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plied, which is untrue. And so will any vendor be held answerable for such injuries from vicious animals sold with warranty of gentle and docile nature.' In this case the warranty was against explosion,-the very thing shown to have happened. Upon this showing by appellant, uncontradicted, we think he would be entitled to recover for his personal injury, as this evidently was in contemplation of the parties, or, according to the natural or usual course of things, might result from a breach of the warranty that the machine would not explode. An explosion of a machine of this sort would usually and ordinarily be attended with damage other than to the machine itself, and might injure persons,-being near a dwelling, would probably do so,--and so it must be held that personal injury was contemplated as a probable result of an explosion, and that was what appellant was assured would not happen."

LIABILITY OF WAREHOUSEMAN FOR GOODS HELD IN CUSTODIA LEGIS UNDER WRIT OF REPLEVIN.-A most vexed question of law arising in actions of replevin is, whether chattels, the subject of replevin which are in possession of a bailee, are to be considered as in custodia legis so as to charge the latter with conversion if he returns tbe goods to the bailor during the progress of the suit. This question arose recently in the case of Mohr v. Langan, 63 S. W. Rep. 409, where the Supreme Court of Missouri held that where chattels were deposited with a regularly licensed warehouseman, and subsequently he was called as a witness as to the value of the chattels in a replevin suit for the chattels between the bailor and another, and thereafter, at the instance of the bailor, he delivered the goods to an auctioneer, who sold them during the pendency of the suit, and judgment was rendered against the bailor in the replevin suit, the warehouseman could not escape liability for the conversion on the ground that, being a regularly licensed warehouseman, he could not question tbe right of his bailor to de. mand a return of the goods, inasmuch as the circumstances were such as to put him on notice of the fact that his bailor might not have title. It was also held that it was proper to instruct that, if the warehouseman caused the goods to be hauled to the auction house, knowing they were to be sold, he was guilty of conversion, though he did not at that time know of the ownership of the goods by the successful defendant in replevin. There is an irreconcilable conflict of authority on this question. The court reviews the cases as follows:

“Of the cases which held that property taken under a writ of replevin remains in custodia legis, even wben the possession is delivered to the plaintiff in the suit, be being regarded only as a substitute for the sheriff. Lockwood v. Perry, 9 Metc. (Mass.) 440, McKinney V. Purcell, 28 Kan. 446, Hunt v. Robinson, 11 Cal. 262, and Hagan v. Lucas, 10 Pet. 400, 9 L. Ed. 470, are fair exponents. On the other hand, the cases

