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in which that phrase is employed.” 5 Stat. 726" 554. As no error appears in the trial of the acThe different states were, of necessity, compelled tion, the judgment of the court below is affirmed. to extend this rule, to a greater or less extent, to Affirmed. their inland streams, and to such coastal waters as are not within federal jurisdiction. The rule NOTE.- What are Navigable Waters. The subject now most generally adopted, and that which of this annotation has been the bone of one of the seems best fitted to our own domestic conditions,
most celebrated controversies that has arisen out of is that all water courses are regarded as navi
our English common law. The general rule of law is gable in law that are navigable in fact. That is,
that navigable waters belong to the crown or state
while non-navigable waters are the property of that the public have a right to the unobstructed
adjoining owners. But what is the test of navigabil. navigation as a public highway, for all purposes
ity? In England only such streams were considered of pleasure or profit, of all water courses, whether
navigable in which the tide ebbed and flowed. Over tidal or inland, ihat are in their natural condition suoh waters the king or the state had absolute sov. capable of such use. The navigability of a water ereignty and the title to the bed and shores up to the course is therefore largely a question of fact for high-water mark was in the king. Later a distinction the jury, and its best test is the extent to which it
began to be recognized between waters inavigable in has been so used by the public when unrestrained.
law, wbich referred only to tidal waters and waters
navigable in fact, which referred to bodies or streams And yet it would seem tbat there must be some
of fresh water which were actually capable of naviga. element of a public highway, and its navigation
tion, whether the tide ebbed or flowed in them or not. must be in some degree required by the neces
Over such waters the state or public were said to have sity or convenience of the public. It sbould not on casement or right of highway by prescription. depend entirely upon the personal wbim of an Williams v. Wilcox, 8 Ad. & El. 314, 333; Woolrych on individual. We are not prepared to say that a Waters, 31. The latter authority says: “Waters flow. landowner would be liable to criminal prosecution ing inland, where the public have been used to exer: because he happened to put a water gate across a
cise a free right of passage from time whereof the creek up which otherwise an idle hunter might be
memory of man is not to the contrary, or by virtue of able to pole a canoe, nor are we now deal
legislative enactments, are public navigable rivers."
Navigability in this last sense had reference only to ing with any right except that of simple navi
the use of the stream as a public highway,-the own. gation. It appears from the evidence that the
ership of the bed and all other proprietary rigbts public were in the habit of passing through North were resident in the adjoining owners. Lord Denman Sand Cove before it was stopped up, and that by expressed in this rule succinctly in Williams v, Wil. its use and distance from one part of the sound to cox, supra: "It is clear that the channels of public anotber was shortened, and navigation rendered navigable rivers were always highways: up to the safer in rough weather. These conditions con
point reached by the flow of the tide the soil was in stitute ample evidence of a navigable stream.
the crown, and, above that point, in the owners of the
| adjacent lands. In either case, the right of the sub. Gould, Waters, $$ 42, 43, 54, 57, 60, 86; Ang.
ject to pass up and down was complete." This is the Water Courses, $$ 537, 541, 550; Wood, Nuis. $$
state of the law on this subject as it exists to-day in 451-456; Wilson v. Forbes, 13 N. Car. 30; Collins
England. It is also the rule adopted by many of the v. Benbury, 25 N. Car. 277; Id., 27 N. Car. 118; states of the American Union, especially the smaller Fagan v. Armistead, 23 N. Car. 433; Lewis v. states of the east. Mill River Co. v. Smith, 34 Conn. Keeling, 46 N. Car. 299; State v. Glen, 52 V. Car. 463; Norway Plains Co. v. Bradley, 52 N. H. 86; 321; State v. Parrott, 71 N. Car. 311; Broadnax v. Fletcher v. Phelps, 28 Vt. 257, 262; Holden v. Manu. Baker, 94 N. Car.1675; State v. Narrows Island
facturing Co., 65 Me. 215; Carter v. Thurston, 58 Club, supra; Hodges v. Williams, 95 N. Car. 331;
N. H. 104; Commonwealth v. Vincent, 108 Mass. 441,
447; Welles v. Bailey, 55 Conn. 292;/Veazle v. Dwinel, McLanghin v. Manufacturing Co., 103 N. Car. 100,
50 Me. 479; Wyandauch Ciub v. Davis, 53 N. Y. $.993; 9 S. E. Rep. 307; State v. Eason, 114 N. Car. 787,
Cobb v. Davenport, 32 N. J. L. 369; Bickel v. Polk, 5 19 S. E. Kep. 88, 23 L. R. A. 520; Burke Co. Harr. (Del.) 325; Goodsell v. Lawson, 42 Md. 348; Comʻrs v. Catawba Lumber Co., 116 N. Car. 731, Chenango Bridge Co. v. Paige, 83 N. Y. 178; Houck 21 S. E. Rep. 941; Farmers' Co-operative Mfg. v. Yates, 82 III. 179; Kiskaskia Commons v. McClure, Co. v. Albemarle & R. R. Co., 117 N. Car. 579 167 III. 23; Williamson v. Haskell, 50 Mich. 361; Lake 23 S. E. Rep. 43, 29 L. R. A. 700; Stanton v!
