credit of the same funds for the succeeding year," the board of public safety has no power to use in any year, in addition to the amount appropriated by the general council for the police department, any balance in the treasury arising from a levy for the same purpose for previous years, until it has been appropriated by the council.-NEUMEYER V. KRAKEL, Ky., 62 S. W. Rep. 519.

67. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Parks - Appropria. tion.-No appropriation having been made by the city council of the city of Detroit, for the use of the park board, to pay for water for the operation of drinking fountains, hydrants, etc., the Detroit waterworks was not entitled to recover from the park board for water so furnished.-BOARD OF WATER COMRS. OF CITY OF DETROIT V. COMRS. OF PARKS AND BOULEVARDS, Mich., 85 N. W. Rep. 1133.

68. NEGLIGENCE - Collision on Highway-Proximate Cause. Where plaintiff, riding his bicycle when it was quite dark, was run over by defendants, and the evidence was conflicting as to the speed at which the latter were driving, and there was some testimony that plaintiff was riding at a high speed, the court prop. erly instructed the jury that if plaintiff was exercising due care, and defendants were racing their horses, plaintiff could recover against all of defendants, but, before he could recover against any of them, their negligence must have been the proximate cause of the injury.-MAHNKE V. FREER, Mich., 85 N. W. Rep. 1099.

69. NEGLIGENCE Question for Jury.-Defendant tied his horse on a public street, with an ordinary strap three-fourths of an inch wide, which was fas. tened into the ring in the bit of the bridle; and while the horse was so standing a paper blew under his feet, whereupon he jumped, broke the bit, and ran into plaintiff's buggy, breaking it, and injuring plaintiff. The horse had previously broken a similar strap and run away, being frightened by the blowing of a paper, of which fact defendant knew, he afterwards taking the precaution to unhitch the horse from the buggy while at church. Held, that the question of defend. ant's negligence was properly left to the jury.-SINSABAUGH V. BROWN, Mich., 85 N. W. Rep. 1110.

70. PARTNERSHIP -Character-Corporation.-Where plaintiff dealt with an association of individuals as a corporation, such dealing fixed the status of the asso. ciation as to that transaction by estoppel, and plaintiff was not entitled to subsequently claim a liability arising therefrom against the association as partners. -CLAUSEN V. HEAD, Wis., 85 N. W. Rep. 1028.

71. PLEADING AND PRACTICE Conduct of Jury.Where, on prosecution for violation of the local op. tion law, it appeared that after the jury retired a juror stated that he had known the State's witness all his life, and that he was a truthful man, while another juror stated that a certain witness for defend. ant was under indictment for horse theft, none of which evidence was before the jury during trial, defendant was entitled to a new trial.-BLALOCK V. STATE, Tex., 62 S. W. Rep. 571.

72. PLEADING AND PRACTICE-Cross-Examination.Though the cross-examination of a witness will ordinarily be left to the discretion of the trial judge, where improper cross-examination was allowed to such an extent as to be clearly prejudicial it is ground for reversal.-GOULD V. GREGORY, Mich., 85 N. W. Rep. 1075.

78. PLEADING AND PRACTICE-Exhibit as Part of Petition. Where a policy sued on is filed with the petition, and referred to therein as a part thereof, its stipulations limiting the liability of defendant are to be considered a part of the petition on demurrer.HUDSON V. SCOTTISH UNION & NATIONAL INS. Co., Ky., 62 S. W. Rep. 513.

lands, a mortgage executed by the agent acting under such power is unauthorized and void.-MINNESOTA STONEWARE Co. v. MCCROSSEN, Wis., 85 N. W. Rep.

1019.

75. RAILROADS-Brakeman Riding on Pilot-Duty of Engineer.-A brakeman, while standing on the pilot of a switch engine, lost his footing, and was run over and killed. Held, that an instruction that if the engineer, by the exercise of ordinary care, could have seen that the brakeman had lost his footing, and he did in fact lose his footing, and the engineer, by the exercise of ordinary care, could have stopped the engine in time to have avoided inflicting fatal injuries on the brakeman, his failure to do so, if he did so fail, was negligence, was erroneous, in assuming as a matter of law, that it was the duty of the engineer to ex. ercise ordinary care to see that the brakeman had not lost his footing, which was a question for the jury.— SAN ANTONIO & A. P. RY. Co. v. WALLER, Tex., 62 s. W. Rep. 555.

