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ployee to show both defect in macbine, with negli. gence in providing it, and also begligence in permit. ting floor on which he stood to operate it to be wet and slippery, when accompanied, also, by instruction to fod for employer if the machine was not defective, although there was no evidence that the admittedly wet and slippery condition of the floor was due to neg. ligence.-SWIFT & Co. V. HOLOUBEK, Neb., 86 N. W.. Rep. 900.
54. MASTER AND SERVANT – Duty of Master - Appli. ances and Place to Work.-A master owes a positive duty to his servants to use ordinary care to furnish appliances reasonably safe for their use considering the nature of the service, and to provide a safe place to work, and keep it is suitable condition. Where he delegates such duty to another, he is responsible for its proper performance by such other, although the latter may be, as to other matters, a fellow-servant with the other employees, for whose negligence the master is not responsible to whom.- LAFAYETTE BRIDGE CO. V. OLSEN, U. S. C. C. of App., Seventh Circuit, 108 Fed. Rep. 335.
55. MASTER AND SERVANT - Injury to Employee-Asgumption of Risk.-The presence of a book on the rear of a locomotive tender, for supporting the bose of the air brake when not coupled, being apparent, and its danger known, and it having been replaced every time the brakeman knocked it off, be assumes the risk of being caught thereby, where he continues to climb over the end of the tender.--CRAWFORD V. DETROIT, ETC. CO., Mich., 86 N. W. Rep. 817.
56. MORTGAGES-Waiver ef Title-Levy of Execution. -The acceptance of a mortgage on property is not necessarily a waiver ot title by the mortgagee, subjecting it to levy, if the parties understood that it was not a waiver.-STACK V. OLMSTED, Mich., 86 N. W. Rep. 851.
57. MONICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Mandamus to City-Tax Levy.-City authorities pot required by mandamus to levy tax for water supply in excess of limit on such tax existing at time of contract.-STATE V. CITY OF WAH00, Neb., 86 N. W. Rep. 923.
59. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONI-Sidewalks-DefectsNotice of Injury.-Where & person injured by falling on a defective sidewalk serves a claim, and describes the location of the detect ag on a certain side of a named street, between two other named streets, and the city recelves and acts on the notice without ob. jection, the notice is sufficiently definite as to the locality.- WHEELER V. CITY OF DETROIT, Mich., 86 N. W. Rep. 822.
59. MUTUAL BENEFIT COMPANY - Insolvency - Dis. tribution of Funds.-Defendants and others held maturod certificates in a mutual benefit company, and, on tallure of the company to pay the certificates, an agreement was made wbereby the amounts were to be paid in installments, and mortgages were to be as. signed to defendants to secure the deferred payments. The mortgages were dever assigned, but defendants acted as a committee in receiving and distributing the casb payments without knowledge of the company's insolvency. Held, that defendants were not liable, as trustees, to the receiver of the company, for the sums distributed.-CALKINS V. BEEKMAN, Mich., 86 N. W. Rob. 835.
60. NEGLIGENCE-Contributory Negligence-Danger. ous Premises.-Where an employee in a sawmill, while on his way to discharge a duty which he has boen ordered to perform, in passing along one of tbe open, public thoroughfares of the mill, stops to ex cbange a remark with a fellow employce concerning the operation of the macbinery of the inill, and is struck and injured by a belt which breaks at tbe moment, he will not be held guilty of such contribu. tory pegligence as will preclude his recovery of dam. ages because he happened to stop in front of (though eight feet away from the pulley which carried the offending belt. If the place was too unsafe to be used
for such a purpose, it ougbt not to have been kept open as a common passage or thorougbfare.-MOORE V. W. R. PICKERING LUMBER, CO., La., 29 South. Rep. 990.
61. NEGLIGENCE – Dangerous Premises – Owner's Duty.-One wbo goes upon the premises of another by express or implied invitation of the owner may recover damages for an injury caused by a failure on the part of such owner to keep the premises in a reason: ably safe condition.-TUCKER V. DRAPER, Neb., 86' N. W. Rep. 917.
