mines.''z2

23

In Holden v. Hardy, the decision of the state court is affirmed, Brown, J., using the following language: "Upon the principles stated, we think the act in question may be sustained as a valid exercise of the police power of the state. The enactment does not profess to limit the hours of all workmen, but merely those who are employed in underground mines, or in the smelting, reduction or refining of ores or metals. These employments, when too long pursued, the legislature has judged to be detrimental to the health of the employees, and so long as there are reasonable grounds for believing that this is so, its decision upon this subject cannot be reviewed by the federal courts.

We have no disposition to criticise the many authorities which hold that state statutes restricting the hours of labor are unconstitutional. Indeed, we are not called upon to express an opinion on this subject. It is sufficient to say of them, that they have no application to cases where the legislature had adjudged that a limitation is necessary for the preservation of the health of employees, and there are reasonable grounds for believing that such determination is supported by the facts. The question in each case is whether the legislature has adopted the statute in the exercise of a reasonable discretion, or whether its action be a mere excuse for an unjust discrimination, or the oppression or spoliation of a particular class." This, then, seems to be the status of affairs: The restriction by the state of the right of individuals to contract with reference to their own labor, is in contravention of any fair construction of American constitutional law and individual rights as declared by our Declaration of Independence; such restrictions may be exercised only in certain cases where the rights of the public are plainly paramount to those of the individual; but the United States Supreme Court will not interfere to prevent such restriction so long "as there are reasonable grounds for believing that the restriction is the result of a proper exercise of the police power of the state."

MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATIONS-CHANGE OF BY LAWS-CONSENT OF MEMBER-RECOVERY OF PREMIUMS-MANDAMUS.

STRAUSS v. MUTUAL RESERVE FUND LIFE

ASSOCIATION.

Supreme Court of North Carolina, June 4, 1901.

1. A mere general consent, given by a member of a mutual benefit association, that its constitution and by-laws may be amended, does not authorize such a change in its rules as will destroy his vested rights under his insurance contract by subjecting him to pay a greater rate of assessment than the contract calls for.

2. Where a mutual benefit association violates its contract with a member, the most practical remedy is the recovery of premiums paid, with interest thereon, and mandamus for reinstatement need not be resorted to.

DOUGLAS, J.: This case is before us on a hearing, being originally reported in 126 N. Car. 971, 36 S. E. Rep. 352. We have again given it careful consideration, and have been forced to the same conclusions announced in our former opinion. It seems useless to again discuss the principles involved, as they are few and simple, as the case is viewed by us. The plaintiff had a contract of insurance with the defendant, which the latter seems to have violated in its most essential features, with the result of having destroyed its value to the plaintiff, But it is said that the plaintiff made such contract of insurance with a mutual insurance association, of which he was a member, and by virtue of such membership; and that he is, therefore, bound by all such rules and regulations as may be thereafter lawfully adopted. "Lawful adoption" may mean much or little. Rules may be adopted under the forms of law that might nevertheless be so unreasonable and inequitable as to be clearly beyond any possible contemplation of law. In any event, such rules can never have any greater force than the law that authorizes their adoption; and, if this has the effect of impairing the obligation of a contract, it is void by constitutional inhibition. But it is said that the plaintiff, upon entering the association, agreed, expressly or impliedly, that changes might be made in its constitution and by-laws, and is bound thereby. We have no evidence that he agreed that such changes might be made as were made, and we have no idea that he ever intended to place it within the power of the association to break his contract at pleasure, or render it utterly valueless by subsequent stipulations or regulations adopted without his consent. A mere general consent that the constitution and by-laws may be amended applies only to such reasonable regulations as may be within the scope of its original design. We must again repeat what we said in our former opinion:

