too long delayed the end to be attained by the exercise of the power to declare a quarantine may be defeated and irreparable injury done."

It is urged that it does not appear that the action of the live stock sanitary commission was taken on sufficient information. It does not appear that it was not, and the presumption which the law attaches to the acts of public officers must obtain and prevail. The plaintiff in error relies entirely on abstract right, which he seems to think cannot depend upon any circumstances, or be affected by them. This is a radical mistake. It is the character of the circumstances which gives or takes from a law or regulation of quarantine a legal quality. In some cases the circumstance would have to be shown to sustain the quarantine, as was said in Kimmish v. Bell, 129 U.S. 217, 32 L. Ed. 695, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 407, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 277. But the presumptions of the law are proof, and such presumptions exist in the pending case, arising from the provisions of and the duties enjoined by the statute, and sanction the action of the sanitary commission and the governor of the state. If they could have been, they should have been met and overcome, and the remarks of the court of civil appeals becomes pertinent:

The facts in this case are not disputed. The plaintiff sues as for a conversion, because of a refusal to deliver his cattle at Fort Worth. It is necessary to his recovery that he show that it was the legal duty of the defendant company to make such delivery. It is for the breach of this alleged duty he sues; yet it nowhere appears from the record that before the quarantine line in question was established the sanitary commission did not make the most careful and thorough investigation into the necessity therefor, if, indeed, that matter could in any event be inquired into. So far as the record shows, every animal of the kind prohibited in the state of Louisiana may have been actually affected with charbon or anthrax, and it conceded that this is a disease different from Texas or splenetic fever, and that it is contagious and infectious and of the most virulent character."

Judgment affirmed.

Mr. Justice Harlan dissenting:

I am unable to concur in the opinion and judgment of the court. The grounds of my dissent are these: (1) The railroad company was bound to discharge its duties as a carrier unless relieved therefrom by such quarantine regulations under the laws of Texas as were consistent with the constitution of the United States. It could not plead in defense of its action the quarantine regulations adopted by the state sanitary commission and the proclamation of the governor of that state, if such regulations and proclamation were void under the constitution of the United States. (2) The authority of the state to establish quarantine regulations for the protection of the health of its people does not authorize it to

create an embargo upon all commerce involved in the transportation of live stock from Louisiana to Texas. There does not appear on the face of the transaction any ground whatever for establishing a complete embargo for any given period upon all transportation of live stock from Louisiana to Texas.

I think, therefore, that the regulations and proclamation upon which the defendant relied were to be deemed void and therefore inapplicable to the particular transportation referred to in the complaint.

It seems to me that the present case comes within the principles announced in Henderson v. New York, 92 U. S. 259, sub nom. Henderson v. Wickham, 23 L. Ed. 543. That case involved the validity of a statute of New York having for its object the protection of the people of that state against the immigration of foreign paupers. It was held by this court to be unconstitutional, because "its practical result was to impose a burden upon all passengers from foreign countries." In that case it was said that, in whatever language a statute was framed, its purpose must be determined by its natural and reasonable effect. So, also, in Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, 473, 24 L. Ed. 527, 531, we held that a statute of Missouri relating to the bringing into that state of any Texas, Mexican or Indian cattle between certain dates was a plain intrusion upon the exclusive domain of congress. This court said: "It is not a quarantine law. It is not an inspection law. It says to all natural persons and to all transportation companies: You shall not bring into the state any Texas cattle, or any Mexican cattle, or Indian cattle, between March 1st and December 1st in any year, no matter whether they are free from disease or not, no matter whether they may do an injury to the inhabitants of the state or not; and if you do bring them in, even for the purpose of carrying them through the state without unloading them, you shall be subject to extraordinary liabilities.' Such a statute, we do not doubt, is beyond the power of a state to enact. To hold otherwise would be to ignore one of the leading objects which the constitution of the United States was designed to secure." What was said of the Missouri statute may be repeated as to the regulations adopted by the sanitary commission and the proclamation of the governor of Texas forbidding the bringing of cattle into that state from LouisiThe result in my judgment is, in view of our former decisions, that the quarantine regulations and proclamation in question involved, by their natural and practical operation, an unauthorized obstruction to the freedom of interstate commerce. This must be so, even if the statute of Texas, reasonably interpreted, was itself not repugnant to the constitution of the United States.

ana.

