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land for him, agreeing to pay them $200 for their serv ices, but stipulating that they were to receive nothing unless they regained the land for him, and placed in their hands a refunding bond by which C was obligated to him for the loss of the land, the attorneys having procured C to purchase the land and convey it to M in discharge of his obligation, the contingency has hap pened upon which the attorneys were to be entitled to the stipulated fee.-MCINTOSH V. BACH, Ky., 62 S. W. Rep. 515.

3. BAIL-Amount of Bond.-A bail bond in the sum of $600 is not excessive in a prosecution for assault with intent to commit rape.-EX PARTE SCOTT, Tex., 52 8. W. Rep. 568.

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4. BANKS AND BANKING Insolvent National BankStockholder's Liability.-Where, on an issue as to whether defendant was liable as a stockholder of an insolvent national bank, it appears from an agreed statement as to what the bank books and reports show that, at the time the four shares in question purported to have been transferred to him by the president, the latter's stock was all pledged, it must be held that defendant acquired no stock, and never in reality became a legal shareholder, and hence is not subject to a shareholder's liabilities.-BURT V. RICHMOND, U. S. D. C., D (Vt.. 107 Fed. Rep. 387.

5. BENEFIT INSURANCE-Right of Action.-Where a beneficiary in a fraternal insurance organization is denied the remedy by appeal provided for by the association, he may maintain a suit at law.-ROSE V. SUPREME COURT, ORDER OF PATRICIANS, Mich., 85 N. W. Rep. 1073.

6. BILLS AND NOTES Joint and Several Liability.Where a note, worded in the singular, was signed by H, and by the firm of G & H, and by G, a suit on it against G only was not objectionable because H was not joined as a party, since the obligation was joint and several.-Dow Law BANK V. GODFREY, Mich., 85 N. W. Rep. 1075.

7. BONDS-Power of Township to Issue.-Under Laws Kan. 1886, p. 123, relating to the organization of new counties, which provided that no bonds of any kind should be issued by any county organized thereunder, or by any subdivision thereof, within one year after such organization, and which was amended by Laws 1887, p. 186, so as to read that "no bonds shall be voted for and issued by any county or township within one year after the organization of such new county under the provisions of this act," a township had no power to vote upon the issuance of bonds within a year after the organization of the county, and rail. road aid bonds issued pursuant to a vote at an election held within a year after the organization of the county are void, although not issued until after the expira tion of such year, and, where the date of the election appears upon their face, all purchasers are chargeable with notice of their invalidity.-SAGE V. FARGO TP., U. 8. C. C. of App., Eighth Circuit, 107 Fed. Rep. 383.

8. BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS-MortgagesParol Testimony.-Where a landowner bought stock in a building and loan association, and pledged the same for a loan secured by a mortgage on real estate, which contained no provision for the release of the mortgagor on the sale of part of the property and assumption of the mortgage by the purchaser, evidence of prior negotiations between the mortgagor and an agent of the association that on such sale and assump. tion the mortgagor should be released from liability to the association, was inadmissible in an action to foreclose the mortgage on property so sold, in the ab sence of fraud or mistake, as tending to vary the terms of a written contract by parol. -PEOPLE'S BLDG., LOAN & SAV. ASSN. v. GHIO, Tex., 62 8. W. Rep.

560.

9. COMBINATIONS-Conspiracy.-An agreement between several independent concerns, each publishing a newspaper and furnishing thereby means for advertising, to compel a fourth person engaged in like busi

ness to reduce his rates for advertising or lose cus tomers, indicates a malicious purpose to injure the business of the latter within the meaning of section 4466a, Rev. St. 1898.-STATE V. HURGIN, Wis., 85 N. W. Rep. 1046.

10. CONTRACTS - Breach - Measure of Damages.Where a manufacturer of ice contracted to supply a local dealer at a certain price for the season, but failed to do so, and the dealer, after being supplied for some time by other parties, was finally compelled to abandon his business before the season closed, and the evidence showed the daily profit made while supplied by other parties, his profits were not so uncer tain and remote as not to be recoverable in an action for breach of contract.-BORDER CITY ICE & COAL CO. V. ADAMS, Ark., 62 S. W. Rep. 591.

