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in which that phrase is employed." 5 Stat. 726° The different states were, of necessity, compelled to extend this rule, to a greater or less extent, to their inland streams, and to such coastal waters as are not within federal jurisdiction. The rule now most generally adopted, and that which seems best fitted to our own domestic conditions, is that all water courses are regarded as navigable in law that are navigable in fact. That is, that the public have a right to the unobstructed navigation as a public highway, for all purposes of pleasure or profit, of all water courses, whether tidal or inland, that are in their natural condition capable of such use. The navigability of a water course is therefore largely a question of fact for the jury, and its best test is the extent to which it has been so used by the public when unrestrained. And yet it would seem that there must be some element of a public highway, and its navigation must be in some degree required by the necessity or convenience of the public. It should not depend entirely upon the personal whim of an individual. We are not prepared to say that a landowner would be liable to criminal prosecution because he happened to put a water gate across a creek up which otherwise an idle hunter might be able to pole a canoe, nor are we now dealing with any right except that of simple navigation. It appears from the evidence that the public were in the habit of passing through North Sand Cove before it was stopped up, and that by its use and distance from one part of the sound to another was shortened, and navigation rendered safer in rough weather. These conditions constitute ample evidence of a navigable stream. Gould, Waters, §§ 42, 43, 54, 57, 60, 86; Ang. Water Courses, §§ 537, 541, 550; Wood, Nuis. §§ 451-456; Wilson v. Forbes, 13 N. Car. 30; Collins v. Benbury, 25 N. Car. 277; Id., 27 N. Car. 118; Fagan v. Armistead, 23 N. Car. 433; Lewis v. Keeling, 46 N. Car. 299; State v. Glen, 52 N. Car. 321; State v. Parrott, 71 N. Car. 311; Broadnax v. Baker, 94 N. Car.1675; State v. Narrows Island Club, supra; Hodges v. Williams, 95 N. Car. 331; McLaughin v. Manufacturing Co., 103 N. Car. 100, 9 S. E. Rep. 307; State v. Eason, 114 N. Car. 787, 19 S. E. Kep. 88, 23 L. R. A. 520; Burke Co. Com'rs v. Catawba Lumber Co., 116 N. Car. 731, 21 S. E. Rep. 941; Farmers' Co-operative Mfg. Co. v. Albemarle & R. R. Co., 117 N. Car. 579 23 S. E. Rep. 43, 29 L. R. A. 700; Stanton v Wimberly, 122 N. Car. 107, 29 S. E. Rep. 63. Many of these cases do not involve directly the right of navigation, as they relate principally to other matters, such as the right of entry or fishing, but they all tend more or less accurately to show the distinction in this state between navigable and non-navigable water courses. That the obstruction of a navigable stream is a public nuisance is well settled by reason and authority. State v. Dibble, 49 N. Car. 107; State v. Parrott, 71 N. Car. 311; State v. Narrows Island Club, supra; Wood, Nuis. §§ 478, 483, 484; Gould, Waters, §§ 91, 94, 140; Ang. Water Courses, §

