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184. STATUTES-Title.-Act Dec. 12, 1884, held unconstitutional, in so far as it prohibits the giving away of liquors, as not expressing the subject of the act in the title.-STATE V. DAVIS, Ala., 30 South. Rep. 344.

185. STATUTES-Title-More Than One Subject.-Act March 25, 1873, held unconstitutional, as embracing more than the subject expressed in its title.-STATE V. CRAIG, Tenn., 64 8. W. Rep. 326.

186. STATUTES-Title-Object.-Act May 17, 1894, en. titled "An act to protect the planting and cultivating of oysters in the tide waters of the state," held not to state the object of the act in the title.-STATE V. STEELMAN, N. J., 49 Atl. Rep. 978.

187. TAXATION Excessive Assessment.-The law contemplates that if taxpayer's property is exces. sively assessed he should sue, after complaint season. ably made before board of review. — LIQUIDATING COM'RS OF NEW ORLEANS WAREHOUSE V. MARRERO, La., 30 South. Rep. 305.

188. TAXATION-Failure to Collect State Tax-County Liable.-A county having failed to collect a tax for state purposes, is liable therefor to the state.-COMMONWEALTH V. MCKEAN COUNTY, Pa., 45 Atl. Rep. 982.

189. TAXATION-Lien- Foreclosure.-Lien created by filing of town collector's bond may be foreclosed in equity. CHATFIELD V. CAMPBELL, N. Y., 71 N. Y. Supp. 1004.

190. TAXATION- Sale.- Sale for taxes to the state, where patent thereafter issued from the state, and was recorded, held valid under Tax Law, 1896, ch. 908, §132.-MORGAN V. TURNER, N. Y. 71 N. Y. Supp. 996.

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191. TAXATION- Transfer Tax. Money of non-resi dent, temporarily deposited in New York, held, on his death, not subject to transfer tax.-IN RE LEOPOLD'S ESTATE, N. Y., 71 N. Y., Supp. 1032.

192. TAXATION-Transfer Tax.-A surrogate cannot amend an order assessing transfer tax on a life interest in United States bonds, subsequently declared by court of appeals to be exempt from taxation.-IN RE VON POST'S ESTATE, N. Y., 71 N. Y. Supp. 1039.

193. TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES MandaumsFurnishing Facilities.- Mandamus lies to compel telephone company to furnish facilities to all similiarly situated without discrimination.-STATE v. CITIZENS' TEL. CO., S. Car., 39 S. E. Rep. 257.

194. TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES-Refusing Connection. A telephone company may refuse connection to one who attaches private extension instruments to its lines, where the company is willing to furnish such instruments at reasonable rates.-GARDNER V. PROV. IDENCE TEL. Co., R. I., 49 Atl. Rep. 1004.

195. TRIAL-Amending Special Findings.-After final judgment, the trial court has no power to amend a special finding.-POLLARD V. FIRST AVE. COAL-MIN. Co., Ind., 61 N. E. Rep. 9.

196. TRIAL-Assuming Truth of Certain Facts.Where certain facts are clearly proven without conflict, a charge assuming them as true held not er. roneous.-WOOD v. MOTEN, Ala., 30 South. Rep. 324.

197. TRIAL- Clerks Minutes. Clerks of court, whether the test mony is taken down in writing or not, must make a minute of the swearing of the wit. nesses, giving their names.-MACKIN V. WILDS, La., 30 South. Rep. 257.

198. USURY-Excess of Principal.-On bill to cancel mortgage because of usury, decree requiring com. plainant to pay anything in excess of principal, with legal interest, held erroneous.-WARD V. BANK (F ABBEVILLE, Ala., 80 South. Rep. 841.

199. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Damages. In action by vendee to recover damages for alleged breach of contract for sale of land, plaintiff held not entitled to recover, where he fails to show tender of the purchase money due, or of a deed ever executed.-HARPER V. JOHNSON, Ala., 30 South. Rep. 288.

200. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Non-Performance.In action for failure to perform a contract for support made in consideration of a good and sufficient deed to certain property, a deed not duly executed and acknowledged held inadmissible in evidence. — GUN. DERSON V. GUNDERSON, Wash., 65 Pac. Rep. 791.

201. WATERS AND WATER COURSES-Irrigation.-The right to the water for irrigation may be obtained by prior appropiation, though the diversion is not made on any portion of the public domain.-BROWN V. BAKER, Org., 65 Pac. Rep. 799.