11. CONTRACT8-Convict Labor.-Where, under a contract between defendants and the warden of the State prison by which the warden was to furnish them with the labor of 30 convicts at a stated price per day, the plaintiff, while a convict, was required by the warden to work for defendants, and they paid the State the contract price for his labor, after plaintiff's discharge from prison he cannot recover the value of his work from defendants, even if his commitment to prison was void, since he had no contract relations, express or implied, with them.-THOMPSON V. BRONK, Mich., 85 N. W. Rep. 1084.

12. CONTRACT-Recovery for Partial Performance.Where a contractor agreed to decorate the walls, ceiling, and wood work of a room, and equip it with furni ture, at the agreed price of $5,200, defects in the woodwork which afterwards develop, and which are shown to be completely remediable at a cost not to exceed $500, should not preclude a recovery of the contract price, less a deduction of that amount, as the defects do not reach the entire consideration; substantial performance of the contract in all other particulars being shown.-PHILIP HISS Co. v. PITCAIRN, U. S. C. C., W. D. (Pa.), 107 Fed. Rep. 425.

13. CONTRACTS Rental of Personal Property.Where defendant contracted to pay plaintiff threequarters of a cent per pound per month for the use of chain belonging to a wrecking apparatus from the time the chain was taken until it was returned, and the contract further provided that all the apparatus should be returned by a certain date, defendant was liable for the stipulated rental until the property was returned, and not merely for rent to the time fixed for return, and damages for the failure to return at that time.-MCMORRAN V. HALL, Mich., 85 N. W. Rep. 1108. 14. CONTRACT-Tender of Performance.-An instruction that, inasmuch as a builder was prevented from going on with his contract, he was entitled to recover for what he had done, if his tender of performance by the correction of defects was made in good faith, was not incorrect because the tender may have been made on condition that sums claimed to be due should first be paid, and no reference was made thereto, as the condition was a circumstance to be considered by the jury with others in determining whether the tender was made in good faith.-CASS COUNTY V. GIBSON, U. S. C. C. of App., Sixth Circuit, 107 Fed. Rep. 363.

15. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-Evidence.-Plaintiff, driving on a load of hay, turned onto a street used by an electric railway company, and passed upon the track without looking, and was struck by a car coming up from behind, and was injured. Held, that he was guilty of contributory negligence if the car was in sight and could have been seen when he turned upon the track.-MCCLELLAN V. CHIPPEWA VAL. ELEC. RY. Co., Wis., 85 N. W. Rep. 1018.

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question was for the jury.-BLAKE V. RAY, Ky., 62 S. W. Rep. 521.

17. CORPORATIONS Promoters Secret Profits.Promoters of a corporation, who become stockholders therein, assume a trust relation to the company and the other stockholders, which binds them to act openly and in good faith in all matters connected with its organization, and the acquiring of the property necessary for the transaction of the business for which it is organized, and they will not be permitted to make a secret profit on the sale of such property to the corporation, at least when by making themselves officers and directors in the initial organization they control the corporation, and assume to act in its behalf in making the purchase.-YEISER V. UNITED STATES BOARD & PAPER CO., U. S. C. C. of App., Sixth Circuit, 107 Fed. Rep. 340.

18. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE- Acts of Co-Conspirators.Under an indictment for grand larceny against several persons jointly, alleging that the offense was com. mitted by stealing tobacco pursuant to a conspiracy, upon the trial of one of the defendants evidence as to sales of tobacco made by a co-defendant was not admissible in the absence of evidence tending to estab lish the alleged conspiracy.-STOVALL V. COMMON. WEALTH, Ky., 62 S. W. Rep. 536.

19. CRIMINAL LAW-Burglary-Attempt.-Defendant knocked at the door of the house of prosecutrix, and asked to be let in, and told her that it would be better for her if she did so, but she refused, and opened a back door, and ran to a neighbor's, and on returning with the neighbor they found the defendant, who, having entered through such open door, was coming out of the house. Held not sufficient to warrant a conviction for attempted burglary under Pen. Code, art. 850, defining an attempt to commit burglary as an endeavor to accomplish the crime carried beyond mere preparation, but falling short of the ultimate design in any particular.-FONVILLE V. STATE, Tex., 62 8. W. Rep. 572.

