Графични страници
PDF файл
ePub

show what manner of man he is. If he be the political judge, the trimmer, the time server, he will deliver over the prisoner to the will of his enemies, and thereafter his henchman will stand in the streets and public places and speak of the fairness of the trial, and even of the favors shown by the court to the prisoner, and that the judge went to the limit of the law to make it as light on the prisoner as possible. But see yonder that infuriated crowd, but recently crying out crucify him, crucify crucify him, satiated in the prisoner's blood returning from the place of execution, these are the witnesses of the favors shown by the court to the defendant at the bar. The execution of the laws will never rise above public sentiment, and the hope of justice is the spirit of the "bar." When the bar is filled with the lofty spirit of the common law, judges will be called to the bench before whom any mad mob will quail! A dauntless spirit, clothed with the power of the law, and standing for justice and right is irresistible. The human mind. instinctively reverences truth and justice, and whenever a judge on the bench, in fact the representative of these principles wields the scepter of his authority, the people yield to him unquestioning obedience. What the country needs is men and judges who will do right because it is right. Principle is everything, and a man or a judge who has not in his make up the hard steel of principle is a mere bag of sand-he is nothing.

The law on this subject of the change of venue is all right, it is simply this, that wherever, through prejudice in the public mind, or otherwise, a prisoner cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial in the county of the finding of the indictment, then the trial of such prisoner shall be changed and removed to the next nearest county, free from such prejudice, and where the prisoner may obtain a fair and impartial trial. The trouble is caused by a judicial yielding to popular prejudices, a giving away to public prejudice. If our citizens accused of crime are to be tried by an excited and angry multitude, if we are to have a reign of mob law

14 Blackstone's Com. vol. 3, p. 383 (Shars. Ed.); Brennan v. People, 15 Ill. 511; Edwards v. State, 25 Ark. 444; Hubbard v. State. 7 Md. 160; Feople v. Perdue, 49 Cal. 425; Walker v. State, 42 Tex. 360; Mersbon v. State, 44 Ind. 498; State v. O'Rourke, 55 Mo. 440; People v. Cogleton, 44 Cal. 92.

[blocks in formation]

Supreme Court of Michigan, May 7, 1901.

Where a tenant in common of lands having a homestead right therein, without intent to defraud his creditors, conveyed his interest to his adopted children, who had lived with him for a long time, and rendered him valuable service, and died shortly after, leaving neither wife nor children surviving, and without sufficient property to pay his debts, on partition of the common property his administrator is not entitled to the proceeds of his interest for the benefit of his creditors, under Const. art. 16. § 2, and Comp. Laws of 1897, § 10,362, providing that no homestead shall be subject to sale on execution for any debt arising on contract.

MOORE, J.: By this appeal the court is asked to decide the question whether the sum of $1.128.72, being a part of the proceeds of the sale of certain premises, should be paid to defendant George M. Savage or to the defendant Robert W. Smylie, adminstrator of the estate of James R. Elliott, deceased. The proceeding of the court below was a bill of partition filed in March, A. D. 1899, wherein the complainant Mrs. Elizabeth E. Eagle, sought to have partition of certain premises on Congress street east, in Detroit, which prior to 1841 belonged to her father, Robert Thomas Elliott, of Detroit. The bill of complaint sets up the many transfers in the title after that date, and shows that prior to August 3, A. D. 1896, James R. Elliott, an unmarried man, and brother of complainant, acquired substantially a six-sevenths interest in the property; that complainant had the largest remaining interest, and the other Elliott defendants held the small remaining undivided interests. In 1893, James R. Elliott, who alone of the owners in common of the premises had been in possession of the same for some years previous thereto, and who alone of said owners continued to occupy the same until his death, executed a mortgage upon his interests in the premises for the sum of $1,800, which mortgage defendant George M. Savage duly acquired after the death of said James R. Elliott, and shortly prior to the filing of the bill of partition. James R. Elliott died on August 31, A. D. 1896. During his last illness,