Mr. Justice White authorizes me to say that he concurs in these views.

NOTE.-Quarantine Laws as Regulations of Inter

state Commerce.-No more difficult or confusing question of law exists to day that the right of a state, under its general police power, to enact laws regulat ing or prohibiting the immigration, introduction or importation into the states of persons, live stock or merchandise which it deems dangerous to the general health or morals. Not only are the authorities of the different state courts in hopeless conflict, but the decisions of the supreme court itself are difficult to reconcile. In the beginning of this discussion we believe we can assert, without fear of being successfully contradicted, that the highest of all laws is that of self-defense, whether of states or individuals, and further, that neither expressly nor impliedly have the states of the American Union surrendered one iota of this right to the general government. Therefore, in the exercise of this right, a state may legislate in its own defense, even though its action may affect interstate commerce, if it does not amount to a regulation. Missouri, Kansas & Texas R. R. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 1; Vance v. Vandercook Co., 170 U. S. 438; New York, etc. R. R. v. New York, 165 U. S. 628; Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99; Michigan Telephone Co. v. Charlotte, 93 Fed. Rep. 11; Lake Shore, etc. R. R. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285;. Huse v. Glover, 119 U. S. 548; Gulf, etc. R. R. v. Helfley, 158 U. S. 98; Morgan Steamship Co. v. Board of Health, 118 U. S. 455; Leloup v. Mobile, 127 U. S. 610; Western Union v. James, 162 U. S. 650; Railroad Com. mission Cases, 116 U. S. 307. This rule is well stated in the celebrated case of Railroad Co. v. Husen,95 U. S. 471, which, although going farther than any other case in denying the right of the state,under its police power, to infringe upon the rights of congress over interstate commerce, nevertheless gives this clear recognition of the rights of the state under such circum. stances: "It may be admitted that the police power of a state justifies the adoption of precautionary meas ures against social evils. Under it a state may legis. late to prevent the spread of crime or pauperism, or disturbance of the peace. It may exclude from its limits convicts, paupers, idiots and lunatics, and persons likely to become a public charge, as well as persons afflicted by contagious or infectious diseases; a right founded on the sacred law of self-defense. The same principle, it must be conceded, would justify the exclusion of property dangerous to the property of citizens of the state; for example, animals having contagious or infectious diseases. All these exertions of power are self-defensive."

The celebrated case of Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, is, of course, the leading case on this question. The decision in that case established forever the complete supremacy of congress over interstate commerce. tection of persons and property as is injurious to hte But even at that time it was foreseen that if everything which a state did, even in its own defense, that af fected interstate commerce, were to be nullified, there would be constant friction and bitterness between the states and the federal government. To avoid this Mr. Justice Johnson, in his concurring opinion, said: "The same bale of goods, the same cask of provisions, or the same ship, that may be the subject of commercial regulations, may also be the vehicle of disease. And the health laws that require them to be stopped and ventilated are no more intended as regulations of commerce than the laws which permit their importation are intended to inoculate the community with disease. Their different purposes mark the distinction between the powers brought into action, and while frankly exercised they can produce no serious collision."