76. RAILROADS-Injury to Animals.-Where statute provides that whenever a railroad train approaches any crossing a bell shall be rung or a whistle blown, and that in case of neglect, the railroad shall be liable for damages sustained by any person by reason of such neglect. Held, that where a horse was injured by being run into by a train, and no statutory signals were given, there could be no recovery for the injury, In the absence of evidence that such failure was the cause of the injury.- MANKEY V. CHICAGO RY. Co., S. Dak., 85. N. W. Rep. 1013.

77. RAILROADS-Speed of Train.-In an action against a railroad company for killing a cow there was evidence that a rule of the company limited the speed of trains at the place where the cow was struck to not more than six miles an hour, and the court charged that if the train was running more than six miles an hour at the time to find defendant guilty of negli gence. Held, that the charge was erroneous, since a violation of the rule would not constitute negligence, unless such violation was the proximate cause of the injury.-SAN ANTONIO & A. P. RY. Co. v. CLARK, Tex., 62 S. W. Rep. 546.

78. RAILROAD COLLISION - Injury to Fireman. Plaintiff, a fireman on a north-bound train, was injured in jumping from his engine to avoid being in. volved in a collision with a south-bound train standing on the main track at a blind siding, where the trains had been ordered to meet. The night was dark, and the engine in front of him was without headlight or signal lamps, and the wind was blowing sand and snow across the track. The siding was without a telegraph station or a signal house by which it could be recognized, and it was a fair inference from the evi dence that there was no signal light at the meeting point. Held, that the negligence causing the collision was attributable to the company, in ordering the trains to meet at such place, though it concurred with negligence on the part of plaintiff's fellow servants, the conductor and engineer of the south bound train, in operating it without lights.-MEXICAN CENT. RY. Co. v. GLOVER, U. S. C. C. of App., Fifth Circuit, 107 Fed. Rep. 356.

79. REAL PROPERTY - Absolute Conveyance. An agreement between husband and wife, by which the former conveys property absolutely to the wife on a consideration that she is to have a life estate, and that the remainder is to go to a daughter, is not void as an inconsistent limitation ingrafted on an absolute conveyance after its execution, and hence the daugh. ter may enforce such remainder as against a person acquiring the property from the wife with a knowl edge of the facts.- POST v. CAMPBELL, Wis., 85 N. W. Rep. 1032.

80. REAL PROPERTY-Trespass to Try Title Recov. ery From Vendor.-In trespass to try title, plaintiff vouched in his vendors, immediate and remote, on a warranty of title alone. There was no allegation of

fraud or mistake, or that the vendors had warranted the quantity of land. The sale was not by the acre, though the deed called for a certain number of acres. A portion of the land was shown to be held by a superior title than that of planitiff. Held, that there could be no recovery against the vendors for a deficit. -BARNES V. LIGHTFOOT, Tex., 62 S. W. Rep. 564.

81. RECEIVERS-Priority.-Where a receiver had in bis hands money which he held as an assignee, and used a portion of such money to pay the expenses of the receivership, and afterwards repaid the estate of which he was assignee, he could not be allowed a preference therefor on a settlement; it appearing that certain creditors had also advanced money for defray. ing the expenses of the receivership, and the claim not being one of the estate, but of the receiver.- BusTER V. MANN, Ark., 62 S. W. Rep. 588.

Where, in a

$2. ROADS AND STREETS-Dedication. suit for the partition of land among devisees in 1868, the land was divided into lots, streets and alleys, as directed by testator's will, and a copy of the plat thereof was filed in the county clerk's office, and deeds were executed to the devisees referring to the plat and to B street, as shown thereon, and lots were sold and conveyed by the devisees by deeds referring to the plat and calling for the streets dedicated thereby, there was a dedication of B street, though the land was not then within the city limits, and though the plat was not recorded, as the law did not then require that to be done; and the subsequent extension of the city limits so as to include a part of B street, and the original construction of that street at the expense of abutting property owners, pursuant to a city ordi nance, are sufficient evidence of acceptance by the city.-SOUTH COVINGTON & C. ST. RY. Co. v. NEWPORT L. & A. TURNPIKE CO., Ky., 62 S. W. Rep. 687.

-

8. SALES-Breach of Warranty Rescission. - De. fendant, in an action for the price of a threshing ma. chine, pleaded a breach of warranty, and asked for a rescission. The machine was sold at its represented value, and the evidence showed that it was of no practical value. Held, that a decree ordering a rescis. sion, and that the unpaid purchase-money notes be cancelled, and that the price paid be returned to the defendant, and ordering the latter to return the machine, would not be reversed in toto on the ground that pleading a breach of warranty was an affirmance of the contract, but that the relief canceling the notes and ordering the repayment of the purchase price was authorized.-GARR, SCOTT & Co. v. YOUNG, Tenn., 62 S. W. Rep. 631.