20. CRIMINAL LAW-Homicide-Provoking Difficulty. -Where the only evidence as to the beginning of the difficulty in which defendant killed deceased was that, while deceased was standing at the bar in defendant's saloon, defendant entered with a gun in his hand, and passed by deceased to a door opposite, and remarked, "Boys, here is a gun S left with me for J. It is Sunday, and the doors ought to be closed," and deceased turned,saying, "There is the son of a—," whereupon the shooting began, it was error to give instructions on "provoking the difficulty," since the attack, whether by deceased or by defendant, was without provocation.-WHITE V. STATE, Tex., 62 S. W. Rep. 575.

21. CRIMINAL LAW-Intoxicating Liquors-Local Option. Where whisky consigned to defendant C. O. D. was in the express office, and he received money from certain witnesses with which be paid for the whisky, which he gave to such witnesses, it was not error for the court to instruct that, if defendant received the money with the understanding that the witnesses were to have the whisky, the transaction constituted a sale.-TREADAWAY V. STATE, Tex., 62 S. W. Rep. 574. 22. CRIMINAL LAW-Malicious Mischief-Indictment. -An indictment charging that defendant did, in a certain county and State, unlawfully and willfully injure and deface a public building, to wit, Rose School House, a public building of E county, and held for public use, is sufficient to support a prosecution for injuring and defacing a public building.- MITCHELL V. STATE, Tex., 62 8. W. Rep. 572.

23. CRIMINAL LAW-Seduction.-Evidence that prosecutrix was a young woman of chaste character prior to her seduction; that defendant often visited her, and made extravagant professions of affection, by which he finally gained her consent to marry him, and that he admitted that he wrote her letters intro. duced in evidence, containing amorous passages, and

that after she promised to marry him he began to ply his arts to seduce the prosecutrix; and that she gave birth to twins born out of wedlock,- was sufficient to sustain a conviction for seduction.-STATE V. FISHER, Mo., 62 S. W. Rep. 690.

24. DEED-Description of Property.-A deed describ ing the land conveyed as adjoining "the toll-gate property" cannot be construed as including the tollgate property.-PATTERSON V. LEXINGTON, N. & D. TURNPIKE ROAD CO., Ky., 62 S. W. Rep. 529.

25. DEED-Patent-Mandamus.-A writ of mandamus will not be awarded to compel the commissioner of the general land office to issue a patent, where there is an adverse claimant to the land, who is not a party to the proceeding.-CHAPPELL V. ROGAN, Tex., 62 S. W. Rep. 539.

26. DEEDS-Undue Influence-Evidence.- A mother deeded certain land to a son by a second marriage, and 13 years thereafter a daughter by the first marriage sued to set aside the deed as procured by undue influence. It appeared that several years prior to the giving of the deed an estrangement had arisen between the mother and daughter, and there was evidence that the parties had never become reconciled, and that the mother had stated that notwithstanding the deed she had done more for the daughter than she could for the son, and there was no evidence to disprove such statement, nor was there any evidence showing undue influence on the part of the son. Held, that complainant's suit had no merit.-RIDLEY V. CHRISMAN, Tenn., 62 S. W. Rep. 661.

27. EVIDENCE-Burning of Property by Insured.- In an action on a policy, where defendant claimed that plaintiff had hired a person to burn the insured house, evidence that no one had been indicted for burning the house was not admissible.-LIVERPOOL & L. & G. INS. Co. v. JOY, Tex., 62 S. W. Rep. 546.

28. EVIDENCE-Certificate of Notary. Section 2635, Comp. Laws, providing that the certificate of a notary public of official acts done by him shall not be evidence of non-payment or non-acceptance in any case in which a defendant shall annex to his plea an affida. vit denying the facts of having received such notice, excludes the admission of such certificate as secondary evidence when the notary is dead.-SEXTON V. PERRIGO, Mich., 85 N. W. Rep. 1096.