and on or about August 3, A. D. 1896, Mr. Elliott, by quitclaim deed, conveyed an undivided onehalf of his interest in the premises to Adelia M. Carey and to John C. Elliott, each. Miss Carey, shortly after the death of Mr. Elliott, married defendant George M. Savage, and she is a defendant in this proceeding as Adelia M. Savage. Defendant George M. Savage acquired by quitclaim deed the interest of his wife in said premises, and, subsequent to the filing of the bill of partition, also by quitclaim deeds, he acquired any interest that John C. Elliott had in the property. The bill of complaint further sets forth the appointment of defendant Robert W. Smylie as administrator of the estate of James R. Elliott, deceased; the appointment of commissioners on claims in due course of adminstration in the probate court for the county of Wayne; the insolvency of the estate; and the claim asserted by defendant Smylie, as adminstrator, that upon any sale of the premises under the partition proceedings he was entitled to the interest therein, over and above the mortgage above referred to, which James R. Elliott had prior to the 3d day of August, A. D. 1896, being the date of the quitclaim deeds to Miss Carey and to John C. Elliott, on the ground that the said conveyances were voluntary, and without consideration, as against claims of the creditors of deceased. The answer of defendant Smylie, as adminstrator aforesaid, states the claims allowed against the estate of James R. Elliott, deceased, as being $4,704.39, and that the assets of the estate amounted to $640; and he asserts his right, as adminstrator to the surplus, over the mortgage, which belonged to James R. Elliott before he gave the quitclaim deeds above referred to. The answers of defendant George M. Savage and his wife deny the claim of defendant Smylie to the fund in question, and assert that the quitclaim deeds were given upon sufficient consideration. This answer was afterwards amended, setting up that the land conveyed was a homestead when the quitclaim deed was made, in which the creditors had no interest. On February 26, 1900, a decree was entered in the circuit court, establishing the interest of the several owners in common to the premises, ordering a sale of the property, and reserving for the further order of the court the determination of several questions, among which was the controversy between defendant Savage and defendant Smylie, as administrator, as to their right to any amount arising from the sale which would represent the interest, over and above the mortgage, which James R. Elliott had in the premises on August 3, 1898. This amount was determined to be $1.128.72.

It is not claimed there was any intent on the part of Mr. Elliott to defraud his creditors in making this deed. The grantees in the deed were adopted children, who had lived with him a long time, and rendered him valuable service; and he without doubt thought he was leaving enough estate to pay his debts, but it is insisted