84. SALE-Fraud-Fiduciary Relations-Rescission.Where the president of a bank, who had been in the habit of helping the bank to make loans, knowing that it relied on his advice, sold it a note, with knowl. edge that the maker was in straightened circumstances, if not insolvent, and that the indorsers were not financially strong, but representing to the bank that he believed both maker and indorsers to have the best of credit, the president's relation to the bank Was such that it was entitled to a full disclosure of his information; and, for his failure to place it in posses. Bion of the facts, it was entitled to rescind its pur. chase of the note, and recover the consideration paid therefor.-HICKS V. STEEL, Mich., 85 N. W. Rep. 1121.

85. STREET RAILROADS-Turnouts.-Under an ordinance authorizing a street railway company to con. struct and maintain a single-track railway along certain streets, with the right to construct, use, and operate all necessary and convenient tracks for turnouts, sidetracks, curves, and switches wherever the same may be necessary, the same to be constructed and in operation within one year from the date of the

on the part of the city.-DETROIT CITIZENS' ST. Rr. Co. v. BOARD OF PUBLIC WORKS OF CITY OF DETROIT, Mich., 85 N. W. Rep. 1072.

86. STREET RAILWAYS-Ordinance-Sounding Gong. -The violation of an ordinance requiring the continuous ringing of a bell on a street car while in motion does not render the company guilty of negligence per se in a crossing accident, even though the ordinance is a condition in the grant of a franchise to the company, since the condition is unreasonable.-STAF FORD V. CHIPPEWA VAL. ELEC. R. Co., Wis., 85 N. W. Rep. 1036.

87. SURETIES Discharge from Liability. Under a sales agent's contract he was to pay cash on receipt of a bill of lading, and to keep strict account of all goods received by and returned by him, and his sureties bound themselves to pay or cause to be paid to his principal all sums which should become due on ac count of shipments to him or on his order during one year, during which all payments by him were to be made promptly in the ordinary course of business. Held, that failure of the agent to pay cash for any shipment on the receipt of the bill of lading was a breach of contract entitling his principal to proceed against him and his sureties to enforce collection of the debt then due, and hence his sureties were entitled to call on authorized agents of his principal for information as to the state of his accounts, and if, by their misrepresentations, the sureties changed their position to their detriment, they were discharged from liability.-ST. LOUIS BREWING ASSN. V. HAYES, U. S. C. C. of App., Fifth Circuit, 107 Fed. Rep. 395. 88. TAXATION-Tax Collector - Sureties-Limitation of Actions. Where a tax collector issued receipts to his creditors for taxes which he did not collect, and the tax rolls were marked "Paid" in connection with each item where such receipts had been issued, and the collector did not report any stubs of receipts to the commissioner's court, but retained them in his office, where they might have been inspected, limita tions run against the right of action against the sure ties on his bond, since the commissioners would have discovered the wrong had they compared his report with the tax roll and receipt stubs, as required by Rev. St. art. 5168. The statute of limitations ruis against counties, except when otherwise provided.WARD V. MARION CO., Tex., 62 S. W. Rep. 557.

89. TAX SALE-Report of Sale.-Under Comp. Laws, § 3922, providing that where any record or paper, after sile for taxes, cannot be found in the proper office, it will be presumed, unless the contrary is shown, that the paper or record was duly made, the fact that after a sale there was no evidence that the county treasurer made to the auditor general the report required by the statute does not render the sale void.-CHURCH V. NESTER, Mich., 85 N. W. Rep. 1078.

90. TELEPHONES AND TELEGRAPHS Breach of Cortract for Use of Instrument.-Where plaintiff, who was engaged in a general messenger business, had a contract with defendant telephone company for the use of its telephone in his place of business for a period of three years, defendant had no right to refuse to deliver messages to plaintiff to notify persons wanted at another telephone exchange, and is there. fore liable in damages to plaintiff for removing its instrument from his place of business after he had used it only four months, because he refused to pay therefor unless defendant would deliver such mes sages. (WENSBORO HARRISON TEL. Co. v. WISDOM, Ky., 62 S. W. Rep. 529.

