gations tainted or in any way connected with gambling devices. Section 3199 provides that any person who shall lose money or property at any game at cards or any other gambling device may recover the same back by an action at law. Not only may the person himself recover money or property lost by him through gambling devices, but section 3201 provides that the wife, children, executors, administrators, and creditors of the person losing may also recover back money or property lost at gambling. Section 3203 provides that the assignment of any bond, bill, note, judgment, conveyance, or other security shall not affect the defense of the person executing the same. And there are numerous other provisions of the statutes of this territory which show conclusively that gambling devices are illegal, and that the courts will not aid the winner in the enforcement of contracts, or in the recovery of money or property won through gambling devices or wagers, in violation of the statute. The section of the statute construed by this court in the case of Joseph v. Miller was enacted in 1857, and, although the section does not specifically mention horse racing, the court held that money won in betting upon a horse race placed the transaction in the category of gambling. The case of Joseph v. Miller was not as strong as the case at bar, in this: that gambling, such as the evidence shows in this case, is expressly within the terms of the statute. The statute of this territory just referred to is almost identical with the statute of Missouri, which was construed by the supreme court of that state in the case of Shropshire v. Glascock, 4 Mo. 536, 31 Am. Dec. 189. About the only material difference between these statutes was the insertion of the word "gambling" in two places by our statute in the section, instead of one, as in the Missouri statute, so that the statute of this territory is more forcible in its terms than that of Missouri. Betting upon a horse race was not specifically mentioned in the Missouri statute, but the court held it to be equally prohibited with other forms of gambling, such as the cards, dice, etc., and that the terms "other game or games" was sufficiently broad to include horse racing, and was intended to prohibit all kinds and modes of gambling. Counsel for appellee did not seriously question the law as contended for by the counsel for appellant, but insisted upon two propositions, which, he contended, were supported by the facts: First, that money loaned to pay a loss already incurred at gambling can be recovered by the lender in the absence of a special statute to the contrary; and, second, that the mere knowledge of the lender that the money is to be used for gambling purposes does not prevent him from recovering, in the absence of a special statute; Therefore the first proposition of counsel is not in point. It is true, as stated in the second proposition, that the mere knowledge of the lender that the money is to be used for gambling purposes does not prevent a recovery, in the absence of special statute. This proposition is supported by the very respectable authority, but it is not supported nor is it applicable to the facts in this case, as we have arrived at the conclusion that the money advanced to the appellant in this case was not a loan, nor was it so understood at the time. But where money is loaned or advanced with the understanding and agreement between the parties that it shall be used in gambling, or where the party advancing, or even loaning, the money participates and shares in the gambling transaction thus promoted by his act, he thereby becomes a particeps criminis, and cannot recover for money loaned or advanced under such circumstances. In the case of Oliphant v. Markham, 79 Tex. 543, 15 S. W. Rep. 569, 23 Am. St. Rep. 363, the court held that, while simple knowledge of what the borrower was going to do with the money would not defeat the lender's right to recover, he could not recover if he had taken any active part in the gambling contract. such as depositing the loan as margins, bringing the parties together, etc. In the case of Sondheim v. Gilbert, 117 Ind. 71, 18 N. E. Rep. 687, 5 L. R. A. 432, 10 Am. St. Rep. 23, the court upon this subject says: "In order to invalidate a note or other security in the hands of one who advanced money which the borrower intended to and did employ in carrying on an illegal enterprise, it has been held that it was not enough to defeat recovery that the londer knew the borrower's purpose. He must have been in some way implicated as a confederate in the specific illegal design under contemplation. It must have been a part of the contract, or there must have been