62. NUISANCE - Abatement-Agent.-An "agent," as defined by section 10, ch. 10, of the charter of the city of St. Paul, is one who has general control of the premises. One whose autbority is limited to merely the renting of premises and the collection of rents is not guch an agent, and his authority to abate a pui. sance will not be presumed.-CITY OF ST. PAUL V. CLARK, Minn., 86 N. W. Rep. 893.
63. PLEA IN MITIGATION OF DAMAGES-Evidence of Good Faith.-In those states where by statute a plea in mitigation of damages may be filed in connection with a plea of justification, and evidence in support of the former plea may be received although the latter plea is not established, an issue concerning the good faith of the defendant inheres in every action for slander or libel where a plea in justification is tiled and is not sustained by the proot, since the jury, in determining whether punitive damages should be ag. sessed, are entitled to consider whether the plea was interposed in good or ip bad faith, and evidence hay. ing any legitimate tendency to develop the defend. ant's motive should be received.-KANSAS CITY STAR 00. V. CARLISLE, U. S. C. C. of App., Eighth Circuit, 108 Fed. Rep. 345.
64. PUBLIC LANDS- Entry- Filing-Right of Pog. session.-Where an application for the entry of land is legally and properly made for a homestead under the land laws of the United States, the right to possession thereot inures to the person making such entry, as against a trespasser.-HASTY V. BONNE88, MinD., 86 N. W. Rep. 896.
65. RAILROAD8-Negligence-Death of Employee.Under Comp. Laws, $ 6313, requiring railroads companies to block frogs, it is the duty of the railroad companies to make the frogs as nearly sale as pog. sible, and evidence that the blocking of a certain frog was old and worn by the flanges is suficient to render the question of a company's negligence one for the jury.-JONES V. FLINT & P. M. R. CO., Mich., 86 N. W. Rep. 838.
66. RAILROADS- Relief Departmant - Claims-Releage.-Deceased was killed on the defendant railway while on duty as fireman, and left a widow and two minor children, and was a member of the defendant company's relief department, which had a rule that, in case of the death of a member, the benefits would not be paid until the parties entitled to gue bad ex. ecuted a release to the company of all claims for damages. Held, that the execution of a release by plaint. Iff as the widow and beneficiary of deceased, and an acceptance of a $1,000 benefit therefor, did not bar an action by her as adminstrator of deceased's estate.COWEN V. RAY, U. S. C. C. of App., Seventh Circuit, 108 Fed. Rep. 320.
67. RAILROADS-Right of Way-Liability of Rail. roady- Damages.- Where & railroad company has entered upon tbe land of another and constructed its road through them without the owner's consent, and without condemnation proceedings, the measure of compensation to whicb the owner is entitled is the value of the land when taken by the railroad company, and the injury or diminution in value caused to the contiguous lands, together with interests on said sums thus ascertained from the date of the taking:-SOUTH ERN RY. Co, v. COWAN, Ala., 29 South. Rep. 985.
68. RECEIVERS - Validity of Judgment AgainstPrior Discharge.--A judgment in an action against the receivers of a railroad is valid, where at the time of
its reddition they had not been discharged in the suit 76. TAXATION-Deliquent Taxes-Interest.-Interest in which they were originally appointed, although
cannot be collected on deliquent taxes before tbey are the receivership was subsequently extended to an.
reduced to judgment, since interest is not allowed at other suit against the company, and in such suit they
common law, and Code 1892, $ $ 2348, 2360, only allows had been discharged prior to the judgment.-MCCAR
interest on money due under contracts and judgments. LEY V. MCGHEE, U.S. C. C., N. D. (Ala.), 108 Fed. Rep.
-ILLINOIS CENT. R. CO. V. ADAMS, Miss., 29 Soutb. 494.