Jinction against the use of the earlier conceived but subsequently registered trade-mark, “U-C-A," as ap plied to the manufacture and sale of a similar article; the intent with which the latter mark was used being Immaterial, and its registration being only prima facie evidence of its validity.-WELSBACH LIGHT CO. v. ADAM, U. S. C. C., W. D. (N. Y.), 107 Fed. Rep. 464.

92. TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES-Superintendent of MintLoss of Public Moneys.-Whether the superintendent of a mint was at fault or not, he and his sureties are liable on his bond "for the faithful discharge of his duties" for the loss by fire of public moneys which the law required him to keep safely, and pay over when required.-SMYTHE V. UNITED STATES, U. S. C. C. of App., Fifth Circuit, 107 Fed. Rep. 377.

Postmasters

93. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Money Order Funds.-Funds in other offices on which a postmaster could draw do not constitute money. order funds in his custody, within the meaning of the postal laws and regulations - UNITED STATES V. NOR. TO, U. S. C. C of App., Fifth Circult, 107 Fed. Rep. 412.

94. VENDOR AND VENDEE-Action for Price-Market. able Title. Where, in a suit in equity, upon an execu. tory contract for the sale of land, the purchaser not being in possession, wherein such purchaser alleged fraudulent representations on the part of the vendor as to mortgage upon the land, and pending the suit the vendor procured the mortgage to be canceled, and a decree was rendered providing that, upon the vendor filing with the clerk "a good and sufficient war. ranty deed in fee simple," execution should issue against the vendee for the purchase money, under the law, and the pleadings and evidence in the case in which the decree was rendered, the meaning of the words "a good and sufficient warranty deed in fee simple" was that the vendor must tender a good and sufficient marketable title before he could demand that the vendee accept the deed and pay the purchase money.-HORNE V. RODGERS, Ga., 38 8. E. Rep. 768. 95. WATERS AND WATER COURSES-Sewage-Pollut. ing Stream. In an action for injuries caused by allow. ing sewage to escape into a water course, the opinion of the court to the effect that plaintiff could recover for the time lost even for the sickness of his adult chil dren is not prejudicial error where the charge restricted the jury to a recovery for the loss of time to that of plaintiff's wife by reason of her sickness.— CITY OF SAN ANTONIO V. DIAZ, Tex., 62 8. W. Rep. 549. 96. WATERS AND WATER COURSES-Surface Water.Defendant built a dam to prevent surface water from crossing his land, thereby turning it on property of plaintiff, who sued for damages. Defendant claimed the water from time immemorial had flowed across H's land, and from thence across plaintiff's, and that its natural course had been diverted by a ditch cut by H through a natural elevation, which prevented it from flowing on defendant's property. There was evidence that the water had been diverted onto defendant's land by thy natural course of husbandry. Held, that an owner has not the right, even by ordi. nary husbandry, to divert the natural flowage of sur face water so as to collect and precipitate it on his neighbor's property.-FINKBINDER V. ERNST, Mich., 85 N. W. Rep. 1227.

97. WATER COMPANY-Assignment of Contract with City. Where a city for more than eight years acquiesced to the fullest extent in the assignment by a water company of its rights and privileges under a contract with the city, and allowed the new company during such time to perform the contract of its assignor, it is

land to him worth $5,000, reserving possession and the right to sell, in which event the son was to receive a certain price per acre, or $5,000 at the father's death. Subsequently the father made a will giving $5,000 and some village lots to his son. By legacies to other children and his wife, he disposed of all his estate except a farm included in the land originally deeded to his son, which was to be equally divided among the children. He then assigned to his children his personal property on the same basis as in the will. The son knew of the assignment. On the father's death the son receipted for his legacy and share of the personal property, and then presented a claim for services covered by the deed first men. tioned. Held, that the acceptance of the benefits under the will canceled the son's claim.-RUBERT V. RUBERT, Mich., 85 N. W. Rep. 1119.

99. WILLS

Construction Trust Estates Life E-tates-Statutes-Estates in Fee.- Where a devise in fee was made in a will, but in a subsequent paragraph it provided that if the devisee should die without bodily heirs the property should be divided among certain others, the devisee, having survived the tes tator, took an estate in fee, since a devise over to third persons, dependent on the event of death with out issue, referred to death in the lifetime of the tes tator.-STRATTON V. MCKINNIE, Tenn., 62 8. W. Rep.

626.