which hold that the property does not remain in custodia legis after it has been delivered to the plaintiff in the replevin suit, and that such plaintiff may sell it and pass a good title to a bona fide purchaser, being liable to the defendant in the replevin suit for the value of the property, if he ultimately loses his suit, are fairly illustrated by the cases of Gimble v. Ackley, 12 Iowa, 27, White v. Dolliver, 113 Mass. 400, Davies v. Gambert, 57 Iowa, 239, 10 N. W. Rep. 658, Smith v. McGregor, 10 Ohio St. 461, and Ilsley v. Stubbs, 5 Mass. 280; but in no case is the proposition more clearly stated or more ably maintained than in Coen v. Watkins, 62 Mo. App. 502. One of the reasons given for holding that the property is in custodia legis is that, if it can be levied upon by a third party, the plaintiff in replevin is disabled from returning it to tbe defendant in replevin, if the plaintiff fails in his suit, and hence would have to pay the defendant in replevin the assessed value of the property, and still would not have the property, for it would have been taken away from him by the third party under the second replevin, or by attachment or under execution, and in this way the same property might be utilized to discharge an indefinite number of debts of the same debtor." The court after reviewing the statutory provision on the subject in Missouri,, says: "These statutory provisions manifestly treat the property as in custodia legis pending the litigation, so far as the parties to the replevin suit are concerned, and exclude the right of the party in possession to sell the property during the pendency of the suit, and further preserve the right of the winning party to follow the property in the bands of any person who purchased it from the party in possession pending the litigation. But, while this is true, it does not follow that the property is in custodia legis as to third persons, so that it cannot be levied upon by any other kind of a judicial process. Of course, it cannot be seized under any other kind of judicial process by either party to the replevin suit or their grantees or privies. But the weight of authority, amply supported by logic and roason, is that it may be seized by a third person, under any appropriate judicial process, who claims hostile to both parties to the replevin suit. It is ably and strenuously argued, however, that defendant Langan is a regularly licensed warehouseman, and, as he received the goods from Mrs. Smith, he could not question her right to demand their return, nor set up a paramount title in any one else, and that no demand was made on him for the goods by Mrs. Mohr before this suit was begun, and hence he is not liable in this action for the conversion of the goods. The general rule of law is as contended for. Story, Bailm. $ 108; Edw. Bailm. $$ 54, 353; Daugherty y. Chapman, 29 Mo. App. 233; Pulliam v. Burlingame, 81 Mo. 111, 26 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (1st Ed.), pp. 720-723. But this general rule will not protect a bailee who, having notice of the rights of the real owner, yet aids and abets the bailor in wrongfully converting the goods. Nanson v. Jacob, 93 Mo. 331, 6 S. W. Rep. 246; Koch v. Branch, 44 Mo. 542; Williams v. Wall, 60 Mo. loc. cit. 321; Dusky v. Rudder, 80 Mo. 400. Having reached the conclusion that the property, as to Mrs. Smith and Mrs. Mohr, was in custodia legis, and that Mrs. Smith had no right to sell it, it follows that, as Langan knew of the replevin suit, he knew that Mrs. Smith had no power to sell it, and, as he aided her in doing so, he thereby became a party to the conversion, and his general exemption as a warehouseman is no protection to him, for he acted outside of bis duties as such warehouseman."


In the last edition of Lawson on Presumptive Evidence, in the chapter on “The Presumption of Continuance,” it is laid down “A presumption is not retrospective (Rule 37).The illustrative cases cited by the author support this proposition. In one, proof that a woman was married in 1860 was held not to be evidence that she was married in 1854. In another, proof that a person held the office of a justice of the peace on June 25, was held not to be evidence that he held the office on June 5.2 In another, proof that i person was insane in 1864 did not raise the presumption that he was insane in 1860.3

The rule as stated by the author in the first edition has been expressly approved in two recent cases. In Jarvis v. Vanderford* it is said: “It was not shown that Alexander Evans was clerk, or that Richard Evans was deputy clerk, of the court of pleas and quarter sessions in 1808. And although there was evidence tending to show that Alexander Evans was clerk, and Richard Evans was deputy clerk, in 1818, this did not create a presumption that they were such officers in 1808, 10 years before that time. Lawson, Pres. Ev. 190.” In Martin v. Curtist it is said: “It is now contended by the plaintiff that to show that this piece of land has long been used for a pasture would tend to show that it has always been used for that purpose, and, if

always used for that purpose, water is 80 essential to a pasture that it is probable that the 10 acres described in that deed of 1806 included a part of the brook. The words ‘bas long been used' are indefinite in respect to the time in the past from which it is claimed that this land has been used as a pasture, but it is not claimed that the offer is to be construed as showing such use at the time the deed was executed, in 1806. The existence of a tbipg permanent in its character, once established, is presumed to continue bereafter until the contrary is shown, but the use of land as a pasture is not of such a character. Again, 'a presumption is not retrospective.' Lawson, Pres. Ev. 190, Rule 37. Hence, no such inferences as those for which the plaintiff contends can legally be drawn from the evidence excluded.”

But on page 2396 the author says: “In maritime law a different rule seems to prevail. Thus a ship soon after leaving port becomes so leaky and disabled as to be un. able to proceed. There is no evidence that she encountered any great storm or peril of the seas. The presumption is that she was unseaworthy when she sailed.”