202. WATER AND WATER COURSES-Prior Appropria tion.-Allegation in reply of right to the entire flow of a stream by reason of riparian proprietorship held a departure, where the complainant asserted a right by prior appropriation. -BROWN V. BAKER, Oreg., 65 Pac. Rep. 799.

203. WILLS-Bequest of Personalty for Life.-Where personalty was given to wife, her children to take what was unconsumed at her death, the wife took an absolute estate therein.-CAIN V. ROBERTSON, Ind., 61 N. E. Rep. 26.

In construing

204. WILLS- Codical-Construction. codici of will, limitations expressed in will, and refererd to in codicil, must be considered.—VAUGHAN V. BRIDGES, S. Car., 39 S. E. Rep. 347.

205. WILLS- Construction of "Heirs."- Wills construed, and word "heirs" held used in the sense of children, and that on the death of testator's wife his children take a life estate, and on their death his grandchildren acquire a fee. - WATSON V. WILLIAMSON, Ala., 30 South. Rep. 281.

206. WILLS-Omitting Children-Evidence of Intention. Where plaintiff's mother died, leaving a will in terms giving her entire estate to their father, making no mention of her children, oral testimony that she Intended to omit them is inadmissible.-MORRISON V. MORRISON, Wash., 65 Pac. Rep. 779.

207. WILLS-Omitting Reference to Children.-Where plaintiff's mother died, leaving a will in terms giving her entire estate to their father, making no mention of her children, the will is void as to them.-MORRISON V. MORRISON, Wash., 65 Pac. Rep 779.

208. WILLS-Partnership Contract as a Will.-An instrument creating a partnership between father and son held in effect a will by the father, and not a deed.GOMEZ V. HIGGINS, Ala., 30 South. Rep. 417.

209. WITNESSES-Donee Causa Moris.-In an action by administrator of depositor against savings bank, and a defense of payment to donee causa mortis, the latter is not an incompetent witness.-PODMOre v. SEAMEN'S BANK FOR SAVINGS, N. Y., 71 N. Y. Supp. 1026.

210. WITNESSES- Duces Tecum. Where a witness summoned by subpœna duces tecum produces the books of a corporatitn, it is no objection to their admission that the statute provides another mode of securing them.-COBB V. LAGARDE, Ala., 30 South. Rep. 326.

211. WITNESSES-Farm Labor Contracts.- Brother of one contracting party held a disinterested witness in a prosecution for violation of a verbal contract to labor on farm.-STATE v. EASTERLIN, S. Car. 39 S. E.. Rep. 250.

212. WITNESSES-Impeachment.-Proof of particular vices is inadmissible as against accused in an attempt to impeach his character.- STATE v. GUY, La., 30 South. Rep. 268.

218. WITNESSES-Name on Back of Indictment.- A witness for the state will not be excluded because his name does not appear on the back of the indict. ment.-STATE V. ROBISON, S. Car., 39 S. E. Rep. 247.

214. WITNESSES-Relative-Credibility.-That a wit ness in behalf of accused is a relative, or jointly indicted for the offense, may be considered by the jury in passing on his credibility.-COCHRAN V. STATE, Ga., 39 S. E. Rep. 382.

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., NOVEMBER 22, 1901

Our honored correspondent at Galveston, Mr. E. T. Harris, a prominent attorney of that city, has just sent us a marked copy of his brief in the case of Hildenbrandt v. Ames, now pending in the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, First Supreme Judicial District. This case is one of many suits which will probably arise out of the late flood disaster at Galveston, in which that very difficult and unsettled question of law will prominently protrude itself, the proof of survivorship in a common disaster. Perhaps that phase of the question arising under wills and the distribution of estates of decedents will occasion little difficulty, the law being quite well settled on that point. See the leading case of Newell v. Nichols, 75 N. Y. 78. That phase of the question, however, arising under policies of life insurance, is in hopeless confusion and considerably complicated by the further question of the vested interest of the beneficiary peculiar to regular life policies. Mr. Harris' brief canvasses this question, and in the marked copy to which we have alluded we observe that what he expressly considers his most valuable citation is from the CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL. In closing his discussion of the authorities Mr. Harris says: "The ablest article or resume of the law bearing upon the case at bar is found in the 53d CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL, pages 184-189, inclusive. Were it not for wearying this court would embrace the entire language of said article in this argument, and submit it as the fairest presentation of both sides of the questions involved which has reached the eye of counsel for appellee. On page 189 of that article the author states, 'where the policy provides that the beneficiary shall take, "if surviving," no difficulty should arise in any view of the case, as, in such case, survivorship is clearly a condition precedent to the enjoyment of the fund, and upon the representatives of the beneficiary must be the burden of proving survivorship before they are entitled to take anything under the policy.' The article in question cites many cases, and we doubt not it will have the calm

