prosecutrix. The envelope on its face was designed to attract the attention of the public, and when the prosecutrix received these letters in these envelopes the fact was thereby published that this association was in correspondence with her for the purpose of collecting a bad debt. The evident purpose and design of the defendant and the association he employed and for whose acts he is responsible in this matter, was to publish the prosecutrix as a bad debtor, a dishonest person, who would not pay her honest debts, and to degrade her in the eyes of the public and her employers, and as such was clearly libelous. Muetze v. Tuteur, 77 Wis. 236; Dennis v. Johnson, 42 Minn. 301; Johnson v. Commonwealth (Pa. 1888), 14 Atl. Rep. 425. The law will not countenance nor tolerate this method of collecting a debt. The fact that the debt was originally only $3.45, that it was barred by the statute of limitations, that defendant persisted in his endeavor to extort the money from the prosecutrix after her protest, and the avowed intention of his agents to publish her to the world, amply sustain the charge that this was maliciously done. To permit a defenseless woman, in this day of enlightenment, to be thus persecuted would be a reproach to our laws."

Publication of defamatory matter through business channels makes the publication none the less actionable nor offers any excuse therefor. For instance, the writing of defamatory matter and delivering it for transmission to a telegraph company is a publica. tion and makes the writer liable. Monson v. Lathrop, 96 Wis. 386. The transmission of a message containing defamatory matter by a telegraph company is a publication by the latter. Peterson v. Western Union Telegraph Company, 72 Minn. 41. The dictation of defamatory matter to a private stenographer is a publication. Pullman v. Hill (1891), 1 Q. B. 5246. This case is explained fully by the court in the principal case and amply sustains its position. The only case of similar character that has arisen in this country is the case of Owen v. Ogilvie Publishing Co., 32 N. Y. App. Div. 465. The court in that case held that where the manager of a corporation dictated a letter containing defamatory words, in relation to the business of the corporation, to his private stenographer, as both persons were employed by a common master and were engaged in the performance of the duties which their respective employments required, the stenographer could not be regarded as a third person in the sense that the dictation to her, or the subsequent reading of the let ter by her, could be regarded as a publication by the corporation. We believe the error in this decision lies in the fact that the court overlooked, or at least, failed to give proper respect to the maxim qui facit per alium facit per se. The general manager was undoubtedly the agent of the corporation in the writing of this letter and his dictation of the defamatory was a sufficient publication to make the corporation liable therefor. It is the height of absurdity to say that a stenographer in the employ of a corporation is not a third person in her relation to the corporation under the rule of law respecting the publication of defama

are led to believe that no other rule can reasonably be applied to the printing of defamatory matter upon postal cards for delivery through the mail. To make the postal card an exception to the general rule offers an opportunity for scandal mongers and unscrupu lous agencies that is not demanded by the necessities of the case. If a man is overcome with a desire to express himself to a certain person in a manner that would be defamatory if addressed to a third person he must take every precaution that his statements, either spoken or written, are not brought to the attention of anyone else in the world than the one of whom they are made.

A. H. ROBBINS.

JETSAM AND FLOTSAM.

LITERATURE AND THE BAR.

Address by George B. Rose, delivered before the Arkansas State Bar Association, May 23, 1901.

A

It is the proud boast of the law that it is the one profession that embraces every human interest. No matter how exquisite the art, no matter how recondite the science, those who practice it must look to the law for the protection of their rights and the redress of their wrongs. The law is as broad as humanity. Nothing is so high as to be beyond its reach, naught too lowly to feel its fostering care. All classes of men must appear before its tribunals, every kind of act must be submitted to its scrutiny. lawyer, therefore, ought to know everything, but that is impossible. Ordinarily he must trust to informing himself by special study and investigation when retained in a case involving the application of scientific principles. The science of jurisprudence alone has grown far beyond the capacity of any man to master. Lord Coke said: "Ask me a question about the common law,and Ishould be ashamed not to answer without looking at the books: but if you ask me a question about the statute I should be ashamed to answer without looking at the books." Lord Coke was the last and perhaps the only one who could say so much about the common law. Certainly many generations have passed since any man has lived who could truthfully assert that he knew one tenth of its immense and ever-shifting mass. A man could devote a life longer than that of Methuselah to its study and yet feel that he was still upon the confines. Therefore, the greater part of every lawyer's time must be devoted to the study of the law. He must be a mental athlete; and if he neglects his training even for a short period, he loses his strength and suppleness, and falls backward in the race.