The admiralty rule seems to be meeting with favor in actions for personal injuries, and has been adopted in several very recent cases. Thus, in a case decided this year in Illinois, it is held that evidence of the condition of an appliance, both before, as well as after, an accident, is admissible to show its condition at the time of the accident.? In La Plante v. Warren Cotton Mills, 8 & personal injury case, to quote from the opinion of the court, by Holmes, J.: "A witness was allowed to testify that the ladder on which the plaintiff stood was of home manufacture, made of two pieces of wood with strips nailed across, and one leg longer than another. He did not see the ladder until nearly two years after the accident; and it was objected that the evidence was inadmissible without testimony expressly showing that there had been no change in the ladder.

1 Erskine v. Davis, 25 III. 251; Murdock v. State, 68 Ala. 667.

2 Bereli v. Lytle, 4 La. Ann. 567.
3 Taylor v. Creswell, 45 Md. 422.
21 S. E. Rep. 802 (N. Car.).
31 Atl, Rep. 296 (Vt.).

6 Lawson on Presumptive Evidence (2d Ed.).

7 St. Louis, P. & N. R. R. Co. v. Dorsey, 189 Ill. 251, 254 (1901). And see Todd v. Rowley, 8 Allen, 51; Cutter v. Hawlin, 147 Mass. 471, 18 N. E. Rep. 897 (1888); Neal v. City of Boston, 160 Mass. 518, 36 N. E. Rep. 308 (1894).

8 165 Mass. 487, 489, 43 N. E. Rep. 294 (1896).

It is said that presumptions do not run back

(d.) In Respect to Occupation of Member or In.

crease of Risk. wards. But that depends on the case. Todd

(e.) In Respect to Suicide of Member. v. Rowley, 8 Allen, 51.The court held (f.) Generally. that there was no error committed. In

I. When Change is Binding on Members and McCulloch v. Dobson,' in an action upon a

Beneficiaries.-(a.) In Respect to Decrease in covenant to keep in repair, contained in a

Disability Benefits.—The right to sick benefits lease of a silk mill and machinery, the court

in a mutualsociety, under a contract reserving say: “Evidence as to the condition of ma

the right to make change therein, is not a chinery in a mill at a particular date is com

vested right even after sickpess has taken petent, ordinarily, to show what its condi

place and the member is actually drawing tion was at a date shortly before. It is not

the benefits provided by the contract, and necessary that the witnesses should have

the society may, in the manner provided by seen the machinery at or before the time

its laws for changing the contract, reduce when its condition is to be ascertained. The

the amount recoverable by the member either fact that they did not examine or see the ma

to a stipulated sum as its total liability or by chinery at the very day, nor until some days

a flat reduction of the sum named as weekly or even months subsequent to the time in

disability benefits.? question, may affect the value, but not, ordinarily, the competency of the testi

(6.) In Respect to Decrease of Death Benemony." In Toland v. Paine Furniture Co., 10

Ifits.—The right of the beneficiary of a memthe court say: “One, McKenzie, testified

ber of a mutual society to a death benefit, as to the condition of the stairs and the mats

under a contract reserving the right to make on tbe day of the accident at 4 o'clock, and

changes therein, is not a vested right to the on the Monday morning following. He tes.

maximum sum promised to be paid, and the tified that the condition was the same on

society may, in the manner provided by its Monday as on Saturday. The question then,

laws for changing the contract, reduce the is, whether a defective condition of things

amount recoverable by the member's bene. found four hours after an accident, there be

ficiary before the same has become a claim ing no evidence of any change in the mean.

by the death of the member, either by changtime, as admissible to show the condition at

ing the classification of its members, which the time of the accident. We have no doubt

would result in a depletion of a certain class that the evidence was admissible.".

and a consequent inability of the society to John D. Lawson.

collect a sufficient amount by assessment Columbia, Mo.

upon the depleted class to make up the maxi

mum sum promised to be paid, or by a law 9 138 N. Y. 114, 124, 30 N. E. Rep. 641 (1892).

wbich simply makes the maximum sum pay10 61 N. E. Rep. 52 (1901) (Mags).