that as he was in fact insolvent, that the conveyance was, in law, a fraud upon his creditors. In our view of the case we need consider but one question, and that is whether the creditors can complain of the conveyance by Mr. Elliott of his homestead. The position of counsel for the administrator is that the homestead is not an absolute estate, but at most is an artificial estate, which may be waived by the person to whose benefit it inures; citing Riggs v. Sterling, 60 Mich. 652, 27 N. W. Rep. 705; 15 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, pp. 638, 639. Counsel says: We admit that James R. Elliott had a homestead interest in the premises at the time he executed the quitclaim deeds in question, while calling attention to the fact that he alone had any such interest in the property, and while emphasizing the fact that any homestead interest in the premises lapsed with his death. There being no widow or children surviving him, the provisions of sections 3 and 4 of article 16 of the constitution have no application to this case. We admit that the homestead law (Comp. Laws 1897, § 10,362), which is founded upon the constitutional provisions, has been and should be liberally construed, and that the real estate, while occupied as a homestead (that is, in this case, during the life of James R. Elliott), could not be levied upon or in any other way subjected to the claims of his creditors. Furthermore, we admit that James R. Elliott might have sold his property, and during his lifetime his creditors could not complain of the sale, even if it was voluntary. And, further, if Mr. Elliott had sold his interest in the property for, say, $1,500, this fund would likewise have been exempt from process during a reasonable time within which to invest the same in another homestead. Cullen v. Harris, 111 Mich. 20, 69 N. W. Rep. 78. But our contention is that appellant, as administrator, may, in behalf of such creditors, attack such voluntary conveyance after the death of James R. Elliott." They argue that the homestead is a privilege personal to the owner, and may be waived by him, and that a gift of the homestead is fraudulent as to the creditors; citing Fellows v. Lewis, 65 Ala. 343, 39 Am. Rep. 1; Kingsbury v. Wild, 3 N. H. 30; Currier v. Sutherland, 54 N. H. 486, 20 Am. Rep. 143; Ruohs v. Hook, 3 Lea, 306, 31 Am. Rep. 642; Schaffer v. Beldsmeier, 107 Mo. 314, 17 S. W. Rep. 797; Miller v. Leeper, 120 Mo. 466, 25 S. W. Rep. 378. An examination of the authorities will show a want of harmony in them. The following authorities are to the effect that a creditor has no interest in a homestead, and cannot complain of its conveyance by the debtor: Crummen v. Bennett, 68 N. C. 494; Sears v. Hanks, 14 Ohio St. 298. 84 Am. Dec. 378; Wood v. Chambers, 20 Tex. 247; Hibben v. Sawyer, 33 Wis. 319; Dreutzer v. Bell, 11 Wis. 114; Conklin v. Foster, 57 Ill. 104; Hartwell v. McDonald, 69 Ill. 293; Smyth, Homest, § 234; Legro v. Lord, 10 Me. 165; Baker v. Kinnaird, 94 Ky. 5, 21 S. W. Rep. 237. In Marshall v. Strange (Ky.), 9 S. W. Rep. 250,

it was held that, where a debtor conveys a portion of his homestead, the whole of which is worth less than the statutory limit, his creditors cannot, after his death, charge the land so conveyed with his debts. In Grimes v. Portman, 99 Mo. 229, 112 S. W. Rep. 792, it was held one may sell, mortgage, or give away his homestead, and his creditors cannot complain. The question in this state is not a new one. The constitutional provision is as follows: "Every homestead

shall be exempt from forced sale on execution, or any other final process from a court, for any debt contracted after the adoption of this constitution." Article 16, § 2. The statutory provision reads: "A homestead * owned and occupied by any resident of this state shall not be subject to forced sale on execution, or any other final process, for any debt or debts growing out of or founded on contract, either express or implied, made after the third day of July, 1848." Section 10,362, Comp. Laws 1897. In Riggs v. Sterling, 60 Mich. 643, 27 N. W. Rep. 705, it was argued, as it is was argued here, that the homestead is a privilege personal to the owner, and not an absolute right. The court said: "The homestead exemption, as it now exists, is not only a privilege conferred (Chamberlian v. Lyell, 3 Mich. 458), but, under the constitution, it is an absolute right. It was intended to secure against creditors a home, and, to a certain extent, the means of support, to every family in the state.' Dye v. Mann, 10 Mich. 297; McKee v. Wilcox, 11 Mich. 358, S3 Am. Dec. 743." In Farrand v. Caton, 69 Mich., at page 242, 37 N. W. Rep. 203, it is said one may do what he pleases with his exempt property. In Anderson v. Odell, 51 Mich. 493, 16 N. W. Rep. 870, it is said creditors have no right to complain of dealings with property which the law does not allow them on their claims. In Rhead v. Hounson, 46 Mich. 243, 9 N. W. Rep. 267, in speaking of a voluntary conveyance of real estate from a father to his son, the court said: "It appears conclusively from the bill and evidence that when the execution debtor gave the deed in question he held and occupied a homestead on the premises. That part of the farm was therefore exempt. The holder was as free to dispose of it without interference as though he had not been indebted at all,”—citing Smith v. Rumsey, 33 Mich. 183. See also, Pulte v. Geller, 47 Mich. 560, 11 N. W. Rep. 385; Bank v. Elliott, 53 Mich. 256. 18 N. W. Rep. 805; Armitage v. Toll, 64 Mich. 412, 31 N. W. Rep. 408: Toll v. Davenport, 74 Mich. 386, 42 N. W. Rep. 63; Cullen v. Harris, 111 Mich. 20, 69 N. W. Rep. 78. We think the circuit judge made a decree in harmony with the uniform decisions of this court. The decree is affiamed.

