construction of street railways. In the opinion the court said: "A railroad is for the use of the universal public, in the transportation of all persons, baggage and other freight; a street railway is dedicated to the more limited use of the local public, for the more transient transportation of persons only and within the limits of the city. In the technical sense, therefore, a street railway is not a railroad." In Bloxham v. Railroad Co., 36 Fla. 539, 18 South. Rep. 446, 29 L. R. A. 509, it is said: "The word 'railroad,' as generally used, applies to commercial railways engaged in the transportation of freight and passengers for long distances, and, as a general rule, having steam engines for motive power, and making stops at regular stations for the receipt and discharge of freight and passengers. The term 'street railroad' applies only to such roads the rails of which are laid to conform to the grade and surface of the street, and which is otherwise constructed so that the public are not excluded from the street as a public highway, which runs at a moderate rate of speed compared with commercial railroads, which carries no freight, but only passengers from one part of a thickly-populated district to another in a town or city and its suburbs." In Trust Co. v. Douglas, 104 Iowa, 536, 73 N. W. Rep. 1040, in a very late case it is said: "The words 'railroad' and 'railway' may undoubtedly be so used as to mean a street railway, but by popular usage, when used without qualifying words, they are understood to refer to commercial railways; the word "street' being almost invariably used in connection with 'railway' to designate a street railway." The same has been substantially held in other states in the discussion of the various uses of the words "railroad" and "street railway." Funk v. Railway Co., 61 Minn. 435, 63 N. W. Rep. 1099, 29 L. R. A. 208; Sears v. Railway Co. (Iowa), 23 N. W. Rep. 150; Railway Co. v. Johnson (Wash.), 25 Pac. Rep. 1084, 11 L. R. A. 693. And the same rule has been laid down in the federal courts. Manhattan Trust Co. v. Sioux City Cable R. Co. (C. C.), 68 Fed. Rep. 82; Trust Co. v. Hamilton, 32 C. C. A. 46, 88 Fed. Rep. 588; 1 Foote & E. Incorp. Co., p. 668, note 5, It is claimed that the words, "other transportation companies," include street railway companies. We think, by reference to the context and other sections of the same article, it clearly appears that the words refer to transportation companies engaged in the business of common carriers of freight and passengers. The section refers to and speaks of "the rates of fares and freight" established by the commission. And in section 21 of the same article it is provided: "No discrimination in charges or facilities for transportation shall be made by any railroad or other transportation company between places or persons or in the facilities for the transportation of the same classes of freight or passengers within this state or coming from or going to any other state." In section 20 reference is made to the consequences of lowering rates for transporta

tion of passengers or freight from one point to another." Companies engaged in draying, running freight wagons, delivery wagons, delivering parcels, teaming, or running elevators, are engaged in the business of "transportation," but it surely could not be contended that they are subject to the jurisdiction of the "railroad commission." The people of the state would not have agreed to pay the salaries and expenses of the railroad commissioners selected from different geographical sections of the state for the purpose of regulating the charges of the "United Carriage Company" of San Francisco. Yet it is a transportation company. It clearly is not a transportation company whose "fares and freights" are subject to regulation by the railroad commissioners of the state. It follows that the judgment should be affirmed.

TEMPLE, J. (dissenting): The question here is whether the jurisdiction of the railroad commissioners extends to street railroads. That the phrase "railroad and other transportation companies," does include street railroads in its natural and most obvious sense, and also by common usage of the words, is not and cannot be denied. The phrase is repeated five times in this section, and nowhere is there a suggestion that anything comprehended in the phrase is to be excluded, and the constant repetition of the more extensive accompanying term, as though fearing and desiring to forestall an adverse construction which might limit the usefulness of the commis. sion, is significant of a determination that there shall be no doubt as to the extent of the power of the board.

It is said that to give the words, "and other transportation companies" any meaning whatever will lead to absurd consequences, and one must limit the term, so far as railroads are concerned, to a particular species of them, to-wit, what counsel call commercial railroads, and it is said if these words mean anything there was no occasion to mention railroads at all, as they are all transportation companies. By what rule of construction are these words repeated in section 22 five times, and in article 12 many times more, to have no effect whatever? If the words serve no other purpose, they demonstrate that the jurisdiction of the commission was not to be confined to commercial railroads, although they were thought to be the principal offenders. Their use should conclude this question.

