as signor of a judgment was not a competent witness for his assignee to establish the fact that the judgment had been assigned to him by a person since deceased.Hagins v. Arnett, Ky., 64 8. W. Rep. 436.

205. WITNESSES-Cross-Examination.-On cross-examination of prisoner as a witness, he can be ques tioned as to material matter for purposes of contra diction.-State v. Sheppard, W. Va., 39 S. W. Rep. 676. 206. WITNESSES- Impeachment. -A witness' char. acter for truth and veracity only can be impeached.State v. Means, Me., 50 Atl. Rep. 30.

207. WITNESSES - Impeachment - Felony. - Under Civ. Code Prac. § 597, which applies to criminal as well as civil cases, a conviction of felony may be shown to impeach a witness.-Wilson v. Common. wealth, Ky., 64 S. W. Rep. 457.

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., DECEMBER 13, 1901

The New York Law Journal in a recent issue favors us with an extended criticism of our position on the validity of legislation regulating the practice of medicine, which we indicated editorially in our issue of November 8th. In this particular editorial we endeavored to lay open the clear invasion of private right inherent in such legislation, especially when it presumes to bar from practice homœopaths, osteopaths, christian scientists, magnetic healers, or any other school of healing not recognized by the state or represented on the board of examination. We took this position, not because we believe in any of the "heretical systems," as our contemporary styles all systems of healing outside of the orthodox schools of medicine and surgery, but because the experience of history has taught it to be unwise for one generation to pass judgment on heresy, in either religion or science, that may spring up in its midst and does not concern any one but its immediate votaries; the reason being that very often the heretical views of one generation become the orthodox views of the next. The cry of "heresy" is the cry of the dark ages,-it never was the slogan of a progressive people. This unreasonable antipathy to new things and new systems has its petrified unanswerable object lesson in the history of the Chinese Empire. Our contemporary speaks of the science of medicine as founded on the "experimentation of centuries." Not more than ten or twelve centuries. The Chinese have a system based upon the experimentation of forty centuries, together with the total exclusion of "heretical systems" by imperial edict! It cannot be denied that the great freedom of thought and practice permitted and encouraged during the century which has just closed, has been the principal cause for the wonderful advancement of the civilized world in all the avenues of science and learning. Feeling the importance of the issue, the CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL has always lifted up its voice for the rights of the individual and against the encroachments of the state under the guise of the police power. In this

particular instance the courts, in comparatively recent cases, have recognized and sustained the position we have taken, holding that while the state may prescribe who is proficient enough to practice "medicine" they cannot say that one who does not rely at all upon medicine shall not minister to the sick. In other words, by constructional limitations, these statutes have been held to have no application to these so-called "unorthodox methods of treatment." Nelson v. State Board of Health (Ky. 1900), 57 S. W. Rep. 501; Evans v. State, 9 Ohio, S. & C. P. Dec. (Ohio 1899) 222; State v. Myloid (R. I.), 40 Atl. Rep. 15; State v. Liffring, 61 Ohio St. 39.

In another recent issue of The New York Law Journal, and on another question of state interference with individual rights, our contemporary, with apparent reluctance, takes up the gauntlet for the individual. The subject referred to is quite a timely one"Practical Restraints of the Evils of Ambulance Chasing." It seems that in the east the lawyer whose practice consists mainly in bringing suits against large corporations for personal injuries, is subjected, not only to a "certain amount of professional and social ostracism," but also of very hostile criticism which often regards his methods as criminal, and is continually suggesting some appropriate punishment for him. One ridicu. lous suggestion, according to our contemporary, was made in one of the newspapers of New York City recently-that the present rules of negligence should be revised, because modern inventions and the modern spirit of haste call for a less stringent measure of liability for common carriers! The suggestion is worthy of a Czar or a Son of Heaven! We wonder what the rights of the individual can be in the city of New York when such suggestions can be even tolerated. Does twentieth-century civilization demand that the individual must bow before the "modern spirit of haste," and that the lawyer who seeks out the man who has been crushed by it and tells him of his rights and, if indigent, offers his services for a contingent fee, must be publicly ostracised and indicted as a criminal? We do not wish to be understood by this as giving our sanction to the practice of "ambulance chasing,"-we certainly agree

that it is very unprofessional. But the seriousness of this offense is much mitigated when we consider that the great corporations themselves have made the practice almost necessary by rushing upon their unfortunate victims and endeavoring, by falsely stating their rights under the circumstances, to induce them to compromise their claims against the company for a mere pittance. We believe more odium attaches to the latter practice than to the former.

The whole trend of this discussion, however, is wrong, and lawyers and law journals are as much responsible for the state of public sentiment on this question as any other source of criticism. The public have been led to believe that an action for damages for negligence resulting in personal injury is an unfair and illegitimate scheme to make money; that there is no equity in it; and that any damages which plaintiff may obtain in such a case is punitive rather than compensatory. It is a pleasure to note, however, that the courts of the country have not encouraged this sentiment, but, with very few exceptions, have, in firmly sustaining verdicts obtained in such cases, asserted that damages for a broken limb, or a blinded eye, are just as legitimate as those for the loss of profits in a business transaction. Bringing

an action for damages, therefore, based on negligence, does not ostracize the lawyer. On the other hand, he performs the noblest function of the advocate, in defending the weak against the strong, and upholding the rights of the individual as superior to any and all rights of property and to any "modern spirit of haste" that would sacrifice human life for material gain.

NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS.

LARCENY BY KEEPING WHAT WAS INNOCENTLY GOT.-The distinction between the felo

ate the money was conceived, and that therefore the intent, appropriation, and receipt were simultaneous. But this kind of reasoning is very far from satisfactory. Some judges have also regarded a case of this kind as equivalent to the retention by the finder of lost property. But, if the possession of property is innocently obtained, the subsequent retention of it, with a purpose to deprive the true owner thereof, cannot be deemed larceny without doing violence to the ordinary definitions of that crime. In the case of retention of lost property by the finder the cases generally agree in holding that the taking must be with the criminal intent in order to constitute larceny; that, if the finder did not have any intent to withhold the property from the true owner at the time when he found it he is not guilty of larceny, even if he afterwards appropriates it to his own use. It is obvious, of course, that, if he does retain the property when he knows or could easily ascertain, who the owner is, it will be pretty difficult in most cases for him to prove that he did not have such intent when the property was first found, but this is merely a matter of proof, and, if the circumstances are such that he can show his innocent intent at the time of finding the property, he is not guilty of larceny.

A change of the common-law definition of larceny has been made by statute in so many instances that it is obviously necessary to take what has been said above with the understanding that it is no longer true in all the states. In New York, for instance, the statute defining this crime has been so broadened as to include almost every withholding of another's property with intent to deprive him of it. But wherever the commonlaw rule on the subject of larceny is in force it may be safely said that the unlawful retention of property innocently received will never constitute that crime.-Weekly Law Bulletin.

A PURCHASER'S LIEN FOR DEPOSIT.-The vendor's lien for unpaid purchase money is one of the most familiar instances of a charge arising by operation of law, but it is less usual to meet with a purchaser's lien such as was discussed in the recent case of Whitbread & Co. v. Watt, 49 W. R. 534 (1901), 1 Ch. 911. That a vendor of land, who has conveyed without receiving the purchase money or part of it, has a lien for the amount unpaid has been undisputed law ever since Lord Eldon's examination of the doctrine