Shore R. R. Co. v. Platt, 53 Obio St. 254; Allen v. Wimberly, 122 N. Car. 107, 29 S. E. Rep. 63.
Weber, 80 Wis. 531. It might be stated, however, Many of these cases do not involve directly the
that one requirement of the common-law right of
navigation over inland waters, i. e., that it must be right of navigation, as they relate principally to
required by long user or prescription, has, for obvious other matters, such as the right of entry or fish
reasons, been disregarded in applying the same rule ing, but they all tend more or less accurately to in this country. In all these states the owners of show the distinction in this state between navi lands situated on the banks of navigable streams owns gable and non-navigable water courses. That the the river beds, subject to the public right of naviga. obstruction of a navigable stream is a public nui tion. In nearly all the other states of the union, sance is well settled by reason and authority. | where this question has been decided, the common. State v. Dibble, 49 N. Car. 107; State v. Parrott,
Jaw rule has been rejected, and all navigable waters, 71 N. Car. 311; State v. Narrows Island Club,
i. e., those waters which are navigable in fact
or which do or which may afford a channel for com. supra; Wood, Nuis. $$ 478, 483, 484; Gould,
merce,-belong to the state in fee, the rights of Waters, $$ 91, 94, 140; Ang. Water Courses, $ I riparian owners extending only to the low water mark. Allegheny City v. Moorehead, 80 Pa. St. 118; | 64 N. H. 545; Lewis v. Coffee Co., 77 Ala. 190, 54 Am. State v. Tomlinson, 77 N. Car. 58; In re Garnett, 141 Rep. 55; Lancey v. Clifford, 54 Me. 487, 92 Am. Dec. U.S. 1; McMapns/v. Carmichael, 83 Iowa, 1; Benson 561; Town of Pierrepont v. Loveless, 72 N. Y. 211; v. Morrow, 61 Mo. 345; Webb v. Demopolis, 95 Ala. Shaw v. Iron Co., 10 Oreg. 371, 45 Am. Rep. 146; 116; Renwick v. Railroad, 49 Iowa, 664, 669; Habn v. Gatson v. Mace, 33 W. Va. 14; Weatherby v, Meikle. Dawson, 134 Mo. 581; Gilbert v. Emerson, 55 Minn. Jobn, 56 Wis. 73. In American River Water Co. v. 254; St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Ramsey, 53 Ark. 314; Weise Amsden, 6 Cal. 443, bowever, it was held that while a v. Iron Co., 13 Oreg. 496; Shoemaker v. Hatch, 13 stream is navigable which can float rafts of lumber, Nev. 261; Wood v. Fowler, 26 Kan. 682; Bucki v. It is not so if it only have capacity for floating logs Cone, 25 Fla. 1; Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255; Heck. and planks. But see contra: Deddrick v. Wood, 16 man v. Smett, 99 Cal. 303, 32 Cent. L. J. 284, 297. Pa. St. 9. But whether we enbrace within the legal meaning
On the question whether streams periodically navi. of the term "navigability” the proprietary right of
gable are navigable in law is a question on which the the government in the bed of the streams as well
authorities are not harmonious. The great lumber as the right of easement to the use of the stream as a states are inclined to take the position that a stream public highway, or only the latter signification, the
is navigable if it is valuable as a highway of com. test of the navigability is the same in one case as in the merce at any period of the year. Holden v. Manu. other. The ebb and flow of the tide is absolutely no facturing Co., 65 Me. 216; Walker v. Allen, 72 Alatest at all of the navigability of waters in this country
456; Felger v. Veazie, 3 Oreg. 457; Little Rock v. under any phase of the question,-the final and con Brooks, 39 Ark. 403; Olson v. Merrill, 42 Wis. 203; clusive test in all such cases is whether the stream is
