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The exercise of the power by an explicit to embrace all cases under all circumstances direction, or other sufficient act constituting clearly is to the effect that where the breach a breach of the contract, or, if performance occurs before performance, or after part perhas been entered upon, not to continue in formance, where damages for the breach of the carrying out of the contract, or any act the contract are claimed and not the mere preventing such continuance, does not in value of part performance, or where conany exact sense, of itself, effect a rescissionsideration for full performance is in someof it. By rescission a contract is put an end thing other than money, the action must be to and no longer exists as the basis of any predicated upon the contract alone, and a right, but by a breach it continues effective recovery bad for damages in the strict sense for the recovery of damages by the party in only. The manner of breach, limited to the jured in some cases as his only basis of re- | narrow question under consideration, must covery-in others, as such basis at his option. be such that the other party is not at liberty The distinction is found in the fact that the to disregard it, and is usually effected by an rights of the party not in fault, as he may | explict direction not to commence, or not to elect, are not the same if the breach is continue performance, or notice that the effected after, as when it occurs before per party giving it will not be bound by the conformance is entered upon. In the latter case tract or that he renounces its obligation. there is no recovery of damages eo nomine, But the renunciation must go to the whole upon and for a breach of the contract, but contract.33 in the former instance it has been often, but At what period with reference to the time not always held—the decisions are not har when performance is due, the power to stop monious—that the party willing to perform performance may be exercised, has been much may treat the contract as rescinded from the discussed in the courts. The question does beginning and recover upon the quantum not arise except in case of an anticipatory meruit for the work done. 30 But the rule breach. That a contract may be broken by seems to have its limitations and “the right renunciation by a party to it before the time to sue * * * on a quantum meruit is for performance has come seems to be well frequently and emphatically stated to depend settled.84 However, instances are found on the fact that the contract has been dis- where it seems to be held that if the renun. charged.”81 The principle has been stated ciation or other step constituting a breach is thus: “If he has done all or a portion of made or taken before performance is due, it that which he promised, so as to have a claim is yet incumbent upon the other party to to a money payment for such performance, treat the contract as in force up to the time he may deal with such a claim as due upon a to begin its performance, as before then the different contract arising upon a promise party who has signified his renunciation may which is understood from the acceptance of change his purpose and abide by the conan executed consideration.”32 Thus it ap- tract.35 The point, doubtless, is to some ex. pears that the party not ia default, upon a tent dependent upon the acts to be done to breach occurring after he has entered upon effect performance, as whether the mere deperformance may, in some instances, treat livery of something already in existence is the contract as rescinded from the beginning, required, or whether previous preparation to and have a recovery of the value of his part perform is necessary, as when the party is performance without regard to the contract. required to prepare or construct the thing to But the general rule of law formulated so as be delivered before the day of tender. In time whereby the other party is placed under And further, such failure or refusal to accede obligation to refrain from increasing the to the anticipatory breach enables the party damages must constitute a breach of the con committing it to take advantage of any intertract. The general rule as already shown vening circumstances justifying non-perseems to be that any explicit order, or posi formance-as where performance becomes tive assertion of a wish that performance be illegal or is excused by matter subsequent, or abandoned, or of a present intended repudi. affording him the means of mitigating bis ation of the contract, even before performance loss, as a change in the market. 