in some way such a combination of intention between the lender and the borrower that the money furnished should be used in aid of and to promote the unlawful enterprise, as by that the former became particeps criminis." See, also, Irwin v. Williar, 110 U. S. 499, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 160, 28 L. Ed. 225; Embrey v. Jemison, 131 U. S. 336, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 776, 33 L. Ed. 172. In the case at bar the proof shows that the money advanced by the appellee was put up from time to time during the progress of a gambling game, in which he participated as one of the principals: the testimony of all the witnesses being to the effect that the money advanced was used during the progress of the game. It will not do for the appellee in this case to say that he did not know that this money was to be used for gambling purposes, because he participated in the game, and in its use for that very purpose; and, while pos ence, is quite sufficient to make him particeps criminis in law, and as such he cannot recover. Indeed, he participated in another way. It is reasonable to believe that the production of this money by the appellee, after the appellant's money was exhausted, had the effect of continuing and prompting the gambling being carried on at the time, and the continued participation of the appellant in the game; and in this way, also, while it may not be said that the appellee was instrumental in bringing the parties together for the unlawful purpose of gambling, it is undoubtedly true that his participation had the effect of continuing the illegal transaction in which the parties were engaged at the time. The appellant admits in his own testimony that he was a winner to some extent during the game, the exact amount he does not state. Undoubtedly, however, the money won by him during the progress of the game constituted at least part, if not all, of the balance which he claimed to be due him from the appellant. Therefore the entire indebtedness claimed arose out of a gambling transaction, in violation of the statutes of this territory, and the courts will not lend aid to a winner whose alleged claim arose out of a gambling transaction in which the creditor participated. From the views above expressed, it follows that the assignments of error numbered 1 and 2, above quoted in this opinion, were well assigned, and that the court below erred in rendering judgment for appellee, and the judgment of the court below will therefore be reversed, and judgment for appellant for costs. NOTE. -Validity of Loans for Gambling Purposes. All gambling contracts are illegal and unenforceable and all contracts tainted with this kind of illegality are alike void and without effect. Whether contracts for the loan of money to be used in gambling or to pay a gambling debt already incurred come within this latter designation is not always an easy matter to determine. And the authorities them. selves are not a little confusing. It is very clear, on the one hand, that the mere loaning of money which was intended to be used and was afterwards used for the purpose of gambling, but without any knowledge on the part of the lender, is not void for illegality and the lender can recover his loan. This is too well established to require the citation of authority. On the other hand, where money is loaned on the distinct condition that it is to be used for gambling purposes and the lender shares in the profits of the scheme, such lender becomes particeps criminis to the transaction, and he cannot recover his loan nor demand an accounting. Shaffner v. Pinchback, 133 Ill. 410, 23 Am. St. Rep. 624. Between these two extremes the law in any given case must depend on the particular case. The whole question depends upon the knowledge of the lender and the extent of his participation in the gambling transactions. It is held by one line of authorities that a mere knowledge on the part of the lender of the proposed use of the money by the borrower does not impair the loan nor defeat recovery thereon. Corbin v. Wachhorst, 73 Cal. 411; Oliphant v. Markham, 79 Tex. 543; Plank v. Jackson, 128 Ind. 424; White v. Yarbrough, 16 Ala. 109; Osgood v. Westphelling, 72 Mo. App. 45; Krake v. Alexander, 86 Va. 206; Waugh v. Beck, 114 Pa. St. 422; Jackson v. Bank, 125 Ind. 347; Longnecker v. Shilds, 1 Colo. App. 264, 28 Pac. Rep. 659; Armstrong v. Bank, 133 U. S. 433, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 450; Tyler v. Carlisle, 79 Me. 210, 9 Atl. Rep. 306. Where, however, there is some understanding, over and above mere knowledge, that the money to be loaned was to be used for gambling purposes, there can be no recovery