Rep. 996. 69. SALES- Contract of Sale-Title. -An arrange
77. TAXATION-Exceeding Statutory Limit-Injuncinent whereby chættels are conveyed at a price cer.
tion.-“When a tax is void,-that is, when tbere is no taia, with a provision that the vendee may, if he fails
tax which the plaintiff is in equity bound to pay,-he to resell them, return them to the vendor, is a con.
may invoke the aid of a court of equity to protect bis tract of sale.-OMARA NAT. RANK V. KRAUS, Neb., 86 N.
rights by an injunction, notwithstanding section 144, W. Rep. 906.
ch. 77, art. 1, Comp. St. 1899."-GRAND ISLAND & W.0. 70. SALE-Land-Contract-Description.-In a con.
R. CO. V. DAWES COUNTY, Neb., 86 N. W. Rep. 934. tract for the sale of land a description by name is 78. TAXATION- Personal Property-Assessment to suficient il It can be indentided by extrinsic evidence Wrong Party.-Under Comp. Laws, $ 3836, requiring not contradictory of the contract.-GARVEY V. PARK property to be assessed "to the owner" on the second HURST, Mich., 86 N. W. Rep. 802
Monday of April, and section 3840, providing that no 71. SALE-Rescission-Fraud.-Rescission of a sale on
change of location or sale of any personal property the ground of fraud is justified on evidence that the
after the 1st day of May shall affect the assessment of purchaser said that he was in as good pecuniary con.
for such year, the assessment of personal property of dition and had as good credit at the bank as ever, and
be Fergerson Hardware Company, Limited, in the could meet his paper when due; that he had not as
name of its predecessor, the Ferguson Hardware Com.
pany. gave no tax lien on the goods, and the purchaser good credit at the bank as previously; and that a month later, on account of threatened suit by creditore,
at a valid chattel mortgage foreclosure sale after tbe he torined a corporation, to which he conveyed all
1st of May could replevin them from the tax col. his property except his home and some lots, which he
lector.-CHIPPEWA HARDWARE CO. V. ATWOOD, Mich., conveyed to his wite.-CLARK V. WILLIAM MUNROE
86 N. W. Rep. 864. Co., Mich., 86 N. W. Rep. 816.
79. TAXATION-7ax Judgment-Action to Appul.-In 72. SALE – Written Contract - Oral Warranties.
an action under section 1610, Gen. St. 1894, to have a
tax judgment annulled and vacated, upon which a Warranties cannot be added by parol to a written con. tract which on its face purports to contain the wbole
certificate regular on its face has been issued, the agreement of the parties. But where, in an action for
court may, as a condition to its order setting aside the price of a cash register, the contract of sale being
such judgment, require, as a condition therefor, that
subsequent taxes paid by the holder of the certificate, in writing, defendant pleaded that the seller repre.
and tacked to the game, must be paid by the plaintsented to bim that the machine could not be manipu.
iff.-ROBERT P. LEWIS CO. V. KNOWLTON, Minn., 86 N. lated to his prejudice, and that in reliance thereon be
W. Rep. 875. purchased the register, which in truth could be ma. nipulated, defendant might give evidence to sbow the
80. TAXATION-Tax Sale-Rights of Purchaser.-A purcbage induced by deceit.-HALLWOOD CASH.REG.
purhaser of lands at an invalid tax sale lg subrogated 18TER CO. V. MILLARD, Mich., 86 N. W. Rep. 833.
to the rigbts of the county. - GREEN V. HELLMAN
Neb., 86 N. W. Rep. 912. 73. SHIPS AND SHIPPING-Collision-Action for Dam.