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consideration of this Honorable Court." This is not the only instance in which this particular article has been cited. In a similar case pending in the Supreme Court of Missouri, the attorney for the administrator has sent us acknowledgment of its valuable assistance. We mention this simply as an evidence of the practical aid and assistance which the CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL renders the active practitioner in winning his cases. The JOURNAL is not a legal storybook nor a graveyard of obituaries. It is devoted solely to the law-the announcement of its latest principles, and the solution of its most difficult problems. It is for that reason more often cited in the decisions of the courts than any other law journal in the country. The great mass of digests and reports are, of course, invaluable to the lawyer in ordinary cases. But questions of extreme rarity or peculiarity, or which have been settled unsatisfactorily or contrary to right principles or on which there is great conflict of authority, must be determined by exhaustive and dispassionate analysis and not by the mere partisan citation of authorities, the mind of the court being more inclined toward the former than the latter. The CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL has a staff of paid contributors-practicing lawyers of most exceptional competency who wrestle with these difficulties and boldly announce a solution based on the best considered authorities and the clearest principles of law. Such assistance is of all things most valuable to the court which seeks to be guided by right principle rather than solely by precedents, even if the latter are all "hog cases" and "on all fours."

No subject is more often litigated, apparently, than that of the liability of telegraph companies for negligent delivery of messages. The rule is that in all cases delivery must be made to the addressee or his authorized agent. The difficulty is not, however, in the rule itself as in its application. In the recent case of Western Union v. Hendricks, 63 S. W. Rep. 341, the Supreme Court of Texas held that where a telegraph message is addressed to a person residing in the country in care of a resident of the town, both of whom are temporarily in another town, and a special price is paid to secure

its delivery, the delivery to the partner of the latter is insufficient, but it should be delivered at the residence of the addressee. Other recent authorities on this question might be cited as follows: Pearsall v. Western Union, 124 N. Y. 256, 21 Am. St. Rep. 662; Telegraph Co. v. Mitchell, 91 Tex. 454, 44 S. W. Rep. 274, 66 Am. St. Rep. 906; Hendricks v. Western Union, 126 N. Car. 304, 35 S. E. Rep. 543; Western Union v. Mitchell (Tex. 1898), 44 S. Rep. 274; Western Union

W. v. Jackson (Tex. App. 1898), 46 S. W. Rep. 279; Martin v. Telegraph Co., 18 Wash. 260, 51 Pac. Rep. 376. In the case of Western Union v. Tressall, 98 Ind. 566, however, it was held that there was an implied authority on the part of a hotel clerk to receive a telegram for a guest, and the company cannot be held responsible for the clerk in failing to deliver it. On the other hand, in the case of Western Union v. Jackson, 46 S. W. Rep. 279, it was held that though a telegram is directed in care of a certain person, the company must use diligence to deliver to the addressee. So also in the case of Telegraph Co. v. Mitchell, 91 Tex. 454, it was held that a charge that, in the absence of the husband, it was the duty of the company, if his wife was at the residence, to deliver to her a message addressed to him, was error, she not being the general agent of her husband.

NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS.

ACTION ON FOREIGN JUDGMENT-PROOF OF LAWS ALLOWING INTEREST ON JUDGMENTS IN FOREIGN STATE.-In the recent case of Schroeder v. Boyce, 86 N. W. Rep. 387, the Supreme Court of Michigan reversed the decision of a trial court because of failure to prove that a foreign state allowed interest on judgments. The appellate court held that where the trial court, in a suit on a judgment of another state, allowed interest thereon without proof of the rate of interest in such state, there was reversible error, since the common law was presumed to be in force in the foreign state, and at common law judgments do

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law of such state allows interest on judgments." Judgments at common law do not bear interest, so that in the absence of express legislation which, if of a foreign state, must be proved, a recovery on a judgment would not include interest. Hamer v. Kirkwood, 25 Miss. 95; Winch v. Ice Co., 86 N. Y. 618; Ex parte Brown, 18 S. Car. 87; Ormsby v. Johnson, 1 B. Mon. (Ky.) 80; Atchison, etc. R. R. v. Gabbert, 34 Kan. 132; Thompson v. Monrow, 2 Cal. 99, 56 Am. Dec. 318; Cavender v. Guild, 4 Cal. 253; Kermott v. Ayer, 11 Mich. 181.