Sbaw v. Oswego Iron Co., 10 Oreg. 371; Thunder navigable in fact. This last question is sometimes River Booming Co. v. Speechly, 31 Mich. 336, 18 Am one of great difficulty and can most satisfactorily Rep. 184; Brown v. Chadbourne, 31 Me. 9; Smith v. be answered by a review of the decided cases. The
Fonda, 64 Miss. 551. The rule announced in these general rule on this subject was very accurately laid states is well stated by Danforth J., in Holden v. down by Justice Field in the case of The Daniel Manufacturing Co., supra, as follows: "In order to Ball, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 557, 563, where he states: make a stream floatable, it is not necessary that it “Those rivers must be regarded as public baviga. should be so at all seasons of the year. It is sufficient it ble rivers in law which are navigable in fact. Ard
it have that character at different periods with rea. they are navigable in fact when they are used, cr are sonable certainty and for such length of time as to susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condi.
make it profitable for that purpose." In other states tion, as highways for commerce, over which trade and
in which the lumber interests are not important this travel are or may be conducted in the customary rule is denied. Hubbard v. Bell, 54 III, 110,5 Am. modes of trade and travel on water." In Carter y. Rep. 98; Cardwell v. Sacramento Co., 79 Cal. 347. See Thurston, 58 N. H. 104, 42 Am. Rep. 584, it was held case of Hanies v. Hall, 17 Oreg. 165, for a full and inthat any stream capable of being generally and com. etresting discussion of the question of streams perimonly useful for some purpose of trade, and the odically floatable. In that case the court limits the transportation of property, whether by steamers, or doctrine of the earlier cases decided in that state. sailing vessels, or oarboats, or rafts, is a public An interesting case, very similar in its facts to the stream. But is also necessary that, to consti. principal case, is that of Toledo Liberal Shoottute a stream as navigable, the commerce passing ing Co. v. Erie Shooting Club, 90 Fed. over it, or capable of being transported over it, must Rep. 680, where it was held that a bayon be of an essentially valuable character. Woodman an area of one of the Great Lakes, some 4,000 acres in 9. Pittman, 79 Me. 456; Burrows v. Gallup, 32 Conn. extent, which was patented to the state as swamp 493; Rowe v. Granite Bridge, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 344. land, and which, though of sufficient depth for Thus a pass or crevasse caused by the overflow of the navigation where it open into the lake, is throughout Mississippi river,through which a few fishermen have the remainder of its extent of an average depth of not occasionally gone with small vessels and through more than two feet, and rarely more than three feet, which one or two cargoes of timbers may have passed, and is covered through the summer with grass and but which has not been used for any purpose of in. rushes, is not navigable water, but merely a marsh, erstate commerce, does not constitute a navigable and subject to private ownership. So also in the very water in the sense that a dam erected therein similar case of Niles v. Cedar Point Club, 85 Fed. for the purpose of reclaiming overflow lands will Rep. 45. constitute an obstruction in navigable waters, within the prohibition of act of congress of 1890. Leavy v.
