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138. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Public Contracts How Made.-Under St. 1896, ch. 415, an ordinance directing with whom a contract for printing shall be made is invalid.-Goddard v. CITY OF LOWELL, Mass., 61 N. E. Rep. 53.

139. NEGLIGENCE-Store-Injuries to Customer. - In an action by a customer for injuries sustained in falling down an open stairway in defendant's shop, evidence held to sustain a finding of negligence of defendant.-TOLAND V. PAINE FURNITURE Co., Mass., 61 N. E. Rep. 52.

140. SALES-Agreed Price-Recovery Not a Quantum Valebat.-Where a complaint alleges a sale of goods at an agreed price, and that the whole amount is due and unpaid, recovery must be had on the express contract alleged, and not on a quantum valebat.-TILDEN V. GOR. DON & CO., Wash., 66 Pac. Rep. 50.

141. NEW TRIAL Specification of Error.- Under Comp. Laws, § 5090, where the statement of intention to move for new trial contains no specifications of error, it is unavailing on the motion for a new trial-NELSON V. JORDETH, S. Dak., 87 N. W. Rep. 140.

142. NEW TRIAL-Statement.-Under Code Civ. Proc., § 1054, the judge can grant an extension of time to prepare a statement on motion for new trial only to one who is not in default.- FREESE V. FREESE, Cal., 66 Pac. Rep. 43.

143. PARTNERSHIP- Accounting - Limitations.- Rill to settle partnarship accounts may be filed within six years after actual dissolution, or from a partnership transaction on account.-DUGGER V. TUT WILER, Ala., 30 South. Rep. 91.

144. PARTNERSHIP-Agreement to Divide Fee-Consideration. Where partnership is formed to buy land, agreement of partners that fee to be paid one of the partners for effecting the sale should be divided among all the partners held supported by a sufficient consideration.-DUGGER V. TUTWILER, Ala., 30 South.

Rep. 91.

145. PARTNERSHIP-Proof of Relation - Testimony of Alleged Partners.-In an action against alleged copartners it was error to refuse to allow defendants to testify as to relations existing between them.SCHOLTZ V. FREUD, Mich., 87 N. W. Rep. 130.

146. PLEADING Amendment - Matter of Right.Where a complaint is bad for not showing jurisdiction an amended complaint is a matter of right, is a new pleading, and becomes the complaint in the action.JOHN W. SIMMONS V. CO. COSTELLO, 71 N. Y. Supp. 577. 147. PLEDGES-Bonds-Conversion.- A pledgee of railroad bonds payable to bearer does not convert such bonds by causing them to be registered in his own name.-RITCHIE v. BURKE, U. S. C. C., N. D. (Ohio), 108 Fed. Rep. 16.

148. PLEDGES Note- Conversion.- Liability of Pledgee.-Pledgee of note held liable for its conver. sion, without payment or tender of the debt for which the note was pledged.-MEYER BROS. Drug Co. v. MATTHEWS, Ark., 64 S. W. Rep. 264.

149. PLEDGES-Note-Pledgor's Liability for Debt.Pledgor of a note, the possession of which the pledgee parted with without authority, held to be liable for the amount of the debt for which it was pledged.-MEYER BROS. DRUG Co. v. MATTHEWS, Ark., 64 Pac. Rep. 264. 150. POWER OF ATTORNEY-Stamp Requirements.Note, with power of attorney authorizing confession of judgment attached thereto, held not within act June 13, 1898, requiring powers of attorney to be stamped.-TOLMAN V. TREAT, U. S. C. C., S. D. (N. Y.), 109 Fed. Rep. 80.

151. PUBLIC LANDS-U. S. Patent v. State Certificate. -Under St. 1873 74, p. 827, a certificate by the register of the state land office to a tract of land as swamp land, which had previously been patented by the United States to a settler was void.-FREDERICKS V. ZUMWALT, Cal., 66 Pac. Rep. 38.

152. RECEIVERS-Adequate Remedy-Discretion of Court.-Appointment of receiver is in the discretion of the court, where there is a probability that person asking therefor will succeed, and there is no other adequate remedy or means of accomplishing the desired object.-MEYER V. THOMAS, Ala., 30 South. Rep. 89.