It is urged by the defendant that, if the plaintiff is entitled to any relief, it is not by recovery of the premiums he has paid, but by mandamus for reinstatement. This remedy is not demanded by the plaintiff, nor does it seem practicable to us. It is true, we might issue the mandamus to a foreign corporation having its general offices in New York; but how to make such a mandamus effective is a different question, the solution of which is not at all clear to us. Moreover, in the present instance the plaintiff, Strauss, is now dead. Much stress has been laid upon the fact that the Supreme Court of Minnesota, in Ebert against this defendant (83 N. W. Rep. 506), while agreeing with us upon the main question of the right of recovery, differs with us as to the measure of damage. We are much impressed with the views of the court upon that point, which have much to commend them as theoretical propositions; but we are equally impressed with the frank admission of the court as to the difficulty of their practical application. Our own rule, even in our own minds, falls short of theoretical perfection; but, after most careful consideration, we are unable to find a better. The impaired health of the insured, or his having passed the insurable age, would present complications practically insurmountable in the actual trial of an action. Moreover, the defendant claims that the plaintiff's insurance has cost more than he has paid in, and therefore his recovery would be nothing. The plaintiff would have no means of disproving the alleged cost of his past insurance, the proof of which would be exclusively in the possession of the defendant. He might cross-examine the defendant's witnesses, or demand its books and papers; but if he got them, what could he do with them? It seems to have taken the defendant several years to find out that the plaintiff's insurance was costing more than his premiums, and this it did only with the assistance of the insurance commissioner of New York and expert actuaries. With or without such assistance, what chance would the average juror have of mentally digesting five hundred pages of insurance statistics? All actions must be capable of a practical determination, with a reasonable certainty of substantial justice; and rules of law must be adjusted to that end, even if, in exceptional cases, they fall short of the full measure of ideal right. A distinguished jurist has said: "Indeed, one of the remarkable tendencies of the English common law upon all subjects of a general nature is to aim at practical good, rather than at practical theoretical perfection; and to seek less to administer justice in all possible cases than to furnish rules which shall secure it in the common course of human business." Story, Eq. Jur., p. 115. The rule we have followed is not new. It was laid down by Chief Justice Pearson in Braswell

V. Insurance Co 75 N Cor & and has been uni.

ciations. Where is the essential difference in principle or in its practical result? Both companies pay back only what they have received, with legal interest thereon, and neither company is permitted to retain anything for the cost of past insurance. If the mutual association receives less, it pays back less. If the old time company collects more than the actual cost of insurance, it pays back that much more, and loses its surplus, as well as its cost of insurance. As we see no reason to change our former judgment, the petition to rehear is denied. Petition dismissed.

NOTE. Beneficial Associations-Right to Alter, Repeal or Amend By Laws-Must Not Impair Vested Rights. Of course, a benefit society, like any other society, may alter and repeal its by laws. In incorporated associations this right is implied from the express power to enact by laws. Supreme Lodge v. Knight, 117 Ind. 497. But one very important limitation of this right is that it must not impair rights which have become vested. Borgards v. Insurance Co., 79 Mich. 440; Wist v. Grand Lodge, 22 Oreg. 271, 29 Am. St. Rep. 603; Supreme Lodge v. Malta, 95 Tenn. 157; Morrison v. Insurance Co., 59 Wis. 166; Hobbs v. Association, 82 Iowa, 107, 31 Am. St. Rep. 466; Stohr v. Society, 82 Cal. 557: Becker v. Society, 144 Pa. St. 232. There is no controversy of any im. portance over the rule of limitation just announced, but its practical application appears to be a most difficult undertaking, the decisions being in apparent conflict over the question as to what are vested rights in such cases. The right must be a property right, it must have accrued in the sense that it must not be something merely in prospect In other words, an amendment must not affect a present right of property. Thus, after a member's death an association cannot, by adopting a new article or repealing the old one, relieve itself of the obligation to pay to the widow benefits which had become fixed by death. Gundlach v. Association, 4 Hun (N. Y.), 339. But where the value of a certificate was reduced by a by law creating another class upon more advan tageous terms from a prospective two thousand dollars to one hundred and seventy three dollars, the beneficiary was not allowed to recover the difference. Supreme Lodge v. Knight, 117 Ind. 489. The question of whether a provision for sick benefits in force at the time of the contract of membership can be reduced by subsequent amendment passed before the sickness of the member is generally answered in the affirma tive. The New York courts vacillated over this question for some time before they came to the same conclusion. A study of the case from this state is interesting and profitable. Gundlach v. Association, 4 Hun (N. Y.), 339; McCabe v. Society, 24 Hun (N. Y.), 149; Poultney v. Backman, 62 How. Pr. 466, 10 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y.) 252, reversed 31 Hun, 49. See also St. Patrick's Society v. McVey, 92 Pa. St. 510. In the case of Becker v. Beneficial Society, 144 Pa. St. 232, 27 Am. St. Rep. 624, will be found a strong opinion against the right of a benefit society to reduce tee amount of benefits agreed to be paid on the death of the member by subsequent by law. A contrary view, however, is expressed in the case of Fagan v. Mutual Society, 46 Vt. 362.

divided. Some hold to the affirmative. Fillmore v. Great Camp, 103 Mich. 437; Osceola Tribe v. Schmidt, 57 Md. 98; Hembeau v. Great Camp, 101 Mich. 161, 45 Am. St. Rep. 400. Other authorities hold such restriction to be void on grounds of public policy. Mulray v. Knights of Honor, 28 Mo. App. 463; Austin v. Searing, 16 N. Y. 112; Olery v. Brown, 51 How. Pr. 92; Supreme Council v. Garrigus, 104 Ind. 133, 54 Am. Rep. 298.