JETSAM AND FLOTSAM. United States, 177 U. S. 621, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 797, reversing 92 Fed. Rep. 344. But in order to be a
CROSS-EXAMINATION. navigable stream it is not necessary that the waters There is an old saying that advice is cheap and shall be deep enough to admit the passage of boats at
therefore easily given. In the practice of the law this all portions of the stream. St. Anthony Falls Water
is not so, as many will testify to. In this short talk Power Co. v. St. Paul, 168 U. S. 349, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. on the subject of cross examination, I will note that 157; Walker v. Allen, 72 Ala. 456; Broadpax v. Baker,
the little advice I propose to set out in this article 94 N. Car. 675, 55 Am. Rep. 633; Brown v. Chad: was not cheap to me. On the other hand it came bourne, 31. Me. 925, 50 Am. Dec. 641. Thus in tbe tirst
from years of work. It came also from blunders and ease cited it was held that the Mississippi,in the region disappointments. While it will not be my purpose to of the falls of St. Anthony, Minn., is to be classed as a speak of these blunders and disappointments, I do navigable river, being navigable in its natural state trust what little I have to say will save some young both above and below the falls and the adjacent
attorney from similar troubles and annoyances. But rapids. So, also, waters wbich are capable only of
after all, the young attorney can learn to cross exfloating rafts and logs are public highways, at least
amine bis witnesses in one way only, and that is by for that purpose. Thompson v. Androscoggin Co., practice. Yet he must be familiar with certain prin
ciples. He must know something of the law. Hard junior, “does not consist in repeating in a louder tone work and close observation will make him in the the examination in chief." course of time proficient.
However annoying the cross-examination of a wit. I will say at the outset that while the examination ness may be, or however difficult it may be to get the in chief of a witness is a very important matter, yet questions answered properly, it is a safe rule to keep in many cases the cross-examination of that same a good temper. When a man gets mad, be is apt to be witness by the lawyer on the other side is equally as
insulting. When a lawyer loses his temper, he not important and sometimes much more difficult to con
only injures himself with the jury and witness, too, duet with the proper degree of skill and safety. And but he is the laughing stock of the profession, for he it is reasonable and proper to ask, why should great
then places himself at the mercy of all. I am sorry importance be attached to the cross.examination of to say it, but I know a certain lawyer who is so bigh. witnesses in & trial, whether the case be a civil or
strung" and easily provoked that the very first thing criminal one? It is very evident from the manner in
his brother attorneys on the other side of the case do which we often see tbis kind of examination carried
is to get him mad, and then they usually have things on, that the examiner himselt does not realize its im.
all their own way. portance.
Wher one begins to think of the many things of
many kinds connected with the cross-examination of The power of cross-examination has been justly
witnesses, he finds special rules for special cases to be said to be one of the principal, as it certainly is one
rare occurrences. While the general law is ever the of the most efficacious tests, which the law has de.
game, we find no two witnesses alike. Next to a vised for the discovery of truth. By means of it the
sound knowledge of the law, we would say that good situation of the witness with respect to the parties
common sense and a knowledge of human nature are and to the subject of litigation, his interest, his mo
absolutely essential, I could say more along this line, tives, his inclinations and prejudices, bis manner of
for surely more can be said, and then the subject obtaining certain knowledge of the facts to which he
show little signs of exhaustion.-North Carolina Lav bears testimony, the manner in which be used those
Journal. means, his powers of discernment, memory and de. scription, are all fully investigated and ascertained,
LUNATIC BANKRUPTS. and submitted to the consideration of the jury, be.
In spite of the fact that the law of lunacy was the fore whom he has testified, and wbo have thus had an
subject of a consolidated enactment so recently as the opportunity of observiug his demeanor and of deter.
year 1890, followed by an important amending statute mining the just weight and value of his testimony. It
in the year 1891, there is still no branch of the law of is not easy for a witness who is subjected to this test
greater intricacy or more beset with pitfalls at every to impose on a court or jury, for however artful the turn than that relating to lunatics. But when the fabrication of falsehood may be it cannot embrace
element of insolvency is also introduced, the combi. all the circumstances to which a cross-examination nation gives rise to complex problems both of law and may be extended.
practice of quite exceptional difficulty. Most of
these arise out of the contest which generally ensues Therefore, in the object of the cross-examination,
between the creditors of the lunatic and his commit. which is to break the force or destroy the effect of the
tee, the former struggling to secure the lunatic's testimony given by the witness upon his direct ex.
property before it gets beyond reach of their amination, or to lay the foundation for testimony of
attack, the latter striving to save the lunatic's estate other witnesses, is readily seen its great importance.
