Графични страници
PDF файл

instead of legal justice, then we had as well close our court houses, and say, “Rule thou, blind, bloody vengence.” But every patriotic citizen shudders at the contemplation of such a condition of things. Then what is the remedy? It is this: Let our courts in each and every case do right and justice, though the heavens fall.

Lixtox D. LANDRUM. Columbus, Miss.




Supreme Court of Michigan, May 7, 1901.

show what manner of man he is. If he be the political judge, the trimmer, the time server, he will deliver over the prisoner to the will of his enemies, and thereafter his henchman will stand in the streets and public places and speak of the fairness of the trial, and even of the favors shown by the court to the prisoner, and that the judge went to the limit of the law to make it as light on the prisoner as possible. But see yonder that infuriated crowd, but recently crying out crucify him, crucify him, satiated in the prisoner's blood returning from the place of execution, these are the witnesses of the favors shown by the court to the de. fendant at the bar. The execution of the laws will never rise above public sentiment, and the hope of justice is the spirit of the "bar.” When the bar is filled with the lofty spirit of the common law, judges will be called to the bench before whom any mad mob will quail! A dauntless spirit, clotbed with the power of the law, and standing for justice and right is irresistible. The human mind instinctively reverences truth and justice, and whenever a judge on the bench, in fact the representative of these principles wields the scepter of his authority, the people yield to him unquestioning obedience. What the country needs is men and judges who will do right because it is right. Principle is everything, and a man or a judge who has not in his make up the bard steel of principle is a mere bag of sand-he is nothing.

The law on this subject of the change of venue is all right, it is simply this, that wherever, through prejudice in the public mind, or otherwise, a prisoner cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial in the county of the finding of the indictment, then the trial of such prisoner shall be changed and removed to the next nearest county, free from such prejudice, and where the prisoner may obtain a fair and impartial trial.14 Tbe trouble is caused by a judicial yielding to popular prejudices, a giving away to public prejudice. If our citizens accused of crime are to be tried by an excited and angry multitude, if we are to have a reign of mob law

Where a tenant in common of lands having a home. stead right therein, without intent to defraud bis creditors, conveyed his interest to his adopted children, who had lived with him for a long time, and ren. dered him valuable service, and died shortly after, leaving neither wife por children surviving, and without sufficient property to pay his debts, on partition of the common property his administrator is not entitled to the proceeds of bis interest for the benefit of his creditors, under Const. art. 16. $ 2, and Comp. Laws of 1897, $ 10,362, providing that no homestead shall be subject to sale on execution for any debt arising on contract.

MOORE, J.: By this appeal the court is asked to decide the question whether the sum of $1. 128.72, being a part of the proceeds of the sale of certain premises, should be paid to defendant George M. Savage or to the defendant Robert W. Smylie, adminstrator of the estate of James R. Elliott, deceased. The proceeding of the court below was a bill of partition filed in March, A. D. 1899, wherein the complainant Mrs. Elizabeth E. Eagle, sought to have partition of certain premises on Congress street east, in Detroit, which prior to 1841 belonged to ber father, Robert Tbomas Elliott, of Detroit. The bill of complaint sets up the many transfers in the title after that date, and shows that prior to August 3, A. D. 1896, James R. Elliott, an unmarried man, and brother of complainant, acquired substantially a six-seventbs interest in the property; tbat complainant had the largest remaining interest, and the other Elliott defendants held the small remaining undivided interests. In 1893, James R. Elliott, who alone of the owners in common of the premises had been in possession of the same for some years previous thereto, and who alone of said owners continued to occupy the same until his death, executed a mortgage upon his interests in the premises for the sum of $1,800, wbich mortgagé defendant George M. Savage duly acquired after the death of said James R. Elliott, and shortly prior to the filing of the bill of partition. James R. Elliott died on August 31, A. D. 1896. During his last illness,

14 Blackstone's Com, vol. 3, p. 383 (Sbars. Ed.); Bren. nap v. People, 15 Ill. 511; Edwards v. State, 25 Ark. 444; Hubbard v. State, 7 Md. 160; Feople v. Perdue, 49 Cal. 425; Walker v. State, 42 Tex. 360; Mersbon v. State, 44 Ind. 498; State v. O'Rourke, 55 Mo. 440; People y. Cogleton, 44 Cal. 92.