38 is due or any preparation to that end begun, It has been already noticed that cases where or placing "himself in an attitude of impos a court of equity will decree specific performsibility of performance” is sufficient, and ance of a contract form an exception to the that decisions holding such instances not to general rule under consideration. That fact be within the rule thus stated are excep alone seems to invest such contracts with other tional.36 A perusal of the decisions cited in privileges at law. Thus it is said: “If it be the several notes hereto will fully disclose the a case for specific performance, the plaintiff contention for and against the rule. In having the power to perform is at liberty to Marks v. Van Eeghen, 37 Wallace, C. J., do so and recover a t law under the conwriting for the court (Circuit Court of Ap | tract.”:39 It was so ruled in an action to repeals, Second Circuit), and citing a great cover an installment due on a contract made number of decisions both English and Ameri. by the defendants for the support of their can, says: “In veiw of the overwhelming father during his life, though they had given preponderance of adjudication, we think it notice that they would pay nothing further must be accepted as settled law that where under said contract. The circumstances one party to an executory contract renounces suggest that the recovery at law according to it without cause, before the time for per the provisions of the contract was nothing forming it has elapsed, he authorizes the other or different than the specific performother party to treat it as terminated, without mance which equity would have decreed. prejudice to a right of action for damages ; However, though the result is the same it is and, if the latter elects to treat the contract reached by proceeding upon other and disas terminated, his right of action accrues at tinct lines. once.” But it must appear that the inten The construction of the subject expressed tion to repudiate the contract was distinctly in the title of this article with its immediate signified. It is not enough to prove an incidents is easily susceptible of expansion equivocal or indeterminate renunciation. into a treatise. So it has not been attempted
the latter instance clearly any direction given several liability on the part of each subscriber to the
or other act done by one party at whatever amount of his subscription only, and that in other respects the interests of the subscribers were joint, and that all must unite in order to repudiate and re 33 See cases cited in previous notes. nounce the contract.
34 Hochster v. Dela Tour, 2 El. & B1. 678; Bungee 30 Derby v. Johnson, 21 Vt. 17; Hulle v. Hightman, v. Koop, 48 N. Y. 225; Howard v. Daly, 61 N. Y. 362; 2 East, 145; Weeks v. Burt, 78 N. Y. 191; Mitchell v. Ferris v. Spooner, 102 N. Y. 10; Platt v. Brand, 26 Scott, 41 Mich. 108. See also cases cited in previous Mich. 173 (2d Series), and cases cited in note. notes.
35 Daniels v. Newton, 114 Mass. 533; Kadish v. 31 Anson, Cont. p. 366 (2d Am. Ed.), and cases cited. Young, 108 III, 170, 48 Am. Rep. 548, and cases cited; 32 Anson, Cont. p. 367 (2d Am. Ed.), and cases cited. | Clark v. N. B. & Q. (o. Co., 67 Fed. Rep. 222.
There is another point of much interest to to review in detail all the arguments adthe effect that if the party not violating the vanced in support or challenge of the quescontract keeps it, as he may, in force for his tions presented. However, it is contended own benefit, up to the time performance is that the conclusions reached are shown to be due—it is his right to have bis damages as maintainable upon principle and reason, and certained at that date—he also keeps the that they are in harmony with the great contract alive for the benefit of the other weight of authority both in England and in party. Therefore, if the notice of intention this country.
Geo. W. NEWTON. not to perform is withdrawn before it is ac
38 Avery v. Bronson, 5 E. & B. 714; Frost v. Knight ceded to or acted upon as a breach, the right L. R. 7 Exch. 111, 1 Eng. Rep. 218; Brown v. Muller, to treat the contract as broken is lost, and L. R. 7 Exch. 319, 3 Eng. Rep. 429; Roper v. Jobpson,
L. R. 8 C. P. 167, 4 Eng. Rep. 397. the rights of the several parties are the same
89 Marsh v. Blackman, 50 Barb. 333. as they were before the notice was given.
36 Roebling & Sons Co. v. Lock S. F. Co., 130 I11. 660: Kadisb v. Young, 108 II. 170, 48 Am. Rep. 548, and
CARRIERS-PERSONAL INJURIES-FREE PASS cases cited; Roehm v. Horst, 91 Fed. Rep. 345, 33 C.
-RELEASE-EFFECT-NEGLIGENCE. C. A. 550, 62 U. S. App. 620, 48 Fed. Rep. 565, and cases cited. This case has recently been affirmed by
PAYNE v. TERRE HAUTE & I. R. CO. the United States Supreme Court, but the opinion is not at hand. A brief notice of it may be found in
Appellate Court of Indiana, May 10, 1901. Vol. 51, Cent. L. J. p. 161, dated August 31, 1900.