from his creditors in order to provide for the lunatic's Now, conceding the fact that cross-examination is maintenance. & very important matter, it should not be forgotten It does not make the solution of these problems any that there lurks around it more or less daüger, and easier when one reflects that the main question which blunders made there ofttimes are costly and well nigh really lies at the root of most of them, namely, irremediable. While examining a witness in chief the whether a lunatic can commit an act of bankruptcy fewer the questions, generally speaking, put by the and be adjudicated bankrupt thereon, bas been, lawyer, the better for him and his client, with the since it was tirst raised a hundretl years ago, and still cross-examination it is different. The examiner is is, an open one. Moreover, the courts do not seem obliged to ask questions and questions, and keep mov. particularly inclined to face it, since, though it was ing all the time. He can pot hold one position long | clearly raised in Re Farnbam (No. 1) (1895), 2 Ch. 799, at a time. He lurks around the witness, as it were, the court of appeal said it might as well remain open firing a sbot here and there, and then falling back a little longer, and decided the case on a different as it in retreat, and when he sees the advantage ground. takes it and tbat quickly. It is possible to make mis. There is nothing either in the lunacy or in the bank. takes tbat may ruin the case. Sometimes a question ruptcy acts which gives any guidance in these mat. may bring out matter overlooked by the other side, ters. The only reference to lunacy in the bankruptcy and as I have seen it often, with young inexperi. acts is in section 148 of the Act of 1883, which enced men, that instead of weakening the case of their provides that for all the purposes of that act a lunatic opponent they succeed by blunders in giving to it may act by his committee or curator bonis, and in strength, to the injury of themselves and their clients. section 2 (2) of the Act of 1890, which enables the Sometimes, for example, a witness is called upon, on court to make a special order as to public examipa. his cross-examination, to explain this or that. If the tion of a lunatic. This latter provision certainly ap. matter without explanation does not injure you, it pears to assume the possibility of a lunatic being made is best to pass it by unnoticed. Explanations, when a bankrupt, but it is doubtful whether it does you do not know your ground are dangerous, par. not merely refer to the particular case in which ticularly, when ibey rebound and injure you. “It is a lunatic may be made bankrupt at the instance of his a good rule," says a writer "never to put a question committee, a point which will be noticed later on. in cross.examination without giving a reason for Viewing the matter from the practical standpoint it.” “Cross-examination,” said a learned judge to & of the creditor whose only anxiety is to get his money, not much light will be thrown upon the subject gent, and gets it into his control before the lunacy, by discussing the abstract question of whether a there will be nothing left for the lunatic, since tbe lunatic can be made bankrupt. It is very rare to court in lunacy has no jurisdiction to interfere with find a creditor who wishes to indulge in litigation the bankruptcy court, and will not attempt to take which can only end in the house of lords. The the property out of the hands of the creditors for practical question of creditors is how far the lunacy the benefit of the lunatic. Re Farnbam (No.2), 44 overrides their common-law rights and the right W. R. 836. which the bankruptcy law gives them to get control Now, as regards the cases in which bankruptcy fol. of the debtor's property and have it applied in dis: 1 lows lunacy, there is at least one case in which this charge of the debtor's obligations. In considering may, without doubt, occur, and that is where the this question, it is very material to remember that committee of a lunatic proceeds, with the leave of the there is a well-established principle upon which the court, to wind up the lunatic's affairs in bankruptcy. court of lunacy always deals with the claims of the This he has undoubtedly power to do, if it is for the lunatic's creditore, in cases where tbe estate is insoly. benefit of the lunatic. Re James, 12 Q. B. D. 332; ent. The moment the lunatic's property becomes Re Aytoun, 36 L. J. Newspaper, 407. But this is a subject to the jurisdiction of the lunacy court, the power specially conferred under the lunacy jurisdicprimary consideration is, what is for the benefit of tion, and every step in the proceedings must be cop. the lunatic! The lunatic's benefit comes first, the trolled by the lunacy court. If, for instance, after creditor's interest second, and unless there is suffi. filing, with leave a declaration of inability to pay cient to provide ample maintenance for the lunatic, debts, the committee desires to consent to an adjudi. the creditor's claims will not be paid. This principle cation upon & petition presented by a creditor, he has been established by a long series of decisions, and ought not to do so without the leave of the court. was clearly enunciated in Re Plenderleith, 42 W.R. Re Aytoun. 224, and more recently still by Rigby, L. J., in Re R. Now it is possible that the interests of the lunatic S. A. (1901), 1 Q. B. 35. But the lunacy only affects and of the creditors may coincide, and that bankruptcy the creditor through its control over the debtor's may be desirable, as in Re Aytoun, where it was property. The creditor may still pursue all his ordi. judged for the benefit of the lunatic to be made nary remedies against the lunatic, it he pleases, suing a bankrupt in order that his property might be him to judgment, issuing execution and getting realized, when it was anticipated that all his creditors charging orders; but if he has to bave recourse in would be paid and a surplus provided for his mainte. pursuing his remedies to the lunacy jurisdiction, bis pance. If the creditor is lucky enough to find a com. claim will be controlled by the principle before
mittee willing to take this view, he may safely stated.