and on or about August 3, A. D. 1896, Mr. Elliott, 1 that as he was in fact insolvent, that the convey. by quitclaim deed, conveyed an undivided one ance was, in law, a fraud upon bis creditors. In half of bis interest in the premises to Adelia M. our view of the case we need consider but one Carey and to John C. Elliott, each. Miss Carey, question, and tbat is whether the creditors can shortly after the death of Mr. Elliott, married complain of the conveyance by Mr. Elliott of his defendant George M. Savage, and she is a defend homestead. The position of counsel for the adant in this proceeding as Adelia M. Savage. De ministrator is that the homestead is not an abfendant George M. Savage acquired by quitclaim solute estate, but at most is an artificial estate, deed the interest of his wife in said premises, which may be waived by the person to whose and, subsequent to the filing of the bill of par- benefit it inures; citing Riggs v. Sterling, 60 tition, also by quitclaim deeds, he acquired any Mich. 652, 27 N. W. Rep. 705; 15 Am. & Eng. Enc. interest that John C. Elliott had in the property. Law, pp. 638, 639. Counsel says: We admit The bill of complaint further sets forth the that James R. Elliott had a homestead interest appointment of defendant Robert W. Smylie as in the premises at the time he executed the quitadministrator of the estate of James R. Elliott, claim deeds in question, while calling attention to deceased; the appointment of commissioners on the fact that he alone had any such interest in the claims in due course of adminstration in the property, and while emphasizing the fact that probate court for the county of Wayne; tbe in any homestead interest in the premises lapsed solvency of the estate; and the claim asserted by with his death. There being no widow or childefendant Smylie, as adminstrator, that upon any dren surviving bim, the provisions of sections 3 sale of the premises under the partition proceed and 4 of article 16 of the constitution bave no apings he was entitled to the interest therein, over plication to this case. We admit that the home. and above the mortgage above referred to, which stead law (Comp. Laws 1897, $ 10,362), which is James R. Elliott bad prior to the 3d day of Au founded upon the constitutional provisions, has gust, A. D. 1896, being the date of the quitclaim been and should be liberally construed, and that deeds to Miss Carey and to John C. Elliott, on the real estate, while occupied as a homestead the ground that the said conveyances were vol. (that is, in this case, during the life of James R. untary, and without consideration, as against Elliott), could not be levied upon or in any other claims of the creditors of deceased. The answer way subjected to the claims of his creditors. of defendant Smylie, as adminstrator aforesaid, Furthermore, we admit that James R. Elliott states the claims allowed against the estate of | might bave sold his property, and during his James R. Elliott, deceased, as being $4,704.39, lifetime his creditors could not complain of tbe and that the assets of the estate amounted to sale, even if it was voluntary. And, further, if $640; and he asserts his right, as adminstrator to Mr. Elliott had sold his interest in the property tbe surplus, over the mortgage, wbich belonged for, say, $1,500, this fund would likewise have to James R. Elliott before he gave the quitclaim been exempt from process during a reasonable deeds above referred to. The answers of defend time within which to invest the same in another ant George 'M. Savage and his wife deny the homestead. Cullen v. Harris, 111 Mich. 20, 69 claim of defendant Smylie to'the fund in question. N. W. Rep. 78. But our contention is that apand assert that the quitclaim deeds were given pellant, as administrator, may, in behalf of such upon sufficient consideration. This answer was creditors, attack such voluntary conveyance after afterwards amended, setting up that the land con the death of James R. Elliott." They argue that veyed was a homestead when the quitclaim deed the homestead is a privilege personal to the was made, in which the creditors had no interest. owner, and may be waived by him, and that a On February 26, 1900, a decree was entered in gift of the homestead is fraudulent as to the the circuit court, establishing the interest of creditors; citing Fellows y. Lewis, 65 Ala. 343, the several owners in common to the premises, | 39 Am. Rep. l; Kingsbury v. Wild, 3 V. H. 30; ordering a sale of the property, and reserving for Currier v. Sutherland, 54 N. H. 486, 20 Am. Rep. the further order of the court the determination 143; Ruobs v. Hook, 3 Lea, 306, 31 Am. Rep. 642; of several questions, among which was the con Scbaffer v. Beldsmeier, 107 Mo. 314, 17 S. W. troversy between defendant Savage and defend Rep. 797; Miller v. Leeper, 120 Mo. 466, 25 S. W. ant Smylie, as administrator, as to their right to Rep. 378. An examination of the authorities any amount arising from the sale which would will show a want of harmony in them. The folrepresent the interest, over and above the mort. lowing authorities are to the effect that a credgage, wbich James R. Elliott had in the premises itor has no interest in a homestead, and cannot on August 3, 1898. This amount was determined complain of its conveyance by the debtor: Crumto be $1,128.72.