And it is said section 22, art. 12, has received a practical and contemporaneous construction by the act to organize and define the powers of the board of railroad commissioners, passed April 15, 1880. The act provides for the organization of the board, and that its members and employees, when in performance of their official duties, sball be carried free over all railroads, steamboats, etc., and in all vehicles employed in or by any railroad or other transportation company, etc.; and in section 14 that the term "transportation companies" shall be deemed to mean and include,

"first, all other companies owning and operating railroads (other than street railroads) within this state." Contemporaneous construction can have no weight whatever where there is no doubt or ambiguity in the terms used, and none arises by implication from the context. This is clearly laid down by Cooley, Const. Lim. p. 80 et seq. The authorities are carefully collected and elaborately discussed in Morris v. Wrightson, 56 N. J. Law, 126, 28 Atl. Rep. 56, 22 L. R. A. 548. It would serve no useful purpose to go over that subject, especially as I think there has been no need for a contemporaneous or practical construction of this constitutional provision.

NOTE.-Contemporaneous Construction of Consti tutions.-One difference must be noted at the outset between the construction of constitutions and statutes, in this, that the former are to be strictly while the latter are to be liberally construed. The reason for the rule is well stated by Stuart, J., in Greencastle v. Black, 5 Ind. 570: "The discretion of courts is more restricted in applying the rules of construction to a plan of government contained in a written constitution than in the construction of statutes, and the reason is conclusive. Statutes often are hastily and unskillfully drawn, and thus need construction to make them sensible. But constitutions import the utmost discrimination in the use of language." So also it must be borne in mind that a constitutional provision should not be so construed as to defeat its evident purpose and intent, but rather so as to give it effect. ive operation and suppress the mischief it was aimed at. Jarrolt v. Moberly, 103 U. S. 921. In the con. struction of constitutional provisions, however, the question is, not what was the intention of the framers, but what is the meaning of the words they have used. A constitution does not derive its force from the con vention which framed it, but from the people who ratified it, and the intent to be arrived at is that of the people, and this is found only in the words of the text. Beardstown v. Virginia, 76 Ill. 34. Upon this last rule stated is founded the most important rule of construction in all constitutional law and one which, in the principal case, the court or counsel, or both, obviously overlooked. When and how far can extrinsic circumstances be consulted in construing the meaning of a constitu tion l provision where there is no inconsistency of expression or meaning in the words themselves when taken in their natural meaning? In denying any such right whatever under ordinary circumstances, Chief Justice Marshall, in the leading case of Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 122, formulates the rule in the following words: "When the words conflict with each other, where the different clauses of the instrument bear upon each other, and would be inconsistent unless the natural and common import of words be varied, construction becomes necessary, and a departure from the obvious meaning of words is justifiable. But if, in any case, the plain meaning of a provision, not contradicted by any other provision in the same instrument, is to be disregarded, because we believe the framers could not intend what they say, it must be one in which the absurdity and injustice of applying the provision to the case would be so monstrous that all mankind would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting the application.

In view of the rules just stated, and of the fact that the words of a constitutional instrument are pre

sumed to be chosen with the utmost discrimination, it is surprising that the court in the principal case should have resorted to extrinsic circumstances and especially to the rule of contemporaneous construetion, in order to show that the framers of the constitutional provision under discussion meant absolutely nothing by the words, "and other transportation companies." The words are certainly unambiguous, they are certainly full of meaning, and giving to the words their natural meaning their application is not so monstrous as to cause all mankind to unite in rejecting it, as whatever else may be included under the term "transportation companies,"street railroads obviously and naturally come within the designation, and in such case it matters not what the people or the framers meant by the use of such words,-they are presumed to know the natural meaning of the words they use and to intend them to be taken in that sense. We therefore agree with Temple, J., in his dissenting opinion, that there was no authority to resort to extrinsic aid in the construction of the constitutional provision referred to in the principal case.

