railroads which such companies hold by lease, are not authorized to become con-
solidated into one corporation. State v. Vanderbilt, 657.
9. The lines of two railroad companies which are in their general features
parallel and competing, cannot be connected for the carriage of freight and pas-
sengers over both "continuously," and hence such companies cannot become
consolidated into one corporation under that section. Id.
10. A certificate made by the directors of consolidating railroad companies
which fails to show any place of residence of the directors of the new company
is fatally defective. Id.
11. In an action to prevent the consolidation of railroad companies, the
election of directors for the new company, at a meeting of the stockholders,
will not justify such an appointment against either of the companies, on the
ground that part of the stockholders participating in the meeting have been
inhibited from doing so by injunction, Railway Co. v. Jewett, 702.
1. Private corporations are persons, within the meaning of the first section of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and are entitled, so far as their property is con-
cerned, to the equal protection of the laws. County of San Mateo v. S. P. R. R.
Co. 1.
2. The State possesses no power to withdraw corporations from the guarantees
of the Federal Constitution in this respect. Id.
3. Under the reserved power to amend, alter, or repeal the laws under which
private corporations are formed, the State cannot divest property or rights
which have become vested. Id.
4. By the constitution of California, every law must pass by a majority, the
yeas and nays being entered on the journal. The courts in determining
whether a law has passed properly will examine the journal. Id.
Sections 1166 and 1167 of the Code of Tennessee, touching the liability
which railroad companies incur by failing to observe certain precautions in run-
ning their trains, do not apply to contractors engaged in constructing a railroad.
Griggs v. Houston, 357.
See NEGLIGENCE (CONTRIBUTORY).
1. Parol unauthorized statement of agent not admissible to vary the terms of a
conveyance. Houston, etc., R. R. Co. v. McKinney, 723.
2. One who, by deed, grants a right of way over his land to a railway com-
pany, impliedly waives all right to damages not reserved in the deed, occasion-
ed by the removal of timber or other obstructions situated in the line of the des-
ignated right of way. Id.
CORPORATION, 1, 541, 552.
See CONSOLIDATION; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; Damages, 12; PARTNERSHIP.
1. Neither the adoption of a new name by a corporation, sanctioned by legis-
lative authority, nor the legislative grant of new powers, changes the identity of
the corporation or creates a new one. Meyer v. Galveston et. al. 584.
2. A railroad company may be sued in any county through or into which its
road passes, without regard to the nature of the cause of action.
Co. v. Jewett, 702.
See INDICTMENT, 1, 2; NEGLIGENCE, 6.
1. An embankment which is constructed as a necessary approach to the rail-
way track is, in legal contemplation, a part of the crossing; but where the rail-
road crosses the highway nearly on a level with it, there is no necessity for an
embankment 20 rods long in order to reach the actual crossing.
tral, etc., R. R. Co. 210.
2. In an action to recover damages for an injury done to plaintiff's son while
driving in a wagon which was run down at a crossing, the evidence showed
that the train to which the engine was attached had just emerged from a cut.
The train was travelling at the rate of 35 miles an hour. No warning was
given as it approached the crossing. The engineer might have seen the wagon
in which plaintiff's son was riding from the time he left the cut, and might
have stopped the train in time to avert the accident. Held, that it was clear
there had been negligence on the part of the company defendant. Indianapolis,
etc., R. R. Co. v. McLin, 237.
3. In the above case it appeared that the highway upon which plaintiff's son
was riding crossed the defendant's track by a grade which it took some time to
rise. The son testified that before mounting the grade he listened and looked,
but heard nothing or saw nothing of the approaching train. Other persons be-
hind him at the time saw the smoke of said train, but it appeared that interven-
ing objects might have prevented his seeing it. Held, that under all the facts of
the case the court could not say that plaintiff's son had been guilty of contrib-
utory negligence.
4. In Indiana a failure to whistle on approaching crossings is negligence per
se, and the company is liable for an injury occurring in consequence. Pittsburg,
etc., R. R. Co. v. Martin, 254.
5. There is no obligation on the part of a person to stop, look and listen before
coming to a railroad crossing where the precaution would be useless. Id.