Yet he who confines his studies to the law alone makes as great a mistake as he who is always training for the battle. Athletes know that it is as dangerous to be over trained as it is to be deficient in training. Nerves and muscles that are over-trained lose their freshness and elasticity. To attain the bighest vigor of mind or body alternations of repose and exertion, of exercise and relaxation, are essential. Some na. tures demand more of the one. some more of the

tion, was dictated by its manager to its stenog. rapher, who wrote it out in shorthand, copied it upon a typewriter, and mailed it. The manager and stenographer were held to be servants of a common master, and to be engaged in the performance of duties which their respectivie employments required, and that under such circumstances the stenographer should not be regarded as a third person, in the sense that either the dictation or the subsequent reading should be regarded as a publication by the corporation. The English cases mentioned were not referred to, but the court nevertheless said: "It may be that the dictation to the stenographer and her reading of the letter would constitute a publication of the same by the person dictating it, if the relation existing between the manager and the copyist was that of master and servant, and the letter be held not to be privileged." Upon the exact question here involved the above extract from the opinion in that case seems to afford slender support to the appellant's contention, and what it does decide is not in accord with the views expressed by this court in Carter v. Machine Co., 51 Md. 294, in which Judge Alvey said that it would seem to be now clear, whatever may have been the former state of judicial opinion upon the subject, that corporations are liable for all acts, whether willful or malicious, of their agents or servants, done in the course of their employment, and that actions for such injuries, including libel, could be sustained against corporations in any case where under similar circumstances such actions could be sustained against individuals for the acts of their servants. It is true that that case was not an action for libel, but it sufficiently indicates that this court would not be astute to find reasons for relieving corporations from liability in libel cases for want of technical publication. We think, for the reasons given above, that the defendant's 1st prayer was properly rejected.

Apart from the question of publication, the defendant's 2d and 3d prayers raise the additional question whether, under the pleadings in this case, the action must not have been for slander, instead of libel, but we have no difficulty on this point. We have no doubt that the dictation of these letters to the stenographer was the publication of a slander, for which, if nothing further had been done by either, an action of slander could have been maintained, but we have no more doubt that the stenographic notes, the typewritten copy, and the letterpress copy con

ers were properly rejected, not only for the reasons now given, but for those applicable to defendant's 1st prayer, and that the plaintiff's 3 1-2 and 41-2 prayers were for the same reasons properly granted."

NOTE. What Constitutes Sufficient Publication in Cases of Slander and Libel.-Exaggeration and misrepresentation of the character and faults of others, if not the greatest, is undoubtedly the most common failing of human nature. The Bible, the oldest and highest authority for this statement gives the following awful commentary on human nature in this regard: "There is none that doeth good, their throat is an open sepulchre, the poison of asps is under their lips, their mouth is full of cursing and bitterness." Again: "Thy tongue imagineth wickedness and with lies thou cuttest like a sharp razor. Thou hast loved to speak all words which may do hurt; Oh thou false tongue, therefore shall God destroy thee forever." And still further: "Let the lying lips be put to silence which cruelly, disdainfully and despitefully speak against the righteous." The world has

never found fault with this severe condemnation of its own inherent weakness. Indeed, it has fully shared the sentiment therein expressed, and no law is more stringently enforced than that which condemns the man who "cruelty, disdainfully and dispitefully" speaks against his neighbor.

The gist of the action of libel or slander being the injury to one's reputation or the estimate put upon him by his fellowmen, it is absolutely necessary, that before defamatory words become actionable they must be published, that is, communicated to some third person. Therefore defamatory words spoken in an uninhabited wilderness or in the presence of the person of whom they are spoken cannot be the ground for an action of either libel or slander. They must be brought to the attention of a third person and in a language which he can understand. What will constitute a sufficient publication, however, can be more accurately determined by a glance at the authorities. If a person compose a libel and send it to his agent to be read by him, and it reaches its destination and is read by such agent, this is a sufficient publication to support an action. And this rule applies to a publication by a corporation to its agent of the cause of the discharge of an employee. Bacon v. Railroad, 55 Mich. 224. Where defendant sent through the mail a letter addressed to the prosecuting witness, in an envelope with the words "Bad Debt Collecting Agency" printed thereon, he was held guilty of criminal libel. State v. Armstrong, 106 Mo. 395. As this form of libel has arisen quite frequently in late years, being used by certain collection agencies as a means of coercing the payment of bad debts, it will not be unprofitable to quote from the opinion of the case just cited: "Was the sending of this envelope the publishing of a libel? We are