Where a passenger riding on a free pass was in37 85 Fed. Rep. 863, 30 C. C. A. 208.
| jured through the negligence of a railroad company's
discussion of the proposition would be useless. We are bound by the law as declared by the supreme court. In Railway Co. v. Faylor, 126 Ind. 126, 25 N. E. Rep. 869, it was held that an answer pleading a contract of release indorsed on a free pass upon which appellee was riding at the time he was injured would not bar an action for damages based upon the negligence of the company. The answer in that case was in principle the same as tbe second paragraph of answer here. To the same effect are the following cases: Railway Co. v. Nickless, 71 Ind. 271; Railway Co. v. Selby, 47 Ind. 471. Upon the authority of these cases the answer was fatally defective. In our judgment, the ruling in the cases cited is not in conflict with the more recent case of Railway Co. v. Keefer, 146 Ind. 21, 44 N. E. Rep. 796, 38 L. R. A. 93, as urged by appellant; nor is a different rule there declared. Judgment reversed, and the court below is directed to sustain appellant's demurrer to the second paragraph of answer.
employees, an answer in a suit for such injuries that, by an express stipulation indorsed on the pass, the acceptance and use tbereof, was a release of any in. juries whicb might be sustained by the person to whom it was issued, will not bar an action brought by such passenger against the company for negligence
WILEY, J. The only question involved in this appeal is the sufficiency of the second paragraph of answer, a demurrer to which was overruled. The complaint is in three paragrapbs, and charges that appellant was a passenger upon one of appellee's trains, and while so riding as a passenger he was injured by the carelessness and negligence of appellee's servants in charge of the train. In the second paragraph of answer it is charged that, at the time appellant was injured in the manner stated in the complaint, he was riding upon the car and train of the appellee, and was entitled to be there solely by virtue of a pass theretofore issued to and accepted by him and used as a pure gratuity, and that by an express stipulation indorsed on the back of said pass, it was provided that by its acceptance and use any and all claims for injuries that might accrue to the person named on the face of the pass should be released. The answer further avers that the appellant was the only person named on the face of said pass, and that he was riding upon said pass at the time he was injured, and had paid no fare, nor was any expected of him. A copy of said release was indorsed upon the pass, as set out in full in the answer, and is as follows: “By its acceptance and use any and all claims for injuries to person or for loss or damage to baggage that might accrue to the person or persons named on the face thereof are released.” It is then averred that the appellant accepted said pass as a pure gratuity, tbat be paid nothing therefor, and that he bad full knowledge of the express release above set out and indorsed thereon. After the court had overruled a demurrer to tbis paragraph of answer, the appellant refused to plead further, and suffered judgment to be entered against him for costs. It is obvious, therefore, that the question for determination is simply this: Can a railroad company exempt itself from liability to a passenger on one of its trains who is injured by the negligence of its employees wbile he is being carried as such passengers upon a gratuitous pass? This question must be answered in view of the fact that the passenger accepts such pass with a full knowledge of the limiting clause indorsed upon its back; for the answer avers that the appellant did so accept and use the transportation with such knowledge, and the demurrer admits the truth of the allegation. The decisions upon this proposition in the different state courts, and also the federal courts, are in irreconcilable conflict; but the courts in this state have uniformly beld that common carriers are subject to the same liability for injuries resulting from negligence to persons riding on free passes as they are to those who pay full fare. To enter into a
NOTE.--Limitation of Carriers' Liability for Inju. ries to Passengers.-No more difficult or controverted question of law arises more often to perplex the courts of the present day than the one covered by the subject of this annotation. The authorities cannot be reconciled.