100. WILLS-Contest-Burd en of Proof. A charge that the burden of proof on the issue of the soundness of testator's mind at the time of the making of the will was on the contestants, and that they must estab lish by a preponderance of the evidence that testator was of unsound mind, and that if there was only a bare balance of evidence, or a mere doubt of the testa tor's sanity, the presumption was in favor of sanity, was erroneous, as inducing the jury to believe that the contestants must prove testator's insanity to the exclusion of all doubt.-BIMS V. COLLIER, Ark., 62 S. W. Rep. 593.

101. WILLS-Perpetuities.-N devised all his estate, real and personal, to M, as trustee, with power to sell all his real and personal estate; to invest and reinvest the proceeds thereof as he should deem fit; the trust fund to be used: (4) to pay annually one-half of the income to his son Charles during his life, and the other half of said income to his daughter during her life; (5) upon the death of his son Charles to pay one-half of the principal to the children of Charles, but, if no issue survive his son, then to pay one-half to the children of his daughter; (6) upon the death of his daughter to pay one-half of the principal to her children, but, if no issue survive her, then to pay the same to the children of his son Charles; (7) upon the death of either his son Charles or bis daughter without issue, to pay the entire net income to the survivor of the two during his or her life; (8) if both of said child. ren die without issue, then his entire estate shall be vested in the brother of the deceased, and his heirs, forever. Held: (1) that the devise was for more than two lives in being, and was therefore vold; (2) that the statute against perpetuities applies to a case where the trustee is authorized to sell the real estate and other property of the deceased, but is required to immediately reinvest it; (3) the provision for the life estate devised to the sister is good.-NILES V. MASON, Mich., 85 N. W. Rep. 1100.

102. WILLS-Remainders Death Without Issue.Where a will bequeathed $1,000 to C for life, and on bis death without issue to his brothers, the rule that where a provision of a will, standing alone, would

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., JULY 12, 1901.

The case of Atherton v. Atherton, decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, April 15, 1901, and reported in 52 Cent. L. J. 484, is awakening earnest inquiry, especially in the eastern States upon the probable encouragement such decision will give to the enactment of loose divorce laws in States whose public policy has not heretofore given evidence of much concern for the inviolability of the marriage relation. In our annotation to that case, however, we pointed out that from a legal standpoint, the position of New York and several other eastern States in refusing to recognize the decree of divorce of a sister State unless both husband and wife were domiciled therein had been justly rebuked by the supreme court in the decision just referred to. We showed also that while the motive which prompted these States in their refusal to recognize divorces granted in other States may have been commendable, its result was an absurdity in that it held people divorced in one State to be married in another, and vice versa, and was attended by all the serious consequences which such confusion of authority was bound to result in. But while this is true we desire to extend our sympathy and admiration especially to the States of New York and South Carolina which have so nobly and so unequivocably set themselves like a stone wall against the tide of easy divorce legislation, and whose policy has been to limit divorce and to check the wholesale separation of marital relations which like an epidemic has been spreading over the country, but whose earnest efforts in this direction have been counteracted in a large degree by the action of sister States whose laws have encouraged sepa ation and made it easy of attainment. result has been that there has arisen an absolute disregard of the sacredness of the marriage relation and a drifting away into paths of free love which permits the status of marriage to be changed at the will of the parties, and ends in the destruction of the home and its influences. We concur in the words of Pope, J., of South Carolina, in the case of McCreery v. Davis, when he said: "All

The

admit that the true ideal in marriage is such a perfect union that leads to the indestructibility of the relation of man and wife; for, in its very inception, such is the declared purpose of the parties to it. Such is in exact accordance with the moral law: 'And they twain shall be one flesh.' England held this view for centuries, and while she held it, the thirteen colonies in America were planted, each adopting this view of the mother country. South Carolina was one of these, and, with the exception of the interval between the years 1872 and 1878, she has constantly retained this view. If others have drifted she cannot be so charged to have done."

A uniform federal divorce law is an absolute necessity. This is the sensible conclusion to which the recent agitation of this question is leading the people of this country. One prominent newspaper in the east says: "So widespread and insistent has become the demand for legislation by congress with reference to the regulation of divorce proceedings that action toward that end seems likely to be undertaken at the next session of the national law making body. Recent decisions of the supreme court have again brought the matter prominently into notice throughout the country." The New York World, showing the awful consequence of the wholesale granting of divorces, says editorially: "Many lawyers and judges. have asked that federal legislation be inaugurated to put a stop to this state of affairs. From time to time the justices of the supreme court here and in other judicial departments have endeavored to prevent fraudulent and collusive divorces by stringent investigation, but the lawyers who advertise to procure divorces at forty dollars a head are ever ready to invent some method of carrying on the divorce-made-easy process. Jurists and practitioners eminent in their profession are emphatic in their declarations that federal action is necessary. One is quoted to have given his opinion as follows: "I consider the present state of divorce legislation in this country most deplorable. It cannot be remedied except by federal legislation. Why should marriage, which is universal, be treated by every State in the Union in a different manner? The law on this subject should be universal. Then we

should hear no more of Dakota or New Jersey decrees being invalid."