81. TAXATION.-Void-Levy.- Where the board ot agos to Tow-Master of Tug as Libelant.-The master of a tug is a common-law bailee of a tow and her cargo
supervisors voted salaries to the sheriff and otber
officers, and such salaries were included in the tax which are in his charge with a lien thereon for the
levy, tax deeds based thereon are void.-COLLINS Y. towage services rendered, and as such he is entitled to maintain ap action against another vessel for a colli
REA, Mich., 86 N. W. Rep. 811. sion in which his tow and her cargo are lost, and in such 82. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Default of Vendeeaction to recover their full value, holding the amount Recovery of Payment Made.-A vendee in & contract remaining, alter deducting his own logs, in trust for for the sale of lands, which provides for the forteiture the owner. In such case the owperg of the tow and to the vendor of all payments made as liquidated cargo may intervene as co-libelants, if they desire, or damages in case of default in any of the payments, the respondent may bring in the tug, under admiralty and for the right of the vendor to rescind the contract rule 69, by petition showing her to have been in fault, on such default, cannot while so in default maintain in which case a substitution of the owners of the tow | an action against the vendor to recover back money and cargo as libelants is the proper courge.- TAE paid in part performance of said contract on the MERCEDES, U.S. D. C., 8. D. (N. Y.), 108 Fed. Rep. 559. ground of a rescission of the contract by the vendor,74. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-Cloud on Title.- Where
MALOY V. MUIR, Neb., 86 X. W. Rep. 916. defendant contracted to purchase land op delivery of 83. WILLS-Constructiong-Life Estate. -A will conan abstract showing a good title clear of all incum. sisting of a single sentence in the German language, brances, and it appeared that plaintiff's title was ob of which the following is, as nearly as possible, a lit. talned under a foreclosure sale which took place 13 1-2 eral translation into English, omitting Dames: “I do years after the entry of decree, on which state of will and bequeath to my wife all my property, she bas facte defendant's counsel advised that the title was entire control ( Sie habt zu verfuegen') over the not perfect, there was such doubt as to the validity
le after my death as long as she lives,"-devises & the title tbat plaintiff was pot entitled to enforc life estate only, and the reversion at the death of the
pecific performance.-WALKER Y. GILLMAN, Mich., testator vests in his beir or beirg at law.-SCHIMPF V. 86 N. W. Rep. 830.
RHODEWALD, Neb., 86 N. W. Rep. 908. 75. STATE8-Action Against State-Damages to Prop. 84. WITNESSES- Competency-- Wife as Interested erty.Under Aon. Code, $ 4248, providing tbat any per. Party.-Under Comp. Laws, $ 10,212, providing that in son having a claim against the state, alter demand actions against decedents' estates the opposite party made of the auditor of public accounts therefor, and shall not be permitted to testify to matters wbich, it his refusal to issue & warrapt in payment thereof, true, must have been equally within the knowledge of may sue the state, a party renting land to the state is decedent, a wife of complainant in an action agalpst not entitled to sue such state for bad husbandry in a decedent's estate for damages for a breach of an breach of the lease, since such claim, being unliqui agreement is not a party in Interest and ibcompetent dated, is not such a one as the auditor can audit. to testify.- DUNN V. DUNN'S ESTATE, Mich., 86 N. W. HALL V, STATE, Miss., 29 South. Rep. 994.
Central Law Journal.
and its effect is clearly observed in the : decision of Judge Hammond in the case of Southern Railway Co. v. Machinists' Union,
just referred to. This case was a suit for ST. LOUIS, MO., OCTOBER 18, 1901.