It is the general rule that where a member of a beneficial association is illegally expelled or deprived of benefits to which he was entitled as a member of the order, and it does not appear that he had any redress within the association, a court of equity will inquire into the reasonableness and propriety of the society's action and afford such relief as the case warrants. Olery v. Brown, 51 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 92. Thus, when a member of a beneficial society has been denied his benefits and illegally expelled, equity will restore him to membership and compel an accounting. Glover v. Lodge, 1 Del. Co. Rep. (Pa. 1882) 317. The most general remedy in cases where a member of a beneficiary association has been wrongfully expelled therefrom is to compel his reinstatement by mandamus. Meurer v. Association, 95 Mich. 451, 54 N. W Rep. 954; Lavalle v. Societe, 17 R. I. 680, 24 Atl. Rep. 467; Otto v. Union, 75 Cal. 308; State v. Adams, 44 Mo. 570; Manning v. Club, 63 Tex. 166, 51 Am. Rep. 639; Savannah Cotton Exchange v. State, 51 Ga. 668; Sibley v. Club, 40 N. J. L. 295; Evans v. Club, 50 Pa. St. 107; People v. Union, 118 N. Y. 101. In such cases, however, the member cannot resort to the courts for reinstatement without first exhausting the remedies provided by the constitution and by laws of the society, and this though the order of expulsion be void. People v. Order of Foresters, 162 III. 78, 44 N. E. Rep. 401; Screwmen's Assn. v. Benson, 76 Tex. 552, 13 S. W. Rep. 379; State v. Knights, 10 Wkly. L. Bul. (Ohio) 2. In Missouri this latter rule is not adhered to, and in such cases it is not incumbent on the member whose rights have been violated to take steps to exhaust all remedies within the order or to have it reversed in a higher judicatory. Hoeffner v. Grand Lodge, 41 Mo. App. 30; Glasdon v. Knights of Pythias, 50 Mo. App. 45. Whether an action for damages can be maintained in such cases is a point much controverted and not clearly settled. The court in the principal case holds this to be the most practicable remedy in many cases. It is sustained by the following authorities: Ludow iski v. Benevolent Society, 29 Mo. App, 337; Dilcher v. Church, 53 N. Y. 103; Koppstein v. Lipu, 28 Ohio St. 665. It is opposed by the following authorities: Lovalen v. Society, 17 R. I. 680. 24 Atl. Rep 467; Peyre v. Mutual Relief Society, 90 Cal. 240; Ebert v. Association, 83 N. W. Rep. (Minn. 1900) 506. The last case sums up the reason for holding a beneficial association not liable in damages in such cases in the following language: "Purely fraternal benefit associations are not liable in damages for the unlawful cancellation of a membership, because such a corpo ration acts purely as a trustee to collect and distri bute a sick or death fund, and has no other fund, and no power to collect any money except to meet such a payment."

JETSAM AND FLOTSAM.

IS IT PERMISSIBLE FOR A LAWYER TO CALL A WOMAN A LIAR.

A Chicago paper recently published a criticism of Mr. Albert S. Barnes, assistant states attorney, on an

incident occuring in a recent trial in which one of the attorneys in the case denounced one of the opposing witnesses, who was a woman, as a "liar." Mr. Barnes says

"I am asked if there is anything in the code of ethics of the legal profession which permits a lawyer, in court, to call a woman, no matter what her character may be, a liar. I do not pretend to be an authority on legal ethics, although I have decided opinions as to what constitutes a gentleman, at any time and in any place. Moral ethics forbids a man, lawyer or no lawyer, from addressing a woman as a liar and I should say that legal ethics did likewise.