29. EXECUTION-Rights of Mortgagee.-Comp. Laws, § 4389, provides that, when mortgaged personalty is levied on before the property is taken, the officer must pay or tender the amount of the mortgage debt, or deposit the amount with the county treasurer to the order of the mortgagee. An execution was levied on certain mortgaged property in possession of the mortgagee. The judgment creditor and the sheriff had full knowledge of the existence of the mortgage. No tender was made of the amount due, and no deposit was made with the county treasurer. Held, that the mortgagee was not estopped to claim such property, to the extent of his mortgage lien, by de livering to the sheriff a receipt for the property, conditioned that on default in redelivery he would pay the amount of the execution.-PLUNKETT V. HANSCHKA, 8. Dak., 85 N. W. Rep. 1004.

30. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS - Survival of Cause of Action.-Though a cause of action for the death of an intestate, which survives to his administrator under the New Hampshire statute (Pub.St. 1901, ch. 191, §§ 8-12), is transitory, the survival is wholly where the right is, and local, and, the right to sue arising wholly in that State where the accident causing death occurred, it is not carried by the statute to a Vern ont administrator of the decedent, endeavoring to sue defendant in the latter State.-LYON V. BOSTON & M. R. Co., U. S. C. C., D. (Vt.), 107 Fed. Rep. 386.

31. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES.- Where one joint maker of a note, believing the note paid by the other maker, before suit thereon conveyed an undivided interest in land which he had just inherited to his

wife, in payment of money which he had borrowed from her and promised to repay, and to secure a homestead for her, such conveyance was not fraudu. lent as to the holder of such note, and should not be set aside at the suit of such creditor.-COLE V. COLE, Mich., 85 N. W. Rep. 1098.

32. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-Deed to Wife. - Defendant owned 160 acres of land, 40 of which was his homestead, another 40 was mortgaged for more than It was worth, and the remaining 80 he transferred to his wife without consideration. In a suit by defendant's mortgagee to set aside this transfer in order to collect a deficiency judgment, it appeared that an execution, issued against defendant shortly after the transfer, had been returned nulla bona, and, though defendant testified that at the time of the transfer he owned considerable personal property, he was unable to remember whether or not it was mortgaged. Held not to show the defendant was amply able to pay his debts, and had no creditors other than the plaintiff, so as to make the transfer to his wife valid.- GRUNER V. BROOKS, Mich., 85 N. W. Rep. 1085.

33. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-Mortgages.-Where a mortgage includes both real estate and personalty, and the mortgagee permits the mortgagor to retain a portion of the personalty consumable in the use, to sell and exchange the same at will, and to retain some of it long after default, and the mortgage gives no power of sale, except of certain of the personalty, it will be declared void as against Judgment creditors of the mortgagor.-MORRIS V. CLARK, Tenn., 62 S. w. Rep. 673.

34. GARNISHMENT-Equitable Contingent Contract.Defendant and V entered into a contract to engage in the loan and real estate business for three years, defendant to draw a salary of $100 per month until the termination of the contract, when he was to receive a certain per cent. of the profits of the business, provided that there were any profits in excess of the sal ary already drawn, after collecting all claims. Held, that the fact that the defendant's interest in the con. tract could not be reached by trustee process or ordinary garnishment proceedings, prior to the termination of the contract, because defendant's interest was contingent, did not entitle plaintiffs to maintain an action of equitable garnishment, since the unascertained profits of a contingent contract cannot be reached by equitable garnishment.-STEVENSON V. MCFARLAND, Mo., 62 S. W. Rep. 694.

35. GUARANTORS-Extension of Time Release of Guarantor.-A release of a guarantor of a railroad construction company's agreement to pay contractors for their work, resulting from an extension of time for its completion without the guarantor's assent, would not release the latter from liability for what had been done before the extension. - O'BRIEN V. CHAMPLAIN CONSTRUCTION CO., U. S. C. C., D. (Vt.), 107 Fed. Rep. 338.