One of the most interesting phases of this question arose about 1875, at the time when the opposition of cattle raisers of the north began to be raised against the importation of cattle inoculated with a disease known as Spanish or Texas fever. Kansas, Missouri, Illinois, Iowa, and other states passed prohibitory laws excluding the introduction of such cattle during certain periods of the year and laying extraordinary liabilities upon those who violated the laws. The first case in which statutes of this kind came before the supreme court was that of Railroad v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465. The statute under consideration was that of Missouri and prohibited the introduction into the state of any "Texas, Mexican or Indian cattle" between the first day of March and the first day of November, except that on interstate railroads or steamboats, such cattle would be permitted to pass through the state provided they were not unloaded at any place within its bounds. ries, but even in such case the carrier would be liable for existence of the disease at any place along its line, the very fact of its existence being prima facie proof of its being communicated by such transportation. The exact ground on which the supreme court held this statute to be unconstitutional was that it prohíbited the introduction of all Texas, Mexican or Indian cattle "without any distinction between such as may be diseased and such as are not." At the same time the court laid down this general rule, that while a state may enact sanitary laws, and for the purpose of self-protection establish quarantize and reasonable inspection regulations, and prevent persons and animals having contagious or infectious diseases from entering the state, it cannot, beyond what is absolutely necessary for self-protection, interfere with transportation into or through its territory. In 1888 in the case of Kimmish v. Ball, 129 U. S. 217, the statute of Iowa came before the court, but only that section of it creating a civil liability upon those bringing such cattle into the state and letting them run at large, for all damages that might result. The case is important, however, for its construction of the case of Railroad Co. v. Husen. In the interval between these two decisions, scientists had made a close study of this disease and the districts where it originated and while many of the views expressed were not in harmony, several conclusions had been reached and generally adopted. The court states these conclusions as follows: "That cattle coming from those sections of the country during the spring and summer months are often infected with a contagious and dangerous fever is a notorious fact; as is also the fact that cold weather, such as is usual in the winter north of the southern boundary of Missouri and Kansas, destroys the virus of the disease, and thus removes all danger of infection." In discussing the case of Railroad Co. v. Husen, after showing that the ground of the court's objection to the Missouri statute was that it excluded all Texas, Mexican or Indian cattle without regard to whether they were diseased or not, Justice Field uses these significant words: "No attempt was made to show that all Texas, Mexican or Indian cattle coming from the malarial districts during the months mentioned were infected with the disease, or that such cattle were so generally affected that it would have been impossible to separate the healthy from the diseased. Had such proof been given a different question would have been presented for the consideration of the court. Certainly all animals thus infected may be excluded from the state by its laws until they are cured of the disease, or at least until some mode of transporting

them without danger of spreading it is devised." The question again arose in 1897 in the case of Missouri, Kansas & Texas R. R. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613, the statute of Kansas being in the crucible. This stat ute was in effect the same as the Missouri statute, except that it excluded all cattle liable to impart, or capable of communicating disease. Further on, however, it makes proof that the cattle alleged to caused damage, were brought into the state from south of the thirty-seventh parallel of north latitude, shall be prima facie evidence that such cattle were, between the months of February and December, capable of communicating Texas, splenic or Spanish fever. This statute the court held to be valid. After - an exhaustive examination of the authorities, Justice Harlan reaches the conclusion that, if a carrier takes diseased cattle into a state, it does so subject for any injury thereby done to domestic cattle to such lia. bility as may arise under any law of the state, that does not go beyond the necessities of the case and burden or prohibit interstate commerce, and a statute prescribing as a rule of civil conduct that a person or corporation shall not bring into the state cattle known, or which by proper diligence ought to be known, to be capable of communicating disease to domestic cattle, cannot be regarded as beyond the necessities of the case. In a strong dis. senting opinion Justice Brewer attempts to show that this decision practically overrules the case of Railroad Co. v. Husen, and points out some serious results which will likely result from the decision, one of which is especially important. "If," says Justice Brewer, "other northern states follow with like leg. islation commerce between the two sections of the country in this most important product of portions of the south will be practically interrupted."

It may therefore be safely assumed that the exercise of thepolice power by the states was not surrendered in any particular to the federal government and all state legislation affecting interstate commerce to be valid must come within the legitimate exercise of this power. Robbins v. Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489. But police regulations must be such in fact; a state cannot, under alleged cover of its police power, burden interstate commerce where the regulation goes beyond the necessities of the case. Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485; Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 91; Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 289; Patapsco Guano Co. v. Board of Agriculture, 171 U. S. 345; Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 275; Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537; Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. 1. Thus an express declaration that a statute is passed in pursuance of the police power, and as a police regulation is not binding upon the federal courts, and will not sustain the statute if the act is one which trenches directly upon that which is within the ex clusive jurisdiction of the national government. Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 289. The case of Railroad v. Haber, supra, has firmly established the rule that in regard to the commerce clause of the constitution, the failure of congress to act is an im. plied declaration that until congress sees fit to act, the states themselves may act, and make any reasonable regulations in protection of the health and morals of the people. Thus it was said in Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691: "There have been, it is true, expressions by individual judges of this court going to the length that the mere grant of the commercial power, anterior to any action of congress under it, is exclusive of all state authority; but there has been no adjudication of the court to that effect."

JETSAM AND FLOTSAM.

From an address delivered before the Georgia State Bar Association, at Warm Springs, Ga., July 4, 1901, by Mr. Joseph Hansell Merrill, of Thomasville. Ga., we quote the following:

THE BIBLE IN A LAWYER'S LIBRARY.