men v. Bennett, 68 N. C. 494; Sears v. Hanks, 14 It is not claimed there was any intent on tbe Ohio St. 298, 84 Am. Dec. 378; Wood v. Champart of Mr. Elliott to defraud bis creditors in bers, 20 Tex. 247; Hibben v. Sawyer, 33 Wis. 319; making this deed. The grantees in the deed Dreutzer v. Bell, 11 Wis. 114; Conklin v. Foster, were adopted children, who had lived with him a 57 Ill. 104; Hartwell v. McDonald, 69 Ill. 293; long time, and rendered him valuable service; | Smyth, Homest, $ 234; Legro v. Lord, 10 Me. 165; and he without doubt thought he was leaving Baker v. Kinnaird, 94 Ky. 5, 21 S. W. Rep. 237. enough estate to pay his debts, but it is insisted in Marshall v. Strange (Ky.), 9 S. W. Rep. 250, it was held tbat, where a debtor conveys a por courts being more in the direction of giving effect to tion of his homestead, the whole of which is | the purpose of the homestead exemption laws than worth less than the statutory limit, his creditors in attempting to observe any consistent theory or cannot, after bis death, charge the land so con

rule. Technicalities of expression or theory bave, veyed with bis debts. In Grimes v. Portman, 99

therefore, little to do with the application of the law

of homestead. This is especially the case when we Mo. 229, 112 S. W. Rep. 792, it was held one may

consider the right to aliepate or incumber the estate. sell, mortgage, or give away bis homestead, and

The general rule is that the homestead law does not · bis creditors cannot complain. The question in interfere with the rights of parties to voluntary sales this state is not a new one. The constitutional or mortgages of the homestead lands. McGrath v. provision is as follows: "Every homestead * * Berry, 76 Ky. 391; Smith v. Malone, 10 S. Car. 39. sball be exempt from forced sale on execution, or The owner may, therefore, alienate bis homestead. any other final process from a court, for any debt

Pendergast v. Heekin, 94 Ky. 384, 22 S. W. Rep. 605; contracted after the adoption of this constitu

Peterson v. Hornblower, 33 Cal. 266; Williams v. tion." Article 16, $ 2. The statutory provision

Watkins, 92 Va. 680; Green v. Root, 62 Fed Rep. 191;

Ray v. Yarnell, 118 Ind. 112; Vanstory v. Thornton, reads: “A homestead * * * * owned and

112 N. Car. 196, 34 Am. St. Rep. 483; Halliday v. Hess, occupied by any resident of this state shall not

147 III. 588; Greer v. Major, 114 Mo. 145; Roane v. be subject to forced sale on execution, or any

Hamilton, 101 Iowa, 637; Scalf v. Collin Co., 80 Tex. other final process, for any debt or debts growing 514; Parker v. Dean, 45 Miss. 408; Gunn v. Wades, 65 out of or founded on contract, either express or | Ga. 537; James v. Wilder, 25 Minn. 305; Wea Gas, implied, made after the third day of July, 1848." etc, Co. v. Franklin Land Co., 54 Kan. 533, 45 Am. St. Section 10,362, Comp. Laws 1897. In Riggs v.

Rep. 533. In Tong v. Eifort, 80 Ky. 152, the court Sterling, 60 Mich. 643, 27 N. W. Rep. 705, it was

held that a husband and wife have the right, with or

without consideration, to convey their homestead argued, ag it is was argued here, that the home

without regard to the claims of creditors. And in stead is a privilege personal to the owner, and

Pendergast v. Heekin, supra, it was held that a not an absolute right. The court said: “The

debtor may, by will as well as deed, invest his wife homestead exemption, as it now exists, is not or child with title to the homestead, free from the only a privilege conferred (Chamberlian v. Lyell, claims of his creditors. The right of homestead, 3 Micb. 458), but, under the constitution, it is an however, which has not been set out is not assigna. absolute right. It was intended to secure against

ble. Gunnison v. Twitchel, 38 N. H. 62. A husband, creditors a home, and, to a certain extent, the

without the concurrence of his wife, bas power to means of support, to every family in the state.'

dedicate a part of the community homestead to a city

for the wife's use of bomestead. Orrick v. City of Dye v. Mann, 10 Micb. 297; McKee v. Wilcox, 11

Ft. Worth (Tex. 1895), 32 S. W. Rep. 443. See also Micb. 358, S3 Am. Dec. 743.” In Farrand v.