injunction prohibiting members of a certain
labor union from the commission of acts Government by injunction bas been most of violence and intimidation against nonseverely condemned, not altogether justly, union employees of the complainant. The but at the same time not altogether without court concerned itself principally with what reason. The application of this extraordi it termed the personal liberty of the non-union Dary and most arbitrary of all legal remedies workmen, and based its right to grant reby courts of equity has been with most | lief on the ground that no police or other marked frequency of late years, especially protection was afforded them, "which is in the settlement of disputes between labor really," says the court, "the chief reason and capital, and has given rise to much dis wby resort must be had to courts of equity; cussion as to its probable abuse. A recent ordinary police protection being ineffective decision by Judge Hammond of the United in fact whatever cause may produce that States District Court at Memphis, handed (insufficiency; the condition of non-protecdown a few weeks ago, enters largely into | tion, in fact, being all with which equity is the ethics of the question and arrives at the | concerned.” Then follows this sweeping conclusion that the jurisdiction of equity is | statement of the extent of the court's jurispractically supreme and uplimited in the diction to grant injunctions in such cases, protection by injunction not only of prop which we believe evidences the most aderty, but of personal rights as well, and irre vanced position which has yet been taken on spective of the fact whether the act com this important question: plained of is punishable as a crime or not. “The suggestion that the same constituThe case which bas been responsible more tion which safeguards the personal liberty of than any other for this clear extension of the .scab' and his employer guarantees to its equity jurisdiction is that of In re Debs, 158 violators trial by jury for their crimes or ofU. S. 564. The exact holding of this case fenses arising out of the violation is not an was that a court of equity bas jurisdiction answer to the fact that prosecutions and conto enjoin the obstruction of the mails sequent convictions are either wholly wantand highways used in interstate com: ing or ineffectual for the protection of the merce, though such obstruction amounts to 'scabs' and their employers. The Debs case a public nuisance, for which a criminal prose settles that the same constitution also guarancution would lie, and that the punishment tees the equitable remedy. It is not, indeed, imposed by such court for violation of its as the able counsel of defendants argued, a injunction is not an exercise of criminal ju concurrent remedy with that afforded by crimrisdiction. The point, however, which dis- inal prosecution, and it is one dependent, as tinguished this case from others and made it he says, upon conditions in which mere the stepping stone, whether so intended or police failure is not included, but that failure not, to a wider exercise of equitable powers is none the less the occasion of the resort to of injunction was the strong disclaimer by equity-the paramount necessity for it. The the court of any desire to rest its decision on equitable remedy is a wholly independent one any rights of property which the United arising out of conditions of inadequacy of States might or might not bave in the car that other likewise wholly independent remriage of the mails as a prerequisite to the edy of an action at law for damages, and jurisdiction of the court to restrain or re upon neither of ihese does the remedy of move by injunction any obstruction to the criminal prosecution have the least bearing. exercise of any of the powers of government Except that if the criminal law be.so thorwhere no other equally satisfactory or adeoughly executed that there could be no vioquate remedy is at hand. This absolutelylation of or offenses against the personal dismisses the question whether the act en- liberty of the 'scabs' and their employers, joined might be punished as a crime or not, there would then be no occasion for actions
at law for damages or bills in equity for in make any regulations for the conduct of its busijunction. That is all the relation that the
ness which is reasonable. An American, however,
feels any limitation on bis personal rigbts so sepsicriminal law has to such suits as this. Re
tively that he will instinctively protest against Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 594.”
it. This fact probably accounts for the continuous We have quoted this case in advance of its litigation over this question, and especially that appearance in the Reporters, because of its phase of it regarding the right of a carrier to unique importance in this day of labor trou place a time limit on its contract of transportation bles and disputes. Undoubtedly this exten
by merely printing same on the ticket, but not
bringing it expressly to the attention of the passion of equity jurisdiction, although not abro
senger. This was tbe question discussed in the gating the general rule that equity never case of Coburn v. Railroad, 29 South Rep. 882, interferes by injunction to prevent the com where the Supreme Court of Louisiana held that mission of a crime, nevertheless undermines a purchaser of a railroad passenger ticket must it with another exception so far reaching as
take notice of the time limitation printed or
stamped on the face of the ticket, and that a limit to eventually make the rule itself a very
of one day on such a ticket was pot unreasonably precarious foundation to build upon. Whether sbort. this will be a calamity is not altogether cer Subject to the qualification of reasonableness, tain, depending more upon the character of time limits in railroad tickets are valid, and the the men into whose hands this extraordinary
holder of such a ticket must start upon his pas
sage within the time prescribed or forfeit his power is committed than upon any inherent
right to passage. Elmore v. Sands, 54 N. Y. 512; injustice in the role itself.