I had presented to me several years ago five ponderous volumes bound in law sheep, Matthew Henry's Commentaries, inscribed on the inside cover of one of which was, "That my brother may be conversant with the laws of the kingdom of God, as well as those of the commonwealth of Georgia." The result is that, being myself a straggler along after the throng of Bible students, and having seen some of the treasures in this storehouse for lawyers, I thought it would not be amiss to undertake to entertain you with some citations of special interest to lawyers in this book, which has been aptly said to be "A book for all ages and for all nations, for all classes of men and all states of society, for all capacities of intellect and all necessities of the soul. It is so conservative as to make it a duty to revere the past; so progressive as to be in advance of the most enlightoned age."

We study the old Grecian Law, the Civil Law, the Code of Napoleon, the English Common Law, why not the Mosaic? For pure water, which is the emblem of truth, we trace the stream to its fountain head. If there be a human fountain head for law, surely that is Moses. If the measure be antiquity or wisdom, or the number who obey, or the length of time influenced, be stands pre eminently above all others, even leaving out of consideration all question of divine inspiration. Judging by my own experience, it will be a surprise to note to what an extent the Mosaic law is the foundation of our own. I was first led to study this by a reference from William on Executors to Numbers 27: 8-11, the Mosaic law, on the subject of descent, in a case had where there was no wife or children or brothers or sisters. I have since had occasion often to consult it, to compare our laws with that, and at times found considerable help. We find in the twentieth chapter of Exodus the first giving of the Ten Commandments, the foundation of all the law, of which all else is but an elaboration, since the germ of it all is contained in them. To them we trace all the acts which we call malum in se. By the light of them we determine what is right and what is wrong, which is the objective point in all our reasoning. They are the constitution, and all laws that cannot stand the test of their requirements should be abrogated. Let us see what are some of these laws on subjects which we are dealing every day. In the twenty first chapter of Exodus, immediately following the decalogue, after disposing of the question of slavery, with which we are done, we come in the twelfth verse to the subject of homicides. For a deliberate killing the penalty is, "He shall surely be put to death." While, "If God deliver him into his hand" (a peculiar way of stating an accidental killing), a city of refuge is provided. This is not the first time the death penalty is ordered. We find the same law given to Noah (Genesis 9:6), "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed." The next subject treated is kidknaping, one of very lively interest to us during the past year. The law is, "he that stealeth a man and selleth him, or if he be found in his hand, he shall be surely put to death." When we read of the agony of parents suffering from this crime we feel that the Mosaic penalty is more

appropriate than our four to seven years in the penitentiary. In the matter of larceny (25:7), if goods be stolen double restitution shall be made. This was good authority for our similar provision in the double penalty for selling mortgaged property, but slavery and imprisonment for debt having been abolished, it was dropped out as unconstitutional. Double damages also for trespasses of cattle. The law of inheritance is given in Numbers 27:8-11, "If a man die and have no son ye shall cause his inheri tance to pass to his daughter; if he have no daughter, then to his brethren; if he have no brethren, then to his father's brethern; if his father have no brethren, then to his kinsman that is next to him of his family." And what are these laws to us? Go one step further with me and recognize their divine inspiration. "On the two tables of stone hang all the law and the prophets." Proclaimed from the summit of Mt. Sinai, in the earliest authentic history of man, they have been and are to-day a light to the world, showing the path of right, of justice, of peace, of happiness. In the Bible we have that law that is inexorable, that must be, always is, and always will be, obeyed. Given its violation the penalty never fails to follow. Glorify God if we will by obeying and experiencing his mercies. If not in this way, then we shall glorify him by vindicating his justice.