36. GUARDIAN AND WARD-Compensation-Res Judicata.-Where certain compensation was allowed a guardian by the clerk of the county court, and was ratified and affirmed by the court, and subsequently such allowance was confirmed by the chancery court of another county on a petition by the guardian to remove the guardianship to the latter county, the guardian could not thereafter be charged with such allowance in a suit by the ward to remove the guard

sive on the question of residence.-MINNESOTA STONEWARE CO. V. MCCROSSEN, Wis., 85 N. W. Rep. 101.

88. HOMICIDE-Former Conviction-Second Indictment.-Under Const. art. 2, § 28, prohibiting a person from being twice placed in jeopardy for the same of. fense, but providing that a reversal of a judgment of conviction for error of law shall not prevent a new trial on a proper indictment, a prisoner convicted of murder in the second degree, under an Indictment for first-degree murder, which judgment is reversed on appeal, may be retried under a second Indictment, charging murder in the first degree. Such new trial for first-degree murder is not a violation of the fourteenth amendment of the United States constitution, requiring trial by due process of law, since the State has a right to impose conditions for the granting of new trials.-STATE V. GODDARD, Mo., 62 S. W. Rep. 697.

39. HUSBAND AND WIFE-Deed-Right of Survivor. ship.-Under Ky. St. § 2143, providing that "if real estate be conveyed or devised to husband and wife, unless a right of survivorship is expressly provided for, there shall be no mutual right to the entirety by sur. vivorship between them, but they shall take as tenants in common, and the respective moieties shall be subject to the respective rights of the husband or wife as herein fixed, with all other incidents to such tenancy," a deed conveying land to husband and wife, "and upon their death" to others, or to them "during their natural lives," amounts to an express provision for the right of survivorship, within the exception of the statute, unless the presumption that such was the intention be rebutted by the terms of the deed.MCALLISTER V. FOLDEN'S ASSIGNEE, Ky., 62 S. W. Rep.

538.

40. INFANTS-Stepchildren-8upport.-Where defendant moved on his wife's farm, and used the products of it in the support of her children by a former mar. riage, and after the death of their mother the stepchildren sued defendant for railroad ties which he had sold off the land, it was error to refuse to allow defendant a counterclaim for the support and main. tenance of the stepchildren, since he assumed to sup. port them only with the aid of their means.-KEMPSON V. GO88, Ark., 62 S. W. Rep. 582.

41. INSURANCE-Failure to Promptly Pay Loss-Con. stitutional Law. Rev. Stat. Texas 1895, art. 3071, imposing on a "life or health insurance company" an additional liability for its failure to pay a loss within the time specified, consisting of 12 per cent. damages on its amount, and attorney's fees for its collection, is not repugnant to the provisions of the federal constitution against taking property without due process of law, and guaranteeing all persons the equal protection of the law. Such article, however, has no appli. cation to accident insurance companies, whether they were a part of the res gesta or not, and no predi. cate was needed for such evidence after proof of the conversation by defendants.-FIDELITY & CASUALTY CO. OF NEW YORK V. DOROUGH, U. S. C. C. of App., Fifth Circuit, 107 Fed. Rep. 389.

42. INTERNAL REVENUE STAMPS-Chattel MortgageValidity.-Where plaintiff, on taking a chattel mortgage securing 12 notes, placed a United States revenue stamp on each note, but none on the chattel mortgage, without intent to defraud the revenue, but with the

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without having paid the special tax, defendant claimed that he sold 18 quart bottles at a time, deliver. ing it to the purchaser in less quantities as required by the purchaser, and receiving pay for the same, but there was no evidence that any specific 18 quarts of beer were set apart for the purchaser with the intent that the property therein should presently pass, defendant was guilty of retailing liquor, within Comp. Laws, § 5380, defining a retail dealer as one selling one dozen quart bottles or less at one time to any person or persons.-PEOPLE V. LUDERS, Mich., 85 N. W. Rep. 1081.