554. As no error appears in the trial of the action, the judgment of the court below is affirmed. Affirmed.

NOTE. What are Navigable Waters.-The subject of this annotation has been the bone of one of the most celebrated controversies that has arisen out of our English common law. The general rule of law is that navigable waters belong to the crown or state while non-navigable waters are the property of adjoining owners. But what is the test of navigabil. ity? In England only such streams were considered navigable in which the tide ebbed and flowed. Over such waters the king or the state had absolute sov. ereignty and the title to the bed and shores up to the high-water mark was in the king. Later a distinction began to be recognized between waters navigable in law, which referred only to tidal waters and waters navigable in fact, which referred to bodies or streams of fresh water which were actually capable of navigation, whether the tide ebbed or flowed in them or not. Over such waters the state or public were said to have on casement or right of highway by prescription. Williams v. Wilcox, 8 Ad. & El. 314, 333; Woolrych on Waters, 31. The latter authority says: "Waters flow. ing inland, where the public have been used to exercise a free right of passage from time whereof the memory of man is not to the contrary, or by virtue of legislative enactments, are public navigable rivers." Navigability in this last sense had reference only to the use of the stream as a public highway,-the ownership of the bed and all other proprietary rights were resident in the adjoining owners. Lord Denman expressed in this rule succinctly in Williams v. Wilcox, supra: "It is clear that the channels of public navigable rivers were always highways: up to the point reached by the flow of the tide the soil was in the crown, and, above that point, in the owners of the adjacent lands. In either case, the right of the subject to pass up and down was complete." This is the state of the law on this subject as it exists to-day in England. It is also the rule adopted by many of the states of the American Union, especially the smaller states of the east. Mill River Co. v. Smith, 34 Conn. 463; Norway Plains Co. v. Bradley, 52 N. H. 86; Fletcher v. Phelps, 28 Vt. 257, 262; Holden v. Manufacturing Co., 65 Me. 215; Carter v. Thurston, 58 N. H. 104; Commonwealth v. Vincent, 108 Mass. 441, 447; Welles v. Bailey, 55 Conn. 292; Veazle v. Dwinel, 50 Me. 479; Wyandauch Ciub v. Davis, 53 N. Y. S. 993; Cobb v. Davenport, 32 N. J. L. 369; Bickel v. Polk, 5 Harr. (Del.) 325; Goodsell v. Lawson, 42 Md. 348; Chenango Bridge Co. v. Paige, 83 N. Y. 178; Houck v. Yates, 82 Ill. 179; Kaskaskia Commons v. McClure, 167 Ill. 23; Williamson v. Haskell, 50 Mich. 364; Lake Shore R. R. Co. v. Platt, 53 Ohio St. 254; Allen v. Weber, 80 Wis. 531. It might be stated, however, that one requirement of the common-law right of navigation over inland waters, i. e., that it must be required by long user or prescription, has, for obvious reasons, been disregarded in applying the same rule in this country. In all these states the owners of lands situated on the banks of navigable streams owns the river beds, subject to the public right of naviga tion. In nearly all the other states of the union, where this question has been decided, the commonlaw rule has been rejected, and all navigable waters, i. e., those waters which are navigable in fact or which do or which may afford a channel for commerce,-belong to the state in fee, the rights of riparian owners extending only to the low water

mark. Allegheny City v. Moorehead, 80 Pa. St. 118; State v. Tomlinson, 77 N. Car. 58; In re Garnett, 141 U. S. 1; McManns v. Carmichael, 83 Iowa, 1; Benson v. Morrow, 61 Mo. 345; Webb v. Demopolis, 95 Ala. 116; Renwick v. Railroad, 49 Iowa, 664, 669; Hahn v. Dawson, 134 Mo. 581; Gilbert v. Emerson, 55 Minn. 254; St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Ramsey, 53 Ark. 314; Weise v. Iron Co., 13 Oreg. 496; Shoemaker v. Hatch, 13 Nev. 261; Wood v. Fowler, 26 Kan. 682; Bucki v. Cone, 25 Fla. 1; Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255; Heckman v. Smett, 99 Cal. 303, 32 Cent. L. J. 284, 297.