To the student of oratory, and I take it we are all such, the Bible is of great value. It abounds in the most apt illustrations, most striking, dramatic scenes; from it can be made the most effective quotations, because, as the people sang: "Saul has slain his thousands, but David his tens of thousands," so in a lawyer's regulation audience of twelve, or the politi cian's "vast concourse," where one has read Skakespeare, ten have read the Bible, are familiar with it, and instantly grasp your idea. It is remarkable to note how many of "The World's Best Orations" (Brewer) have the words, phrases, ideas of the Bible in their climaxes. One of the most effective speeches I ever heard made in our court house, was made by one of our bar defending a farmer in a suit by a horse dealer, the plea breach of warranty; and it consisted of almost nothing but the preoration: "Gentlemen, you have all read in your Bibles how a certain man went from Jerusalem down to Jericho and fell among thieves. Well, this defendant left his farm up here in the country, and came down to Thomasville and fell among-horse traders." As a graceful and effective speaker, the Apostle Paul never had a human superior. Note the delicate compliment with which he begins his defense before Agrippa. "I think myself happy, King Agrippa, because I shall answer for my. self this day before thee, especially because I know thee to be expert in all questions and customs which are among the Jews." Hear him at Athens, a city full of statues to gods and goddesses. "Ye men of Athens, I perceive that in all things ye are very religious. For as I passed by and beheld your devotions I found an altar with this inscription, "To the Unknown God;' whom therefore ye ignorantly worship, him declare I unto you." How beautifully he catches their attention by referring to something they are already interested in. They start off on common ground, well acquainted. Contrast the effect of this style of speaking with that of the man who plunges into what he has to say, like a school. boy into his declamation. Those inclined to skyscraping oratory, by which they shout over juries heads, and then wonder why they rarely get a verdict, could profitably study the style of the Lord himself, unquestionably the most forceful speaker the world

has known. See how constantly he uses the expressions, the experiences, the customs, the surroundings of the every day life of his audiences,

BOOK REVIEWS.

WILLIAMS ON MUNICIPAL LIABILITY FOR TORT.

A rew book of vital importance to city solicitors ard lawyers having suits against municipalities for tort and negligence is that entitled, "The Liability of Municipal Corporations for Tort," by Waterman L. Williams, A. B., LL. B. The book treats very fully the rules that govern the liablity of such corporations in the different classes of tort and negligence cases, and the general principles on which these rules rest as they have become clear and well settled. Mr. Williams, in determining these rules, carefully considers these three points: First. The character of the corporation chargeable with liability for the tort. Second. The nature of the duty from the breach of which the tort resulted. Third. The means at the command of the corporation for the performance of that duty. Published by Little, Brown & Company, Boston, Mass.

BURDICK ON SALES.

An advance in the preparation of legal text-books is the distinction that is being closely observed between books for the busy lawyer and practitioner and those for the law student and theorist. It is almost impossible at this day to write a book on any important legal subject that will be suitable to both lawyer and student. The latter require a clear understanding of the principles of law without being confused with their extensive application, the former demand the complete and exhaustive analysis of the decided cases, with every shadow of distinction which experience and wisdom has dictated in the application of the general rules of law. In the student's text-book the method is synthetical-building up general principles from decided cases-in the lawyer's text-book, the method is analytical, tearing apart the general principles and showing their application under a thousand different conditions. A most notable example of the student's text-book and one, by the way, which the author claims to be useful only to students, is the Law of Sales of Personal Property by Francis M. Burdick, Professor of Law in Columbia University. It is a compact little book covering the entire subject of Sales in 284 pages. The style is clear, concise and accurate. This is a revised edition of this work but is practically a new edition. Among the most important subjects which have received fuller treatment are "Reservation of the Right of Disposal," "Condition and Warranties," and "Interest as Damages." On "Conditions and Warran ties" Professor Burdick contributed an article to the Columbia Law Review for February, which has attracted much attention; and the pith of that article is to be found in the chapter given to that branch of the subject, which is based, not on theory, but on an analysis of the leading cases and on a careful, consistent use of the terms, "conditions" and "warranties." On some doubtful questions discussed in the earlier edition, cases decided in the last few years have thrown effective light, and these cases are carefully studied and cited; notably is this the case in discussing the question of the "Premature Repudiation of His Contract by the Purchaser." Published by Little, Brown & Company, Boston, Mass.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

Handbook of Equity Jurisprudence. By James W. Eaton, of the Albany Bar. Professor of Law in the Albany Law School, and Lecturer in the Boston University School of Law. St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1901. Sheep, pp. 734. Price, $3.75. Review will follow. The Law of Contracts. By Edward Avery Harriman, of the Chicago Bar, Professor of Law in the Northwestern University Law School. Second Edition, Revised and Enlarged. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1901. Sheep, pp. 410. Price, $3.50. Review will follow.

Handbook of Admiralty Law. By Robert M. Hughes,

M. A. of the Norfolk (Va.) Bar. St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1901. Sheep, pp. 503. Price, $3.75. Review will follow.

HUMORS OF THE LAW.