We have already found that in the construction of constitutions extrinsic circumstances can be consulted only in case of unsolvable doubts, ambiguities or inconsistencies after applying the natural meaning of the words to the provisions in question. This is the general rule, although the authorities are not uniform. Thus some courts seem to have held that contemporaneous history and convention debates and the circumstances and conditions under which they were passed may be consulted even where there are no doubts or ambiguities. Bay City v. State Treasurer, 23 Mich. 499; Daily v. Swope, 47 Miss. 1380; People v. Harding, 53 Mich. 485, 51 Am. Rep. 95. But it conceded by the great weight of authority that contemporaneous construction of constitutional provisions either by the people or the legislature can never be resorted to when the plain and natural meaning of the words themselves are entirely free from doubt. Hovey v. State, 119 Ind. 386; Jarrot v. Jarrot, 7 Ill. 1; Story on Const. § 407; Biggs v. McBride, 17 Oreg. 640; Enckling v. Simmons, 28 Wis. 272; Brown v. State, 5 Colo. 496; Union Pac. R. Case, 91 U. S. 72. But in case of doubt or ambiguity the contemporaneous or practical construction is not only permissible but is the safest and most reliable of all extrinsic aids to construction. Its influence is often controlling. Cobens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 418; Harrison v. State, 22 Md. 468; Howell v. State, 71 Ga. 224, 51 Am. Rep. 259; Allen v. Clayton, 63 Iowa, 11, 18 N. W. Rep. 663; Chesapeake, etc. R. R. v. Miller, 19 W. Va. 408; Collins v. Henderson, 74 Ky. 74; Linesay v. Wright, 6 Colo. 92; Cordova v. State, 6 Tex. App. 207; Jackson v. Board of Supervisors, 34 Neb. 680, 52 N. W. Rep. 169; Hedgcock v. Davis, 64 N. Car. 650. Thus where the provisions of the constitution relating to the appointment of officers of benevolent institutions of the state, not being entirely free from doubt, the fact that the legislature has colorable authority to make appointments, and that this authority was exercised by the legislature both before and since the adoption of the constitution, must be taken into consideration in construing such provisions since the practical exposition in such case is of controlling force. Hovey v. State, 119 Ind. 386. It must be borne in mind, however, that the contemporaneous construction just referred to is not that evidenced by the popular understanding of its meaning at the time,-that is of little force. What is meant is that practical applica tions of its provisions by other departments of the government at the time of their adoption,-these

furnish strong presumption that such construction rightly interprets the intention. McPherson v. Secretary of State, 92 Mich. 377, 31 Am. St. Rep. 587, 52 N. W. Rep. 469; Ex parte McNiel, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 236; People v. LaSalle County, 100 Ill. 495. Thus, the legislature having the same right to construe the constitution of the state that the courts have, where the question is a doubtful one or one in which a lib eral construction may be made, the legislative construction wil not be condemned unless it very clearly appears that it is wrong. Ex parte Selma & G. R. Co. 45 Ala. 696. In Harrison v. State, 22 Md. 468, it was held that a contemporaneous construction of the constitution, of long duration, continually practiced under, and through which many rights have been acquired, ought not to be shaken but upon grounds of manifest error and cogent necessity. And also in United States v. Moore, 95 U. S. 760, it was held that the construction given to a provision by those charged with the duty of executing it is always entitled to the most respectful consideration and should not be overruled without cogent reasons. But a construction of the constitution by the legislature where it is restrictive of legislative authority or where such leg. islative construction is not continuous and concurring, it is not entitled to much weight. Maige v. State, 4 Ind. 342. And in Portland Bank v. Apthorp, 12 Mass. 252, a similar limitation is noted where it is held that although the practice and usages of successive legislatures will be considered in construing constitutional provisions, still no continued usurpation under color of legislative construction will work a forfeiture of any constitutional rights and liabilities.

JETSAM AND FLOTSAM.

TRIED TO BEAT THE BAND.

A complaint which a correspondent says was filed in an Idaho court, runs as follows:

"I. That at all times hereinafter mentioned plaint iffs .... were associated together as a musical organization under the name and style of the Granville Brass Band.