prosecutrix. The envelope on its face was designed to attract the attention of the public, and when the prosecutrix received these letters in these envelopes the fact was thereby published that this association was in correspondence with her for the purpose of collecting a bad debt.・・・ The evident purpose and design of the defendant and the association he employed and for whose acts he is responsible in this matter, was to publish the prosecutrix as a bad debtor, a dishonest person, who would not pay her honest debts, and to degrade her in the eyes of the public and her employers, and as such was clearly libelous. Muetze v. Tuteur, 77 Wis. 236; Dennis v. Johnson, 42 Minn. 301; Johnson v. Commonwealth (Pa. 1888), 14 Atl. Rep. 425. The law will not countenance nor tolerate this method of collecting a debt. The fact that the debt was originally only $3.45, that it was barred by the statute of limitations, that defendant persisted in his endeavor to extort the money from the prosecutrix after her protest, and the avowed intention of his agents to publish her to the world, amply sustain the charge that this was maliciously done. To permit a defenseless woman, in this day of enlightenment, to be thus persecuted would be a reproach to our laws."

Publication of defamatory matter through business channels makes the publication none the less actionable nor offers any excuse therefor. For instance, the writing of defamatory matter and delivering it for transmission to a telegraph company is a publica. tion and makes the writer liable. Monson v. Lathrop, 96 Wis. 386. The transmission of a message containing defamatory matter by a telegraph company is a publication by the latter. Peterson v. Western Union Telegraph Company, 72 Minn. 41. The dictation of defamatory matter to a private stenographer is a publication. Pullman v. Hill (1891), 1 Q. B. 5246. This case is explained fully by the court in the principal case and amply sustains its position. The only case of similar character that has arisen in this country is the case of Owen v. Ogilvie Publishing Co., 32 N. Y. App. Div. 465. The court in that case held that where the manager of a corporation dictated a letter containing defamatory words, in relation to the business of the corporation, to his private stenographer, as both persons were employed by a common master and were engaged in the performance of the duties which their respective employments required, the stenographer could not be regarded as a third person in the sense that the dictation to her, or the subsequent reading of the let ter by her, could be regarded as a publication by the corporation. We believe the error in this decision lies in the fact that the court overlooked, or at least, failed to give proper respect to the maxim qui facit per alium facit per se. The general manager was undoubtedly the agent of the corporation in the writing of this letter and his dictation of the defamatory was a sufficient publication to make the corporation liable therefor. It is the height of absurdity to say that a stenographer in the employ of a corporation is not a

third nere

are led to believe that no other rule can reasonably be applied to the printing of defamatory matter upon postal cards for delivery through the mail. To make the postal card an exception to the general rule offers an opportunity for scandal mongers and unscrupu lous agencies that is not demanded by the necessities of the case. If a man is overcome with a desire to express himself to a certain person in a manner that would be defamatory if addressed to a third person he must take every precaution that his statements, either spoken or written, are not brought to the attention of anyone else in the world than the one of whom they are made.

A. H. ROBBINS.

JETSAM AND FLOTSAM.

LITERATURE AND THE BAR.

Address by George B. Rose, delivered before the Arkansas State Bar Association, May 23, 1901.

It is the proud boast of the law that it is the one profession that embraces every human interest. No matter how exquisite the art, no matter how recondite the science, those who practice it must look to the law for the protection of their rights and the redress of their wrongs. The law is as broad as humanity. Nothing is so high as to be beyond its reach, naught too lowly to feel its fostering care. All classes of men must appear before its tribunals, every kind of act must be submitted to its scrutiny. A lawyer, therefore, ought to know everything, but that is impossible. Ordinarily he must trust to informing himself by special study and investigation when retained in a case involving the application of scientific principles. The science of jurisprudence alone hasTM grown far beyond the capacity of any man to master. Lord Coke said: "Ask me a question about the com. mon law,and Ishould be ashamed not to answer without looking at the books: but if you ask me a question about the statute I should be ashamed to answer without looking at the books." Lord Coke was the last and perhaps the only one who could say so much about the common law. Certainly many generations have passed since any man has lived who could truth. fully assert that he knew one tenth of its immense and ever-shifting mass. A man could devote a life longer than that of Methuselah to its study and yet feel that he was still upon the confines. Therefore, the greater part of every lawyer's time must be devoted to the study of the law. He must be a mental athlete; and if he neglects his training even for a short period, he loses his strength and suppleness, and falls backward in the race.