City of Little Rock v. Wright, 58 Ark. 142, 23 S. W. Caton, 69 Mich., at page 242, 37 N. W. Rep. 203,

Rep. 876. An interesting point arose under Virginia it is said one may do wbat he pleases with bis Code 1887, sec. 3649, providing that when the homeexempt property. In Anderson v. Odell, 51 Mich. stead rigbt in property ceases it shall become subject 493, 16 N. W. Rep. 870, it is said creditors have no to the debts of the owner. It was held that this did right to complain of dealings with property wbich

not prevent its incumbrance or alienation during the the law does not allow them on their claims. In

continuance of its bomestead character; and that a Rhead v. Hounson, 46 Mich. 243, 9 N. W. Rep.

creditor was not entitled to an injunction to preserve

the corpus of homestead property, either real or per: 267, in speaking of a voluntary conveyance of real

sonal, fro:2 alienation. Williains v. Watkins, 92 Va. estate from a father to his son, the court said:

680, 24 S. E. Rep. 223. This power of alienation is not “It appears conclusively from the bill and evi

derived from the constitution or statute relating to dence that when the execution debtor gave the alienation of homesteads. It is an incident of the deed in question he held and occupied a home ownersbip of property independent of the homestead stead on the premises. That part of the farm law, and the directions and probibitions of the conwas therefore exempt. The holder was as free

stitution or statutes as to alienation are mere restric. to dispose of it without interference as though

tions upon this antecedent power. Hinson v. Booth,

39 Fla. 333. The right to alienate or mortgage a be had not been indebted at all,"-citing Smith

homestead must be determined by the law in force v. Rumsey, 33 Mich. 183. See also, Pulte v.

when the mortgage was given. Watts v. Burnett, 56 Geller, 47 Mich. 560, 11 N. W. Rep. 385; Bavk v.

Ala. 340. Tbus, where one was married before the Elliott, 53 Mich. 256, 18 N. W. Rep. 805; Arm adoption of the constitution of 1868, and bad acquired itage v. Toll, 64 Mich. 412, 31 N. W. Rep. 408; the property in question before that time, the restricToll v. Davenport, 74 Mich. 386, 42 N. W. Rep. tion on bis right to convey without the joinder of his 63; Cullen v. Harris, 111 Mich. 20, 69 V. W. Rep.

wife contained in art. 10, sec. 8, does not apply. 78. We think the circuit judge made a decree in

Shaffer v. Bledsoe, 117 N. Car. 144, 23 S. E. Rep. 169. harmony with the uniform decisions of this court.

The following authorities hold that a homestead may

be incumbered in any manner the owner may desire, The decree is affiamed.

without any consideration of the rights of creditors: NOTE-Right of Alienation of Homestead.-One of

Dickerson v. Cuthburtb, 56 Mo. App. 647; Blevins y. the most peculiar things about the law of homestead

Rogers, 32 Ark. 258; Moran v. Clark, 30 W. Va. 359, 8 is its apparent difficulty of application. This is due,

Am. St. Rep. 66; State Bank v. Asbmead, 23 Fla. 379; no doubt, very largely to the fact that the rigbt of

Danforth v. Beattie, 43 Vt. 138; Hill v. Alexander, 2 homestead is construed sometimes as an estate and

Kan. App. 251; Pioneer, etc, Co. v. Paschall, 12 Tex. sometimes as a mere exemption,--the tendency of the

Civ. App. 613; Bartholomae Brewing Co. v. Schroe. der, 67 Ill. App. 560; Hall v. Fulgbam, 86 Tepp. 451; forced after its termination: Mills v. McDaniels, 59 Low V. Anderson, 41 Iowa, 476. In fact, the bome. Mo. App. 331; Burwell y. Tullis, 12 Minn. 572; Mor. stead may even be given away without affecting the ris v. Ward. 5 Kan. 239; Richart Utterback (Ky. rights of creditors. Grimes v. Portman, 99 Mo. 229. 1888), 9 S. W. Rep. 825. Thus where one occupying