"II. That the defendants are, and at the times hereinafter mentioned were, associated together and doing business at the county and state of Idaho under the name and style of the Democratic Executive Committee of Idaho county, Idaho, and that the said defendants constituted the head push of what is commonly known and styled as the Unterrified or Great Unwashed, and are and were organized and existing for the purpose of knocking the stuffing out of the G. O. P., and then and thereby drawing public pap and growing fat and sleek therefrom.

"III. That during the months of September, Octo ber, and November, 1900, at the county and state of Idaho, the defendants then and there being desirous of rallying the Unterrified to listen to the shooting of

are now enjoying the fat and lucrative offices much coveted by the G. O. P. and the Pops, commonly called 'Hayseeds.'

"V. That plaintiffs bave demanded in writing payment thereof, and there is now due and owing from defendants to plaintiffs the said sum of $60 together with $5 attorney's fees as provided by law. "Wherefore, plaintiffs demand judgment against defendants for the sum of $60 together with $5 attorney's fees, and costs of this action."-Case & Com ment.

SENATOR VEST'S FAMOUS DOG SPEECH.

Many years ago, in a country town in Missouri, Senator Vest was retained for the plaintiff in a dog case. It was charged that the defendant had shot the dog in malice. Senator Vest said:

"Gentlemen of the Jury: The best friend a man has in the world may turn against him and become his enemy. His son or daughter that he has reared with loving care may prove ungrateful. Those who are nearest and dearest to us, those whom we trust with our happiness and our good name, may become traitors to their faith. The money that a man has, he may lose. It flies away from him, perhaps when he needs it most. A man's reputation may be sacrificed in a moment of ill considered action. The people who are prone to fall on their knees to do us honor when success is with us may be the first to throw the stone of malice when failure settles its cloud upon our heads.

"The only absolutely unselfish friend that man can have in this selfish world, the one that never proves ungrateful or treacherous, is his dog. A man's dog stands by him in prosperity and poverty, in health and sickness. He will sleep on the cold ground, where the wintry winds blow and the snow drives fiercely, if only he may be near his master's side. He will kiss the hand that has no food to offer; he will lick the wounds that come in encounter with the roughness of the world. He guards the sleep of his pauper master as if he were a prince. When all other friends desert, he remains. When riches take wings and reputation falls to pieces, he is as constant in his love as the sun in its journey through the heavens. If fortune drives the master forth an out. cast in the world, friendless and homeless, the faithful dog asks no higher privilege than that of accompany. ing him, to guard against danger, to fight against his enemies. And when the last scene of all comes, and death takes the master in its embrace, and his body is laid away in the cold ground, no matter if all other friends pursue their way, there by the graveside will the noble dog be found, his head between his paws, his eyes sad, but open and alert in watchfulness, faithful and true even in death."

Then Vest sat down. He had spoken in a low voice, without a jesture. He made no reference to the evidence or the merits of the case. When be finished, judge and jury were wiping their eyes. The jury filed out, but soon entered with a verdict for the

ing a practicing attorney and counselor at law in Maryland. There are no defects of hearing, speech or sight to handicap this aspirant; no bodily weakness to prohibit active attention to business in or out of court. But while this unfortunate individual possesses a bright brain, stood among the highest in the class, and could probably do as well at the bar as any of the young men who are turned out by our colleges and universities, there is one grave indictment against this graduate which, in the eye of the laws of Maryland, more than counterbalances all the good qualities mentioned, and that is that nature made this young person a member of the female sex.

The only crime of Miss Etta H. Maddox is that she is a woman, and in Maryland the doors of the courts have not yet been opened to women as practitioners of law. They can practice medicine in this state, and kill or cure according to the most approved methods of regular male practitioners, and they can enter almost every other field of endeavor; but when they ask to assist justice they are sternly pointed to the code and told that ladies are not admitted.