45. JUDGMENT-Execution-Bond of Indemnity.-A sheriff having an execution in his hands was notified by the attorney of the judgment debtors that the execution was void, and not to levy, and such debtors executed a bond to indemnify the sheriff against loss or damage for failing to levy. The validity of the exe. cution depended on a new statute, which had not been construed by the court, and the sheriff was in honest doubt as to his right to levy. Held, that taking the bond was not against public policy, nor in contravention of any statute, and, the sheriff's bondsmen having been compelled to pay the amount of the execution, their assignee may recover on the bond of indemnity.-RAY V. MCDEVITT, Mich., 85 N. W. Rep.

1087.

46. JUDGMENT-Matters Concluded by Decree. - A petition in intervention was filed in a railroad foreclosure suit setting up a claim for rental of terminal property against the defendant accruing prior to the appointment of receivers in the suit, on account of which the intervenor claimed a statutory landlord's lien, and also that its claim constituted a preferential debt in equity entitled to priority over the debt of the mortgagee as a part of the necessary expenses of operating the road. Issue was joined on both of such claims, and on a hearing the petition was dismissed on the merits, and the decree of dismissal was affirmed on appeal. Subsequently the receiver having accumulated a fund in the registry of the court from the earnings of the road, the intervener filed an amended petition asserting its equitable right to preferential payment from such fund. Held, that the former decree was conclusive against its right to maintain such petition, the claim made, as well as the right in which it was asserted, in the two petitions being identical, and one which, had it been sustained in the first proceeding, would have been a charge upon the same fund when subsequently earned.-MANHATTAN TRUST Co. v. TRUST CO. OF NORTH AMERICA, U. S. C. C. of App., Eighth Circuit, 107 Fed. Rep. 328.

47. LANDLORD AND TENANT-Attornment-Action for Rent.-Plaintiff's tenant leased the premises from defendant, who claimed them under leases made to him by a city which had obtained them at a tax sale; defendant agreeing to save the tenant harmless from any loss or damage on account of plaintiff's claim for possession. The tenant assigned his claim for rent paid under such lease to plaintiff. Held, in an action by her for such rent, that it was error to direct a verdict in her favor on the ground that a tenant cannot make a valid attornment to a third person, since, as there was no stipulation in the lease as to taxes, they were payable by the landlord, and the tenant was entitled to show that his landlord's title has been extinguished by sale for such taxes.-SHERMAN V. SPALDING, Mich., 85 N. W. Rep. 1129.

48. LARCENY OF MONEY--Sufficiency of Indictment.An indictment charging theft of $35 in money, of the value of $35, sufficiently describes the stolen property, though it does not state the denomination or charac ter of the money stolen.-BELL V. STATE, Tex., 62 S. W. Rep. 567.

49. LIBEL-Relevant Allegation in Pleading- Privi

not lie, since it was made in the due course of legal proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction, and relevant to the issues therein.-JONES v. BROWNLEE, Mo., 61 S. W. Rep. 795.

50. LIFE INSURANCE-Evidence.-The written decla. ration of the insured that the policy had not been delivered to him, that he had not paid the premium, and that he desired it to be canceled, was admissible on the defense that there never was a binding contract.ATKINS V. NEW YORK LIFE INS. Co., Tex., 62 S. W. Rep. 563.

51. LIFE INSURANCE-Insurable Interest-Brother.A life insurance policy may be taken out for the benefit of a brother of the insured, and it is immater. ial what arrangements are made between them for the payment of premiums.-FIDELITY MUTUAL LIFE ASSN. V. JEFFORDS, U. S. C. C. of App., Fifth Circuit, 107 Fed. Rep. 402.

52. LIFE INSURANCE -Misstatements and Concealments-Effect of Good Faith.-Code, Ga. 1895, §2097, requires applications for life insurance to be made in the utmost good faith, and declares that representa tions are considered as covenanted to be true, and that a variation by which the nature, extent, or character of the risk is changed will void the policy. Section 2099 declares that the failure to state a material fact, if not done fraudulently, does not avoid the policy, but the wilful concealment thereof, enhancing the risk, will avoid it. Section 2101 avoids a policy for wilful misrepresentation as to any material inquiry made. Held, in view of this statute, that an untrue statement by insured that he did not have consumption, or his omission to name, when requested, all physicians who examined him within a specified time, would not avoid his policy, if his answers were made in good faith, and the misstatement or omission was not wilful, but due solely to his ignorance or failure to recollect, notwithstanding he distinctly certified that his answers were true, and agreed that, if any concealment or untrue statement or answer be made, the policy should be void.FIDELITY MUT. LIFE ASSN. V. JEFFORDS, U. S. C. C. of App., Fifth Circuit, 107 Fed. Rep. 402.