by the lender. Williamson v. Baley, 78 Mo. 636; Shaffner v. Pinchback, 30 Ill. App. 355, affirmed 133 Ill. 410; Tyler v. Carlisle, 79 Me. 210; Cutler v. Welsh, 43 N. H. 497; Mordecai v. Daw. kins, 9 Rich. L. (S. Car.) 262; Carney v. Plimmer, 66 L. J. Q. B. 415; Long v. Jones, 69 Ill. App. 615; Levy v. Perkins, 7 Ky. (4 Bibb) 505; Alfriend v. Hughes, 67 Ky. (4 Bush) 40; Emerson v. Townsend, 73 Md. 224, 20 Atl. Rep. 984; White v. Wilson, 100 Ky. 367: Machir v. Moore, 2 Gratt. (Va.) 258; Bates v. Watson, 33 Tenn. 376; Terrell v. Adams, 23 Miss. 570; Raymond v. Leavitt, 46 Mich. 447. The line of distinction between these authorities is sometimes very dimly discernible. A glance at the best considered cases will, however, serve to show that the distinction is not altogether shadowy and is well founded in principle. Thus, in Tyler v. Carlisle, 79 Me. 210, the court charged the jury that if the plaintiff loaned the money with an express understanding, intention and purpose that it was to be used in gambling, and it was so used, the debt so created cannot be recovered; but otherwise if the plaintiff had merely knowledge that the money was to be so used. In the case of Waugh v. Beck, 114 Pa. St. 422, the plaintiff furnished money to the defendant, knowingly and with the purpose of furthering a gambling transaction but without any gain to himself. The court said: "Where a man lends money for the express purpose of enabling him to commit a specific unlawful act, and such act be afterward committed by means of the aid so received, the lender is a particeps criminis." The court, however, reversed the decision of the trial court because of an instruction permitting the jury to find for the defendant on the "mere knowledge" of plaintiff of the purpose for which the defendant wanted the money. The court held that to invalidate a loan for a gambling transac tion, the lender must not only have krown the use intended, but must have been implicated as a confederate though not necessarily for gain. So, also, in Cannon v. Bryer, 3 B. & Ald. 254, it was held that money lent and applied by the borrower for the express purpose of settling losses on illegal stock-jobbing transactions, to which the lender was no party, cannot be recovered back. The court said: "It being unlawful for one man to pay, it cannot be lawful for another to furnish him the means of paying." That was a case where the means were furnished with a full knowledge of the object to which they were to be applied, and for the express purpose of accomplishing that object. The case of Jackson v. Bank, 125 Ind. 347, is just on the other side of the line and serves well to make clear the distinction between the two lines of authorities. In this case the plaintiff loaned the defendant a certain sum of money fully knowing the purpose and intent of defendant to invest it in gambling contracts, plaintiff being told by the defendant at the time said loan was made that he wanted the money for the express purpose of making wagering contracts. The defendant used the money for the purpose he intended, the plaintiff, knowing at the same time that the money was so used. The court held on demurrer to answer that the plaintiff could recover. The court said: "It is not alleged and it does not appear that appellee had any interest in such gambling contracts, or that it took any part in the making of them, or that it in any way took part in furthering the deals, except to loan the money with the knowledge that he intended to use it in making illegal contracts generally." In this case it will be observed that the loan was not for any express or definite transaction but to be used generally for gambling in grain futures altogether at the option of the defendant, who was at liberty to change the mind and use it for any other purpose he chose. The plaintiff was not interested in what he did with the money. In the case of Raymondv. Leavitt, 46 Mich. 447. involved a loan for the express purpose of assisting in "running a corner" on wheat and by the terms of the contract the lender had a proportionate share in the profits. Such a loan was, of course, tainted with the illegality for which its proceeds were to be used, and no recovery could be had thereon. So, also, in the case of Shaffner v. Pinchback, plaintiff advanced money to defendant to be used by them as partners in the business of betting on horse races. It was held he could not recover the money so advanced, being in pari delicto with the defendant. The following cases are very similar to the principal case in being loans made for the purpose of gambling at cards while the game is going on. Thus, in Williamson v. Baley, 78 Mo. 636, A loaned B one