The provisions of the Maryland Code on the subject are survivals of a period when woman, though a lawgiver, as now, in her own house, did not aspire to legal fame and profit. The old regulations have lingered on till the beginning of this--century, probably rather because there has been no special demand for their repeal than because of any determined opposi tion. If a proposition for their repeal should come before the next legislature, as we trust it may, it does not seem likely that it would be opposed by any considerable portion of the bar or by any members of the judiciary. Opposition could be based only on fear of competition, and there are few men who would be willing to confess themselves afraid to meet feminine competition in the courts.

It is true we have a great many attorneys at law already, but that is not equivalent to saying that we would have too many lawyers, the terms not being by any means equivalent. The general moral tendency of admitting women to the bar would probably be wholesome. There would be fewer "shysters" among the women practitioners, and they would be likely to exercise a good influence both in the actual trial of cases and in upholding the dignity and fair name of the profession. If the lawyer is regarded by many thoughtless and prejudiced persons as tricky and untrustworthy, a licensed soldier of fortune, ready for a consideration to make the worse appear the better cause, prepared without regard to principle or precedent to defend to day what he denounced yesterday, it is the male sex which is responsible for these misapprehensions, as well as for cases of actual offense. Nowadays women, whether because men have become more worthless than formerly, or more selfish and less matrimonial, are compelled in increasing numbers to make their own livings. In the vast majority of cases it is not a question of choice, but of necessity. If they could do as they pleased they would probably prefer to do as, their grandmothers did-contine their efforts to the home circle. But conditions and times have changed, and the women have been forced to change with them in the matter of work. So now they are admtted almost every where to whatever they can turn their hands or minds, and the world is giving them a cordial wel come and a hearty God speed.

WHAT'S IN A NAME?

Job Trotter Brown, the tipstaff, was a student of the ..laws,

And all his time was occupied in learning legal

saws.

He scorned to live a fameless life-mere lackey of the court

And nightly did he lucubrate on Contract, Crime and Tort.

For Job had sworn quite solemnly, forensical re

nown

Should trumpet to the universe (the worthy name of Brown;

And, though his own accomplishments ne'er reached the outer throne,

His genius hatched a brilliant scheme to help his oath along.

So all his little children, as they numerously came, He christened after jurists in the Pantheon of Fame. Hence Mansfield and then Webtster Brown and Salmon Chase Brown appeared,

And Brewster Brown and Blackstone Brown and Story Brown were reared.

P. Henry Brown and E. Coke Brown arrived at man's estate,

And Bacon Brown and James Kent Brown filled up the family slate.

Old Job believed his great named boys predestined to renown

And that, in time, they'd lift the sod from the buried name of Brown.

But still that great day has not come, and still that worthy name

Is missing from the pedestal within the Hall of Fame;

For Mansfield Brown, the farmer, is the man behind the hoe;

And Webster Brown's a tailor, content to sit and sew;

Salmon Chase Brown's a monger, of fish, both shell and scale;

And Brewster Brown's a maker of choicest brands of ale;

Young Blackstone Brown delivers coal-good anthra cite's his line

And Story Brown is pitching for the Tallahassee nine;

Pat Henry Brown, the lightweight, is a pugilist of note;

And E. Coke Brown's a stoker on a Jersey ferryboat;

The butcher shop is Bacon Brown's and there he toils each day;

While James Kent Brown makes cock tails in a Cripple Creek cafe.-Green Bag.

CORRESPONDENCE.

TAXATION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY.

To the Editor of the Central Law Journal:

In your editorial contained in the JOURNAL's issue of the 20th inst., you call the attention of the bar to the present method and chaotic system of taxation, and especially to the fact that the great majority of taxpayers make no return whatever on mortgages. bonds or other intangible securities, and remark that the American people are looking to the legal profes sion for a remedy. The income tax, could it be fmposed under the decision of the United States court, would be a partial remedy, but I beg to suggest an other which I believe would be even more effective,

and that is to require every bond, debenture, note, mortgage or other evidence of debt to be stamped by the assessor of taxes showing its rendition for taxes, and unless so stamped the same should be non col. lectible by any process of law. The state and county, and all municipal bodies should be inhibited from paying any bond issued by them unless so stamped. This would unearth untold millions of secreted per sonal property, force the tax-dodgers to assess their estates, and relieve farmers and other holders of realty from the unequal and excessive burdens now imposed upon them. JAMES B. SIMPSON.