153. RECEIVERS.-Corporations-Right of Equity to Appoint.-Chancery has no jurisdiction to sequester the property of a corporation by means of a receiver outside of that specially conferred by statute.-DAVIDSON V. JOHN GOOD CORDAGE & MACHINE CO., 71 N. Y. Supp. 565.

154. REMOVAL OF CAUSES - Petition for RemovalRecord. Where a case removed from a state court is taken to a circuit court of appeals for review the peti tion for removal is an essential part of the record to enable the court to determine its jurisdiction.-LARNED V. JENKINS, U. S. C. C. of App., Eighth Circuit, 109 Fed. Rep. 100.

155. REPLEVIN - Ownership by Third Party - Dis missal. Where, in a suit to recover chattels, the evi dence showed that neither plaintiff nor defendant had title, and defendants were in possession for a third party, held error not to dismiss the complaint.-LEVY V. KELTER, 71 N. Y. Supp. 509.

156. SALVAGE-Towing-Disabled Bark.-The towing of a partially disabled bark into port by a steamer on request of the master of the bark held to be a towing, and not a salvage service. - THE J. C. PFLUGER, U. s. D. C., N. D. (Cal.), 109 Fed. Rep. 93.

157. SCHOOL AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS-School FundsApportionment. -The apportionment of school funds under Pol. Code, § 1858, subd. 4, must be based on the average daily attendance in the primary and gram. mar schools of the district, to the exclusion of the night and high schools. -STOCKTON SCHOOL DIST. OF SAN JOUQUIN COUNTY V. WRIGHT, Cal., 66 Pac. Rep. 34. 158. SEDUCTION-Conditional Promise to Marry.There is no seduction if prosecutrix submitted in reliance of defense special promise of marriage in the event of pregnancy, though the parties were engaged to marry at the time of the special promise.-PEOPLE v. RYAN, 71 N. Y. Supp. 527.

159. SHIPPING-Barge-Lost Through Unseaworthiness. A carrier by water held not liable for loss of cargo by the sinking of a barge through its unsea. worthiness under the term of the bills of lading.-THE ARCTIC BIRD, U. S. D. C., N. D. (Cal.), 109 Fed. Rep. 167.

160. SHIPPING-Barge-Presumption of Unseaworthiness.-The sinking of a barge six hours after starting on a voyage and while being towed in smooth water held presumptively due to her unseaworthiness at the commencement of the voyage. -THE ARCTIC BIRD, U. S. D. C., N. D. (Cal.), 109 Fed. Rep. 167.

161. SHIPPING Ten Days' Notice of Loss - Reasonable Regulation.-A provision of a bill of lading requiring notice of any claim for loss or injury to the goods to be given within 10 days after such loss or injury is known to the shipper is reasonable and valid. -THE ARCTIC BIRD, U. S. D. C., N. D. (Cal.), 109 Fed. Rep. 167.

162. SHIPS AND SHIPPING-Master-Wages.-The master of a dredge which was incapable of being nav. igated, held entitled to a lien on the vessel for his wages.-THE JOHN MCDERMOTT, U. 8. D. C., D. (Conn.), 109 Fed. Rep. 90.

163. SHIPS AND SHIPPING - Voluntary Towage-Com. pensation. The master and crew are not entitled to share in an award made for a voluntary towage serv. ice performed for a partially disabled vessel, but not as a salvage service.-THE J. C. PFLUGER, U. S. D. C., N. D. (Cal), 109 Fed. Rep. 93.

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to tow a bark, which was partially disabled, into port, the service delaying her for eight hours, held entitled to an award. -THE J. C. Pfluger, U. S. D. C., N. D. (Cal.), 109 Fed. Rep. 93.

165. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE - Sale of Plantation.-A contract for the sale of a plantation as a going concern, including stock, implements, and supplies, for a fixed sum, may be specifically enforced in equity as an entirety.-BROWN V. SMITH, U. S. C. C., D. (8. Car.), 109 Fed. Rep. 26.

166. STATUTES- General Statute Repealing Special Act.-Laws 1899, p. 133, entitled "An act to provide for the confirmation of titles to real estate," being a general statute, does not repeal Sand. & H. Dig. ch. 25, relating solely to confirmation of tax titles.-EX PARTE MORRISON, Ark., 64 S. W. Rep. 270.