NOTE-Right of Alienation of Homestead.-One of the most peculiar things about the law of homestead is its apparent difficulty of application. This is due, no doubt, very largely to the fact that the right of homestead is construed sometimes as an estate and sometimes as a mere exemption,-the tendency of the

courts being more in the direction of giving effect to the purpose of the homestead exemption laws than in attempting to observe any consistent theory or rule. Technicalities of expression or theory have, therefore, little to do with the application of the law of homestead. This is especially the case when we consider the right to alienate or incumber the estate. The general rule is that the homestead law does not interfere with the rights of parties to voluntary sales or mortgages of the homestead lands. McGrath v. Berry, 76 Ky. 391; Smith v. Malone, 10 S. Car. 39. The owner may, therefore, alienate his homestead. Pendergast v. Heekin, 94 Ky. 384, 22 S. W. Rep. 605; Peterson v. Hornblower, 33 Cal. 266; Williams v. Watkins, 92 Va. 680; Green v. Root, 62 Fed Rep. 191; Ray v. Yarnell, 118 Ind. 112; Vanstory v. Thornton, 112 N. Car. 196, 34 Am. St. Rep. 483; Halliday v. Hess, 147 Ill. 588; Greer v. Major, 114 Mo. 145; Roane v. Hamilton, 101 Iowa, 637; Scalf v. Collin Co., 80 Tex. 514; Parker v. Dean, 45 Miss. 408; Gunn v. Wades, 65 Ga. 537; James v. Wilder, 25 Minn. 305; Wea Gas, etc. Co. v. Franklin Land Co., 54 Kan. 533, 45 Am. St. Rep. 533. In Tong v. Eifort, 80 Ky. 152, the court held that a husband and wife have the right, with or without consideration, to convey their homestead without regard to the claims of creditors. And in Pendergast v. Heekin, supra, it was held that a debtor may, by will as well as deed, invest his wife or child with title to the homestead, free from the claims of his creditors. The right of homestead, however, which has not been set out is not assigna. ble. Gunnison v. Twitchel, 38 N. H. 62. A husband, without the concurrence of his wife, has power to dedicate a part of the community homestead to a city for the wife's use of homestead. Orrick v. City of Ft. Worth (Tex. 1895), 32 S. W. Rep. 443. See also City of Little Rock v. Wright, 58 Ark. 142, 23 S. W. Rep. 876. An interesting point arose under Virginia Code 1887, sec. 3649, providing that when the homestead right in property ceases it shall become subject to the debts of the owner. It was held that this did not prevent its incumbrance or alienation during the continuance of its homestead character; and that a creditor was not entitled to an injunction to preserve the corpus of homestead property, either real or per sonal, from alienation. Williams v. Watkins, 92 Va. 680, 24 S. E. Rep. 223. This power of alienation is not derived from the constitution or statute relating to alienation of homesteads. It is an incident of the ownership of property independent of the homestead law, and the directions and prohibitions of the constitution or statutes as to alienation are mere restric tions upon this antecedent power. Hinson v. Booth, 39 Fla. 333. The right to alienate or mortgage a homestead must be determined by the law in force when the mortgage was given. Watts v. Burnett, 56 Ala. 340. Thus, where one was married before the adoption of the constitution of 1868, and had acquired the property in question before that time, the restriction on his right to convey without the joinder of his wife contained in art. 10, sec. 8, does not apply. Shaffer v. Bledsoe, 117 N. Car. 144, 23 S. E. Rep. 169. The following authorities hold that a homestead may be incumbered in any manner the owner may desire, without any consideration of the rights of creditors: Dickerson v. Cuthburth, 56 Mo. App. 647; Blevins v. Rogers, 32 Ark. 258; Moran v. Clark, 30 W. Va. 359, 8 Am. St. Rep. 66; State Bank v. Ashmead, 23 Fla. 379; Danforth v. Beattie, 43 Vt. 138; Hill v. Alexander, 2 Kan. App. 251; Pioneer, etc. Co. v. Paschall, 12 Tex. Civ. App. 613; Bartholomae Brewing Co. v. Schroe