Marriage is not a contract between the parties to be dissolved by their mutual consent, but is on the contrary, a status into which they have entered binding them for life in a relation which is the most sacred and the most vital to the perpetuity of society of all the relations of life. In Aryan civilization, at least, the home has always been most jealously guarded as the fountain spring out of which comes all that is good or bad in the social and political life of the people. In undermining the marriage relation we destroy the home and in destroying the home, we destroy the most powerful influence and restraint upon the actions of men only excepting that of the spirit of God himself. It is earnestly to be hoped that the discussion of this important question now being awakened throughout the country will serve to arouse the people to first principles on this subject, and lead them to secure the purity and indistructibility of the home by providing for a uniform law of divorce which might stipulate, probably, not more than three grounds, suggested by Mr. Bishop as the only proper and reasonable grounds for divorce, adultery, desertion and sævitia.

NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS

MUTUAL MISTAKE OF LAW.-An interesting point of law is discussed by the Court of Chancery Appeals of Tennessee in the case of Harlan v. Central Phosphate Company, 62 S. W. Rep. 614. In that case a half interest in common in a lot descended to A, who supposed, under a mistake as to the law of descent, which was also shared by B, that the lot descended in severalty to the latter, who, in fact, inherited no interest therein. A owned other land adjoining this lot, and together with B executed a joint mineral lease to the several tracts owned by them, which included the lot in question. The lease was executed as a joint lease merely for convenience, and all the parties, including the lessee, supposed that A had in law no interest in the lot in question, though they all knew the facts. It was held by the court that the lease did not convey the interest of A in such lot, since it was executed under a mutual mistake of law as to the ownership thereof. The court said: "The inquiry as to when equity will relieve from mistakes of law is an exceedingly difficult one. The general rule is simple enough. The difficulty arises upon a consideration of its qualifications and exceptions. Judge Story has considered this question at

length in his work of Equity Jurisprudence, and we have recourse to that authority for enlightenment upon this matter. In that work it is said that agreements entered into in good faith, but under a mistake of law, are generally held valid and obligatory upon the parties." After considering a great number of authorities, which are apparently against the position taken by the court, the learned judge who writes the opinion collates authorities showing a well defined exception to this general rule which he states as follows: Where the mistake is of so fundamental a character that the minds of the parties have never in fact met, or where an unconscionable advantage has been gained by a mere mistake or misapprehension, and there was no gross negligence on the part of the plaintiff, either in falling into the error or in not sooner claiming redress, and no intervening rights have accrued, and the parties may still be placed in statu quo, equity will interfere, in its discretion, in order to prevent intolerable injustice. This we believe to be the clearly defined and well-established rule upon the subject in courts of equity both in England and America."

HOMESTEAD-CHANGE OF RESIDENCE.-In the recent case of Minnesota Stoneware Co. v. MeCrossen, 85 N. W. Rep. 1019, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin decided an interesting question in the law of homestead. It was held in this case that where the owner of a homestead moved with his family to a distant State, where he remained more than three years, the finding of the trial court, on his positive testimony, that the removal was temporary and without intent to abandon his homestead, should not be reversed, though he registered and voted several times in such State, since the fact of voting is not conclusive on the question of residence. We quote from the opinion:

"There is left the question of fact, upon which the case mainly turned, as to whether the removal of Mr. McCrossen from the homestead was for temporary purposes, with intent not to abandon it as a homestead but to reoccupy it as such, as found by the court. We shall not discuss at length the evidence upon which such finding was made. In this case there is the very significant circumstance that Mr. McCrossen exercised the elective franchise in the State of Washington three times while residing there. We must presume that the essentials of citizenship are the same in that State as here, and that McCrossen's assertion of the right of citizenship, as indicated, was inconsistent with his possessing a homestead in the State of Wisconsin. But we cannot say that such circumstance is conclusive. He violated the law in voting, or he committed perjury in testifying that his residence in the State of Washington was for mere temporary purposes and that his intention at all times was to return to the Wisconsin homestead. The trial court concluded from all the circumstances that he tes