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CRIMINAL TRIAL-IMPROPER REMARKS OF TRIAL JUDge. Some courts seem to have fallen into the very bad practice of commenting on the evidence and insidiously infecting the jury with their own opinion of the facts in the case. As a general rule, however, these remarks do not call for a reversal of the cases unless it is clearly shown that appellant has been injured by them. Thus, in the recent case of Hinzar v. State, 63 S. W. Rep. 329, the Supreme Court of Texas held that a comment of the court in a criminal prosecution on rejected evidence that: "That cuts no ice. The only question is whether defendant assaulted her [the prosecutrix],"-while improper, is not reversible error.

While the court in this case may be correct in its view that such remark did not injure the appellant in this case, it is not difficult to imagine a case in which such a remark could be highly prejudicial. No comment could be more calculated to impress upon the jury the court's opinion that the evidence sought to be introduced was frivolous and in a close case would certainly affect the weight of the evidence and the verdict of the jury. It is the well-settled rule that any improper remarks of the court in the presence and hearing of the jury, liable to influence their action, is misconduct. Wanack v. Macon, 53 Ga. 163; Bowman v. State, 119 Neb. 523; Skelly v. Boland, 78 Ill. 438; Cronkhite v. Dickerson, 51 Mich. 177. Thus where in charging the jury the judge playfully remarked that the jury might give "such damages as would teach the old gentleman not to violate the Sabbath, nor injure his health by riding in the night, nor interfere with the rights of others," it was held that the instructions were erroneous, because the remarks were calculated to make the jury believe that the judge thought the facts justified heavy exemplary damages. Hair v. Little, 28 Ala. 236.

LIFE INSURANCE-MISREPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES.-One of the most often litigated questions in the law of life insurance is the effect of misrepresentations in the application. The whole question lies wrapped up in the further question whether such representations are to be given the legal effect of warranties or of mere representations only. In the former case the statements in the application unless literally true will avoid the policy, however immaterial such misrepresentations may be; in the latter case mis

statements in the application, sufficient to work an avoidance of the policy, must be of facts substantially material to the risk. In the recent case of Kansas Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Pinson, 63 S. W. Rep. 531, the Supreme Court of Texas held that an application for life insurance recited that the applicant agreed that his statements to the medical examiner were true, and were offered to the company as a consideration of the contract. The policy stipulated that the insurance was granted in consideration of the statements and agreements in the application, "which are made a part of the contract." The applicant stated to the medical examiner that he had five sisters, aged, respectively, 52, 50, 47, 45, and 36 years, but their ages were in fact, respectively, 49, 46, 44, 36, and 33 years. The court held that the provisions of the policy constituted a warranty of the truth of the statements in the application, and that the discrepancy forfeited the contract. The court makes this peculiar statement of the law: "There is nothing in the facts stated in connection with the question which will take this case out of the general rule that the breach of a warranty in an insurance policy works a forfeiture of the contract. The rule that a substantial performance of a warranty is sufficient does not apply in this case, and we are not called upon to say what would be the effect if the variance between the actual ages and the ages warranted was very slight. Lest this opinion might be misunderstood, we will state that we do not intend to assert that a literal compliar ce with such a warranty would be necessary, but, in our opinion, the facts do not justify the court in assuming that the discrepancy in the ages is so irrelevant as to avoid the effect of the warranty. To the question, we answer that the provisions of the policy constitute a warranty of the truth of the statements made in the application, and that the discrepancy between the ages of the sisters as stated and their actual ages caused a forfeiture of the contract of insurance." The court's reference to a rule of law stating that a substantial performance of a warranty is sufficient, fails to find support from the authorities. The latter are all agreed that if the statements in the application, have by express agreement been made a part of the policy, and given the effect of warranties, they must be literally complied with. Hartford Insurance Co. v. Gray, 91 1. 159; Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Pyle, 44 Ohio St. 19; Alabama Insurance Co. v. Garner, 77 Ala. 210; Blooming Grove Insurance Co. v. McAnerney,

VENUE IN FORECLOSURE SUITS.