der, 67 Ill. App. 560; Hall v. Fulgham, 86 Tenn. 451; Low v. Anderson, 41 Iowa, 476. In fact, the homestead may even be given away without affecting the rights of creditors. Grimes v. Portman, 99 Mo. 229.

The homestead act has not created a new estate distinct from the fee, but simply an exemption; and when the holder conveys without releasing the right he transfers the fee, but the operation of the deed is suspended until he abandons the premises or surienders possession. McDonald v. Crandall, 43 III. 231, 92 Am. Dec. 112; Rutledge v. McFarland, 75 Ga. 774; Hewitt v. Templeton, 48 Ill. 367. There seems to be some dispute over the question whether a conveyance or mortgage which is insufficient to convey the right of homestead is enforceable after abandonment or termination of the homestead. The following au thorities deny that such conveyances can be enforced: Bruner v. Bateman, 66 Iowa, 488, 24 N. W. Rep. 9; Cummings v. Busby, 62 Miss. 195; Amphlett v. Hibbard, 29 Mich. 298; Alt v. Banholzer, 39 Minn. 511, 40 N. W. Rep. 830, 12 Am. St. Rep. 681. Thus, an assignment of a contract for a deed of the homestead, invalid because not joined in by the husband, is not made valid by a subsequent abandonment of the premises as a homestead. Belden v. Younger, 76 lowa, 567, 41 N. W. Rep. 317. So, also, a conveyance of a homestead made by a married man alone, without the signature of the wife, does not become valid by reason of the property subsequently losing its character as a homestead. Barton v. Drake, 21 Minn. 299. The following authorities controvert the posi tion assumed by the cases just cited: Himmelmann v. Schmidt, 23 Cal. 117; Lee v. Kingsbury, 13 Tex. 68; Vasey v. Trustees, 59 Ill. 188; Rutledge v. McFar land, 75 Ga. 774; Chaffe v. McGehee, 38 La. Ann. 278. Thus, where a mortgagor abandons his homestead, it is immaterial whether he knew or was ignorant of the fact that the mortgage on the homestead contained a clause releasing it at the time he executed it, or whether his wife signed or acknowledged it, the mortgage being, by the abandonment, rendered operative as to the homestead. Cobb v. Smith, 88 III. 199.

We now come to the consideration of the right of alienation as to outstanding judgments or claims. We note considerable confusion on this subject. In the first place, in regard to judgments, some authori. ties hold to the rule that a judgment creates a lien upon the homestead which may be enforced after abandonment or alienation, and others that there can be no lien upon a homestead. The former theory is supported by the following authorities: Brandon v. Moore, 50 Ark. 247, 7 S. W. Rep. 36, 7 Am. St. Rep. 96; Bills v. Mason, 42 Iowa, 329; Eaton v. Ryan, 5 Neb. 47; Vanstory v. Thornton, 112 N. Car. 196; Moore v. Smead, 89 Wis. 558, 62 N. W. Rep. 426. Thus, under constitution, Arkansas, 1868, providing for the exemption of a homestead, the lien of a judgment attaches to land occupied as a homestead, and can be enforced against one who purchases from the judgment debtor. Jackson v. Allen, 30 Ark. 110. So also under Code, N. Car. sec. 435, which makes a docketed judgment a lien on "all the iand" of the debtor in the county where it is docketed, from the date of the docketing, the lien of a judgment properly docketed has priority over the liens of mortgages on the homestead executed subsequently to the docketing of such judgment. Vanstory v. Thornton, 112 N. Car. 196, 17 S. E. Rep. 566, 34 Am. St. Rep. 483. The following authorities hold that a judgment does not create a lien on a homestead which can be en