The old rule at the common law prohibited any attempt whatever on the part of a common carrier, either by notice or contract, to limit the liabilities imposed by the common law. Cole v. Goodwin, 19 Wend.(N. Y.) 257, 32 Am. Dec. 470; Fish v. Clapman, 2 Ga.349, 46 Am. Dec. 393. One modification of this rule has been made and universally recognized and conceded,-that a common carrier may limit its liability, by special contract, for injuries pot arising from its own negligence or that of its servants. Mer. rill v. Express Co., 62 N. H. 514; New York Central R. R. Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. (U. S.) 357; Louisville, etc. R. R. v. Gilbert, 88 Tenn. 430; Chris. tenson v. Express Co., 15 Minn. 270; Rosenfeld v. Rai.road, 103 Ind. 121, 53 Am. Rep. 500. This limita. tation of liability by the carrier, however, cannot be affected by notice or otherwise that by special agreement, oral or written. Baltimore, etc. R. R. v. Campbell, 36 Ohio St. 647, 38 Am. Rep. 617; Smith v. Railroad, 64 N, Car. 235; Kansas City, etc. R. R. v. Rodebaugh, 38 Kan. 45, 5 Am. St. Rep. 715; Solon v. Railroad (Iowa, 1895), 63 N. W. Rep. 692; St. Louis, etc. R. R. v. Weakly, 50 Ark. 397, 7 Am. St. Rep. 104. Contra in Pennsylvania: Lake Shore, etc. R. R. v. Rosengweig, 113 Pa. St. 519; Camden, etc. R. R. v. Baldauf, 16 Pa. St. 67, 55 Am. Dec. 481. The rule is well stated in New Jersey Navigation Co. v. Bank. 6 How. (U. S.) 344, where the court said: “The common carrier is in the exercise of a sort of public office, and has public duties to perform, from which he should not be permitted to exonerate himself with. out the assent of the parties concerned. And this is not to be implied or inferred from a general notice to the public, limiting his obligation, which may or may not be assented to. :· · The burden of proof lies on the carrier, and nothing short of an ex. press stipulation by parol or in writing should be permitted to discharge him from duties which the law has annexed to his employment."
At this point the authorities diverge. Can a com.
mon carrier, by special contract supported by a valu. which he may not assume the responsibility of, and able consideration, as for instance, a reduction of he may assume all or any portion of it." A distinc. fare, limit its liability for its own negligence or that tion sought to be made in the case of Perkins v. Rail. of its servants? The leading case of this subject, and road, 24 N. Y. 196, bolding a railroad liable for its undoubtedly still sustained by the weight of author. own negligence, but not that of its servants, has ity, is that of New York Central R. R. v. Lockwood, been generally repudiated. See Gull, etc. R. R. v. 17 Wall. (U. S.) 317, where the United States Supreme McGowan, 65 Tex. 645. It might also be mentioned Court clearly and definitely decided the question that there is a line of cases holding that a common propounded in the negative, bolding, first, that a com carrier may limit its liability for ordinary negligence mon carrier cannot lawfully stipulate for exemption but not for gross negligence. Chicago, etc. R. R. v. from responsibility when such exemption is not just Chapman, 133 III. 96, 23 Am. St. Rep. 587; Bosiowitz and reasonable in the eye of the law; secondly, that it | v. Express Co., 98 III. 239, 523, 34 Am. Rep. 191; Black is not just nor reasonable for a common carrier to | v. Transportation Co., 55 Wis. 322; Amas v. Railroad, stipulate for exemption from responsibility for the 67 Wis, 46, 58 Am. Rep. 848; Meuer v. Railroad, 58. negligence of himself or servants; thirdly, tbat these Dak. 568; Smith v. Railroaci, 29 Barb. 132; Baltimore, rules apply both to carriers of goods and carriers of etc. R. R. v. Brady, 32 Md. 333. This distinction has passengers for hire,and with special force to the latter. I also been repudiated as too artificial and vague. See This decision is undoubtedly supported by the great Griswold v. Railroad, 53 Conn. 371, 55 Am. Rep. 115; weight of authority. Louisville, etc. R. R. v. Taylor, Philadelphia, etc. R. R. v. Derby, 14 How. (U.S.) 468. 