hundred and fifty dollars' worth of poker chips to be used in a game then going on. It was held that A could not recover the face value in money of the chips loaned. But a loan at a place of gambling is not necessarily a loan for the purpose of gambling. Roberts v. Blair, 11 Colo. 64. In the recent case of Schoenberg v. Aldler, 105 Wis. 645, 81 N. W. Rep. 1055, defendant lost at poker and requested plaintiff, who was present at the games, to pay his losses, which he did. An action was brought to recover the amount so advanced. Held, that the agreement sued on was void and that plaintiff was not entitled to recover. So, also, in the recent case of White v. Wilson's Administrator, 100 Ky. 367, it was held that one who is a member of a club at which gaming is indulged in, and at which there is a "take out" to pay expenses of the club, and for meals, drinks, and cigars of the members and guests, has such an interest in the game as will prevent his recovering money loaned to one to pay losses, although he was not actually engaged in the games in which the losses were sustained. The clearest statement of the law is probably that of Peters, C. J., in the case of Tyler v. Carlisle, 79 Me. 210, as follows: "It does not follow that a lender bas a guilty purpose merely because he knows or believes that the borrower has. There may be a visible line between the motives of the two. If it were not so, men would have great responsibilties for the motives and acts of others. A person may loan money to his friend, to the man, and not to his purpose. He may at the same time disapprove this purpose. He may not be willing to deny his friend, however much disapproving his acts. In order to find the lender in fault, he must himself have an intention that the money shall be illegally used. There must be a combination of intention between lender and borrower,a union of purposes. The lender must in the same manner be a confederate or participator in the borrower's act, be bimself implicated in it. He must loan bis money for the express purpose of promoting the illegal design of the borrower; not intend merely to serve or accommodate the man. "" JETSAM AND FLOTSAM. THE LAW OF CHINA. In an address given some time ago before the New York State Bar Association, Mr. Wu Ting fang, Chinese Minister to the United States, gave the following succinct statement of Chinese law. "The law of China may be treated under three heads-common law, statute law and case law. By common law I mean that which consists of those principles and rules sanctioned by usage and custom from time immemorial. Another source of common law is to be found in the wise maxims and injunctions of ancient emperors scattered through the classics. Some of these are forty centuries old, and are still scrupulously observed. In the trial of cases for murder and other serious crimes Chinese judges are particularly careful and cautious. If there is any point can be stretched in favor of the accused they will give him the benefit of it. The consequence of wrongly convicting an innocent person is most serious. Suppose a person were convicted and sentenced to death for the crime of murder, of which he was innocent, and an appeal to Pekin resulted in the reversal of the decision. All the officials who had anything to do with the trial of the case, from the governor of the province down to the submagistrate of the district, would be degraded and subjected to the severest punishment. "The statute law of China is the most important result of legislation. Its foundation was laid over twenty centuries ago, and since then successive dy. nasties have built upon it by addition, amendment, abrogation and amalgamation, as circumstances required. The standard work, which is now in use over the whole Empire of China, is called Ta Ching Luli generally known as the penal code. It contains not only the fundamental statute, but also the supplemental laws. It is arranged under seven headings, viz.: general, civil, fiscal, ritual, military, criminal and that relating to public works, and is subdivided into four hundred and thirty-six sections. It also contains a collection of important cases which have been decided by the proper authorities and approved by the emperor, with notes and comments illustrating the practice and theory of the law appended. The first edition was published in 1647, only three years after the accession of the present dynasty. A new edition is generally issued every five or ten years, with summary reports of important cases that de serve notice. "The law provides various degrees of punishment for a man or woman who marries through the legal period of mourning for a deceased parent, and for a