Yet he who confines his studies to the law alone makes as great a mistake as he who is always training for the battle. Athletes know that it is as dangerous to be over trained as it is to be deficient in training. Nerves and muscles that are over-trained lose their freshness and elasticity. To attain the bighest vigor of mind or body alternations of repose and exertion,

tion, was dictated by its manager to its stenog. rapher, who wrote it out in shorthand, copied it upon a typewriter, and mailed it. The manager and stenographer were held to be servants of a common master, and to be engaged in the performance of duties which their respectivie employments required, and that under such circumstances the stenographer should not be regarded as a third person, in the sense that either the dictation or the subsequent reading should be regarded as a publication by the corporation. The English cases mentioned were not referred to, but the court nevertheless said: "It may be that the dictation to the stenographer and her reading of the letter would constitute a publication of the same by the person dictating it, if the relation existing between the manager and the copyist was that of master and servant, and the letter be held not to be privileged." Upon the exact question here involved the above extract from the opinion in that case seems to afford slender support to the appellant's contention, and what it does decide is not in accord with the views expressed by this court in Carter v. Machine Co., 51 Md. 294, in which Judge Alvey said that it would seem to be now clear, whatever may have been the former state of judicial opinion upon the subject, that corporations are liable for all acts, whether willful or malicious, of their agents or servants, done in the course of their employment, and that actions for such injuries, including libel, could be sustained against corporations in any case where under similar circumstances such actions could be sustained against individuals for the acts of their servants. It is true that 'that case was not an action for libel, but it sufficiently indicates that this court would not be astute to find reasons for relieving corporations from liability in libel cases for want of technical publication. We think, for the reasons given above, that the defendant's 1st prayer was properly rejected.

Apart from the question of publication, the defendant's 2d and 3d prayers raise the additional question whether, under the pleadings in this case, the action must not have been for slander, instead of libel, but we have no difficulty on this point. We have no doubt that the dictation of these letters to the stenographer was the publication of a slander, for which, if nothing further had been done by either, an action of slander could have been maintained, but we have no more doubt that the stenographic notes, the typewritten copy, and the letterpress copy con

ers were properly rejected, not only for the reasons now given, but for those applicable to defendant's 1st prayer, and that the plaintiff's 3 1-2 and 41-2 prayers were for the same reasons properly granted."

NOTE.- What Constitutes Sufficient Publication in Cases of Slander and Libel.-Exaggeration and misrepresentation of the character and faults of others, if not the greatest, is undoubtedly the most common failing of human nature. The Bible, the oldest and highest authority for this statement gives the following awful commentary on human nature in this regard: "There is none that doeth good, their throat is an open sepulchre, the poison of asps is under their lips, their mouth is full of cursing and bitterness." Again: "Thy tongue imagineth wickedness and with lies thou cuttest like a sharp razor. Thou hast loved to speak all words which may do hurt; Oh thou false tongue, therefore shall God destroy thee forever." And still further: "Let the lying lips be put to silence which cruelly, disdainfully and despitefully speak against the righteous." The world has

never found fault with this severe condemnation of its own inherent weakness. Indeed, it has fully shared the sentiment therein expressed, and no law is more stringently enforced than that which con. demns the man who "cruelly, disdainfully and dispitefully" speaks against his neighbor.

The gist of the action of libel or slander being the injury to one's reputation or the estimate put upon him by his fellowmen, it is absolutely necessary, that before defamatory words become actionable they must be published, that is, communicated to some third person. Therefore defamatory words spoken in an uninhabited wilderness or in the presence of the person of whom they are spoken cannot be the ground for an action of either libel or slander. They must be brought to the attention of a third person and in a language which he can understand. What will constitute a sufficient publication, however, can be more accurately determined by a glance at the authorities. If a person compose a libel and send it to his agent to be read by him, and it reaches its destination and is read by such agent, this is a sufficient publication to support an action. And this rule applies to a publication by a corporation to its agent of the cause of the discharge of an employee. Bacon v. Railroad, 55 Mich. 224. Where defendant sent through the mail a letter addressed to the prosecuting witness, in an envelope with the words "Bad Debt Collecting Agency" printed thereon, he was held guilty of criminal libel. State v. Armstrong, 106 Mo. 395. As this form of libel has arisen quite frequently in late years, being used by certain collection agencies as a means of coercing the payment of bad debts, it will not be unprofitable to quote from the opinion of the case just cited: "Was the sending of this envelope the publishing of a libel? We are