126 Ind. 126; Missouri Pacific R. R. v. Ivy, 71 Tex. 409, Thus far the authorities while not in harmony are 10 Am. St. Rep. 758; Jones v. Railroad, 125 Mo. 666, 28 by an overwhelming preponderance in favor of the S. W. Rep. 883, 46 Am. St. Rep. 514, 26 L. R. A. 718; rule that in case of passengers for hire, a common B. & 0. R. R. v. McLaughlin, 73 Fed. Rep. 519; Doyle carrier will not be permitted to limit its liability for v. Railroad, 162 Mass. 66, 44 Am. St. Rep. 385; Rose its own negligence or that of its servants. But now v. Railroad, 39 Iowa, 246; Davis v. Railroad, 93 Wis. the further question arises, is a common carries liable 470, 67 N. W. Rep. 16; Cleveland, etc. R. R. v. Curran, to a person carried gratuitously or at reduced rates, 19 Ohio St. 1; Louisville, etc. R. R. v. Oden, 80 Ala. and, even if so, wi!l that fact furnish such a consid. 38; Southern Express Co. v. Moon, 39 Miss. 822; eration as will validate a contract with tbe passen. Moulton v. Railroud, 31 Minn. 85. The reason of the ger exonerating the carrier from responsibility for its rule thus announced is well stated in Louisville, etc. own negligence or that of its servants. The great R. R. V. Taylor, supra, where the court said: “A confusion of authority and argument that exists on stipulation that the carrier shall not be bound to the this subject is due no doubt in large measures to a exercise of care and diligence is in effect an agree. failure to distinguish between the carrier's liability ment to absolve him from one of the essential duties on contract and tort. The undertaking of a common of his employment. ••• The law will not allow the carrier to transport a passenger from one point to carrier tbus to abandon bis obligation to the public, another is more than a contractual relation between and hence all stipulations which amount to a denial individuals,-it is a public relation as well, to which or repudiation of duties which are of the very es. duties and liabilities are attached entirely sepa. sence of his employment will be regarded as unrea: rate and distinct from any arising under the con. sonable, contrary to public policy, and therefore tract. These duties to the public the carrier and, void.” .
indeed, the passenger himself, cannot in principle Another line of authorities bold to a contrary be permitted to abrogate or modify. The govern. doctrine. This has been called the “New York rule," ment as parens patriæ, is interested in the life of tbe although it is difficult to see why it should be called citizen and even the latter himself is not justified in the rule of one state over another as each state making an attempt to take his life by his own hand; reached its conclusion without relying particularly much less should a railroad corporation be peron the authority of any state. In fact an examination mitted to exonerate itself from any responsibility of the cases will show that these authorities rely more to protect the life of the passenger under its on the English construction of a railroad's right to care and, by special contract, to place itself in limit its liability under the Railway and Canal Act a position where it is free to maim, injure and than upon any other outside authority. The rule kill without fear of liability. Such a contract is adopted by these authorities is to the effect that a absolutely against public policy and should be common carrier may make a valid contract with the sterply discountenanced. It is evident therefore passenger exonerating itself from all liability not that persons riding gratuitously by express caused by the fraud or willful wrong of the company. or implied invitation of the carrier are as much pas. Meuer v. Railroad, 5 S. Dak. 568, 59 N. W. Rep. 945, sengers in every sense of that term as passengers for 25 L. R. A. 81; Arnold v. Railroad, 83 III. 273, 25 Am. hire. The consideration for such a contract is in the Rep. 386; Higgins v. Railroad, 28 La. Ann. 133; Smith rule that the confidence induced by undertaking any v. Railroad, 29 Barb. (N. Y.) 132; Wilson v. Railroad, service for another is a sufficient legal consideration 97 N. Y. 87; Bissell v. Railroad, 25 N. Y. 602; Kinney to create a duty in the performance of it. This rule v. Railroad, 32 N. J. L. 407, 90 Am. Dec. 671; Balti. was laid down in the leading case of Coggs v. Ber. more, etc. R. R. v. Brady, 32 Md. 333. The reason of nard, 1 Smith's Leading Cases, 199, and is universally this rule is well stated in the case of Bissell