But whether we enbrace within the legal meaning of the term "navigability" the proprietary right of the government in the bed of the streams as well as the right of easement to the use of the stream as a public highway, or only the latter signification, the test of the navigability is the same in one case as in the other. The ebb and flow of the tide is absolutely no test at all of the navigability of waters in this country under any phase of the question,-the final and conclusive test in all such cases is whether the stream is navigable in fact. This last question is sometimes one of great difficulty and can most satisfactorily be answered by a review of the decided cases. The general rule on this subject was very accurately laid down by Justice Field in the case of The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 557, 563, where he states: "Those rivers must be regarded as public naviga. ble rivers in law which are navigable in fact. Ard they are navigable in fact when they are used, cr are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condi tion, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water." In Carter v. Thurston, 58 N. H. 104, 42 Am. Rep. 584, it was held that any stream capable of being generally and commonly useful for some purpose of trade, and the transportation of property, whether by steamers, or sailing vessels, or oarboats, or rafts, is a public stream. But is also necessary that, to constitute a stream as navigable, the commerce passing over it, or capable of being transported over it, must be of an essentially valuable character. Woodman v. Pittman, 79 Me. 456; Burrows v. Gallup, 32 Conn. 493; Rowe v. Granite Bridge, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 344. Thus a pass or crevasse caused by the overflow of the Mississippi river,through which a few fishermen have occasionally gone with small vessels and through which one or two cargoes of timbers may have passed, but which has not been used for any purpose of inerstate commerce, does not constitute a navigable water in the sense that a dam erected therein for the purpose of reclaiming overflow lands will constitute an obstruction in navigable waters, within the prohibition of act of congress of 1890. Leavy v. United States, 177 U. S. 621, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 797, reversing 92 Fed. Rep. 344. But in order to be a navigable stream it is not necessary that the waters shall be deep enough to admit the passage of boats at all portions of the stream. St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v. St. Paul, 168 U. S. 349, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 157; Walker v. Allen, 72 Ala. 456; Broadnax v. Baker, 94 N. Car. 675, 55 Am. Rep. 633; Brown v. Chadbourne, 31 Me. 925, 50 Am. Dec. 641. Thus in the first ease cited it was held that the Mississippi,in the region of the falls of St. Anthony, Minn., is to be classed as a navigable river, being navigable in its natural state both above and below the falls and the adjacent rapids. So, also, waters which are capable only of floating rafts and logs are public highways, at least for that purpose. Thompson v. Androscoggin Co.,

54 N. H. 545; Lewis v. Coffee Co., 77 Ala. 190, 54 Am. Rep. 55; Lancey v. Clifford, 54 Me. 487, 92 Am. Dec. 561; Town of Pierrepont v. Loveless, 72 N. Y. 211; Shaw v. Iron Co., 10 Oreg. 371, 45 Am. Rep. 146; Gatson v. Mace, 33 W. Va. 14; Weatherby v. MeikleJohn, 56 Wis. 73. In American River Water Co. v. Amsden, 6 Cal. 443, however, it was held that while a stream is navigable which can float rafts of lumber, it is not so if it only have capacity for floating logs and planks. But see contra: Deddrick v. Wood, 15 Pa. St. 9.

On the question whether streams periodically navigable are navigable in law is a question on which the authorities are not harmonious. The great lumber states are inclined to take the position that a stream is navigable if it is valuable as a highway of commerce at any period of the year. Holden v. Manufacturing Co., 65 Me. 216; Walker v. Allen, 72 Ala456; Felger v. Veazie, 3 Oreg. 457; Little Rock v. Brooks, 39 Ark. 403; Olson v. Merrill, 42 Wis. 203; Shaw v. Oswego Iron Co., 10 Oreg. 371; Thunder River Booming Co. v. Speechly, 31 Mich. 336, 18 Am Rep. 184; Brown v. Chadbourne, 31 Me. 9; Smith v. Fonda, 64 Miss. 551. The rule announced in these states is well stated by Danforth J., in Holden v. Manufacturing Co., supra, as follows: "In order to make a stream floatable, it is not necessary that it should be so at all seasons of the year. It is sufficient if it have that character at different periods with reasonable certainty and for such length of time as to make it profitable for that purpose." In other states in which the lumber interests are not important this rule is denied. Hubbard v. Bell, 54 Ill. 110,5 Am. Rep. 98; Cardwell v. Sacramento Co., 79 Cal. 347. See case of Hanies v. Hall, 17 Oreg. 165, for a full and inetresting discussion of the question of streams periodically floatable. In that case the court limits the doctrine of the earlier cases decided in that state. An interesting case, very similar in its facts to the principal case, is that of Toledo Liberal Shoot

ing Co. V. Erie Shooting Club, 90 Fed. Rep. 680, where it was held that a bay on an area of one of the Great Lakes, some 4,000 acres in extent, which was patented to the state as swamp land, and which, though of sufficient depth for navigation where it open into the lake, is throughout the remainder of its extent of an average depth of not more than two feet, and rarely more than three feet, and is covered through the summer with grass and rushes, is not navigable water, but merely a marsh, and subject to private ownership. So also in the very similar case of Niles v. Cedar Point Club, 85 Fed. Rep. 45.