The bomestead act has not created a new estate dis. land as a homestead conveyed it to his children, tinct from the fee, but simply an exemption; and reserving a life estate, the land could not, at his when the holder conveys without releasing the right death, be subjected to the payment of a judgment he transfers the fee, but the operation of the deed is recovered against him prior to the conveyance, and suspended until he abandons the premises or surien

subsequent to its

&nbsequent to its acquisition &s & homestead: the ders possession. McDonald v. Crandall, 43 III. 231, evidence being conflicting as to whether the value of 92 Am. Dec. 112; Rutledge v. McFarland, 75 Ga. 774; the land was more than the statutory limit of a homeHewitt v. Templeton, 48 III. 367. There seems to be stead exemption. Richart v. Utterback (Ky. 1888), some dispute over the question whether a conveyance 9 S. W. Rep. 825. or mortgage which is insufficient to convey the right It is undoubtedly the general rule, however, supof homestead is enforceable after abandopment or ported by the great weight of authority, that, as far termination of the homestead. The following au. as alienation is concerned, lands owned and occupied thorities deny that such conveyances can be enforced : as a homestead may be transferred without subject. Bruner v. Bateman, 66 Iowa, 488, 24 N. W. Rep. 9; ing them to the lions of outstanding judgments against Cummings v. Busby, 62 Miss. 195; Amphlett v. Hib the owner. McDonald v. Crandall, 43 III. 231; Ketchin bard, 29 Mich. 298; Alt v. Banbolzer, 39 Mion. 511, 40 v. McCarley, 26 S. Car. 1, 11 S. E. Rep. 1099; BeckN. W. Rep. 830, 12 Am, St. Rep. 681. Thus, an as. maan v. Meyer, 75 Mo. 333; Moore v. Granger, 30 signment of a contract for a deed of the homestead, Ark. 574; Gardner v. Batts, 114 N. Car. 496, 19 S. E. invalid because not joined in by the husband, is Rep. 791; Beyer v. Thoeming, 81 lowa, 517, 46 X. W. not made valid by a subsequent abandonment of the Rep. 1074; Giles v. Miller, 36 Neb. 346, 54 N. W. Rep. premises as a homestead. Belden y. Younger, 76551, 38 Am. St. Rep. 730; James v. Wilder, 25 Minn. lowa, 567, 41 N. W. Rep. 317. So, also, a conveyance 305; Davis v. Prichard (Ky. 1888), 7 €. W. Rep. 549. of a homestead made by a married man alone, with Authorities holding contra: Whitworth v. Lyons, out the signature of the wife, does not become valid 39 Miss. 467; Allen v. Cook, 26 Barb. (N. Y.) 374; by reason of the property subsequently losing its Grant v. Cosby, 51 Ga. 460; Hebert v. Mayer, 42 La. character as a homestead. Barton v. Drake, 21 Minn. | Ann. 839, 8 South. Rep. 590; Taul v. Epperson, 38 299. The following authorities controvert the posi. Tex, 492. Let us examine these cases more in detail. tion assumed by the cases just cited: Himmelmann Thus a conveyance of a homestead thougb fraudu. v. Schmidt, 23 Cal. 117; Lee v. Kingsbury, 13 Tex. 68; lept as to creditors, does not render it, in the bands Vasey v. Trustees, 59 III. 188; Rutledge v. McFarl of the grantee, subject to the lien of a judgment land, 75 Ga. 774; Chaffe v. McGehee, 38 La. Ann. 278. previously obtained against the grantor. Delasbmit Thus, where a mortgagor abandons bis homestead, it v. Trau, 44 Iowa, 613. But in Louisana, where the is immaterial whether he knew or was ignorant of owner of a homestead sells it, dormant judg. the fact that the mortgage on the homestead con ments against him are revived, and will, it tained a clause releasing it at the time he executed recorded, follow the land in the hands of the vendee, it, or whether his wife signed or acknowledged it, and, if the vendor repurchases, he will take subject the mortgage being, by the abandonment, rendered to the judgments, and the homestead exemption operative as to the homestead. Cobb v. Smith, 88 III. will not revive. In Kansas, however, land owned by 199.