widow who marries again within the legal period of mourning for her deceased husband, the period of mourning in each case being twenty-seven months. Whoever marries a wife or husband having a father, mother, grandfather or grandmother at the same time under confinement in prison for a capital offense shall be punished with eighty blows. Nevertheless, if any such person enters into the marriage state at such period by the expressed command of his or her parent or grandparent in prison, no punishment shall ensue, provided the usual feast and entertainment is omitted; otherwise a punishment of sixty blows shall be still inflicted. The prohibition as to marriage be tween persons on account of consanguinity and other relationship are more numerous and general than those in this country or in Europe. There is a provision against the marriage of priests. If a Buddhist or Taoist priest shall marry he shall be punished with eighty blows and be expelled from the order to which he belongs, and the marriage shall be null and void. The law sanctioning divorce gives seven justifying causes, namely: Barrenness, lasciviousness, disobe dience to her husband's parents, talkativeness, thiev ery, jealousy and leprosy. This is, however, almost annulled by the other part of the same section, which declares that, although one of the seven above causes of divorce can be chargeable on the wife, yet if any of the three reasons against a divorce shall exist, namely: (1) the wife having mourned three years for her husband's parents; (2) the family having become rich after having been poor at the time of the mar riage, and (3) the wife having no parents living to receive her back again, then none of the seven aforementioned causes will justify a divorce, and if the husband should put away his wife upon such grounds he shall be punished and obliged to take her back. "The sixth and seventh books deal with usury, license of commercfal agents and false weights and measures. It may be noted that the legal rate of interest is three per cent. per mensem, but in practice it is considerably lower. There is a provision against monopolist and unfair traders which is worth quoting. Section 154 reads: 'When the parties to a purchase or sale of goods do not amicably agree respecting the terms, and one of them, by monopolizing or otherwise using undue influence in the market, obliges the other to allow him an exorbitant profit, or if artful speculators in trade, by entering into a private understanding with the commercial agent and by employing other unwarrantable con trivances, raise the price of their own goods, although of low value, in all such cases the offending parties shall be severally punished with eighty blows, each for his own misconduct. When a trader, observing the nature of the commercial business carried on by another, contrives to suit or manage the disposal or appreciation of his own goods in such manner as to derange and excite distrust against the proceedings of the other, and thereby draws unfairly a greater proportion of profit to himself than usual, he shall be punished with forty blows.' "There are no trusts in China yet, but if there should be such I fear the local authorities will put them down under the law. "The system of procedure for the administration of the law is peculiar and essentially different in many respect from that which prevails in America and Europe. In the first place, we have no such thing as a jury. The judge or magistrate, as the case may be, tries the case alone, and has to decide it according to law and equity. No sentence can be passed without the con fession of the accused. Hence, the cruel practice of extorting confession by torture, I am sorry to say, is often resorted to. But the consequence of convict ing the wrong person is very serious. In some cases the magistrate has to suffer the same punishment that has been inflicted upon the innocent victim. This has the effect of causing all magistrates and judges to be extremely careful in the investigation of cases. "The laws and practices of China has now been enforced for many centuries. Generations of Chinese have lived, moved, worked and died under them. The Penal Code has now been in force for more than two hundred and fifty years. Many of its provisions are taken from the codes of preceding dynasties and nations. There were no ports open to foreign trade, where hundreds and thousands of foreigners could reside and transact business with the natives, as they are now. There were no treaties with other nations then in force, conferring extra territorial rights and special privileges upon foreigners in the country as they are now. What is needed, in my humble opinion, is