Shedd v. Railroad, 40 Vt. 88; Lillis v. Railroad,
64 Mo. 464; Heffron v. Railroad, 92 Micb. 406; NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS.
McRae v. Railroad, 88 N. Car. 526; Pennington v.
Miss. 194: Powell v. Railroad, 25 Ohio St. 70. UNFAIR TRADE -- MALICIOUSLY INDUCING
The conditions generally reads that “this ticket ONE'S CUSTOMERS TO QUIT TRADING WITH
will no: be good unless used on or before a cerHIM.-The unanimous judgment of the House of
tain date. This, however, does not require him Lords in Quinn v. Leatham is particularly im
to commence his passage until midnight of the portant, because it clearly shows that an action
last day, although he cannot reach his destination can still be maintained against persons who ma
until after the expiration of the time limited. liciously induces a man's customers not to deal
Auerbach v. Railroad, 89 N. Y. 281; Georgia, etc. with him, or his servants not to continge in his
R.R. v. Bigelow, 68 Ga. 219; Evans v. Railroad, 11 employment. The contrary bas, no doubt, been
Mo. App. 463; Lundy v. Railroad, 66 Cal. 191, 56 inferred by many people from the decision of the
Am. Rep. 100. same tribunalin Allen v. Flood. In that celebrated case, however, said the lords who dearted Quinn v.
LANDLORD AND TENANT—"CROPPERS"_FAILLeatham, the facts on which the majority based
URE OF TENANT TO COMPLY WITH CONTRACT. their decisions were that the appellant merely
A "cropper" is a term applied to a person bired informed the respondents' employer that, unless
by the land owner to cultivate the land, receiving he dismissed the respondents, his otber workmen
for his compensation a portion of the crops raised. would refuse to work for him, and to give such
In a number of states, statutes have been passed Information truthfully, however maliciouly, can.
defining the rights and liabilities attaching to this not infringe any right. Yet the right of every
peculiar tenancy. These statutes are little more man to earn bis living in his own way, to deal
than declaratory of the common law. Thus, in the with persons who are willing to deal with him,
recent case of Wood v. Garrison, 62 S. W. Rep. is recognized by law. An interference with tbis
728, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that right, it is now laid down, by threats of serious
$ 2327 of statutes, providing that “when a tenant damage or annoyance is prima facie actionable,
enters or bolds premises by virtue of a contract, even when the coercion is applied, not to the man
in which it is stipulated that he is to labor for his himself, but to others for the purpose of injuring
landlord, and he fails to begin such labor, or if, him. Whetber in a particular case the interfer
having begun, without good cause fails to comply ence with a man's business or employment is
with his contract, his right to the premises shall wrongful must be to a large extent a question of
at once cease, and be sball abandon them withfact. In Quinn v. Leatbam the jury found that
out demand or notice," applies where the tenant the appellant had acted wrongfully and mali
is to furnisb labor and the landlord everything ciously, and this verdict was abundantly justified
else, and the tenant is to receive as compensation by tbe facts of the case. --Solicitors' Journal.
either money or a given proportion of the crop;
and therefore where such a tenant, after begin. CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS---REASONABLENESS ning to work, failed to continue, the landlord was OF TIME LIMIT REGULATIONS. It is almost an l entitled to maintain forcible detainer. The court axiom of law that carriers will be permitted to said in part:
"It is everywhere admitted (see cases previously act itself, and no other limitation is authoritative cited) that under a pure or unqualified cropping where the language is unambiguous and construes contract the entire legal ownership of the crop is itself. It is not permissible to go outside the in the owner of the land until division. As was statute, plain in its words, as covering all labor said by Rodman, J., in Harrison v. Ricks, 71 N. contracts and laborers, and to say, on any considCar. 11:*A cropper bas no estate in the land. That eration whatever, that there was an intention to remains in the landlord. Consequently, although limit it to a particular class of laborers, white or he has in some sense the possession of the crop, black, or however else such classification may be it is only the possession of a servant, and is in law made, as of agricultural or industrial workmen; that of the landlord. The landlord must divide to not when the subject-matter and the language the cropper bis share. In sbort, he is a laborer used comprehend these and all other classes." receiving pay in a share of the crop.' Under The following authorities are directly in point the facts of this case as stated above, appellee and sustain the position of the court: Lake County appears to come within the definition of the term v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662; St. Paul, etc. Railroad'v. 'cropper,' which is a tenancy contemplated and Phelps, 137 U. S. 528; Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 included in section 2327. If such a tenant fails to U.S. 414, 419; Dewey v. United States, 178 U. S. begin the labor contracted to be done by him, or, 510, 521. having begun, without good cause fails to con
FIRE INSURANCE-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF tinue it, the landlord may maintain forcible de
ANTI-COMPACT LAWS.-Anti-trust legislation tainer, and dispossess him; and be might also be
under the spur of popular prejudice sometimes entitled to such of the remedies provided in
oversteps the bounds of reason by attacking legitsection 2325 as were applicable to the state of the
imate enterprise and infringing the rigbt and case."