able less than the original maximum sum

promised.? LEGAL EFFECT OF CHANGE OR AT. (c.) In Respect to Increase in Assess

TEMPTED CHANGE IN CONTRACT ments.—The right of a mutual insurance soOF INSURANCE BETWEEN A MU ciety or association to increase the rate of TUAL INSURANCE SOCIETY OR assessments in force at the time the memberASSOCIATION AND A MEMBER. ship of a certificate-holder commenced bas

been upheld, where the society reserved the I. When Change is Binding on Members and Bene.

ficiaries. (a.) In Respect to Decrease in Disability Benefits. 1 Stobr v. San Francisco Musical Fund Soc., 82 Cal. (6.) In Respect to Decrease of Death Benefits. 557, 22 Pac. Rep. 1125; Poultney v. Bachman, 31 Hun, (c.) In Respect to Increase in Assessments.

49; Fugure v. Mutual Society St. Joseph, 46 Vt. 362; (d.) In Respect to Occupation of Member or In. Paine v. Societe St. Jean Baptiste, 172 Mass. 319, crease of Risk.

52 N. E. Rep. 502; Smith v. Galloway (1898), 1 Q. B. (e.) In Respect to Suicide of Member.

71. (f.) Generally.

2 Duer v. Supreme Council Order of Chosen II. When Change is not Binding on Members and Friends, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 493, 52 S. W. Rep. 109; Beneficiaries.

Brundin v. Supreme Council Order of Chosen (a.) In Respect to Decrease in Disability Benefits. Friends, 13 App. Div. 147, 42 N. Y. Supp. 1048; Su. (6.) In Respect to Decrease in Death Benefits. preme Lodge Knights of Pythias v. Knight, 117 Ind. (c.) In Respect to Increase of Assessments.

489, 20 N. E. Rep. 479.

right to change the contract of insurance between themselves and their members has existing between it and the member.3 been sustained in numerous adjudications.

(d.) In Respect to Occupation of Member or But the denial of the right meets with Increase of Risk.—The right of a mutual in. greater favor in the courts, and they have surance society or association to change the sought out and upheld constructions, estopcontract between it and a member, so as to pels and waivers which have prevented the enrelieve the society from liability for a loss forcement of changes, or attempted changes, that would have been covered by the original in such contracts detrimental to the right of compact, is enforceable, where the member recovery by the insured or beneficiary. The agreed in his application to observe and be tendency of the courts is clearly shown to governed by all the conditions of the charter be to prevent changes in contracts which and by-laws of the society as they then existed, affect the pecuniary rights of policy holders.? and any change that might thereafter bel II. When Change is not Binding on made in the same, and a copy of such by-law, Members and Beneficiaries.-(a.) In Rechanging the society's liability, was immedi. spect to Decrease of Disability Benefits. ately after its passage given to the member, The right to sick benefits in a mutual who made no objection, but continued his society, under a contract not shown to membership, and attended the annual meet havé contained a reservation of power in the ing of the society at which the by-law was society to change the same, becomes vested read; and an association or society, so re upon the sickness of the member entitling serving a right to change the contract, may bim to benefits under the original by-law, defeat a beneficiary's right to recover on a

6 Bogards v. Farmers' Mut. Ins. Co., 79 Mich. 440 certificate by changing its by-laws so that an 44 N. W. Rep. 856; Bollman v. Supreme Lodge occupation in which the member was engaged K. of H. (Tex.), 53 S. W. Rep. 722; Bowie v. Grand at the time of obtaining his membership is

Lodge, etc., 99 Cal. 392, 34 Pac. Rep. 103; Brower v.

Supreme Lodge N. R. A., 74 Mo. App. 490; Brundin prohibited by a subsequent by-law.4

v. Supreme Council 0. C. F., 42 N. Y. Supp. 1043, 13 (e.) In Respect to Suicide of Member. - App. Div. 147; Byrne v. Casey, 70 Tex. 247, 8 S. W. A mutual insurance society or association,

38; Daughtry v. Supreme Lodge K. of P., 48 La.