prosecutrix. The envelope on its face was designed to attract the attention of the public, and when the prosecutrix received these letters in these envelopes the fact was thereby published that this association was in correspondence with her for the purpose of collecting a bad debt. ・・・ The evident purpose and design of the defendant and the association he employed and for whose acts he is responsible in this matter, was to publish the prosecutrix as a bad debtor, a dishonest person, who would not pay her honest debts, and to degrade her in the eyes of the public and her employers, and as such was clearly libelous. Muetze v. Tuteur, 77 Wis. 236; Dennis v. Johnson, 42 Minn. 301; Johnson v. Commonwealth (Pa. 1888), 14 Atl.Rep. 425. The law will not countenance nor tolerate this method of collecting a debt. The fact that the debt was originally only $3.45, that it was barred by the statute of limitations, that defend. ant persisted in his endeavor to extort the money from the prosecutrix after her protest, and the avowed intention of his agents to publish her to the world, amply sustain the charge that this was malic. iously done. To permit a defenseless woman, in this day of enlightenment, to be thus persecuted would be a reproach to our laws."

Publication of defamatory matter through business channels makes the publication none the less actionable nor offers any excuse therefor. For instance, the writing of defamatory matter and delivering it for transmission to a telegraph company is a publica. tion and makes the writer liable. Monson v. Lathrop, 96 Wis. 386. The transmission of a message containing defamatory matter by a telegraph company is a publication by the latter. Peterson v. Western Union Telegraph Company, 72 Minn. 41. The dictation of defamatory matter to a private stenographer is a publication. Pullman v. Hill (1891), 1 Q. B. 5246. This case is explained fully by the court in the principal case and amply sustains its position. The only case of similar character that has arisen in this country is the case of Owen v. Ogilvie Publishing Co., 32 N. Y. App. Div. 465. The court in that case held that where the manager of a corporation dictated a letter containing defamatory words, in relation to the business of the corporation, to his private stenographer, as both persons were employed by a common master and were engaged in the performance of the duties which their respective employments required, the stenographer could not be regarded as a third person in the sense that the dictation to her, or the subsequent reading of the let ter by her, could be regarded as a publication by the corporation. We believe the error in this decision lies in the fact that the court overlooked, or at least, failed to give proper respect to the maxim qui facit per alium facit per se. The general manager was undoubtedly the agent of the corporation in the writing of this letter and his dictation of the defamatory was A sufficient publication to make the corporation liable therefor. It is the height of absurdity to say that a stenographer in the employ of a corporation is not a

are led to believe that no other rule can reasonably be applied to the printing of defamatory matter upon postal cards for delivery through the mail. To make the postal card an exception to the general rule offers an opportunity for scandal mongers and unscrupu lous agencies that is not demanded by the necessities of the case. If a man is overcome with a desire to express himself to a certain person in a manner that would be defamatory if addressed to a third person he must take every precaution that his statements, either spoken or written, are not brought to the attention of anyone else in the world than the one of whom they are made.

A. H. ROBBINS.

JETSAM AND FLOTSAM.

LITERATURE AND THE BAR.

Address by George B. Rose, delivered before the Arkansas State Bar Association, May 23, 1901.

It is the proud boast of the law that it is the one profession that embraces every human interest. No matter how exquisite the art, no matter how recondite the science, those who practice it must look to the law for the protection of their rights and the redress of their wrongs. The law is as broad as humanity. Nothing is so high as to be beyond its reach, naught too lowly to feel its fostering care. All classes of men must appear before its tribunals, every kind of act must be submitted to its scrutiny. A lawyer, therefore, ought to know everything, but that is impossible. Ordinarily he must trust to informing himself by special study and investigation when retained in a case involving the application of scientific principles. The science of jurisprudence alone has grown far beyond the capacity of any man to master. Lord Coke said: "Ask me a question about the com. mon law,and Ishould be ashamed not to answer without looking at the books: but if you ask me a question about the statute I should be ashamed to answer without looking at the books." Lord Coke was the last and perhaps the only one who could say so much about the common law. Certainly many generations have passed since any man has lived who could truth. fully assert that he knew one tenth of its immense and ever-shifting mass. A man could devote a life longer than that of Methuselah to its study and yet feel that he was still upon the confines. Therefore, the greater part of every lawyer's time must be devoted to the study of the law. He must be a mental athlete; and if he neglects his training even for a short period, he loses his strength and suppleness, and falls backward in the race.

Yet he who confines his studies to the law alone makes as great a mistake as he who is always training for the battle. Athletes know that it is as dangerous to be over trained as it is to be deficient in training. Nerves and muscles that are over-trained lose their freshness and elasticity. To attain the highest vigor of mind or body alternations of repose and exertion,