freedom of contract. This is especially so in STATUTES — CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUC statutes attempting to control the right of insurTION.-One of the most insidious temptations of anee companies to enter into agreements fixing courts or judges in arriving at the meaning of a the rates of insurance. This is a very important statute is to resort to extrinsic or contemporaneous question at the present time, and one on which construction, whenever the words taken in their the authorities are not altogether clear or harmoordinary meaning do not appeal to their precon- | nious. In the recent case of Niagara Fire Insurceived opinion as to what the law ought to be, or ance Co. v. Cornell. decided by the United States what they think the legislature had in mind when Circuit Court for the district of Nebraska, the they passed the law, and the mistake is not question of the constitutionality of a law which unfrequently made that to find out and effectuate prohibited insurance companies organized and the intention of the legislature in passing a cer. existing under the laws of other States from tain act is perfectly legitimate, whether there is entering into any agreement with respect to the any ambiguity in the meaning of the words or question of rates, was decided in favor of the innot. The intention of the legislature or the evils surance companies. Tbe Nebraska legislature they intended to remedy,.are absolutely imma in 1897 passed a bill in reference to trusts, definterial, where the words they have used, when taken | ing the same, providing means for their suppresin their ordinary usage, admit only of one inter sion, and for the punishment of the violator of pretation. This rule was well stated by the court the statutes. It specifically referred to fire inin the case of Soutbern Railway Company v. surance companies, and in the definition of a Local Union, decided October 5, 1901, by Judge trust recites that "a combination of capital, skill, E. S. Hammond of the U. S. District Court at or acts by persons with intent to prevent compeMempbis. The statute which was the subject of tition in fire insurance, or by which they shall construction provided that it should not be lawful in any manner establish or settle the price of fire for any person knowingly to hire, decoy or entice insurance, with the intent to prevent free compeaway, any one, male or female, who is at the time tition, is in violation of the statute." It will be under contract or employ of another; and any per well to note in this connection that this language son so under contract or in the employ of another is much stronger than has usually been employed leaving their employ without good and sufficient by legislatures in arriving at the same end. The cause, before the expiration of the time for which complainants insisted that the statutes were in they were employed, sball be liable for the dam conflict with both the state and federal constiages the employer may reasonably sustain by tutions for various reasons, and prayed for an such violation of the contract. The court said: injunction to restrain the state through its off
It may be conceded that it is not at all likely cials from enforcing the statutes. The case of that the Tennessee legislature intended to make | Paul v. Virginia was cited by the attorney-genby this statute a law against strikes and strikers eral as a strong argument in favor of any law and the labor unions. But this consideration can which the State of Nebraska might make pernot control the courts in the construction of stat mitting foreign insurance corporations to do busiutes, if they be broad enough in the language ness in that state; and the court held that used to cover the case of strikes and the labor questions of the license fees, and fees for local unions. If the legislature intends to limit its agents, as well as respecting suits to be brought enactment they must do so by the terms of the against insurance companies, and many other