6. Where in a suit for damages to a dray by a train, at a street-crossing in a
city, the negligence of defendant's agents being in question, there was no error
in charging that proper diligence required the tolling of the locomotive bell in
approaching a crossing. Atlanta, etc., R. R. Co. v. Wyly, 262.
7. Statutory provisions requiring signals and checking of speed at whistling
posts are intended to protect persons at crossing. Where accident occurs just
beyond crossing, failure to comply with the statute is evidence of negligence.
Western, etc., R. R. Co. v. Jones, 267.
8. Failure to set up caution boards does not necessarily render the company
liable when the person injured was familiar with crossing and observed no pre-
cautions with regard thereto. Haas v. Grand Rapids, etc., R. R. Co. 268.
9. The fact that the approach of a railroad to a highway crossing is obscured
by embankments, or otherwise, imposes upon travellers by the highway as well as
upon the railroad company special care to avoid collisions. But the company is
not absolutely bound to have a flagman at such crossing. Id.
10. Where an injury was caused by frightening of plaintiff's horse caused by
omission to ring the engine bell, the company is liable. Strong v. Placerville
R. R. Co. 273.
11. Driver approaching a railroad crossing, the view of which is obstructed,
may presume that the company will give statutory signals, and is not bound to
stop, fasten his horse, and look ahead. The measure of his duty in such case,
How near he may approach to crossing. He may recover for injury through
fright of his horses though train did not touch them or the vehicle. İd.
12. The fact that the train was running at a speed faster than is allowed by
city ordinance is evidence of negligence. Faber v. St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co.
278.
13. The evidence in this case showed that plaintiff did his full duty in ap-
proaching the track. Id.
14. At street crossings in a town or city railroads should exercise a high de-
gree of vigilance; the signals required by law for the protection of travellers
upon the highway should be given, and the servants of the company should be at
their posts observant of the track and ready at a moment's notice to avert, if
possible, any apprehended danger. Frick v. St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. 280.
15. The plaintiff, an infant, was run over and injured by a train of the de-
fendant. The track was level, the view between the streets was unobstructed;
the road was unfenced, there were dwellings on either side; there was a path-
way leading across the track, and the train was approaching a crossing. Held,
that if the servants of the defendants saw, or, by the exercise of ordinary care,
under the circumstances stated, could have seen the plaintiff in time to have
avoided injuring her, and failed to do so, the defendant is liable. Id.
16. Whether the rate of speed in approaching a crossing amounts to negli-
gence is for the jury. Id.
17. Section hands engaged in repairing the track placed a hand-car upon a
public crossing. The plaintiff, in attempting to pass the hand-car, collided
her wagon with it, whereupon her horse became frightened and ran away.
Held, that the defendant, by placing upon a public crossing an object liable to
frighten horses, became liable for any injuries resulting from its act. Myers v.
Richmond, etc., R. R. Co. 293.
18. A failure to comply with statutory requirement as to sign-boards does not
render the company liable. Field v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. 425.
19. Where it appears the damages sustained were the result of the injured
party's own negligence, and were not caused by the absence of the sign-board.
Îd.
20. Where a person was killed at a railway crossing the sobriety or intoxica-
tion of deceased was a proper subject for the consideration of the jury in deter-
mining whether he exercised due care or not. Houston, etc., R. R. Co. v.
Waller, 431.
21. Where such person failed to look either way before attempting to pass,
the question of contributory negligence was nevertheless for the jury. Id.
22. A persoa riding in his wagon approached a crossing. A train on a de-
pressed track came round a curve at high speed without making a signal. The
driver could not see the train until very near the track. He then jumped from
his load but was killed by the engine. Held, that the evidence justified the
submission of the question of contributory negligence to the jury. Salter v.
Utica, etc., R. R. Co. 437.
23. The court charged that if the course pursued by the deceased was one
which persons of prudence and self-possession would adopt under the same cir-
cumstances, he was not negligent in so doing; that the standard by which his
conduct was to be judged was that of an ordinary careful, prudent man. Held,
correct. Id.
24. While a traveller on a highway, on approaching a railroad crossing, is
bound to look and listen for an approaching train before undertaking to cross,
it is only where it appears from the evidence that he might have seen had he
looked, or might have heard had he listened, that a jury in the absence of evi-
dence upon the question, is authorized to find that he did not look and did not
listen. Smedis v. