« ПредишнаНапред »
same, will not permit it to enforce a forfeit action thus promoted by his act, such party becomes ure of a member's certificate as against the
particeps criminis, and cannot recover in a suit for the
money loaned or advanced under such circumstaces. beneficiary on account of a by-law subsequently passed or previously in force probib
McFIE, J.: Appellee brought suit in the court
below for the sum of $105, and interest at 6 per iting its members from engaging in a certain
centum, alleged to be due thereon. Jury being occupation, where the society had knowledge
waived, trial was had before the court, May 25, of the member having engaged in the pro 1900, and judgment was rendered for the plaintiff hibited occupation and collected dues and for the sum of $105 and costs. From this judgassessments from him, but took no action
ment an appeal, was taken to this court by the
defendant. The complaint is in the usual form, toward suspending him therefor, though the
and alleges money loaned to the defendant, and hy-laws provide that the engaging in such
the answer is general jissue. The court below occupation shall ipso facto cause a suspen made no findings of fact, so far as the record dission of membership.11
closes, but the judgment recites that tbe court (e.) In Respect to Suicide of Member.
found the issues for the plaintiff. The facts dis
| closed by the record wholly fail to sustain the The right of a mutual insurance society, re
judgment of the court below in this case. The served in the contract between it and its
plaintiff below, appellee in this case, seeks to remembers, to change the same, will not per cover from the defendant $105 and interest, upoo mit it to enforce a forfeiture of a member's the ground that he loaned the defendant that certificate as against the beneficiary on
amount to pay an existing indebtedness to other account of a rule or by-law adopted by a
parties, and while upon direct examination, he
testified to this effect, upon cross-examination he body known as its board of control, but not
admits that this was the amount found due him authorized by the contract to make a change
upon a settlement at the close of a nigbt's gamin it, declaring that the suicide of a member, bling at cards, in which plaintiff, defendant, and whether sane or insane, shall forfeit the right two others participated. He also admits that the of the beneficiary to recover on the certifi
money advanced by him was used in the game,
thus destroying his claim that the money was cate,-prior to the adoption of such by-law
used to pay a pre-existing indebtedness to third by the body of the society empowered to parties. These are admissions against interest, change the by-laws or contract, nor will which bind the appellee, so that his own testievery change in this respect by an author mony destroys his claim tbat the transaction was ized body be enforced by the courts. 12
a loan, and sustains the defense that it was a (f.) Generally.
gambling transaction, in violation of the statute, The denial of the right
and for which there could be no recovery. There of fraternal insurance orders and assessment
were only two additional witnesses who testified associations to change the contract existing in the cause, both of which testified that the between themselves and their members meets money was used in the game, and the money sued with greater favor in the courts than the up
for was the amount found due on settlement, at
the end of the game. The defendant denied that holding of it, especially where pecuniary
he borrowed the money, but admits that when he rights are involved.
and the plaintiff settled at the end of the game Indianapolis, Ind. ROBERT J. BRENNEN. the amount sued for was the balance due the 11 Supreme Tent Knights of Maccabees v. Volkert,
plaintiff. Upon these facts, it is idle to call the 25 Ind. App. 627, 57 N. E. Rep. 203; Hobbs v. Iowa transaction a loan, in a legal sense. It was nothMutual Benefit Assn., 82 lowa, 107, 47 N. W. Rep. ing more nor less than a gambling transaction, 983, 11 L. R. A. 299
in violation of the statute, and any implied con12 Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias v. Stein, 57
tract or obligation to pay was not a legal obligaMiss. 107, 21 Soutb. Rep. 559; Supreme Lodge
tion, enforceable in the courts of this territory. Knights of Pythias y. McLennan, 171 III. 417, 49 N.
To call this matter a loan is clearly a device to E. Rep. 417; Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias v. LaMalta, 95 Tenn. 167, 30 L. R. A. 838; Northwestern,
avoid the provisions of the statute concerning etc. Assn. v. Wanner, 24 III. App. 367; Knights
gambling, and the law will not tolerate subterTemplars, etc. Co. v. Jarman , 101 Fed. Rep. 688; Sov. fuges for this purpose. As was said in 14 Am. & ereign Camp v. Fraley (Tex.), 59 S. W. Rep. 879. Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.), p. 642: “This loaning
must not be a device of one of the parties to the LOAN FOR GAMBLING-RECOVERY. contract to enable the winner to sue the loser for APPLETON v. MAXWELL.
his own loses, for the law pierces disguises of
this sort, and will not allow the winner to recover Supreme Court of New Mexico, February 26, 1901. Where money is loaned or advanced with the
from the loser by subterfuge." understanding between the parties that it shall be
The first assignment of error is: “The court used in gambling, or where the party advancing the erred in holding that a gambling contract could money participates and shares in the gambling trans. I be enforced by law." The second is: "The court erred in rendering judgment in favor of the precedents, or whether we shall give full scope plaintiff, Appleton, and against the defendant, to the broad principle that contracts contrary to Maxwell." As to the law of this case there is little, good morals and sound public policy are invalid, if any, controversy between counsel for appellant and that, therefore, wagers and contracts of that and appellee.' At common law certain wagering character are not to be sustained. We have no contracts were held valid, and the early English hesitance in'adopting the latter course.” Nuprecedents sustained such contracts, with few merous other cases might be cited to the same efexceptions. Some of the American courts fol. fect, but it is not deemed advisable to multiply lowed the early English precedents, but while them here. In 1876 this court was called upon these early English precedents were in many to consider this subject in the case of Joseph v. instances followed, regret was expressed on the Miller, 1 N. M. 621. This was a suit to collect a part of some of the judges that they felt con note, the consideration of wbioh was a bet upon strained, out of respect for precedent, to sustain a horse race. The court, in an elaborate opinion such a doctrine. After the enactments of the by Associate Justice Bristol, sustained the lower statute of Car. II. and 9 Anne, the doctrine an court in holding that the wager was not a valid nounced by the English courts based upon these consideration for a contract, and, referring to statutes was entirely different from that an the case of Wilkinson v. Tousley, beld that the nounced in the early cases, and gaming, gam collection of the pote could not be enforced in bling, and wagering contracts were held void by the courts of this territory. “Being untrammeled these courts. Owing to the regret expressed by by precedents, this being the first adjudication of different courts tbat they felt constrained to sus the question in this territory, we do not hesitate tain tbe doctrine of the early English decisions to lay down the same rule as to wagering con. in deference to precedent, many years ago, and tracts here. Not only do we hold that wagering prior to the enactment of statutes by the different contracts are void on sound principles of law, as states, the courts began to repudiate the doctrine being opposed to public policy and good morals, of the common law as to gambling and wagering but we hold, also, that contracts of this kind are contracts; and upon examination it will be found void under the statute. Section 4 of chapter that the New England states, Pennsylvania, 36 (page 246), of the Complied Laws of New South Carolina, Massachusetts, Vermont, Minne Mexico, provides that 'all judgments, securities, sota, and other states, repudiated tbe common bonds, bills, notes, or conveyances, when the law doctrine. In the case of Amory v. Gilman, consideration is money or property won at gam2 Mass. 6, the court said: “It would seem a dis bling, or at any game or gambling device, shall · graceful occupation for the courts of any country be void,' etc. The word 'gambling' is a word of to sit in judgment between two gamblers, in or very general application, and is not restricted to der to determine which was the best calculator wagering upon the result of any particular game of chances, or which had the most cunning of the or games of chance. In the adjudicated cases on iwo." A leading case, and one which gives the the subject, we find that judges often have applied reason for the repudiation of the common-law this word indiscriminately to wagering of all rule more fully than the others, is the case of kinds. We are unable to discover any distinction, · Wilkinson v. Tonsley, 16 Minn. 299 (Gil. 263), 10 in general principles, between the various methAm. Rep. 139, in which case the authorities are ods that may be adopted for determining by chance collated and examined, which states the case as who is the winner and who is the loser of a bet, follows: “From the foregoing citations from the -whether it be by throwing dice, flipping a copstatutes which of late years have been enacted in per, turning a card, or running a horse race. In England against bets and wagers, as well as from either case, it is gambling. This is the popular common knowledge of the prevailing public sen understanding of the term 'gambling device,' and timent on this subject, we think the remark does not exclude any scheme, plan, or contrivfound in 2 Smith, Lead. Cas. (6th Am. Ed.) 343, ance for determining by chance which of the tbat the moral sense of the present day re parties has won and which has lost a valuable gards all gaming or wagering contracts as stake. That a horse race, when adopted for such ipconsistent with the interests of the community, a purpose, is a 'gambling device,' there can be no und at variance with the laws of morality,' is doubt." abundantly satisfied. * * * In determining, It will thus be seen that this court, as early as then, what is the law upon this subject here, we 1876, announced the doctrine that contracts origare free to lay down such rules as are most in ipating in gambling devices of all kinds were accordance with general principles, and with the contrary to public policy, and would not be enbest.considered and most wholesome views which forced by the courts. But the court in the same have been expressed by other tribunals. * * * case also declares that the same are void under In announcing a rule where none has been before the statute of this territory which was in force at announced, the question is whether we shall the time this decision was rendered. In addition blindly adopt a doctrine which is admitted to l to the provisions of the statute quoted by the bave been originally wrong, both in morals and court in the case of Josepb v. Miller, we find that in laws, and from which the oourts of England numerous provisions have been added to the would gladly escape were they not hampered by statute, all tending to destroy contracts or obli
gations tainted or in any way connected with Therefore the first proposition of counsel is not gambling devices. Section 3199 provides that in point. It is true, as stated in the second propany person who shall lose money or property at osition, that the mere knowledge of the lender any game at cards or any other gambling device that the money is to be used for gambling purmay recover the same back by an action at law. poses does not prevent a recovery, in the absence Not only may the person bimself recover money of special statute. This proposition is supported or property lost by him through gambling de by the very respectable authority, but it is not vices, but section 3201 provides that the wife, supported nor is it applicable to the facts in this children, executors, administrators, and creditors case, as we have arrived at the conclusion that of the person losing may also recover back money the money advanced to the appellant in this case or property lost at gambling. Section 3203 pro was not a loan, nor was it so understood at the vides that the assignment of any bond, bill, note, time. But where money is loaned or advanced judgment, conveyance, or other security shall not with the understanding and agreement between affect the defense of the person executing the the parties that it shall be used in gambling, or same. And there are numerous other provisions | where the party advancing, or even loaning, the of the statutes of this territory wbich show con money participates and shares in the gambling clusively that gambling devices are illegal, and transaction thus promoted by his act, he thereby that the courts will not aid the winner in the becomes a particeps criminis, and cannot recover enforcement of contracts, or in the recovery of for money loaned or advanced under sucb cirmoney or property won through gambling de cumstances. In the case of Oliphant v. Markvices or wagers, in violation of the statute. The ham, 79 Tex. 543, 15 S. W. Rep. 569, 23 Am. St. section of the statute construed by this court in Rep. 363, the court held that, while simple the case of Joseph v. Miller was enacted in 1857, knowledge of what the borrower was going to do and, although the section does not specifically with the money would not defeat the lender's mention horse racing, the court held that money right to recover, he could not recover if he had won in betting upon a horse race placed the taken any active part in the gambling contract, transaction in tbe category of gambling. The such as depositing the loan as margins, bringing case of Joseph v. Miller was not as strong as the the parties together, etc. In the case of Sondcase at bar, in this : that gambling, such as the heim y. Gilbert, 117 Ind. 71, 18 N. E. Rep. 687, 5 evidence shows in this case, is expressly within L. R. A. 432, 10 Am. St. Rep. 23, the court upon the terms of the statute. The statute of this ter this subject says: “In order to invalidate a note ritory just referred to is almost identical with the or other security in the hands of one who adstatute of Missouri, which was construed by the vanced money which the borrower intended to supreme court of that state in the case of Shrop and did employ in carrying on an illegal entersbire v. Glascock, 4 Mo. 536, 31 Am. Dec. 189. prise, it has been held that it was not enough to About the only material difference between these defeat recovery that the londer knew the borstatutes was the insertion of the word “gam rower's purpose. He must have been in some .bling" in two places by our statute in the sec way implicated as a confederate in tbe specific tion, instead of one, as in the Missouri statute, illegal design under contemplation. It must so that the statute of this territory is more forcible | have been a part of the contract, or there must in its terms than that of Missouri. Betting upon have been in some way such a combination of a horse race was not specifically mentioned in the intention between the lender and the borrower Missouri statute, but the court held it to be that the money furnished should be used in aid equally prohibited with other forms of gambling, of and to promote the unlawful enterprise, as by such as the cards, dice, etc., and that the terms that the former became particeps criminis." See, "other game or games" was sufficiently broad to also, Irwin v. Williar, 110 U. S. 499, 4 Sup. Ct. include borse racing, and was intended to pro Rep. 160, 28 L. Ed. 225; Embrey v. Jemison, 131 hibit all kinds and modes of gambling.
U. S. 336, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 776, 33 L. Ed. 172. In Counsel for appellee did not seriously question the case at bar the proof shows that the money the law as contended for by the counsel for ap advanced by the appellee was put up from time pellant, but insisted upon two propositions, to time during the progress of a gambling game, which, he contended, were supported by the in which he participated as one of the principals; facts: First, that money loaned to pay a loss al the testimony of all the witnesses being to the ready incurred at gambling can be recovered by effect that the money advanced was used during the lender in the absence of a special statute to the progress of the game. It will not do for the the contrary; and, second, that the mere knowl appellee in this case to say that he did not know edge of the lender that the money is to be used that this money was to be used for gambling purfor gambling purposes does not prevent him from poses, because he participated in the game, and recovering, in the absence of a special statute; in its use for that very purpose; and, wbile posand counsel refers the court to 14 Am. & Eng. sibly the simple knowledge that it was to be used Enc. Law (2d Ed.), pp. 640-642, and the cases for gambling purposes might not be sufficient to there cited. The facts do not sustain the first | defeat a recovery, the participation of the approposition of counsel for appellee, that this pellee in the unlawful purpose for which the money was loaned to pay a loss already incurred. | money was advanced, and to be used in his pres
ence, is quite sufficient to make bim particeps Mo. App. 45; Krake v. Alexander, 86 Va. 206; Waugh criminis in law, and as such be cannot recover. v. Beck, 114 Pa. St. 422; Jackson v. Bank, 125 Ind. Indeed, he participated in another way. It is
347; Longnecker v. Shilds, 1 Colo. App. 264, 28 Pac. reasonable to believe that the production of this
Rep. 659; Armstrong v. Bank, 133 U. S. 433, 10 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 450; Tyler v. Carlisle, 79 Me. 210,9 Atl. Rep. 806. money by the appellee, after the appellant's
Where, bowever, there is some understanding, over money was exbausted, had the effect of contin
and above mere knowledge, tbat the money to be uing and prompting the gambling being carried
loaned was to be used for gambling purposes, tbere on at the time, and the continued participation can be no recovery by the lender. Williamson v. of the appellant in the game; and in this way, Baley, 78 Mo. 636; Shaffner v. Pinchback, 30 III. App. also, wbile it may not be said that the appellee 355, afflrmed 133 Ul. 410; Tyler v. Carlisle, 79 Me. was instrumental in bringing the parties together
210; Cutler v. Welsh, 43 N. H. 497; Mordecai v. Daw. for the unlawful purpose of gambling, it is un
kins, 9 Rich. L. (S. Car.) 262; Carney v. Plimmer,
66 L. J. Q. B. 415; Long v. Jones, 69 Ill. App. 615; doubtedly true that his participation bad the ef
Levy v. Perkins, 7 Ky. (4 Bibb) 505; Alfriend v. fect of continuing the illegal transaction in which
Hughes, 67 Ky. (4 Busb) 40; Emerson v. Townsend, the parties were engaged at the time. The ap
73 Md. 224, 20 Atl. Rep. 984; Wbite v. Wilson, 100 Ky. pellant admits in his own testimony that he was 367: Machir v. Moore, 2 Gratt. (Va.) 258; Bates v. a winner to some extent during the game, the Watson, 33 Tenn. 376; Terrell v. Adams, 23 Miss. exact amount he does not state. Undoubtedly, 570; Raymond v. Leavitt, 46 Mich. 447. The line of however, the money won by him during the distinction between these authorities is sometimes progress of the game constituted at least part, if
very dimly discernible. A glance at the best con. not all, of the balance which he claimed to be
sidered cases will, however, serve to show that the
distinction is not altogether shadowy and is well dùe him from the appellant. Therefore the en
founded in principle. Thus, in Tyler v. Carlisle, 79 tire indebtedness claimed arose out of a gam
Me. 210, the court charged the jury that if the plaintbling transaction, in violation of the statutes of
iff loaned the money with an express understanding, this territory, and the courts will not lend aid to intention and purpose that it was to be used in & winner whose alleged claim arose out of a gambling, and it was so used, the debt so created gambling transaction in which the creditor par cannot be recovered; but otherwise if the plaintiff ticipated. From the views above expressed, it
had merely knowledge that the money was to be so follows that the assignments of error numbered
used. In the case of Waugh v. Beck, 114 Pa. St. 422, 1 and 2, above quoted in this opinion, were well
the plaintiff furnished money to the defendant, know
ingly and with the purpose of furthering a gambling assigned, and that the court below erred in ren
transaction but without any gain to himself. The dering judgment for appellee, and the judgment
court said: "Where a man lends money for the ex. of tbe court below will therefore be reversed, and
press purpose of enabling him to commit a specific judgment for appellant for costs.
unlawful act, and such act be afterward committed
by means of the aid so received, the lender is a par. NOTE. - Validity of Loans for Gambling Purposes. ticeps criminis.” The court, however, reversed the • Allgambling contracts are illegal and unenforceable decision of the trial court because of an instruction and all contracts tainted with this kind of illegality permitting the jury to find for the defendant on the are alike void and without effect. Whether con "mere knowledge" of plaintiff of the purpose for tracts for the loan of money to be used in gambling which the defendant wanted the money. The court or to pay a gambling debt already incurred come held that to invalidate a loan for a gambling transacwithin this latter designation is not always an easy tion, the lender must not only have krown the use matter to determine. And the authorities them intended, but must have been implicated as a con: selves are not a little confusing. It is very clear, federate though not necessarily for gain. So, also, in on the one hand, tbat the mere loaning of money Cannon v. Bryer, 3 B. & Ald. 254, it was held that which was intended to be used and was afterwards money lent and applied by the borrower for the ex. used for the purpose of gambling, but without any press purpose of settling losses on illegal stock.job, knowledge on the part of the lender, is not void for bing transactions, to which the lender was no party, illegality and the lender can recover his loan. This cannot be recovered back. The court said: “It being is too well established to require the citation of au unlawful for one man to pay, it cannot be lawful for thority. On the other hand, where money is loaned another to furnish him the means of paying." That on the distinct condition tbat it is to be used for was a case where the means were furnished with a gambling purposes and the lender sbares in the prof full knowledge of the object to which they were to be its of the scheme, such lender becomes particeps applied, and for the express purpose of accomplishcriminis to the transaction, and he cannot recover his ing that object. The case of Jackson v. Bank, 125 loan por demand an accounting. Shaffner v. Pinch: Ind. 347, is just on the other side of the line and back, 133 III. 410, 23 Am. St. Rep. 624. Between these serves well to make clear the distinction between the two extremes the law in any given case must depend two lines of authorities. In this case the plaintiff on the particular case. The whole question depends loaned the defendant a certain sum of money fully upon the knowledge of the lender and the extent knowing the purpose and intent of defendant to in. of his participation in the gambling transactions. vest it in gambling contracts, plaintiff being told by It is held by one line of authorities that a mere the defendant at the time said loan was made that knowledge on the part of the lender of the proposed he wanted the money for the express purpose of use of the money by the borrower does not impair making wagering contracts. The defendant used the the loan nor defeat recovery thereon. Corbin v. money for the purpose he intended, the plaintiff, Wachhorst, 73 Cal. 411; Oliphant v. Markbam, 79 knowing at the same time that the money was so used. Tex. 543; Plank v. Jackson, 128 Ind. 424; White v. The court held on demurrer to answer that the Yarbrough, 16 Ala. 109; Osgood v. Westphelling, 72' plaintiff could recover. The court said: "It is not
JETSAM AND FLOTSAM.
alleged and it does not appear that appellee had any interest in such gambling contracts, or that it took any part in the making of them, or that it in any way took part in furthering the deals, except to loan the money with the knowledge that he intended to use it in making illegal contracts generally.” In this case it will be observed that the loan was not for any ex. press or definite transaction but to be used generally for gambling in grain futures altogether at the option of the defendant, who was at liberty to change the mind and use it for any other purpose he chose. The plaintiff was not interested in wbat he did with the money. In the case of Raymondy. Leavitt, 46 Mich. 447, involved & loan for the express purpose of assisting in "running a corner" on wheat and by the terms of the contract the levder had a proportionate share in the profits. Such a loan was, of course, tainted with the illegality for which its proceeds were to be used, and no recovery could be had thereon. So, also, in the case of Shaffner v. Pinch back, plaintiff advanced money to defendant to be used by them as partners in the business of betting on horse races. It was held he could not recover the money so advanced, being in pari delicto with the defendant. The following cases are very similar to the principal case in being loans made for the purpose of gambling at cards while the game is going on. Thus, in Williamson v. Baley, 78 Mo. 636, A loaned Bone hundred and fifty dollars' worth of poker chips to be used in a game then going on. It was held that A could not recover the face value in money of the chips loaned. But a loan at a place of gambling is not necessarily a loan for the purpose of gambling. Roberts v. Blair, 11 Colo. 64. In the recent case of Schoenberg v. Aldler, 105 Wis. 645, 81 N. W. Rep. 1055, defendant lost at poker and requested plaintiff, who was present at the games, to pay his losses, which he did. An action was brought to recover the amount so advanced. Held, that the agreement sued on was void and that plaintiff was not entitled to recover. So, also, in the recent case of White y. Wilson's Administrator, 100 Ky. 367, it was held that one who is a member of a club at which gaming is indulged in, and at which there is a "take out" to pay expenses of the club, and for meals, drinks, and cigars of the members and guests, has such an interest in the game as will prevent his recovering money loaned to one to pay losses, although he was not actually engaged in the games in which the losses were sustained. The clearest statement of the law is probably that of Peters, C. J., in the case of Tyler v. Carlisle, 79 Me. 210, as follows: “It does not follow that a lender bas a guilty purpose merely because he knows or believes that the borrower bas. There may be a visible line between the motives of the two. If it were not so, men would have great responsibilties for the motives and acts of others. A person may loan money to his friend,-to the man, and not to his purpose. He may at the same tine disapprove this purpose. He may not be willing to deny his friend, however much dis. approving bis acts. In order to find the lender in fault, he must himself have an intention that the money shall be illegally used. There must be a com: bination of intention between lender and borrower,a union of purposes. The lender must in the same manner be a confederate or participator in the borrower's act, be bimself implicated in it. He must loan bis money for the express purpose of promoting the illegal design of the borrower; not intend merely to serve or accommodate the man."
THE LAW OF CHINA. In an address given some time ago before the New York State Bar Association, Mr. Wu Ting fang, Chi. nese Minister to the United States, gave the following succinct statement of Chinese law.
"The law of China may be treated under three heads--common law, statute law and case law. By common law I mean that which consists of those principles and rules sanctioned by usage and custom from time immemorial. Another source of common law is to be found in the wise maxims and injunctions of ancient emperors scattered through the classics. Some of these are forty centuries old, and are still scrupulously observed. In the trial of cases for murder and other serious crimes Cbinese judges are par. ticularly careful and cautious, If tbere is any point can be stretched in favor of the accused they will give him the benefit of it. The consequence of wrongly convicting an innocent person is most serious. Sup. pose a person were convicted and sentenced to death for the crime of murder, of which he was innocent, and an appeal to Pekin resulted in the reversal of the decision. All the officials who bad anything to do with the trial of the case, from the governor of the province down to the submagistrate of the district, would be degraded and subjected to the severest punishment.
"The statute law of China is the most important result of legislation. Its foundation was laid over twenty centuries ago, and since then successive dy. pasties have built upon it by addition, amendment. abrogation and amalgamation, as circumstances required. The standard work, which is now in use over the whole Empire of China, is called Ta Ching Luli generally known as the per al code. It contains not only the fundamental statute, but also the supplemental laws. It is arranged under seven headings, viz.: general, civil, fiscal, ritual, military, criminal and that relating to public works, and is subdivided into four hundred and thirty-six sections. It also contains a collection of important cases which have been decided by the proper authorities and approved by the emperor, with notes and comments illustrating the practice and tbeory of the law appended. The first edition was published in 1647, only three years after the accession of the present dynasty. A new edition is generally issued every five or ten years, with summary reports of important cases that de. serve notice.
"The law provides various degrees of punishment for a man or woman who marries through the legal period of mourning for a deceased parent, and for a widow who marries again within the legal period of mourping for her deceased husband, the period of mourning in each case being twenty-seven months. Whoever marries a wife or husband having a father, mother, grandfather or grandmother at the same time under confinement in prison for a capital offense shall be punished with eigbty blows. Nevertbeless, if any such person enters into tbe marriage state at such period by the expressed command of bis or her parent or grandparent in prison, no punishment shall ensue, provided the usual feast and entertainment is omitted; otherwise a punishment of sixty blows shall be still inflicted. The prohibition as to marriage be. tween persons on account of consanguinity and other relationship are more numerous and general than those in this country or in Europe. There is a provision against the marriage of priests. Il a Buddhist or Taoist priest sball marry he shall be punished with