[We desire to thank our correspondent for his sug gestions on this important matter of personal property taxation, and consider them quite valuable. An objection. however, often made to the taxation of evidences of debt, is that the borrower is generally forced to pay the tax or submit to a higher rate of interest, while the lender and the one most able to pay the tax escapes its burden. This objection may be met by the suggestion of Mr. Simpson that all evidences of debt be "stamped by the assessor show. ing their rendition for taxes" before recovery can be had thereon. We shall be glad to hear from Mr. Simpson more at length on this subject, and from any others who may have pertinent suggestions to offer on this vexed and troublesome question.-ED. CENT. L. J.]

BOOK REVIEWS.

OUTLINE OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY.

A most interesting and unique arrangement of the law of real property appears in a tabular analysis or skeleton of that part of the second book of Blackstone's Commentaries which relates to real property, prepared under the above title by L. W. McCandless of Ann Arbor, Mich. This book is one of especial advantage to the student of Blackstone, aiding him in a clearer comprehension of the important subjectmatter of Blackstone's treatment of the subject of Real Property by having constantly before him the entire framework of his subject, showing its divis ions and the inter relations of its parts. Published by George Wahr, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

HIRSH'S TABULATED DIGEST OF THE DIVORCE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES.

Codification of the laws of the several states and tabulation of the laws of all the states are among the latest fads of American jurisprudence. They are, however, more than fads; they stand with the new method of index-digesting, as evidences of the advance reforms of twentieth century jurisprudence-reforms brought about, not by caprice, but of inevitable necessity. With the wide difference and increasing changes, together with the delicate modifications and constructions by judicial opinion, of the laws of the several states, the average lawyer is buried and bewildered under the very mass of it. To put into his hands an index or tabulation of all the law of his own state or of all the law of all the states, is like

so that by a mere glance the particular information sought for may be obtained. The tabulation is printed on one large sheet of paper. At the head of it is an introduction with an explanation of the arbitrary signs and abbreviations used. Then follows an alphabetical list of states and territories in columns, and on each side is an index of causes for divorce. At the end of each column there is a concise synopsis of the practice in such case, showing the jurisdiction of courts, the methods of service of proc. ess, trials, and grounds for separation. To the student of this subject and to any person who may be interested in it--and who is not?-this table presents an easy method of comparing the laws of the various states; and to those who are urging uniformity of divorce laws, this method of compilation will be a saving of months of labor. Published by Funk & Wagnalls Company, New York and London.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

The Law of Sales of Personal Property. By Francis M. Burdick, Dwight Professor of Law in Columbia University School of Law. Second Edition. Revised and Enlarged. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1901. pp. 299. Buckram. Price, $3.00.

The Liability of Municipal Corporations for Tort Treating fully Municipal Liability for Negligence. By Waterman L. Williams, A. B., LL. B. Author of "Statutory Torts in Massachusetts. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1901. pp. 345. Sheep. Price $3.50. Review will follow.

HUMORS OF THE LAW.

A wise old man once said that the three degrees of comparison in a lawyer's progress were: "getting on; getting on er (honor); and getting on est (honest)."

The will of a jilted bachelor left a handsome legacy to a lady who had, twenty years before, refused to marry him, in order to express his gratitude to her for her forbearance, and his admiration for her sagacity in leaving him to a happy bachelor life of independence and freedom.

Mr. W, a prominent Hebrew, who saw an accident, and afterwards took much interest in a suit for damages by the injured person, was approached by Mr. H, the defendant's lawyer, who was also a Hebrew and a friend of his, and asked why he took such an interest against him in that case. He answered that the claim was just and ought to be paid. The next day on the trial of the case, having testified for the plaintiff, he was cross-questioned by his friend, the attorney, as follows: Question: "Mr. W, Haven't you taken a good deal of interest in this case?" Answer: "Yes, sir." Question: "Haven't you been telling around, that you knew this plaintiff would get a verdict?" Answer: "I have made that statement to but one person-that was to you, Mr. H." Ques