53. LIFE INS URANCE - Provision that it Shall not Take Effect until Payment of Premium.-A policy of life insurance contained a provision that possession of it by the insured should not render it valid unless premium thereon had actually been paid in cash. Such policy was issued on an application made through an agent of the company who was allowed by custom to retain his commission from the first prem. ium. The agent delivered the policy to the applicant, and himself remitted to the company the portion of the first premium in excess of his commission, taking a note from the applicant for an amount equal to about two-thirds of the entire premium. The company, in the belief that the premium had been fully paid in cash, credited the same to the policy holder, but on learning the facts after his death, and while the note was wholly unpaid, at once repudiated the transaction and refused payment of the policy. The evidence showed that it was understood between the agent and the applicant that the note of the latter covered all he should be required to pay on account of the first premium, but the agent had no authority from the company, either express or by virtue of his agency, to accept less than full payment in cash. Held, that aside from the question whether, under its terms, the policy would have become effective had the note been for the full amount of the premium, it did not attach in the absence of proof that the holder had either paid, or agreed to pay, in some manner, such premium in full.-MUTUAL RESERVE FUND LIFE ASSN. V. SIMMONS, U. S. C. C. of App., First Circuit, 107 Fed. Rep. 418.

debts not evidenced by contracts in writing and a longer time is fixed for debts founded on written contracts. Held, that the charter of a city railroad com pany, which authorized it to construct and operate its lines under such conditions and ordinances as the city might provide and impose, was not a contract in writ ing within such statute, on which a special assessment against the company for a street improvement, subsequently authorized by the legislature, was founded, as the contract mentioned by the statute is a contract between the parties, and the city was not a party to the company's charter, which was solely between the latter and the State, and hence the two-years limitations applied to actions for such assessments.-CITY OF GALVESTON V. GUARANTY TRUST CO. OF NEW YORK, C. S. C. C. of App., Fifth Circuit, 107 Fed. Rep. 325.

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55. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-New Promise-Husband and Wife.-Under Comp. Laws, §§ 9741, 9745, providing that no joint contractor shall lose the benefit of the bar of limitations by a subsequent promise or pay. ment made by his joint contractor, a made by a husband, and indorsed without the consent of his wife, on a mortgage jointly executed by them, does not defeat the bar of limitations in favor of the wife.-Curtiss v. PERRY, Mich., 85 N. W. Rep. 1131.

56. LOGS AND LOGGING-Obstructions-Removal.-In an action brought under Comp. Laws, ch. 129, provid ing that where the owner of logs placed in a stream has not made adequate provisions for driving and keeping the stream unobstructed, any other person driving logs on the stream may cause such obstruction to be removed at the expense of the owner of such obstructing logs, the defendants under the general issue may show that there was a contract between the parties that each should drive certain portions of the logs of the other.-BELLOWS V. CRANE LUMBER CO., Mich., 85 N. W. Rep. 1103.

57. MASTER AND SERVANT - Assumption of Risk.Where a servant went into the mouth of an elevator bin to cave cotton seed which had become lodged therein, he assumed the risk of digging in the bottom of the bin, whereby the seed slipped and crushed him. -BROWN V. MILLER, Tex., 62 S. W. Rep. 547.

58. MASTER AND SERVANT-Contract of EmploymentTermination.- Where a servant employed for a term of years consents to a termination of his contract, on his discharge before the expiration of such term he cannot maintain an action against the master for wrongful discharge.-BELL v. GUND, Wis., 85 N. W Rep. 1031.