"In any position in life a woman is more or less defenseless. Her sex, her training, ber habits, her physical weakness leave her without many of those elements for resistance that a man possesses. But in court, interested in a case, either as witness or one of the principals, she is even more helpless than elsewhere. She is not familiar with legal procedure. Few, if any, of her own sex are about her. Man's ways, man's laws, man's authority is over her more strikingly than in any other position is life. Her natural timidity at being placed in strange attitudes overwhelms her and she sits shrinking from dangers, apprehended if not seen. Hence the grievous shock to her sensibilities if under such circumstances she is denounced as a liar. Her natural protectors are not by her side, perhaps : if they were, they could show no resentment without displeasing the court. She must take the blow and suffer. I do not believe, to the honor of the legal profession, that such an insult is justified. In the case at question-that of Miss Knabjohann-a more truthful woman never came under my notice. I found her straightforward, womanly, truthful at all times. This made the reflection upon her veracity particularly unwarranted, because in the entire trial (if it could be justifiable) nothing occurred to justify the aspersion.

"It is permissible in courts of law for an attorney to analyze evidence of witnesses; to take the evidence bit by bit and from it to say to the jury or the court that on its face it is false or that a falsehood has been told. But in this particular case no evidence existed of perjury or lying, and the lie direct was given wi.hout provocation on the part of the evidence of the young woman who suffered from the charge. Its effect on the jury was particularly noticeable. Jury. men like the rest of us, have mothers, wives, sweethearts. They carry in their bosoms the same innate respect, chivalry, admiration for womanhood that we do. They were looking into the face of the speaker for the defense when he delivered his invective. Their eyes instantly fell, then raised and rested, not upon his face, but upon that of the woman wrongfully accused. It was palpable then and there that their manhood revolted; that their sympathies instantly went out to her; that if the charge had been ten thousand times true they did not justify the conduct of that manhood which call a woman a liar under any circumstances.

"It is the tendency of judges, juries and attorneys to uphold the hands of woman; to throw extraordinary safeguards about her to keep her still the ideal of the best manhood; the guardian of the cradle; the theme of the song and poem; the one thing that makes the life better and purer for us all. This tendency cannot be made too strong. It should be as powerful in private life as in public. I believe the legal profession with few exceptions means that it shall be so."

CORRESPONDENCE.

EQUITABLE ASSIGNMENT OF INTERESTS IN JUDGMENT FOR PERSONAL INJURY.

To the Editor of the Central Law Journal:

In a recent issue (53 Cent. L. J. 245), in treating of assignment of judgments, you say: "The assignment of an interest in a right of action for a personal injury which is to be prosecuted in the name of the assignor, with an agreement to assign a correspond. ing interest in the judgment which might be recov ered in the future, is equivalent to an equitable assignment of the specified interest in the judgment the moment it is perfected, and binds all parties having notice or knowledge of the same. North Chicago Street Ry. Co. v. Ackley, 58 Ill. App. 572," adding that the rule is different in Missouri.

Now, as a matter of fact, this decision was not sustained by the Supreme Court of Illinois. See 171 1. 100. In the first place, however, the supreme court did uphold the judgment of the appellate court, and its decision to that effect was published immedi ately following its rendition in the Chicago Law Journal Weekly (the correct name, I think). On rebearing, the supreme court reversed the judgment of the appellate court, but it entirely omitted any reference to the very interesting fact that the court, at first, had reached the opposite conclusion. Topeka, Kansas. THOMAS R. BEMAN.

from civil wrongs, threatened, or irremediable if redress be long delayed, in the whirl and clash of twentieth century progress, and the greater satisfaction afforded a client, when the practitioner is able to speedily obtain for him such a remedy, constitute the strongest recommendations for a meritorious publication of this character." The purpose of this treatise is therefore thoroughly practical. Mr. Spelling writes with the confidence of one who knows fully all the intricate workings of his subject and is therefore the master not he slave of the mass of authorities, which confuse the ordinary practitioner. On almost any other subject of law a digest of the cases is practically all that a lawyer needs, but on the question of extraordinary remedies, depending, as they do, in great measure on the discretion of the court, no simple list of precedents will suffice. Careful discrimination and analysis of decided cases and consideration of equitable and legal questions involved are needed, and these by a man competent for his work. In this regard Mr. Spelling's work takes rank as one of the highest authorities on the law of extraordinary remedies to which the profession has any access. The revised edition has been greatly enlarged and carefully revised. It will undoubtedly commend itself to the bench and bar throughout the country. Printed in two volumes of 1894 pages and bound in the best quality of law sheep. Published by Little & Brown & Co., Boston, Mass.

BOOK REVIEWS.

WAPLE'S PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE.