The General Rule as to Venue in Chancery. -As the foreclosure proceeding, in the form we are here considering, is essentially a suit in chancery1 the rules which govern its venue have their source in that forum. The prevailing doctrine is that all equity suits were once transitory. Hence, chancery would entertain a bill for specific performance or for redemption where the defendant was served within the realm, though the suit involved land in a foreign jurisdiction. There are, indeed, decisions in which a contrary opinion is expressed, but the above is the doctrine prevalent in England when the law as to venue originated, and is also the one most in harmony with the maxim that "equity acts. in personam."

Strict Foreclosure a Transitory Proceeding. -The original foreclosure proceeding shared this characteristic of the other remedies of chancery, for it was a proceeding in personam.6 But the proceeding of which this was true was not the modern foreclosure and sale; it

1 Price v. State Bank, 14 Ark 50.

2 Georgia: Clements v. Tillman, 79 Ga. 451, 11 Am. St. Rep. 441. Maryland: Carroll v. Lee, 3 G. & J. (Md.) 504, 22 Am. Rep. 350; Keyser v. Rice, 47 Md. 203, 28 Am. Rep. 448. Tennessee: Newman v. Stuart, Cooke, 339. Virginia: Dickinson v. Hoomes, 8 Gratt. (Va.) 410. Canada: "The foreclosure suit has come down from the chancery practice, and in that practice there never was any fixed locality of venue ap. plying to certain actions as in the common law prac tice." Seymour v. De Marsh, 11 Ont. Prac. Rep. 472. 3 Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves. 444 (1750).

4 Kanawha Coal Co. v. Kanawha, etc. Coal Co., 7 Blatchf. (U. S.) 415; Cf. Cholmondeley v. Lord Clinton, 2 Jac. & W. 134.

5 Dunn v. McMillen, 1 Bibb (Ky ), 409, the court saying: "Analogous to this distinction at law between actions local and transitory, it has been held in chancery, that where the decree is to affect the land directly, as in the case of a suit brought for partition, or for dower, then the court cannot entertain jurisdiction only where the land lies." Cf. Parker v. McAllister, 14 Ind. 12; Gill v. Bradley, 21 Minn. 15; Collins v. Park (Ky.), 18 S. E. Rep. 1013; Chapin v. Circuit Judge (Mich.), 62 N. W. Rep. 351; Neal v. Reynolds, 38 Kan. 432.

6 Federal Cases: Pennover v. Neff. 95 IL. S. 714:

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was the ancient remedy of strict foreclosure. This was in truth a suit in personam, because the relief obtained operated not to affect the land but to cut off the mortgagor's personal right or equity of redemption. Now it was because of this fact that the proceeding was also transitorys and might be instituted in any place where the court had jurisdiction of the mortgagor's person. The fact that the mortgaged land might be situated in another county10 or statel or in a colony12 or dependency, having a different legal and judicial | 7 See Lansing v. Goelet, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 346.

13

"Originally it was regarded as transitory. In so far as it is local it is so made by statute." Ladd, J., in McDonald v. Second National Bank, 106 Iowa, 517528.

England: Toller v. Carteret, 2 Vern. 494 (1705); Paget v. Ede, 18 Eq. Cas. 118. Connecticut: Palmer v. Mead, 7 Conn. 149, 157; Broom v. Beers, 6 Conn. 198 In the latter case it is observed: "The plaintiff in error has taken several exceptions to the decree in question. The first is, that the suit was not brought in the proper county. The title of land is not in question; and such suits have always been considered transitory. 2 Swift's Dig. 197; How. Mort. 1048; Anon. 2 Chan. Cas. 244; Owen v. Granger, cited. Arguendo, 2 Day, 477; Owen v. Hather, Superior Court, Hartford County, 1818; Stat. 34. tit. 6, cl. 1, sec. 6 (Ed. 1808)." Iowa: McDonald v. Second Nat. Bank, 106 Iowa, 517, 523. Kentucky: Caufman v. Sayre, 2 B. Mon. (Ky.) 202; Owings v. Beall, 3 Litt. (Ky.) 108. New York: House v. Lockwood, 40 Hun (N. Y.), 682; Union Trust Co. v. Olmstead, 62 N. Y. 729. South Carolina: Trapier v. Waldo, 16 S. Car. 276, 288. Tennessee: Grace v. Hunt, Cooke (Tenn.), 341; Avery v. Holland, 2 Overt (Tenn.), 71.