JETSAM AND FLOTSAM.

CROSS-EXAMINATION.

There is an old saying that advice is cheap and therefore easily given. In the practice of the law this is not so, as many will testify to. In this short talk on the subject of cross examination, I will note that the little advice I propose to set out in this article was not cheap to me. On the other hand it came from years of work. It came also from blunders and disappointments. While it will not be my purpose to speak of these blunders and disappointments, I do trust what little I have to say will save some young attorney from similar troubles and annoyances. But after all, the young attorney can learn to cross examine his witnesses in one way only, and that is by practice. Yet he must be familiar with certain prin

ciples. He must know something of the law. Hard work and close observation will make him in the course of time proficient.

I will say at the outset that while the examination in chief of a witness is a very important matter, yet in many cases the cross-examination of that same witness by the lawyer on the other side is equally as important and sometimes much more difficult to conduct with the proper degree of skill and safety. And it is reasonable and proper to ask, why should great importance be attached to the cross-examination of witnesses in a trial, whether the case be a civil or criminal one? It is very evident from the manner in which we often see this kind of examination carried on, that the examiner himself does not realize its importance.

The power of cross-examination has been justly said to be one of the principal, as it certainly is one of the most efficacious tests, which the law has devised for the discovery of truth. By means of it the situation of the witness with respect to the parties and to the subject of litigation, his interest, his motives, his inclinations and prejudices, his manner of obtaining certain knowledge of the facts to which he bears testimony, the manner in which be used those means, his powers of discernment, memory and description, are all fully investigated and ascertained, and submitted to the consideration of the jury, before whom he has testified, and who have thus had an opportunity of observing his demeanor and of deter mining the just weight and value of his testimony. It is not easy for a witness who is subjected to this test to impose on a court or jury, for however artful the fabrication of falsehood may be it cannot embrace all the circumstances to which a cross-examination may be extended.

Therefore, in the object of the cross-examination, which is to break the force or destroy the effect of the testimony given by the witness upon his direct examination, or to lay the foundation for testimony of other witnesses, is readily seen its great importance.

Now, conceding the fact that cross-examination is a very important matter, it should not be forgotten that there lurks around it more or less danger, and blunders made there ofttimes are costly and well nigh irremediable. While examining a witness in chief the fewer the questions, generally speaking, put by the lawyer, the better for him and his client, with the cross-examination it is different. The examiner is obliged to ask questions and questions, and keep moving all the time. He can not hold one position long at a time. He lurks around the witness, as it were, firing a shot here and there, and then falling back as if in retreat, and when he sees the advantage takes it and that quickly. It is possible to make mistakes that may ruin the case. Sometimes a question may bring out matter overlooked by the other side, and as I have seen it often, with young inexperi enced men, that instead of weakening the case of their opponent they succeed by blunders in giving to it strength, to the injury of themselves and their clients. Sometimes, for example, a witness is called upon, on his cross-examination, to explain this or that. If the matter without explanation does not injure you, it

junior, "does not consist in repeating in a louder tone the examination in chief."

However annoying the cross-examination of a witness may be, or however difficult it may be to get the questions answered properly, it is a safe rule to keep a good temper. When a man gets mad, he is apt to be insulting. When a lawyer loses his temper, he not only injures himself with the jury and witness, too, but he is the laughing stock of the profession, for he then places himself at the mercy of all. I am sorry to say it, but I know a certain lawyer who is so "highstrung" and easily provoked that the very first thing his brother attorneys on the other side of the case do is to get him mad, and then they usually have things all their own way.