167. STATUTES Interpretation-General Purpose.Where a statute is not framed with regard to the lan guage employed, the legislative will is to be ascer. tained from the text as a whole, interpreted in view of the general object and purpose of the act, and not from the literal meaning of the words of the statute alone.-CHERRY POINT FISH Co. v. NELSON, Wash., 66 Pac. Rep. 55.

168. STATUTES-Time of Taking Effect.-A legislative act, to take effect immediately, is of force from the beginning of the day on which it was enacted.-IN RE BOYCE, Wash., 66 Pac. Rep. 54.

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171. STREET RAILROADS - Injuries Right of Way."-Where a street railroad has a "para. mount right of way" in a street at a point where its rails pass a cul de sac, such right must be exercised with view to the surroundings.-HEWLETT V. BROOK. LYN HEIGHTS R. Co., 71 N. Y. Supp. 531.

172. SUBROGATION-Right of Vendee of Land Taken by Grantor's Creditors.-Where one, purchasing land from a grantor who acquired his title by judicial sale, did not have the transfer registered, he was not entitled to subrogation, on seizure of the land by his grantor's creditors.-AYMETT V. CITIZENS' NAT. BANK, Tenn., 64 S. W. Rep. 302.

173. TAXATION - Assessment - - Hearing.-The Massachusetts statute for the assessment and collection of taxes held not unconstitutional, because not giving taxpayer a chance to be heard.-HARRINGTON V. GLID. DEN, Mass., 64 N. E. Rep. 54.

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174. TAXATION Decree of Non-Liability Res Adjudicata.-A decree enjoining the collection of taxes levied in one year cannot be given effect as an adjudication of complainant's non-liability for similar taxes levied on the same property for similar taxes levied on the same property for a subsequent year.— MERCANTILE NAT. BANK V. LANDER, U. S. C. C., N. D. (Ohio), 109 Fed. Rep. 21.

175. TRADE LABELS-Use by Others-Loss of Right.The originator of a distinctive package or other dress for his goods, who has used the same generally and continuously for many years, does not lose his right to protection in its exclusive use because it has been used by others.-ACTIENGESELLSCHAFT-VEREINIGTE ULTRAMARIN-FABRIKEN V. AMBERG, U. S. C. C. of App., Third Circuit, 109 Fed. Rep. 151.

176. TRADE MARKS-Exclusive Use-Injunction.-A preliminary injunction will not be granted against the infringement of an alleged trade-mark, unless com.

plainant's right to its exclusive use is clearly established.-DIAMOND MATCH CO. V. SAFE HARBOR Match Co., U. S. C. C., E. D. (Pa.), 109 Fed. Rep. 154.

177. TRADE NAMES -Becoming a Descriptive Term.The manufacturers of the original Singer sewing machines, by permitting the name to be applied to the machines themselves as a descriptive term, did not forfeit the right to prevent others from using it.SINGER MFG. Co. v. HIPPLE, U. S. C. C., E. D. (Pa.). 109 Fed. Rep. 152.

178. TRESPASS - Justification

- Specially Pleaded.In an action of trespass a defense of justification must be specially pleaded.-BARRET V. CITY OF MOBILE, Ala., 30 South. Rep. 36.

179. TRIAL-Instruction-Embodied in Another.-It is proper to refuse an instruction, the same proposition having been embodied in another instruction.-WILLIS V. METROPOLITAN ST. RY. Co., 71 N. Y. Supp. 554.

180. TRIAL-Jury-Withdrawing Case.-In a cause involving the title to real estate it was error to take the case from the jury.-NELSON V. JORDETH, S. Dak., 87 N. W. Rep. 140.

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181. TRIAL-Proper Instruction-Refusal.-The fusal of a proper instruction is not error, when the court fully explains the contention of the parties in an instruction given.-JARVIS V. FLINT & P. M. R. Co., Mich., 87 N. W. Rep. 136.

182. TROVER AND CONVERSION-Defense-Legal Au. thority. In trover, a defense that the conversion of property was under legal authority may be proven under the general issue.-BARRET V. CITY OF MOBILE, Ala., 30 South. Rep. 36.

183. TROVER AND CONVERSION-Property Sales-Conversion. Where a watch is stolen from one in posses sion thereof as a conditional purchaser, a subsequent demand by the seller for the return of the property on the falling due of an installment and the purchaser's failure to deliver do not show a conversion.-STERNBERG V. SCHIEN, 71 N. Y. Suppl. 511.