A new edition of the excellent work on parliament ary law has just come under our observation. The subject of this little treatise, now eighteen years old, is a most important one to laymen and lawyers alike. The law of order in deliberative assemblies is not dependent upon arbitrary rules and meaningless forms, as has been often supposed, but is founded upon rea son and established precedent. Mr. Waple's book proceeds upon the recognition of the law as a science, and is therefore the more easily mastered and retained in the memory. We regard this book the highest and clearest authority on this important subject. Printed in one volume of 306 pages, duodecimo size, and bound in cloth. Published by Callaghan & Co., Chicago, Ill.

SPELLING ON EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES.

No subject is more important to litigant or lawyer than the one covered by the work which is the sub ject of this review. It is a practical treatise on injunctions and other extraordinary remedies in cluding habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, by Thomas Carl Spelling, of the San Francisco Bar. The constant strain and most extended use to which these extraordinary remedies have been subjected of late years suggests that they are becoming the most ordinary remedies for a large class of civil wrongs. The remedy by injunction, especially, bas, in recent years, come into such common use, that men are tempted to regard the writ as no longer a measure of extraordinary relief in equity, and are in danger of looking at it as a matter of right in law. Mr. Spelling, however, has

BOOKS RECEIVED.

The American State Reports, Containing the Cases of General Value and Authority Subsequent to Those Contained in the "American Decisions" and the "American Reports," Decided in the Courts of Last Resort of the Several States. Selected, Reported, and Annotated, by A. C. Freeman, and the Associate Editors of the "American Decisions." Vol. LXXX. San Francisco: Bancroft Whitney Company, Law Publishers and Law Book Sellers, 1901. Sheep. Price, $1.00. Review will follow.

WEEKLY DIGEST.

Weekly Digest of ALL the Current Opinions of ALL the bisie and Territorial Courts of Last Resort, and of all the Federal Courts ALABAMA, 3, 19, 21, 25, 27, 45, 53, 54, 63, 65. 87, 90, 106, 123, 131, 132, 150, 153, 161, 162, 183, 184, 196, 198, 198, 205, 208, 210

ARKANSAS

CALIFORNIA. GEORGIA

.33

...7, 61, 81, 85, 118, 135, 173 ..13, 60, 69, 69. 125, 167, 179, 214 INDIANA.........8. 30, 31, 32, 42, 44, 52, 62 102, 107, 195, 203 LOUISIANA, 9, 10, 29. 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 41, 43, 49, 56, 59, 64, 75, 76 77, 89, 91 92, 93, 96, 99, 103, 109, 110, 111, 113, 114, 116, 117, 128, 134, 150, 148, 152, 150, 163, 161, 165, 166, 171, 175, 177, 178, 181, 187, 197, 212 MISSISSIPPI..

NEBRASKA NEW JERSEY..

23

........... 1, 2, 12, 16, 97, 145, 169, 170 154, 186 NEW YORK, 22, 28, 51, 79, 82, 83, 86, 98, 129, 141, 143, 149, 159 172, 180, 189, 190, 191, 192, 209

1. ABATEMENT-Revival Limitation.- Where an action is not revived within a year, the court may strike it from the docket.-PETERS V. HUFF, Neb., 87 N. W. Rep. 184.

2. ABATEMENT AND REVIVAL-Striking Case from Docket.-Striking action from docket for failure to revive on death of party not equivalent to dismissing case.-PETERS V. HUFF, Neb., 87 N. W. Rep. 184.

3. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS-Corporation-Notary a Stockholder. It is no ground for collateral attack on a deed to a corporation that the notary public taking ac knowledgment was a stockholder.-NATIONAL BUILDING & LOAN ASSN. V. CUNNINGHAM, Ala., 30 South. Rep. 335.

4. ACKNOWLEDGMENT-Omission of Notary's Address. -Under Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. § 4533, the omis sion of the notary's place of residence in a certificate of acknowledgment is not a material defect.-GRIFFIN V. CATLIN, Wash., 65 Pac. Rep. 755.

5. ACTION Parties -Authority-Relief.-Where an action is not authorized by one of the parties plaintiff, no relief should be granted as to him.-TOOLE V. JOHNSON, S. Car., 39 S. E. Rep. 254.

6. ADVERSE POSSESSION-Hitching Horses.- Where for 50 years persons attending a church hitched their horses on adjoining land, such use was not adverse possession which would give the church title.HEARN V. JONES, Tenn., 64 S. W. Rep. 344.