Wher one begins to think of the many things of many kinds connected with the cross-examination of witnesses, he finds special rules for special cases to be rare occurrences. While the general law is ever the same, we find no two witnesses alike. Next to a sound knowledge of the law, we would say that good common sense and a knowledge of human nature are absolutely essential. I could say more along this line, for surely more can be said, and then the subject show little signs of exhaustion.-North Carolina Law Journal.

LUNATIC BANKRUPTS.

In spite of the fact that the law of lunacy was the subject of a consolidated enactment so recently as the year 1890, followed by an important amending statute in the year 1891, there is still no branch of the law of greater intricacy or more beset with pitfalls at every turn than that relating to lunatics. But when the element of insolvency is also introduced, the combination gives rise to complex problems both of law and practice of quite exceptional difficulty. Most of these arise out of the contest which generally ensues between the creditors of the lunatic and his commit. tee, the former struggling to secure the lunatic's property before it gets beyond reach of their attack, the latter striving to save the lunatic's estate from his creditors in order to provide for the lunatic's maintenance.

It does not make the solution of these problems any easier when one reflects that the main question which really lies at the root of most of them, namely, whether a lunatic can commit an act of bankruptcy and be adjudicated bankrupt thereon, has been, since it was first raised a hundred years ago, and still is, an open one. Moreover, the courts do not seem particularly inclined to face it, since, though it was clearly raised in Re Farnham (No. 1) (1895), 2 Ch. 799, the court of appeal said it might as well remain open a little longer, and decided the case on a different ground.

There is nothing either in the lunacy or in the bankruptcy acts which gives any guidance in these matters. The only reference to lunacy in the bankruptcy acts is in section 148 of the Act of 1883, which provides that for all the purposes of that act a lunatic may act by his committee or curator bonis, and in section 2 (2) of the Act of 1890, which enables the court to make a special order as to public examina tion of a lunatic. This latter provision certainly ap pears to assume the possibility of a lunatic being made

not much light will be thrown upon the subject by discussing the abstract question of whether a lunatic can be made bankrupt. It is very rare to find a creditor who wishes to indulge in litigation which can only end in the house of lords. The practical question of creditors is how far the lunacy overrides their common-law rights and the right which the bankruptcy law gives them to get control of the debtor's property and have it applied in dis charge of the debtor's obligations. In considering this question, it is very material to remember that there is a well-established principle upon which the court of lunacy always deals with the claims of the lunatic's creditors, in cases where the estate is insoly. ent. The moment the lunatic's property becomes subject to the jurisdiction of the lunacy court, the primary consideration is, what is for the benefit of the lunatic? The lunatic's benefit comes first, the creditor's interest second, and unless there is suffi cient to provide ample maintenance for the lunatic, the creditor's claims will not be paid. This principle has been established by a long series of decisions, and was clearly enunciated in Re Plenderleith, 42 W. R. 224, and more recently still by Rigby, L. J., in Re R. S. A. (1901), 1 Q. B. 35. But the lunacy only affects the creditor through its control over the debtor's property. The creditor may still pursue all his ordinary remedies against the lunatic, if he pleases, suing him to judgment, issuing execution and getting charging orders; but if he has to have recourse in pursuing his remedies to the lunacy jurisdiction, his claim will be controlled by the principle before stated.

This, then, is how the matter stands when there is insolvency but no bankruptcy. In such cases the position of the creditor is a difficult one. There are three courses open to him. He can come in under the lunacy and carry in and prove his claim on the inquiry as to debts of the lunatic which is generally instituted by the master. Rules in Lunacy, 1892, r. 33. If he has reason to think that the whole of the debtor's property is in the control of the lunacy court, this is probably his best and cheapest course. On the other hand, he may pursue his ordinary remedy, sue the debtor to judgment, and obtain charging orders on his property. It is possible that such a charging order may be made effectual, in spite of the lunacy, if the creditor can put it in force against the property of the debtor not yet reduced into the control of the lunacy court; for the only limitation to a judgment creditor's right to reach the property of the lunatic by ordinary writs of the execution is the condition that in doing so he must not interfere with the possession of an officer of the court of lunacy. So in Re Brown, 48 W. R. 461, a creditor successfully enforced a charging order against a fund paid into court in an administration action, and the balance only of the fund was transferred to the lunacy. Moreover, charg ing orders upon the lunatic's property, even if it be under the control of the lunacy, may eventually be. come effectual if the lunatic dies or recovers. Re Plenderleith, supra.