LORD ELDON'S APOLOGY.

On one occasion, says the Green Bag, a junior counsel, on their lordships giving judgment against his client, exclaimed that he was surprised at their decision. This was construed into a contempt of court, and the young barrister was ordered to attend at the bar the next morning. Fearful of the consequences, he consulted his friend John Scott (afterward Lord Eldon), who told him to be perfectly at ease, for he would apologize for him in a way that would avert any unpleasant result. Accordingly when the name of the delinquent was called, Scott rose and coolly addressed the judges: "1 am very sor ry, my lords," he said, "that my young friend has so far forgotten himself as to treat your lordships with disrespect; he is extremely penitent, and you will kindly ascribe his unintentional insult to his ignorance. You must see at once that it did originate in that. He said he was surprised at the decision of your lordships. Now, if he had not been ignorant of what takes place in this court every day-had he known you but half so long as I have done-he would not be surprised at anything you did."

An aged professor, after lecturing on the distinction between trespass and case, asked one of the pupils: "Mr. B. suppose I should be walking in the public street and you should throw a rock and put out one of my eyes, what sort of an action would I have?" "An action on the case," was the ready answer. "Why so?" "Because Blackstone lays it down that an action on the case is the proper remedy of ob structing ancient lights."

The following story of the late Mr. Batten, K. C., is told by the Western Mail. Before Mr. Batten took sick he had already had a successful business career, holding a large number of company directorships, and on one occasion he found himself acting as counsel against one of the companies of which he was director. Nevertheless, this truly Gilbertian position of the K. C. did not prevent him making an elaborate case against his own company. On sitting down after his lengthy argument, Mr. Batten was told by the chairman of the parliamentary committee the tribunal by which the case was tried-that they had heard enough, and added, "We decide in your favor." Here the chairman paused, Mr. Batten smiling triumphantly in the meantime, and then the chairman continued, "as director." Naturally, the committee were convulsed with laughter, in which Mr. Batten himself joined.

1. ADVERSE POSSESSION - Rights of Trespasser.One who enters upon lands as a trespasser, and asserts a claim of ownership thereto, may have such adverse possession of the property as may be tacked to a succeeding possession in privity and ripen into title.PEARSON V. ADAMS, Ala., 29 South. Rep. 977.

2. BANKRUPTCY-Avoidance of Liens-Attachments. -An attachment on mesne process under the statutes of Massachusetts, which creates a lien, under the de cisions of the courts, enforceable, however, only by obtaining judgment and issuing execution thereon within a limited time, is not discharged, under Bankr. Act 1898, § 67f, by the filing of a petition in bankruptcy against the defendant more than four months after such attachment was levied, although the judgment was not obtained until within the four months; nor are the judgment and execution issued thereon rendered void by such section, since they do not affect with a lien the property attached, but only enforce the lien already existing, and which, having attached more than four months before the filing of the petition, is, by necessary implication, preserved by the act.-IN RE BLAIR, U. S. D. C., D. (Mass.), 108 Fed. Rep. 529.

3. BANKRUPTCY-Avoidance of Liens-Attachments. -V. S. § 1791, provides that "personal property attached on mesne process shall be held to respond to the judgment rendered thereon 30 days from the time it is rendered; and unless the plaintiff within 30 days from the rendition of final judgment takes such property in execution it shall be discharged from such process." The decisions of the supreme court of the state treat such attachment as an inchoate lien, which must be perfected by the creditor by obtaining judg ment and taking out execution within 30 days. Held, that where such an attachment was made of property of a bankrupt more than four months prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, but judgment was obtained and execution issued within the four months, such judgment and execution were void, so far as related to the attached property and the property affected was discharged, under Bankr. Act 1898, § 671.-IN RE JOHNSON, U. S. C. D., D. (Vt.), 108 Fed. Rep. 373.

4. BANKRUPTCY - Discharge Fraudulent Concealment of Assets.-Facts and circumstances showing a fraudulent concealment of assets by a bankrupt, which will defeat his right to a discharge, must be proved, and will not be deduced as a matter of doubtful inference, from other facts and circumstances.IN RE CONN, U. S. D. C., D. (Oreg.), 108 Fed. Rep. 525. 5. BANKRUPTCY Election of Trustee-Authority of Attorney to Vote.-The mere relation of attorney at law for creditors of a bankrupt does not authorize