proceed by way or bankruptcy. This was done in Re This, then, is how the matter stands when there is
Lee, 28 Ch. D. 326, where the committee had unsucinsolvency but no bankruptcy. In such cases the
cessfully carried on the lunatic's business, and a position of the creditor is a dificult one. There are
creditor put in an execution and then filed a bank. three courses open to him. He can come in under
ruptcy petition, whereupon the committee applied the lunacy and carry in and prove his claim on the
to the court in lunacy for leave to consent to adjudi. inquiry as to debts of the lunatic which is generally
cation. This was granted. instituted by the master. Rules in Lupacy, 1892, r. 33.
But it is difficult to see, even assuming that a luna. If he has reason to think that the whole of the debt.
tic can commit an act of bankruptcy and be adjudior's property is in the control of the lunacy court,
cated bankrupt, what a creditor can gain by a this is probably big best and cheapest course. On the
bankruptcy where there is already a lunacy under other hand, he may pursue his ordinary remedy, sue
the lunacy jurisdiction. If the committee has done the debtor to judgment, and obtain charging orders
his duty he will have reduced all the lunatic's on his property. It is possible that such a charging
property into his own control, and there will be order may be made effectual, in spite of the lupacy, if
nothing for administration by the trustee in bank. the creditor can put it in force against the property of
ruptcy, unless he can manage to grasp something the debtor not yet reduced into the control of the
which falls in afterwards. In fact, except in those lunacy court; for the only limitation to a judgment
cases in wbich a lunatic is made bankrupt at the creditor's right to reach the property of the lunatic
instance of his committee, bankruptcy is adverse to, by ordinary writs of the execution is the condition
and inconsistent with, the administration of the estate that in doing so he must not interfere with the pos.
in lunacy, and this is really the strongest argument session of an officer of the court of lunacy. So in Re
against the possibility of making a lunatic bankrupt. Brown, 48 W. R. 461, a creditor successfully enforced
Of course, different considerations arise where there a charging order against a fund paid into court in an .
is no official lunacy, and neither the lunatic nor his administration action, and the balance only of the
property are under control of the lunacy jurisdiction. fund was transferred to the lunacy. Moreover, charg.
Such cases will not very likely often occur, but in ing orders upon the lunatic's property, even if it be
a case of this kind, it certainly seems that a creditor under the control of the lunacy, may eventually be.
might successfully and profitably proceed in bank. come effectual if the lunatic dies or recovers. Re
ruptcy. There might be some difficulty about proving Plenderleith, supra.
an act of bankruptcy; but an act of bankruptcy When lunacy is complicated not merely by insolv.
committed in a lucid interval, even it involving ency but by bankruptcy, it is important to consider
intention, would certainly be available, and it is separately the cases ju which bankruptcy precedes
difficult to see why an act of bankruptcy in invitum, lunacy, and those in which, asssuming for the moment
such an execution, should not be equally so, even if these can arise, lunacy precedes bankruptcy. When there is no lucid interval. a man is make a bankrupt, and lunacy supervenes, the position of the creditor is a much stronger one than in the converse one; for upon bankruptcy bis estate vests in his trustee, and if the trustee !s dili.