v. Railroad, sustained by authority. See Waterbury v. Railroad, supra, where the court said: “The principles being 17 Fed. Rep. 671; Annas y. Railroad, 67 Wis. 46, 58 established that parties may lawfully enter into con Am. Rep. 848; New World v. King, 16 How. (U. S.) tracts of this nature, there is no limit to the extent 469. Thus, persons riding free by consent of the and variety of modification which may be given to company, or with consent of the conductor, or where such contracts. The passenger may assume all risks no demand is made for his fare, or on a free pass, arising from the condition of the track, or of the cars, have the same rights as other passengers, and or from the negligence of the agents, of all of them or the carrier assumes towards them the same respon. of any class of them. There is no danger which the | sibility and is liable for the same lack of care and to party may encounter, resulting from the journey, the same degree. Benner Undertaking Co. v. Bus
gon, 58 III. App. 17; Jacobus v. Railroad, 20 Mion. Central R. R. v. Crudup, 63 Miss. 291, it was beld that 125, 18 Am. Rep. 360; Pittsburg, etc. R. R. v. a railroad company was not relieved from liability Caldwell, 74 Pa. St. 421; Sherman v. Railroad, 72 Mo. for the negligence of its servants by the fact that the 62, 37 Am. Rep. 423; State v. Railroad, 63 Md. 433; injured person, a mail agent running on its road, had Rose v. Railroad, 39 Iowa, 246; Buck v. Power Co., accepted a free ticket, by which he assumed the risk 46 Mo. App. 555; Louisville, etc. R. R. v. Taylor, 126 of injury. Ind. 126. This rule and the reason for it is well In conclusion, it may be stated that the weight of stated in Waterbury v. Railroad, 17 Fed. Rep. 671, authority, sound principle and a safe public policy where the court held that the right which a passen sustain the following propositions,-that a common ger by railway has to be carried safely does not de. carrier may limit its liability by special contract for pend on bis having made a contract, but the fact of injuries not arising from its own negligence or that bis being there creates a duty on the part of the com. of its servants, but tbat in regard to the latter a con. pany to carry bim safely. It suffices to enable him to tract exempting itself from liability is void as against malotain an action for negligence if he was being public policy; that in the case of gratuitous passage carried by the railroad company voluntarily, al. the liability of the carrier for its own negligence or thougb gratuitously, and as a mere matter of favor to that of its servants is not modified or limited to any
extent whatever, the liability of the carrier in this The last question to be considered is whether the regard not arising out of the contract of passage, but fact that a carrier agrees to carry a passenger gra. out of the relation created by accepting the person as tuitously or at reduced rates furnishes such a consid: a passenger; and for the same reason any limitation eration as will validate an agreement on the part of of its liability in cases of gratuitous passage is no the latter exonerating the carrier from liability. more warranted than in cases of passengers for hire, The rule supported by the weight of authority and and is as much opposed to a safe public policy in the based, as we believe, on the true principles which one case as the other; that any distinction between distinguish between the contractual and public ordinary and gross negligence in permitting a carrier relations arising upon the agreement to carry, is to to limit its liability as to one and not the other is this effect,-tbat any indorsement or agreement on vague and artificial, as all negligence which injures the back of any part of the contract of carriage the person and endangers human life may be said to which, on consideration of gratuitous or reduced rate be gross. The fraud and willful misconduct of the of passage, exempts the carrier from liability for carrier or its agents are by all authorities held to Degligence is against the policy of the law and void. subject the carrier to a liability from which it can by Grand Trunk R. R. v. Stevens, 95 U. S. 655; Cleve. no contraot claim exemption or exoneration. land, etc. R. R. v. Curran, 19 Ohio St. Rep. 1; Rose v.