10 aufman v. Sayre, 2 B. Mun. (Ky.) 202; Owings v. Beall, 8 Litt. (Ky.) 103; Broome v. Beers, 8 Conn. 198; Palmer v. Mead, 7 Conn. 157. Cf. Trapier v. Waldo, 16 S. Car. 276, 383.

"House v. Lockwood, 40 Hun (N. Y.), 532. This was a suit brought in New York for the strict foreclosure of a mortgage on land in Illinois. The court said: "The subject matter of this controversy is capable of being wholly and completely disposed of by a decree between those parties. They were per sonally within the jurisdiction of the court when its process was served upon them, and the defendants have appeared and served their answers contesting the right of the plaintiff to maintain the action. They are personally, therefore, subject to the jurisdiction of the court. And where that is the fact, and such jurisdiction has been acquired, there it has been the practice of courts of equity to decree relief, disposing of the controversy, although the subject-matter itself may be situated in another state or county." See also Union Trust Co. v. Olmstead, 62 N. Y. 729.

19"Bills are often filed (in England) upon mortgages in the West Indies." Story, Equity Jurisprudence, sec. 1293. Thus Paget v. Ede, 18 Eq. Cas. 118, involved the foreclosure of a mortgage of an estate in Nevis, one of the Leeward islands.

13 Teller v. Carteret, 2 Vern. 494 (1705). This was a suit to foreclose the defendant's equity of redemption in Sark, one of the Channel isles, the whole of which was subject to the mortgage. Neither the

system, was wholly immaterial, so far as the locus of the suit was concerned. And conversely the fact that the land itself might be within the jurisdiction of the court would not authorize the court to entertain the bill if the parties could not be served there.14 Such was the ancient law of venue in this proceeding, and such is still the rule where strict foreclosure alone is sought.15

Change Necessitated by Introduction of Equitable Foreclosure-Proceeding Becomes Either Local or Transitory.—With the introduction of the sale as a substitute for strict foreclosure came a necessary change in the law as to the venue of the suit. For in order to effect a sale the court must have jurisdiction of the res; title to land cannot be affected by a foreign tribunal, and hence a decree of foreclosure and sale in one state is without validity as to land in another.16 Again, the mere fact that the land is within the jurisdiction enables a court to take cognizance of a bill praying for a sale." Hence

jurisdiction of the high court, nor the English mortgage laws extended to the island, but chancery entertained the bill by virtue of the service in England.

14 Grace v. Hunt, Cooke (Tenn.), 341. Cf. Avery v. Holland. 2 Overt (Tenn.), 71; Owings v. Beall, 3 Litt. (Ky) 103.

15 House v. Lockwood, 40 Hun (N. Y.), 532.

16 England: Grey v. Manitoba & N. W. R. Co., App. Cas. (Privy Council, 1897) 254, 66 L. J. P. C. (N. 8.) 66, where Lord Hobhouse observes: “As regards the question of sale, the decisions, both English and transatlantic, which bear on the jurisdiction of courts of justice to deal with foreign land, have been very carefully discussed in the courts below. It is hardly necessary to go into that discussion again here. The thing asked for by the bill is a judicial sale of land partly within and partly out of the jurisdiction, as an entire thing, and with specific directions by the court. It is impossible to do that." "The courts of our state will not recognize the right of courts in other states to affect directly the title to real estate in the former. The most that can be done is to allow foreign courts having jurisdiction of the parties to compel conveyances by the owner, and recognize as valid titles so acquired. We are aware of no case that has gone so far as to recognize the validity of a deed given by a referee or other officer of court by authority of law in another jurisdiction. The rule seems to be that the courts of each state have exclusive jurisdiction to settle the title to lands within its own limits." Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Postal Tel. Co., 55 Conn. 324. Indiana: Eaton, etc. R. Co. v. Hunt, 20 Ind. 457, 465. Kansas: Lichty v. Martin, 11 Kan. 565; Union Trust Co. v. Olmstead, 62 N. Y. 729.

17 "As a sale of mortgaged land operates in rem, cognizance over a bill for a sale may be exercised by the court of equity of the county in which the land lies, and would, upon common-law principles, be restricted to that local court, if the prayer for a sale

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