When lunacy is complicated not merely by insolv. ency but by bankruptcy, it is important to consider separately the cases in which bankruptcy precedes lunacy, and those in which, asssuming for the moment these can arise, lunacy precedes bankruptcy. When a man is make a bankrupt, and lunacy supervenes, the position of the creditor is a much stronger one than in the converse one; for upon bankruptcy his estate vests in his trustee, and if the trustee is dili

gent, and gets it into his control before the lunacy, there will be nothing left for the lunatic, since the court in lunacy has no jurisdiction to interfere with the bankruptcy court, and will not attempt to take the property out of the hands of the creditors for the benefit of the lunatic. Re Farnham (No. 2), 44 W. R. 836.

Now, as regards the cases in which bankruptcy fol. lows lunacy, there is at least one case in which this may, without doubt, occur, and that is where the committee of a lunatic proceeds, with the leave of the court, to wind up the lunatic's affairs in bankruptcy. This he has undoubtedly power to do, if it is for the benefit of the lunatic. Re James, 12 Q. B. D. 332; Re Aytoun, 36 L. J. Newspaper, 407. But this is a power specially conferred under the lunacy jurisdiction, and every step in the proceedings must be controlled by the lunacy court. If, for instance, after filing, with leave a declaration of inability to pay debts, the committee desires to consent to an adjudication upon a petition presented by a creditor, he ought not to do so without the leave of the court. Re Aytoun.

Now it is possible that the interests of the lunatic and of the creditors may coincide, and that bankruptcy may be desirable, as in Re Aytoun, where it was judged for the benefit of the lunatic to be made a bankrupt in order that his property might be realized, when it was anticipated that all his creditors would be paid and a surplus provided for his maintenance. If the creditor is lucky enough to find a com. mittee willing to take this view, he may safely proceed by way or bankruptcy. This was done in Re Lee, 23 Ch. D. 326,1where the committee had unsuc cessfully carried on the lunatic's business, and a creditor put in an execution and then filed a bankruptcy petition, whereupon the committee applied to the court in lunacy for leave to consent to adjudication. This was granted.

But it is difficult to see, even assuming that a lunatic can commit an act of bankruptcy and be adjudicated bankrupt, what a creditor can gain by a bankruptcy where there is already a lunacy under the lunacy jurisdiction. If the committee has done his duty he will have reduced all the lunatic's property into his own control, and there will be nothing for administration by the trustee in bankruptcy, unless he can manage to grasp something which falls in afterwards. In fact, except in those cases in which a lunatic is made bankrupt at the instance of his committee, bankruptcy is adverse to, and inconsistent with, the administration of the estate in lunacy, and this is really the strongest argument against the possibility of making a lunatic bankrupt. Of course, different considerations arise where there is no official lunacy, and neither the lunatic nor his property are under control of the lunacy jurisdiction. Such cases will not very likely often occur, but in a case of this kind, it certainly seems that a creditor might successfully and profitably proceed in bankruptcy. There might be some difficulty about proving an act of bankruptcy; but an act of bankruptcy committed in a lucid interval, even if involving intention, would certainly be available, and it is difficult to see why an act of bankruptcy in invitum, such an execution, should not be equally so, even if there is no lucid interval.

BOOK REVIEWS.