184. TRUSTS-Land Purchased With Wife's Money.Husband taking title to land purchased with his wife's money, a trust results to the wife, which may be proved by parol.-HANEY V. LEGG, Ala., 30 South. Rep.

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187. WILLS Bequest Insurance Policy-Right of Executrix.-Where testator bequeaths to his wife an insurance policy payable to his legal representatives or assigns, the proceeds of the policy go to the wife, instead of the executrix.-LEONARD V. HARNEY, 71 N. Y. Supp. 546.

188. WILLS-Devise to Husband and Wife in Trust for Children.- Devise of real estate to testatrix's son and his wife in trust for the support of themselves and children, children arriving at a certain age being en. titled to their share, does not create a valid trust.TREAT V. VOSE, 71 N. Y. Supp. 507.

189. WITNESSES Cross-Examination - Disparaging Questions. Disparaging questions to defendant on cross examination held within discretion of trial court.-MARKGRAF V. KLINGE, 71 N. Y. Supp. 590.

190. WITNESSES-Husband as Witness Against Wife. -In a suit to set aside a conveyance by a husband to his wife as in fraud of creditors, the husband is not competent as a witness against the wife.-VIRDEN V. DWYER, Miss., 30 South. Rep. 45.

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., NOVEMBER 1, 1901

The West Publishing Company has just issued a most beautiful little booklet, giving an interesting description of its great establishment, and an account of the remarkable growth of its business. The success of this enterprise is one of the marvels of the nineteenth century. Beginning in 1876 in the corner of one little basement room, it is today, cramped into three and one-half acres of floor space, and has acquired within that short period the enviable, but well merited, distinction of being the largest law-publishing house in the world.

But the lawyers of the country are not so much interested in the magnitude of this company's business or in the vast number of publications which it does or is able to turn out, as in the character and value of the books which it publishes and offers to the profession. Of the making of books there is no end, and this is just as true of law books as of any other kind of books. Good books however, are rare, and their publication is always a benefaction. In the law this is especially true, the lawyer of the present day having to depend more largely on the logic of cold type and precedent than ever before in the history of the profession. In this regard the West Publishing Company can, without any stretching of the truth, be considered a public benefactor, and is entitled to take very just pride in being the discoverer of the greatest and most useful of all legal inventions,-the National Reporter System and the American Digest System. These publications have become absolutely indispensable to every American lawyer whose practice is of any importance whatever.

lature itself. Besides being very often inaccurate these private reports were generally several years behind the decisions. The lawyer of the present day who sometimes learns to his cost what it is to be a few months behind the decisions, finds it hard to conceive of such a situation with any other feeling than that of amazement. The National Reporter System started with the Northwestern Reporter covering a small group of the northwestern states. It was some years later until the system was extended to embrace the entire country, the instant success of the idea encouraging this extension more than any other influence. This revolutionary idea was simply to report the decisions from a group of states in one "reporter," thus insuring a sufficient volume of matter to make pssible the weekly publication of "advance sheets" in pamphlet form. This also insured a clientele embracing the bar of several states, which justified a low subscription price. The editorial work on this system is its highest commendation. A most efficient corps of law editors qualified and trained for this particular field of legal work, read, correct and report the decisions of the different state courts immediately upon their receipt, with the proper syllabi and head notes. The accuracy and clearness of expression which so prominently characterizes this work has secured its general recognition in the citations of the courts and in the briefs of counsel. Especially is this So where the citations are from those states where the decisions are reported and the syllabi prepared by some salaried reporter instead of by the court. Indeed, we are willing to hazard the prediction that the general excellence, convenience and economy of this system will, in not a long distance in the future, result in its almost universal adoption for citation and authority.