7. AGRICULTURE-Killing Insects on Trees.-In an action to foreclose a lien on realty for killing insects on the defendant's fruit trees, the fact that the petition contained a prayer for a personal judgment did not vitiate it.-RIVERSIDE COUNTY v. BUTCHER, Cal., 65 Pac. Rep. 745.

8. APPEAL AND ERROR-Ambiguous Instructions.No reversal will be had for ambiguities in instructions in a criminal case, where it is clear the instructions as an entirety did not prejudice appellant and the verdict was justified by the evidence.-MUSSER V. STATE, Ind., 61 N. E. Rep. 1.

9. APPEAL AND ERROR-Attorney's Fees.-Where no attempt was made to prove attorney's fees below, they will not be considered on appeal.-SWAIN V. WEBRE, La., 30 South. Rep. 331.

10 APPEAL AND ERROR-Bonds-Where two appeals are granted in one order and one bond is filed, the order, and bond suffices for one appeal, though the other is dismissed.-MACKIN V. WILDS, La., 30 South. Rep. 257.

16. APPEAL AND ERROR-Finding of Fact.-Findings on questions of fact will not be reviewed without a bill of exceptions.-UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN V. MCGUCKIN, Neb., 87 N. W. Rep. 180.

17. APPEAL AND ERROR-From Nunc Pro Tune Order. An appeal lies from a nune pro tunc order amend. ing a decree entered on default, where the nc pro tunc order was void.-HoOVER V. HOOVER, Oreg., 65 Pac. Rep. 796.

18. APPEAL- Remanding - Duty of Trial Court. Where a judgment of conviction had been affirmed by the appellate court, the lower court on remand cannot vacate it.-STATE V. BOYCE, Wash., 65 Pac. Rep. 763.

19. APPEAL AND ERROR-Special Findings.-Where a case is tried to the court, and a special finding of facts is not asked, and bill of exceptions fail to show exceptions taken to the judgment, it cannot be reviewed. WESTERN UNION TEL. Co. v. WHITE, Ala., 30 South. Rep. 279.

20. APPEAL AND ERROR-Sufficiency of Plea.- Where no question is made below as to sufficiency of a ples, none can be made on appeal.-SMITH V. CARMACK, Tenn., 64 8. W. Rep. 372.

21. ARREST

Escaped Convict.-A sheriff has au. thority to arrest an escaped convict at any time, and is allowed reasonable time thereafter within which to deliver such convict to the hirer of county convicts. -MCQUEEN V. STATE, Ala., 30 South. Rep. 414.

22. ASSIGNMENTS-Agreement as to Probate of Will. -Agreement by executrix and residuary legatee with attorneys as to probate of will held not an equitable assignment of a portion of her interest under the will, so as to authorize them to compel an accounting by her as executrix.-IN RE SHAFER, N. Y., 71 N. Y. Sup. 1033.

23. ASSIGNMENT - Contingent Fee.-In a suit to set off a judgment, where the party obtaining it had agreed to give his attorneys 40 per cent. of the judgment recovered, held that there was an equitable assign. ment in præsenti to defendant's a torneys.-HARRIS V. HAZELHURST OIL-MILL & MFG. CO., Miss., 30 South. Rep. 273.

24. ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS-Insur. ance Policies.-Where a warehouseman, includes cer. tain insurance policies in a trust deed for benefit of creditors, their rights will be governed thereby.SMITH V. CARMACK, Tenn., 64 S.-W. Rep. 872.

25. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-License of Attorney.-A complaint against a lawyer, charging him with engag. ing in practicing law, without having procurred or paid a license, held not demurrable.-ALDRICH V. CNY OF CULLMAN, Ala., 30 South. Rep. 415.

Waiver. The

26. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT - Lien parting with possession of a client's papers by an attorney waives the latter's lien for his compensation given thereon.-GOTTSTEIN V. HARRINGTON, Wash., 65 Pac. Rep. 753,

27. BAILMENT-Hiring Animals-Conversion.-Where a person hires an animal for a specified work and for a definite time, and uses it for other labor and for a longer time, it constitutes conversion.-LEDBETTER V. THOMAS, Ala., 30 South. Rep. 342.

28. BANKRUPTCY -Discharge-Incorrect Schedule.Debt held not discharged, where a schedule gives a debtor's name incorrectly.—LISEUM ▼. KRAUS, N. Y., 71 N. Y. Supp. 1022.

29. BILLS OF LADING-Varying by Parol Evidence.