Ann. 1203; Duer v. Supreme Council, 0. C. F., 21 reserving the right to change the contract

Tex. Civ. App. 493, 52 S. W. Rep. 109; Ellerbe v. existing between it and a member, may de Faust, 119 Mo. 653, 25 S. W. Rep. 390; French v. feat the beneficiary's action to recover on the

Society Select Guardians, 51 N. Y. Supp. 675; Fugure

v. Mutual Society St. Joseph, 46 Vt. 362; Fullen wider certificate, where the member committed

v. Supreme Council Royal League, 180 III, 621, 54 N. suicide, though under the original contract E. Rep. 485; Hadley v. 0. F. B. A. (Mass.), 54 N. E. the suicide of a member was not made a

Rep. 345; Hass v. Mutual Relief Assn., 118 Cal. 6, 49

Pac. Rep. 1056; Haydel v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life cause for forfeiture.5

Assn., 98 Fed. Rep. 200; Hughes y. Wisconsin 0. F. (f.) Generally.—The right of fraternal M. L. I. Co., 98 Wis. 292; In re Supreme Legion benefit insurance orders and assessment as

Select Knights of Canada, 18 Can. L. T. 380; Loeffler

v. Modern Woodmen, 100 Wis. 79, 75 N, W. Rep. 1012; sociations to change the contract existing

McCabe v. Father Matthew T. A. Society, 24 Hun,

149; McKean v. Riddle, 181 Pa. 361, 37 Atl. Rep. 52; % Fullenwider v. Supreme Council Royal League, MacDowell v. Ackley, 93 Pa. 277; Masonic M B. A. v. 180 III. 621, 54 N. E. Rep. 485; Haydel v. Mutual Severson, 71 Conn. 719, 43 Atl. Rep. 192; Montgomery Reserve Fund Life Assn., 98 Fed. 200 (U. S. D. C., County F. M. I. Co. v. Milner, 90 Iowa, 685, 57 N. W. E. D. Mo.), affirmed 104 Fed. Rep. 718.

Rep. 612; Pain v. Societe St. Jean Baptiste, 172 Mass. 4 Bogards v. Farmers' Mutual Ins. Co., 79 Mich. 319, 52 N. E. Rep. 502; Poultney v. Bachman, 31 Hun, 440, 44 N. W. Rep. 856; Schmidt v. Supreme Tent of 49; Robinson v. Templar Lodge No. 17, I. 0. 0. F., the Knights of the Maccabees, 97 Wis. 528, 73 N. W. 117 Cal. 370, 49 Pac. Rep. 170; Schmidt v. Supreme Rep. 22; Ellerbe v. Faust, 119 Mo. 653, 25 L. R. A. Tent Knights of Maccabees, 97 Wis. 928, 73 N. W. 149; People v. Grand Lodge A. 0. U. W., 67 N. Y. Rep. 22; Smith v. Galloway (1898), 1 Q. B. 71; State Sapp. 330; Moerschbaecher v. Supreme Council v. Grand Lodge, 70 Mo. App. 456; Stohr Royal League (I11.), 59 N. E. Rep. 17.

v. San Francisco Musical Fund Society, 82 Cal. 5 Supreme Commandery K. of G. R. V. Ainsworth, 557, 22 Pac. Rep. 1125; Supreme Commandery K. of 71 Ala. 449; Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias v. G. R. V. Ainsworth, 71 Ala. 449; Supreme Lodge K. Kutscher, 179 Ill. 340, 53 N. E. Rep. 620; Supreme of P. v. Knight, 117 Ind. 489, 20 N. E. Rep. 479; Lodge Knight of Pythias v. Trebbe, 179 Ill. 348, 53 N. Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. Kutscher, 170 III. 340, 53 E. Rep. 730; Daughtry v. Knights of Pythias, 48 La. N. E. Rep. 620; Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. Trebbe, Ann. 1203, 20 S. W. Rep. 712; Supreme Lodge K. of P. 179 III. 348; West v. Grand Lodge, 14 Tex. Civ. App. v. La Malta, 96 Tenn. (11 Pick.) 167, 31 8. W. Rep.493, 471. 30 L. R. A. 838; Reynolds v. Supreme Council, etc., 7 The following cases, illustrate the construc. 18. Lanc. L. R. 125, 10 Pa. Dist. Rep. 528.