BATES ON FEDERAL EQUITY PROCEDURE. This work is one of the most important additions to legal literature that has yet been published. It will be hailed with delight by the active practitioner who has anything to do with the federal courts. Its scope is wide and exhaustive. It is a complete treatise on the procedure in suits in equity in the circuit courts of the United States including appeals and appellate procedure, with appendixes containing the constitution of the United States annotated, federal judiciary acts, court rules, equity forms and English orders in chancery, by C. L. Bates of the San Antonio bar. There has certainly been a demand for such a treatise. During the last twenty-five years, the really great and important property litigation in this country has been chiefly in suits in equity in the federal courts, and such litigation is likely to increase with the progress of the country. The procedure in such suits is the same, in all the states of the union; and the busy practitioner has often felt the need of a work furnishing readily a complete and comprehensive statement of the rules of procedure in suits in federal equity. The aim of the author has been, as he states in his preface, "to state fully the procedure in the prosecution and defense of a suit in federal equity, with all its incidents and minor details from the preparation and filing of the bill to and including the final decree, and appeal and appellate procedure." That the author has most satisfactorily carried out his aim and purpose in writing the book a glance through its pages will be most convincing. The style is clear and the statements of the law are made with the positiveness of one who knows what he is talking about, and the citation of authorities evidences the greatest accuracy and the most careful discrimination. It is a book that can be relied upon. We are, therefore, very strong in our opinions that this treatise will ultimately become the highest authority on federal equity procedure. Printed in two volumes of 1,402 pages and bound in extra quality of law sheep. Published by T. H. Flood & Co., Chicago, Ill.

HUFFCUTT ON AGENCY.

A second edition, revised and enlarged, of this splendid little work on Agency has just issued from the press. Its purpose, as the author succinctly observes, "is to set forth the manner in which obligations are incurred or rights acquired through the acts of agents and servants." Book I. deals with the law of principal and agent; Book II. with the law of master and servant. Book II. appears for the first time in this edition and Book I. has been largely rewritten: the whole, therefore, constituting practically a new work. One volume, 456 pages, bound in the best quality of law sheep. Published by Little, Brown & Co., Boston, Mass.

HUMORS OF THE LAW.

"THAT NICE old judge."

You may sing of the judge, common pleas judge,

Not his is the bone they are fighting for,
And why should the judge sail in,
With nothing to gain, but a chance, perhaps,
To lose in strife and chagrin.
There may be a few, perhaps, who fail
To see it quite in this light;
But when the fur flies, I'd rather be

The outside judge in the fight.

I know there are some-of judges I speak-
That think it is quiet the thing
To take the part of one in the fight,
And hop right into the ring;
But I care not a hair what any may say,
In regard to the wrong or the right,
My judgment goes, as well as my rhyme,
For the judge that keeps out of the fight.
-Legal Intelligencer.
"Your letters to me," said his affianced bride one
day, "are so cold and formal."

"Surely, my dear," exclaimed the lawyer, stung by her reproach, "when they are published after my death they will be found to be models of composition, breathing the most exalted sentiments and couched in absolutely correct English."

In a little western town, the other day, says the Argonaut, the most popular citizen soundly whipped a tough character, and to vindicate the majesty of the law the offender was brought up for trial. The jury was out about two minutes. "Well," said the judge, "what have the jury to say?" "May it please the court," responded the foreman, "we the jury find that the prisoner is not guilty of hittin' with intent to kill, but simply to paralyze; and he done it." The verdict was received with applause, and the prisoner received an ovation.

In a suit recently brought in the Kansas district court at Marion for the recovery of the price of a cork leg, the defendant was released from payment on showing that the leg was a mistit. On the testimony of the defendant that the leg made him walk like a "step-and-go-fetch it," the jury also awarded him $5 damages.

FEMININE BARRISTERS.

"That's very well done," he said when the sweet young thing who had interested herself in the law submitted the paper to him, "but you have overlooked one thing."

"What's that?" she asked.

"You do not say at the conclusion, 'And further affiant saith not.'"

"But I stop, don't I?" she demanded. "Oh, yes."

"And I put the signature in?"

"Yes."

"Well, I should think any one of sense could see that when affiant quits talking he has stopped." "Yes, but-"}

"If a person said 'That's the end' every time he finished a statement in conversation people would think he was a fool, wouldn't they?"

"Of course, but you see-"

"When you close a letter you don't have to say 'Here's the finish,' do you?”

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