Of the American Digest System little need be said either to recommend it or to predict its future. Both are absolutely established. As we have more than once said, the Century Digest and its annual continuations, besides being the most stupendous undertaking in the whole range of law publishing, are be

The National Reporter System has unquestionably revolutionized the whole plan of law reporting. The old system of reporting by local reporters, being generally on their own responsibility and at their own convenience, had little to recommend it, except to the fortunate reporter himself who had secured a private monopoly of a business whose impor-yond question, the most valuable tools of

tance to the lawyer is equalled only by the publication of the session acts of the legis

the American lawyer. This system embodies the most perfect system of law-digesting

ever invented. Its classification of the law has received the official indorsement of the American Bar Association, which, in 1900, recommended its universal adoption for all legal indexes and local digests. The inestimable advantages of such a system of digesting can hardly be fully appreciated by any but the busy practitioner. With the wide differences and increasing changes, together with the delicate modifications and constructions by judicial opinion, of the laws of the several states, the average lawyer is buried and bewildered under the very mass of it. To put into his hands such an index to all the law of his own state, or better still, of all the law of all the states, is like throwing a rope to a drowning man. He clutches at it with a sense of infinite relief and sees the expected labor of weeks melt away into the delightful labor of a few hours, and he plunges into his adversary with the feeling of confidence of a general who knows the strength of the enemy's position as well as he does his own.

We congratulate the West Publishing Company on its well merited success, and very cordially wish them a continuance of favor in the appreciation and patronage of the American bar.

NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS.

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FACTORS AND BROKERS-RIGHTS OF REAL ESTATE BROKER TO COMMISSION.-The difference between ordinary brokers and real estate brokers or agents as they are often called, is that the power of a real estate broker does not generally extend to execute a sale, but merely to bring the parties together or to negotiate for the contract. Morris v. Ruddy, 20 N. J. Eq. 236; Reitenberg v. Main, 47 Cal. 213. In the matter of compensation, therefore, a real estate broker has earned his commission, if he is the means of procuring a purchaser ready and willing to buy upon terms acceptable to the owner. Such was the decision in the recent case of Hubachek v. Hazzard, 86 N. W. Rep. 426, where the Supreme Court of Minnesota further held that if the agent is the procuring cause, the owner cannot sell at a less figure than that named to the agent, thereby escaping liability for the commission. The court said: "The point which appellants seem to insist upon is that, because Clark refused to pay $8,250, the agent's figures, the owner was at liberty to sell for $8,000, without liability for his agent's commission. But the various decisions of this court have established the rule that, if an

agent is instrumental in bringing together a proposed purchaser and seller, the fact that the owner himself made the sale would not release him from his responsibility to the agent for his commission as the procuring cause. While the identical question presented here is not raised in those cases, yet there can be no distinction for the underlying principle is the same. It is immaterial whether the owner sold at the same price or at a lower figure than given to the agent, for the agent might still remain the efficient cause of bringing the parties together. The case would present an entirely different aspect if the owner had refused to deal with the purchaser at the time in question, had dropped all proceedings connected with it, and afterwards, through some other source or from some other cause, negotiations were opened anew. In such case, the agent would not be the procuring cause or instrumental in bringing the parties together. Upon this question may be cited Wilkinson v. Martin, 8 Car. & P. 1; Murray v. Currie, 7 Car. & P. 584; Earp v. Cummins, 54 Pa. 394, 93 Am. Dec. 718; Martin v. Silliman, 53 N. Y. 615."

INJUNCTIONS-RIGHT TO INJUNCTION Where THERE IS A REMEDY AT LAW.-It is not a sufficient defense to an application for injunction that the injury threatened is not irreparable or that there is a remedy at law. The remedy at law must be adequate. In the recent case of Staples v. Rossi, 65 Pac. Rep. 67, the Supreme Court of Idaho held that an injunction will issue to restrain temporarily an act which will result in great damage to the plaintiff, although the injury is not irreparable, and notwithstanding that other remedies lie in behalf of plaintiff. This case was an appeal from an order granting the plaintiffs a temporary injunction restraining the defendants from removing from the Golden Group placermining claim logs cut by the defendants from trees growing thereon, which logs are now banked upon the Middle Boise river, upon said mining claim. It is contended by the appellants that the order granting said injunction was unauthorized, for the reason that the appellants were solvent, and that a plain and adequate remedy exists in behalf of the respondents, either by action of replevin, or by action to recover damages for said timber, in the event of plaintiffs establishing title to said mining claim. The court, however, did not consider these remedies adequate and granted the injunction. The court said: "We are not in sympathy with the idea that a trespasser, notwithstanding that he may be solvent, may go upon the lands of another and cut timber thereon, and that the owner of such lands is not, under our statute, entitled to a temporary injunction to restrain the removal of said timber until the owner can establish his title to said land in an action commenced for that purpose. The inconvenience to the defendant from a temporary injunction will be less than would be the injury to plaintiff should plaintiff succeed