| tion the courts will adopt of an amended by.

and an amendment to the by-laws after his become a creditor of the society whose rights sickness and after the society had paid the cannot be swept away by such a scheme.S members benefits therefor is invalid, such (6.) In Respect to the Decrease of Death action of the society being declared to be re- Benefits.—The right of a mutual insurance pudiation of debts and will not be allowed by society to change its by-laws so that $1,500 the courts, the member, in such case, baving will be the limit of its liability on the death

of a member cannot be enforced where,

under the original by-law, the beneficiary law or change in a contract to avoid a forfeiture of the whole or any part of a benefit. Becker v. Berlin

would be entitled to recover five dollars for Benefit Society, 144 Pa. 232; Benton v. Brotherhood each member, though such society had the of Ry. Brakemen, 146 II). 570, 34 N. E. Rep. 938; right, under the act under which it was orCarnes v. Iowa Traveling Men's Assn., 106 Iowa, 281, 76 N. W. Rep. 683; Chadwick v. Order of T. A., 56

ganized to adopt by-laws, by its trustees, Mo. App. 463; Coben v. Supreme Sitting 0. I. H., 105 sówho may change them at pleasure,” it Mich. 283; Courtney v. U. S. Masonic Ben. Assn. appearing in such case that more than a ma(Iowa), 53 N. W. Rep. 238; Coyle v. Father Matthew

jority of all the members of the society proSoc., 29 Hun, 674, 17 N. Y. Wk. Dig. 17; Ebert v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assn. (Minn.), 83 N. W.

tested in writing against the change, and Rep. 506; Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. Aberle, 19 App. that among those protesting was plaintiff's Div. 79, 46 N. Y. Supp. 10; Fire Ins. Co. v. Connor, 17

decedent, nor is such change valid where it Pa. 136; Graftstrom v. Frost Council No. 21, 0. C. F., 19 Misc. Rep. 180, 43 N. Y. Supp. 266; Grand Lodge

| is not shown that the members assented A. 0. U. W. v. Reneau, 75 Mo. App. 402; Grand thereto. Lodge A. 0. U. W. v. Sater, 44 Mo. App. 445; Gund.

(c.) In Respect to Increase in Assesslach v. German Mechanics' Assn., 4 Hun, 341, 49 How. Pr. 190; Hale v. Equitable Aid Union, 168 Pa.ments. —The right of a mutual insurance 377; Hirsch v. U. S. Grand Lodge, 0. B. A., 78 Mo. association, reserved in the contracts between App. 358; Hobbs v. Iowa Mutual Ben, Assn., 82

it and its members, to change the same, inIowa, 107, 11 L. R. A. 299; Hogan v. League, 99 Cal. 248, 33 Pac. Rep. 924; Hussey v. Gallagher, 61 Ga. 86; cluding a special provision that the board of Hutchinson v. Supreme Tent, 22 N. Y. Supp. 801; trustees shall have the right to fix the number Hysinger v. Supreme Lodge K. & L. of H., 42 Mo.

and amount of assessments, will not enable App. 627; Illinois Com. Men's Assn. v. Wabl, 68 II. App. 411; Jarman v. Knights Templars & M. L. I. such an association to so arrange its rates of Co., 95 Fed. Rep. 70, 28 Ins. L. J. 874; Langdon v. assessments that a larger proportional burden Mass. Ben. Assn., 166 Mass. 316, 44 N. E. Rep. 226;

falls upon a part of its membership than McNeil v. Southern Tier Mas. Relief Assp., 40 App. Div. 581, 58 N. Y. Supp. 119; Margesson v. Mass. Ben.

upon the others, as where the association Assn., 165 Mass. 262, 42 N. E. Rep. 1132; Maynard v. places its membership into two classes upon Locomotive Eng. M. L. & A. Ins. Assn., 16 Utah, 145,

one of which the assessments are made at the 51 Pac. Rep. 259; Metropolitan Safety Fund Acc. Soc. v. Windover, 137 III. 417, 27 N. E. Rep. 538; Morris v.