59. MASTER AND SERVANT - Death Assumption of Risk.-An instruction that a locomotive engineer assumes all risks ordinarily incident to the business, but he may presume that the company will furnish a reasonably safe track, and he does not assume risks brought about by the company's negligence, was not subject to the objection that he could only presume the company would use all ordinary diligence to fur. nish a safe track, and that he assumed the risk of a defective track, if, by the exercise of ordinary care, he might have known it.-TEXAS & P. RY. Co. v. MCCLANE, Tex., 62 S. W. Rep. 565.

60. MASTER AND SERVANT Death of Servant-As. sumption of Risk.-Plaintiff's decedent was directed by defendant to assist in stringing an electric wire, in the course of which were two electric light wires pass. ing over the roof of a building. Decedent, holding the wire he was stretching in one hand, climbed on the roof of such building, and crawled under the electric wires, first touching them with his fingers to see if they were alive, knowing the danger if they were. After getting under them on the roof, which was wet and slippery, he attempted to walk along the roof, and slipped, and, either to save himself from falling or involuntarily, he took hold of the electric wire with his other hand, thereby making a complete circuit,

and was killed.

Held, in an action for his death, that it was proper to direct a verdict for defendant, since, as decedent knew of the danger by coming in contact with a live wire, and the slippery condition of the roof, and that, if he slipped, an involuntary movement might bring him in such contact, he assumed the risk. -DAVIS V. PORT HURON ENGINE & THRESHER CO., Mich., 85 N. W. Rep. 1125.

61. MASTER AND SERVANT - Fellow Servants. -A brakeman, and a fireman in the discharge of his ordi nary duty of receiving signals from the brakeman and repeating them to the engineer, are co-equal fellowservants, and the master is not liable for an injury to the brakeman by either the ordinary or gross negli gence of the fireman.-SOUTHERN RY. IN KENTUCKY v. CLIFFORD, Ky., 62 S. W. Rep. 514.

62. MASTER AND SERVANT-Negligence.-A factory caught fire, and a servant sustained injuries by jumping from a third story window. In a suit for the injuries, plaintiff contended that the fire was caused by the negligent maintenance by the master of a vat containing inflammable material in proximity to a trip hammer, and that the material was ignited by sparks from the hammer. It appeared that the hammer was situated 30 feet from the vat, and there was evidence that the sparks from the trip hammer would not con tain sufficient heat to cause any substance to ignite for a distance greater than 20 feet; that the fire was first discovered on a rack beside the vat, the rack being used to drain articles that had been dipped in the vat; that the vat was covered at the time, but that in endeavoring to put out the fire the cover was knocked off, and fire thereupon appeared in the vat. The same conditions had existed many years without developIng danger from sparks. Held, that the evidence was insufficient to support a verdict that defendant was negligent in locating the vat and rack the distance they were from the hammer.-DUNLAVEY V. RACINE MALLEABLE & WROUGHT IRON CO., Wis., 85 N. W. Rep.

1026.

63. MASTER AND SERVANT - Negligence of Servant.Where a boy seats himself on the hounds of a wagon, the driver of which had been forbidden by his em ployer to allow children to ride thereon, and is injured by the horses starting, the employer is not lia ble, even if the driver invited the boy to ride.-SCHULWITZ V. DELTA LUMBER Co., Mich., 85 N. W. Rep. 1075. 61. MINES AND MINERALS-Royalties-Computation. -Where the lessee of a minerai right, required to pay a sum for each ton of phosphate taken from the land, -the same to be determined by the market price of the phosphate,-afterwards adopts a new method, by which the mineral is divided into two classes, selling at different prices, the royalty is to be computed by taking the combined values of the two products which the phosphate produces, though the phosphate has a market value before its separation. Where one class of phosphate so produced is crushed and put in bags, which was not required under the method in use when the lease was executed, the lessor is not required to have a portion of such additional expense deducted from her royalties.-HARLAN V. CENTRAL PHOSPHATE Co., Tenn., 62 S. W. Rep. 614.

65. MORTGAGE-Interest - Tender.-The mortgagor of a past due mortgage is not relieved from paying interest before he is ready and willing to pay both principal and interest, and is prevented from so doing by circumstances which would be the equivalent of a tender.-ADAMS V. GREIG, Mich., 85 N. W. Rep. 1078.

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