a husband and occupied as a homestead may be sold We now come to the consideration of the right of and conveyed by the husband and wife jointly, and alienation as to outstanding judgments or claims. the purcbaser will take the title free from inWe note considerable confusion on this subject. In cumbrance notwithstanding a judgment against the the first place, in regard to judgments, some authori: busband. Morris v. Ward, 5 Kan. 239. In Texas, on ties hold to the rule that a judgment creates a lien the other band, it was held that a judgment lienupon the homestead which may be enforced after holder bas priority over a purchaser of the home. abandonment or alienation, and others that there can stead under a deed of trust signed and duly ackowl. be no lien upon a homestead. The former theory is ! edged by husband and wife. Taul v. Epperson, supported by the following autborities: Brandon v. 38 Tex. 492. But in Missouri, where a debtor cootinMoore, 50 Ark. 247, 7 S. W. Rep. 36, 7 Am. St. Rep. ued to occupy a bomestead after the death of his 96; Bills v. Mason, 42 Iowa, 329; Eaton v. Ryan, 5 wife, and, after several judgments bad been obtained Neb. 47; Vanstory v. Thornton, 112 N. Car. 196; against him, conveyed it for a valuable consideration Moore v. Smead, 89 Wis. 558, 62 N. W. Rep. 426. to his son, it was held tbat the property in the son's Thus, under constitution, Arkansas, 1868, provid. bands was not subject to sale under the judgments. ing for the exemption of a bomestead, the lien of Beckmann v. Meyer, 75 Mo. 333. It is thus seen to a judgment attaches to land occupied as a homestead, be impossible to reconcile the authorities. Each and can be enforced against one wbo purchases from state has its own reason for extending or limiting the the judgment debtor. Jackson v. Allen, 30 Ark. 110. right of homestead, some favoring the creditor, So also under Code, N. Car. sec. 435, which makes a otbers the dobtor. This tendency will also necessarily docketed judgment a lien on "all tbe iand” of the decide its position on the right of alienation of the debtor in the county where it is docketed, from the homestead. date of the docketing, the lien of a judgment properly docketed bas priority over the lens of mortgages on

JETSAM AND FLOTSAM. tbe homestead executed subsequently to the docket. ing of such judgment. Vanstory v. Thornton, 112 N.

EDIBLE EVIDENCE. Car. 196, 17 S. E. Rep. 566, 34 Am. St. Rep. 483.

The jury ate up an important part of the evidence The following autborities hold that a judgment does

in a case they were trying in the superior court at not create a lien on a homestead which can be en

Atlanta, Ga., in which one of the issues submitted


was whetber certain almonds, the price of which was sued for, were of the quality contracted for. The judge that presided at the trial has the humorous tendency tbat characterized the great judge whose names be bears and who was his grandfather,-Chief Justice Joseph Henry Lumpkin,-and in his judg. ment, refusing a new trial in this case, he has this to say:

"If a new trial should be grapted in this case it can never be tried again exactly as it was before. Out of the almonds constituting the subject matter of this litigation a small number were kept, and on tbe trial were submitted to the jury along with some almonds obtained from another shipment, for comparison. When the jury retired to their room for consultation the two small paper sacks containing these almonds were carried out with them. After some time they returned a verdict, but not the almonds. On inquiry the court was informed that as a part of their delib. eration, and probably as a most conclusive mode of comparing the quality of the two samples, they bad eaten both. In case of a new trial there are no more almonds for the next jury. It migbt be said that from an almond standpoint the case is ex. hausted. Perhaps it would be better for the jury not to eat up the evidence, at least not all tbe edible part of it. A due regard for the palates of a possible future jury, in case of a new trial, if nothing else, might suggest the advisibility of only a moderate degustation. It is quite possible tbat juries sometimes tind a difficulty in swallowing all of the state. ments made before them, and that if on some occasion a toothsome or succulent bit of evidence is sent to the jury room with them, appealing at once to in tellectual and gastronomic investigation, the desire for knowledge may be stimulated to a point beyond deliberative moderation."- Green Bag.