This work is one of the most important additions to legal literature that has yet been published. It will be bailed with delight by the active practitioner who has anything to do with the federal courts. Its scope is wide and exhaustive. It is a complete treatise on the procedure in suits in equity in the circuit courts of the United States including appeals and appellate procedure, with appendixes containing the constitution of the United States annotated, federal judiciary acts, court rules, equity forms and English orders in chancery, by C. L. Bates of the San Antonto bar. There has certainly been a demand for such a treatise. During the last twenty-five years, the really great and important property litigation in this country bas been cbiefly in suits in equity in the federal courts, and such litigation is likely to increase with the progress of the country. The procedure in such suits is the same, in all the states of the union; and the busy practitioner has often felt the need of a work furnishing readily a complete and comprehensive statement of the rules of procedure in suits in federal equity. The aim of the author has been, as he states in his preface, "to state fully the procedure in the prosecution and defense of a suit in federal equity, with all its incidents and minor details from the preparation and filing of the bill to and including the final decree, and appeal and appellate procedure." That the author has most satisfactorily carried out his aim and purpose in writing the book a glance through its pages will be most convincing. The style is clear and the statements of the law are made with the positiveness of one who knows what he is talking about, and the citation of authorities evidences the greatest accuracy and the most careful discrimination. It is a book that can be relied upon. We are, therefore, very strong in our opinions that this treatise will ultimately become the bigbest authority on federal equity procedure. Printed in two volumes of 1,402 pages and bound in extra quality of law sheep. Published by T. H. Flood & Co., Chicago, Ill. HUFFCUTT ON AGENCY.
A second edition, revised and enlarged, of this splendid little work on Agency has just issued from the press. Its purpose, as the author succinctly observes, “is to set forth the manner in which obliga. tions are incurred or rights acquired through the acts of agents and servants." Book I. deals with the law of principal and agent; Book II. with the law of master and servant. Book II. appears for the first time in this edition and Book I. has been largely rewritten: the whole, therefore, constituting practi. cally a new work. One volume, 456 pages, bound in the best quality of law sheep. Published by Little, Brown & Co., Boston, Mass.
Not his is the bone they are fighting for,
And why should the judge satl in,
To lose in strife and chagrin.
To see it quite in this light;
The outside judge in the fight.
That think it is quiet the thing
And hop right into the ring;
In regard to the wrong or the right,
-Legal Intelligencer. “Your letters to me,” said bis affianced bride one day, "are so cold and formal.”
“Surely, my dear,” exclaimed the lawyer, stung by her reproach, “when they are published after my death they will be found to be models of composition, breathing the most exalted sentiments and couched in absolutely correct English.”
In a little western town, the other day, says the Argonaut, the most popular citizen soundly whipped a tough character, and to vindicate the majesty of the law the offender was brought up for trial. The jury was out about two minutes. “Well," said the judge, “what have the jury to say?" "May it please the court," responded the foreman, “we the jury find tbat the prisoner is not guilty of bittin' with intent to kill, but simply to paralyze; and he done it." The verdict was received with applause, and the prisoner received an ovation.
In a suit recently brought in the Kansas district court at Marion for the recovery of the price of a cork leg, the defendant was released from payment on showing that the leg was a misfit. On the testi. mony of the defendant that the leg made him walk like a “step-and-go fetch it," the jury also awarded him $5 damages.
FEMININE BARRISTERS. "That's very well done,” he said when the sweet young thing wbo bad interested herself in the law submitted the paper to him, “but you have overlooked one thing."
"What's tbat?" she askerl.
“You do not say at the conclusion, 'And further affiant saith not.""
"But I stop, don't I?" she demanded.
“Well, I should think any one of sense could see that when atfiant quits talking he has stopped."
“If a person said "That's the end' every time he finished a statement in conversation people would think he was a fool, wouldn't taey?".
"Of course, but you see-"
“When you close a letter you don't have to say 'Here's the finish,' do you!"
“No; but in law it's different.” "Well, if the judges are so stupid they've got to be told when the end is reached, I'll just write •Finis.' That's prettier, anyway." “But it won't do."
“Then you can keep your old law books,” she ex. claimed petulantly. “And you can keep your old