forced after its termination: Mills v. McDaniels, 59 Mo. App. 331; Burwell v. Tullis, 12 Minn. 572; Morris v. Ward. 5 Kan. 239; Richart Utterback (Ky. 1888), 9 S. W. Rep. 825. Thus where one occupying land as a homestead conveyed it to his children, reserving a life estate, the land could not, at his death, be subjected to the payment of a judgment recovered against him prior to the conveyance, and subsequent to its acquisition as a homestead; the evidence being conflicting as to whether the value of the land was more than the statutory limit of a homestead exemption. Richart v. Utterback (Ky. 1888), 9 S. W. Rep. 825.

It is undoubtedly the general rule, however, supported by the great weight of authority, that, as far as alienation is concerned, lands owned and occupied as a homestead may be transferred without subjecting them to the liens of outstanding judgments against the owner. McDonald v. Crandall, 43 Ill. 231; Ketchin v. McCarley, 26 S. Car. 1, 11 S. E. Rep. 1099; Beckmann v. Meyer, 75 Mo. 333; Moore v. Granger, 30 Ark. 574; Gardner v. Batts, 114 N. Car. 496, 19 S. E. Rep. 794; Beyer v. Thoeming, 81 Iowa, 517, 46 N. W. Rep. 1074; Giles v. Miller, 36 Neb. 346, 54 N. W. Rep. 551, 38 Am. St. Rep. 730; James v. Wilder, 25 Minn. 305; Davis v. Prichard (Ky. 1888), 7 £. W. Rep. 549. Authorities holding contra: Whitworth v. Lyons, 39 Miss. 467; Allen v. Cook, 26 Barb. (N. Y.) 374; Grant v. Cosby, 51 Ga. 460; Hebert v. Mayer, 42 La. Ann. 839, 8 South. Rep. 590; Taul v. Epperson, 38 Tex. 492. Let us examine these cases more in detail. Thus a conveyance of a homestead though fraudu lent as to creditors, does not render it, in the hands of the grantee, subject to the lien of a judgment previously obtained against the grantor. Delashmit v. Trau, 44 Iowa, 613. But in Louisana, where the owner of a homestead sells it, dormant judg ments against him are revived, and will, if recorded, follow the land in the hands of the vendee, and, if the vendor repurchases, he will take subject to the judgments, and the homestead exemption will not revive. In Kansas, however, land owned by a husband and occupied as a homestead may be sold and conveyed by the husband and wife jointly, and the purchaser will take the title free from incumbrance notwithstanding a judgment against the husband. Morris v. Ward, 5 Kan. 239. In Texas, on the other hand, it was held that a judgment lienholder has priority over a purchaser of the home. stead under a deed of trust signed and duly ackowl edged by husband and wife. Taul v. Epperson, 38 Tex. 492.

But in Missouri, where a debtor continued to occupy a homestead after the death of his wife, and, after several judgments had been obtained against him, conveyed it for a valuable consideration to his son, it was held that the property in the son's hands was not subject to sale under the judgments. Beckmann v. Meyer, 75 Mo. 333. It is thus seen to be impossible to reconcile the authorities. Each state has its own reason for extending or limiting the right of homestead, some favoring the creditor, others the dobtor. This tendency will also necessarily decide its position on the right of alienation of the homestead.

JETSAM AND FLOTSAM.

EDIBLE EVIDENCE.