A. H. ROBBINS. Railroad, 39 Iowa, 246; Brush v. Railroad, 43 Iowa,
554; Jacobus v. Railroad, 26 Ming. 125, 18 Am. Rep.
JETSAM AND FLOTSAM. 360; Illinois Central R. R. v. Crudup, 63 Miss. 291; Bryan v. R. R., 32 Mo. App. 228; Camden v. Railroad,
SPECIALISM IN THE LAW. 7 Atl. Rep. (Pa. 1887) 731; Mobile, etc. R. R. v. Hop James B. Dill, the corporation lawyer, writes inter: kins, 41 Ala. 486, 2 Am. St. Rep. 369. On the other estingly in Success on the question, “Are the Three hand, it was held in New York that public policy was Great Professions Declining?” taking the law as his satisfied by bolding a railroad company bound to take subject. He says: "The great bulk of the work of the risk when the passenger chooses to pay the regu. the profession has been turned into industrial crealar fare. If he voluntarily and for any valuable con. tion and adjustment, and very often the counsel is as sideration waives the right to indemnity, the contract good a business man as his clients. A knowledge of is binding. Bissell y. Railroad, 25 N. Y. 442, 8 Am. law has, therefore, within the last thirty years, beDec. 369. This rule applies particularly to persons come the side arms of certain classes of the captains traveling op passes, and is upheld by the following of industry. Every good business man knows a good authorities: Quimby y. Railroad, 150 Mass. 365, 23 N. deal of law. Specialism has split it up into a halt E. Rep. 205, 5 L. R. A. 846; Griswold v. Railroad, 53 dozen or more divisions, and a lawyer who is now Conn. 371, 55 Am. Rep. 115; Chicago, etc. R. R. v. able to master more than one sort of practice is a Hawk, 36 Ill. App. 321; Rogers v. Steamboat Co., 86 genius. The profession has lost nearly all of its old, Me. 261, 29 Atl. Rep. 1069, 25 L. R. A. 491; Muldoon æsthetic, ostentatious attractions. The civil law pays 5. Railroad, 10 Wasb. 311, 45 Am. St. Rep. 787; Anpas a practitioner so much more than the criminal law 1. Railroad, 67 Wis. 46, 30 N. W. Rep. 282, Thus, in the does, that it attracts the ablest men. Juries and case of Rose v. Railroad, 39 Iowa, 246, a railroad was courts no longer care for eloquence. Yes, law is held liable for causing the death of a passenger by business, and if the young man wants to practice it, the negligence of its employees, although he was
the sooner he makes up his mind to do so with an eye riding on a pass releasing the company from all lia single to some particular branch of it, the better bility for injury to his person and property. In the lawyer will be become.” case of Bissell v. Railroad, 25 N. Y. 442, it was held that a common carrier, in consid.
BOOKS RECEIVED. eration of an abatement in whole or in part of his legal fare, may lawfully contract with a
| Tabular Analysis of the Law of Real Property. Ar. passenger that the latter will take upon himself the
ranged by L. W. McCandless. (Following Blackrisk of damage from the negligence of agents and
stone Book II.) Ann Arbor, Mich. Published servants, for which the carrier would otherwise be
by George Wahr, 1901. Cloth, price $1.50. Reliable. In Bates v. Railroad, 147 Mass. 255, it was
view will follow. held that the privileges accorded by a railroad to an
Hirsch's Tabulated Digest of the Divorce Laws of express messenger of riding in the baggage car where
the United States. (New Revised Edition.) By passengers are not allowed, is a sufficient considera.
Hugo Hirsch. Folding Chart, Cloth Covers. tion for an agreement to absolve the railroad from all Price, $1.50. Funk & Wagnalls Company, New liability for resulting injury. In the case of Illinois
York and London. Review will follow.