to recast and revise the code to suit the requirements and circumstances of the present day. Many of its sections should be retained, while many others, which are not in keeping with the present state of society, should be considerably modified, if not entirely changed. I may say that efforts have been made in this direction on my part, but so far without success. In view of the many thousands of foreigners residing in various parts of China and the vast trade that is being daily carried on by millions of natives with them, it seems to me that there is an urgent necessity for the compilation of a commercial code giving the laws relating to patents, copyrights, corporations, shipping and other kindred subjects, and also a code of procedure for the trial of mixed cases, both criminal and civil. The want of such codes is severely felt. It seems to me that now is ust the time for such a useful work. The power hich, through its advice and influence, is instrumental in bringing about so beneficient an undertaking as this will confer a great boon on foreigners and natives alike in China. "We have just passed out of an old century and entered the threshold of a new one. The nineteenth century has furnished many examples of noble achievements of men and nations for our admiration and emulation-such as the abolition of slavery, the emancipation of serfs, the extention of intercourse and commerce between peoples, the mitigation of the horrors of war, and the gradual recognition of the principal of arbitration in the settlement of inter national disputes. Now we are at the beginning of the twentieth century. He would be a bold man, indeed, who should predict that during the century the millennium would surely come. But I think it is not too sanguine to hope that the opening of the new century will be signalized by the crection of a grand monument of humane legislation, which, while providing just punishments for evildoers, shall secure equal rights and liberty to both foreigners and natives in China without distinction or discrimination. In this noble work I trust this great nation, with the advice and assistance of the eminent lawyers of the Empire State, will take a prominent part. Happy will be the day when uniform principles of law, based on justice and equity shall prevail throughout the world." BOOK REVIEWS. AMERICAN DIGEST, Volume A of the American Digest of 1901 is just from the press. As a digest it covers all the current decisions of all the American courts, as reported in the National Reporter System, the official reports, and elsewhere, together with leading English and Canadian cases, from October 1, 1900, to March 31, 1901, prepared and edited by the editorial staff of the American Digest System. The promptness with which this digest is issued is not the least of the many excellencies of this incomparable system of ican law and is rapidly displacing all other digests, local or general. Published in one volume by the West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn. BOOKS RECEIVED. A Brief on the Modes of Proving the Facts Most Frequently in Issue or Collaterally in Question, on the Trial of Civil or Criminal Cases. By Austin Abbott. Second and Enlarged Edition, by the Publisher's Editorial Staff. The Lawyers' Cooperative Publishing Company, Rochester, N. Y., 1901. Sheep, pp. 653. Price, $1.50. Review will follow. WEEKLY DIGEST. Weekly Digest of ALL the Current Opinions of ALL the State and Territorial Courts of Last Resort, and of all the Federal Courts ALABAMA, 1, 7, 21, 41, 49, 50, 56, 57, 58, 61, 84, 88, 89, 90, 91, 95, 97, 108, 111, 122, 137, 139, 150, 181. CALIFORNIA, 39, 45, 47, 49, 53, 55, 74, 75, 83, 85, 105, 106, 129, 134, 153, 165 COLORADO.. IDAHO.... ............................6, 12, 22, 25, 35, 67, 109, 110, 152, 162 ..26, 102, 146 ILLINOIS, 2, 8, 10, 32, 33, 42, 44, 71, 72, 73, 76, 78, 93, 95, 98, 107, 119 121, 127, 128, 131, 141, 158, 164, 174, 183 KENTUCKY MASSACHUSETTS. .... ......86, 87, 156, 172 .......175, 185, 186, 187 ...... ....... .43, 112, 115, 142, 155 ......169, 170 .......182 .....94, 104 ......148, 154 ...51 TEXAS............ .......66, 143, 180, 190 VIRGINIA............30, 31, 62, 103, 114, 166, 167, 178, 179, 184 WASHINGTON ...........11, 23, 21, 63, 133, 147, 149, 151, 188 WEST VIRGINIA......... ...46, 64, 82, 100, 101, 138, 145, 161, 163 WISCONSIN, 4, 8, 9, 13, 17, 18, 19, 20, 34, 36, 52, 63, 69, 70, 79, 81, 99, 113, 116, 117, 119, 132, 144 1. ABATEMENT AND REVIVAL-Pendency of Former Suit.-Pendency of a former suit held a good cause for abatement of a bill in equity between the same parties upon the same cause of action.