The Law of Agency, including the Law of Principal

and Agent and the Law of Master and Servant. By Ernest W. Huffcut, Professor of Law in the Cornell University College of Law. Second Edition, Revised and Enlarged. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1901. Sheep. Price, $3.50.

pp. 406. Review will follow. Federal Equity Procedure. A Treatise on the Pro

cedure in Suits in Equity in the Circuit Courts of the United States. Including Appeals and Appellate Procedure with Appendixes containing the Constitution of the United States Annotated, Federal Judiciary Acts, Court Rules, Equity Formg, English Orders in Chancery. By C. L. Bates, of the Bar of San Antonio, Texas. In two volumes. Chicago: T. H. Flood & Company, 1901. Sheep, pp. 1407. Price $12.60 delivered.

Review will follow.
Law Books by the Million. An Account of the

Largest Law Book House in the World,-the
Home Establishment of the National Reporter
System and the American Digest System. St.
Paul, Minn., West Publishing Co., 1901.


A judge once made an attempt to bave a more ceremonious court, with the following result. He drilled the sheriff in the proper ceremony for opening the court, and the sheriff opened it in these words: “Oyez, Oyez-The honorable-Mublenberg-Circuit Court-is now convened-Judge Caldwell presiding --God save the commonwealth! ! !"


Woekly Digest of ALL tho Carrent Opinions of ALL the state and Territorial Courts of Last Resort, and of all the Federal Conrts.


To the Editor of the Central Law Journal:

An interesting example of a pretermitted statute is section 735, Rev. Stat. Mo. 1879. In subsequent revisions this section disappears. The case of Manhattan Brass Co. v. Webster Glass Co., 37 App. p. 145 (1889), was decided upon this statute. It is probably declaratory, but so are many other sections under the chapters respecting corporations. The only authority in this state leclaring tbe rule is Missouri Lead Co. v. Reinbard, 114 Mo. 218 (1893).



ALABAMA, 3, 62, 63, 113, 121, 127, 136, 137, 143, 144, 152, 178,

182, 184 ARKANSAS, 28, 29, 31, 32, 35, 47, 54, 55, 58, 70, 71, 75, 76, 93,

95. 96. 119, 148, 149, 166 CALIFORNIA...............37, 38, 49, 50, 114, 120, 142, 151, 157 KENTUCKY...............

............... 102 MASSACHUSETTS........................ 33, 181, 138, 139, 173 MICHIGAN.........23, 77, 80, 81, 94, 133, 134, 145, 169, 170, 181 M1881981PPI, 25, 26, 27, 30, 48, 51, 52, 60, 92, 98, 99, 101, 122,




Tbere would appear to be hardly any necessity for a new work on this important subject, at least from the practitioner's standpoint. For the student of law, bowever, this subject bas never been satis. factorily presented, so as to bring out clearly the great principles of this subject freed from its many difficult and confusing technicalities. This latter end, however, has been excellently attained in the treatise on Equity Jurisprudence just prepared by Mr. James W. Eaton for the Hornbook series of legal text books. The arrangement is clear, logical and concise, and is undoubtedly the best text book on tbe subject that has so far appeared. One volume of 784 pages, bound in law sheep. Publisbed by the West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn.


.............. 64, 68, 82 NEBRASKA..... .. . . . .......................91, 129 NEW YORK, 8, 16, 41, 42, 43, 57, 59, 78, 83, 100, 105, 116, 123,

125, 126, 146, 153, 155, 158, 171, 179, 183, 185, 187, 188, 189 SOUTH DAKOTA................

........6, 141, 180 TENNESSEE.................24, 40, 66, 67, 69, 74, 102, 132, 172 TEXAS............

.........56, 118 UNITED STATES C.C., 7, 21, 22, 34, 36, 39, 72, 73, 86, 87,

103, 104, 106, 107, 110, 115, 147, 150, 165, 174, 176, 177, 186 UNITED STATES C. C. OF APP., 9, 14, 20, 44, 45, 53, 61, 84,

85, 69, 90, 108, 154, 160, 161, 175 UNITED STATES D. C., 1, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 124,

156, 159, 162, 163, 164 WASHINGTON, 2, 4, 5, 46, 65, 79, 88, 97, 109, 111, 117, 128,

130, 140, 167, 168 1. ADMIRALTY - Maritime Liens-Findings of Master -Questions of Fact.-The finding of a master as to questions of fact relating to the right to a lien for sup. plies wili not be disturbed where the evidence is con

« ПредишнаНапред »