in establishing his right." The trend of modern decisions and authorities upholds the court in its decision of this case. Davis v. Reed, 14 Md. 152; Fulton v. Harman, 44 Md. 253; Shipley v. Ritter, 7 Md. 408, 61 Am. Dec. 371; Smith v. Rock, 59 Vt. 232, 9 Atl. Rep. 551; De La Croix v. Villere, 11 La. Ann. 39; Lanier v. Alison (C. C.), 31 Fed. Rep. 100; U. S. v. Guglard (C. C.), 79 Fed. Rep. 23; Smith's Appeal, 69 Pa. 474; King v. Campbell (C. C.), 85 Fed. Rep. 814; Disbrow v. Harwood Co. (Sup.), 59 N. Y. Supp. 378; King v. Stuart (C. C.), 84 Fed. Rep. 546; Watson v. Sutherland, 5 Wall. 74, 18 L. Ed. 580; Irwin v. Lewis, 50 Miss. 368; U. S. v. Parrott, Morr. Min. Rep. 335; Boyce's Exrs. v. Grundy, 3 Pet. 210, 7 L. Ed. 655. In Watson v. Sutherland, supra, the court said: “If the remedy at law is sufficient, equity will not relieve, but it is not enough that there is a remedy at law. It must be plain and adequate, or, in other words, as practical and efficient to the ends of justice and its prompt administration as the remedy in equity."

MINING CORPORATIONS-VALUE OF PROPERTY TAKEN IN PAYMENT OF CAPITAL STOCK.-In the formation of mining corporations one of the most difficult questions is the value to be attached to the property which is turned over to the company by the promoters in payment of stock. The value is entirely problematical. It may be worth millions or it may be worth nothing. In the recent case of Richardson v. Mining Company, 65 Pac. Rep. 74, the Supreme Court of Utah held that where property is taken in payment of capital stock at the inception of a corporation, the question is, what was the fair estimated cash market value of the property at the date of incorporation, and not at the time when, through the expenditure of large sums of money, the property has been demonstrated to possess no value. Honesty and good faith are the tests, and when it appears that the value of mining property taken for capital stock was fixed honestly and in good faith, that the owner had title thereto, and that the property conveyed to the corporation and accepted by it in full payment of the capital stock, the courts will not disturb the transaction, and parties dealing with the corporation are bound to take notice of what lawfully appears in the articles of incorporation and in the statutes under which it was created. See, also, Transit Co. v. Lynch, 55 Pac. Rep. 639; Henderson v. Turngren, 35 Pac. Rep. 495; Coit v. Amalgamating Co., 119 U.S. 343, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 231; Young v. Iron Co., 65 Mich. 111, 31 N. W. Rep. 814. The court in the

The question in such a case always is, what was the fair estimated cash market value at the time of the incorporation and not at some future time, when, through large expenditures of money or capital, the property has been demonstrated to possess no value. If this were otherwise,-if stockholders in such a corporation, the moment the property, which had, in good faith, been deemed of ample value, and taken in full payment of their stock, was, by development thereof, shown to be worthless, were to be held liable to creditors for the value of the stock,-it is apprehended that few person, especially those of limited means, would be willing to assume the risk of developing mines. Fortunately for the mining industry such is not the law. The statute contemplates no such results. Under its provisions, as we have seen, incorporators of mining corporations are permitted, in the absence of fraud, to pay for their stock in property at its estimated fair, cash market value, whatever its actual cash value may be; and this is so even where the property has no ascertainable market value. The fixing of such value is a matter of opinion. It requires the exercise of judgment; and the exercise of judgment for such purposes it is clear the legislature left to the incorporators where the corporation is organized for mining purposes. An opinion thus formed must be one honestly entertained, but it is subject to no other qualification."

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The term public policy received a judicial definition in Egerton v. Brownlow,1 where the following language was used: "By public policy is intended that principle of the law which holds that no subject can law. fully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good, which may be termed the policy of the law, or public policy in the administration of the law."

The administration of justice being maintained at the expense of the public, no court will render its assistance either directly, by compelling specific performance, or indirectly, by awarding damages or compensation for the breach of a transaction or contract which, in its object, operation or tend

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