The jury ate up an important part of the evidence in a case they were trying in the superior court at Atlanta, Ga., in which one of the issues submitted

was whether certain almonds, the price of which was sued for, were of the quality contracted for. The judge that presided at the trial has the humorous tendency that characterized the great judge whose names he bears and who was his grandfather,-Chief Justice Joseph Henry Lumpkin,-and in his judg ment, refusing a new trial in this case, he has this to say:

"If a new trial should be granted in this case it can never be tried again exactly as it was before. Out of the almonds constituting the subject matter of this litigation a small number were kept, and on the trial were submitted to the jury along with some almonds obtained om another shipment, for comparison. When the jury retired to their room for consultation the two small paper sacks containing these almonds were carried out with them. After some time they returned a verdict, but not the almonds. On inquiry the court was informed that as a part of their delib. eration, and probably as a most conclusive mode of comparing the quality of the two samples, they had eaten both. In case of a new trial there are no more almonds for the next jury. It might be said that from an almond standpoint the case is exhausted. Perhaps it would be better for the jury not to eat up the evidence, at least not all the edible part of it. A due regard for the palates of a possible future jury, in case of a new trial, if nothing else, might suggest the advisibility of only a moderate degustation. It is quite possible that juries sometimes find a difficulty in swallowing all of the statements made before them, and that if on some occasion a toothsome or succulent bit of evidence is sent to the jury room with them, appealing at once to in tellectual and gastronomic investigation, the desire for knowledge may be stimulated to a point beyond deliberative moderation."-Green Bag.

CORRESPONDENCE.

A PRETERMITTED STATUTE.

To the Editor of the Central Law Journal:

An interesting example of a pretermitted statute is section 735, Rev. Stat. Mo. 1879. In subsequent revisions this section disappears. The case of Manhattan Brass Co. v. Webster Glass Co., 37 App. p. 145 (1889), was decided upon this statute. It is probably declaratory, but so are many other sections under the chapters respecting corporations. The only authority in this state declaring the rule is Missouri Lead Co. v. Reinhard, 114 Mo. 218 (1893).

Yours,

CHARLES P. WILLIAMS.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

The Law of Agency, including the Law of Principal and Agent and the Law of Master and Servant. By Ernest W. Huffcut, Professor of Law in the Cornell University College of Law. Second Edition, Revised and Enlarged. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1901. Sheep. Price, $3.50. pp. 406. Review will follow.

Federal Equity Procedure. A Treatise on the Procedure in Suits in Equity in the Circuit Courts of the United States. Including Appeals and Appellate Procedure with Appendixes containing the Constitution of the United States Annotated. Federal Judiciary Acts, Court Rules, Equity Forms, English Orders in Chancery. By C. L. Bates, of the Bar of San Antonio, Texas. In two volumes. Chicago: T. H. Flood & Company, 1901. Sheep, pp. 1407. Price $12.60 delivered. Review will follow.

Law Books by the Million. An Account of the Largest Law Book House in the World,-the Home Establishment of the National Reporter System and the American Digest System. St. Paul, Minn., West Publishing Co., 1901.

[blocks in formation]

BOOK REVIEWS.

[blocks in formation]

EATON ON EQUITY.

There would appear to be hardly any necessity for a new work on this important subject, at least from the practitioner's standpoint. For the student of law, however, this subject has never been satisfactorily presented, so as to bring out clearly the great principles of this subject freed from its many difficult and confusing technicalities. This latter end, however, has been excellently attained in the treatise on Equity Jurisprudence just prepared by Mr. James W. Eaton for the Hornbook series of legal text books. The arrangement is clear, logical and concise, and is undoubtedly the best text book on the subject that has so far appeared. One volume of 734 pages, bound in law sheep. Published by the West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn.

[blocks in formation]

UNITED STATES C. C., 7, 21, 22, 34, 36, 39, 72, 73, 86, 87, 103, 104, 106, 107, 110, 115, 147, 150, 165, 174, 176, 177, 186 UNITED STATES C. C. OF APP., 9, 14, 20, 44, 45, 53, 61, 84, 85, 69, 90, 108, 154, 160, 161, 175

UNITED STATES D. C., 1, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 124, 156, 159, 162, 163, 164

WASHINGTON, 2, 4, 5, 46, 65, 79, 88, 97, 109, 111, 117, 128, 130, 140, 167, 168

[blocks in formation]
« ПредишнаНапред »