-Orman v. Lane, Ala., 30 South. Rep. 441. Taxes. -An 2. ACTION-Against State-Refunding action against a state insurance superintendent to compel the refunding of taxes to, and enjoining the further collection of the taxes from, foreign insurance companies, is not an action against the state, and can be maintained.-German Aliance Ins. Co. v. Van Cleave, Ill., 61 N. E. Rep. 94. 3. APPEAL AND ERROR-Amount Involved.-No appeal lies from order of appellate court sustaining a mechanic's lien involving less than $1,000, in the absence of a certificate of importance.-Davis v. Upham, Ill., 61 N. E. Rep. 76. 4. APPEAL AND ERROR- Former Decision Conclusive on Second Trial.-A decision by the supreme court that the damages recovered for a personal injury are excessive is conclusive on a subsequent trial of the cause.-Collins v. City of Janesville, Wis., 87 N. W. Rep. 241. 5. APPEAL AND ERROR-Misconduct of Counsel.— Where there is no record of misconduct of counsel in argument, save statement of court on denying new trial, statement must be accepte i as true.-Pinkerton Bros. v. Bromley, Mich., 87 N. W. Rep. 200. 6. APPEAL AND ERROR-Objection at Trial.-Where defendant fails to object to matter alleged by plaintiff in the trial court, an objection on appeal is not tenable.- Wilson v. Union Distilling Co., Colo., 66 Pac. Rep. 170. 7. APPEAL AND ERROR-Original Papers.-Original papers, not copied in the transcript, cannot be looked to by the supreme court in reviewing a cause on appeal.-Black v. Pate, Ala., 30 South. Rep. 434. 8. APPEAL AND ERROR-Res Adjudicata.-Where the court decided, on an appeal from an order overruling a demurrer, that the complaint did not state a cause of action, the same was res adjudicata on second appeal.-Finney v. Guy, Wis., 87 N. W. Rep. 255. 9. APPEAL AND ERROR-Taxation of Costs.-In the absence of a bill of exceptions or objection to the costs taxed on the trial, the taxation thereof is not reviewable on appeal.-Lauterbach v. Netzo, Wis., 87 N. W. Rep. 229. 10. APPEAL AND ERROR-Vacation Orders.-An appeal does not lie from orders of circuit judges granting or refusing to dissolve injunctions in vacation.— Hawkins v. Burwell, Ill., 61 N. E. Rep. 68. 11. ASSIGNMENT-Judgment.-A judgment creditor, without the debtor's consent, cannot assign his interest in the judgment pending appeal, and, by reserving all rights arising out of the supersedeas bond, sue thereon.-Lewis v. Third St. & S. Ry. Co., Wash., 66 Pac. Rep. 150. 12. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-Compensation-Evidence.-Attorneys held to be competent witnesses, in an action against an attorney as to the reasonable charges for services.-Wilson v. Union Distilling Co., Colo., 66 Pac. Rep. 170. 13. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-Rights of Attorneys to Contract with Adversary.-Attorney and client may contract as to subject-matter o employment or with adversary of client, where a suit is pending between him and the client.-Vanasse v. Reid, Wis., 87 N. W. Rep. 192. 14. BANKRUPTCY-Composition.-Whether a proposed composition is for the interest of ereditors depends on whether they would thus receive more or less than would reasonably be expected from the administration of the estate. -Adler v. Jones, U. S. C. C. of App., Sixth Circuit, 109 Fed. Rep. 967. 15. BANKRUPTCY - Preference.-One who, during insolvency of debtor and within four months of bankruptcy, has had claims paid, has received a preference within Bankr. Act 1898, § 57, cl. “'g," and section 60, cl.“a."—In re Bashline, U. S. D. C., W. D. (Pa.), 109 Fed. Rep. 965. 16. BANKRUPTCY Referee's Jurisdiction. Under Bank. Act. § 39, par. 4, a referee cannot determine a question relating to confirmation of a composition, but may report the facts.-Adler v. Jones, U. S. C. C. of App., Sixth Circuit, 109 Fed. Rep. 967. 17. BANKRUPTCY-Term "Insolvency."-The term "'insolvency," under bankrupt and insolvent laws, means inability to pay debts in the regular course of business.-Marvin v. Anderson, Wis., 87 N. W. Rep. 226. 18. BANKS AND BANKING- Petition to Recover on Certificate of Deposit.-Where depositor in insolvent bank received certificate of deposit, petition by him for order requiring receiver of the bank to pay over the deposit held insufficient for not offering to surren der the certificate of deposit.-Hyland v. Roe, Wis., 87 N. W. Rep. 252. 19. BILLS AND NOTES-Innocent Purchaser. - Where payee of notes sells the same to innocent purchaser, and repurchases, he has no better rights against maker than he had in the first instance.-Andrews v. Robertson, Wis., 87 N. W. Rep. 190. 20. BRIDGES - Construction.-Rev. St. 1898, § 1319, does not authorize the county board to contract jointly with a town board for the construction of a |