"attained age” of that class and at the age Farmers' Mutual F. Ins. Co., 63 Minn. 420, 65 N. W. atentry” of the other class. 10 Rep. 655; Morrison v. Wisconsin Odd Fellows M. L.

(d.) In Respect to Occupation of Member Ins. Co., 59 Wis. 162; Mutual Aid & I. Soc. v. Monti, 59 N. J. L. (30 Vrom.), 341, 36 Atl. Rep. 666; Mutual

or Increase of Risk.—The right of a mutual Endowment Assessment Assn. v. Essenden, 59 Md. insurance society, reserved in the contract 463; Northwestern Ben. & Mut. Aid Assp. v. Warner,

between it and its members, to change the 24 Ill. App. 357; Pellazzione v. Society, 16 Cin. Law Bull. 27; Pokrefky v. Detroit Firemen's Fund Assn. 8 Becker v. Berlin Benefit Society, 144 Pa. 232; Ber(Mich.), 80 N. W. Rep. 240; St. Patrick's Male lin v. Eureka Lodge (Cal.), 64 Pac. Rep. 254. Ben. Soc. v. McVey, 92 Pa. 510; Seiverts y. National 9 Pokrefky, v. Detroit Firemens' Fund Assn. Ben. Assn., 95 Iowa, 710, 64 N. W. Rep. 671; Starling (Mich.), 80 N. W. Rep. 240; Getz v. Supreme Council v. Supreme Council R. T. of T., 108 Mich. 440, 66 N. A. L. of H. (C. C.), 109 Fed. Rep. 261; Langan v. Su. W. Rep. 893; Stewart v. Lee Mutual, etc. Assn., 64 preme Council A. L. of H., 70 N. Y. Supp. 663; HipMiss. 499, 1 South. Rep. 743; Strauss v. Mutual ple v. Supreme Ruling Fraternal Mystic Circle, 10 Reserve Fund Life Assn. (N. Car.), 36 S. E. Bep. 352; Pa. Dist. Rep. 317. Street v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assn. (V. Car.), 10 Ebert v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assn. (Minn.), 36 S. E. Rep. 1024; Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. La. | 83 N. W. Rep. 506; Strauss v. Mutual Reserve Fund Malta, 95 Tenn. 157, 30 L. R. A. 838; Supreme Lodge | Life Assn. (N. Car.), 36 S. E. Rep. 352; Hill v. Mutual K. of P. v. McLennan, 171 Ill. 417, 49 N. E. Rep. 530; Reserve Fund Life Assn. (N. Car.), 36 S. E. Rep. Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. Stein, 75 Miss. 107, 21 1023; Street v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assn. (N. South. Rep. 59; Supreme Tent Knights of Macca. Car.), 36 S. E. Rep. 1024. Rehearings in each of bees y. Volkert (Ind.), 57 N. E. Rep. 203; Weiler v. above cases have resulted in a reaffirmance of the Equitable Aid Union, 92 Hun, 277; Wheeler v. opinions cited. Also see Covenant Mutual Life Assn. Supreme Sitting 0. I. H., 110 Mich. 437,68 N. W. Rep. v. Kentner (III.), 58 N. E. Rep. 966; Covenant Mutual 229; Wist v. Grand Lodge, A. 0. U. W., 22 Oreg. 271, Ben. Assn. V. Baldwin, 49 Ill. App. 203; Rowell v. 29 Pac. Rep. 610; Yelland v. Yelland, 25 Ont. pp. 91. | Covenant Mutual Life Assn., 84 III. App. 304.

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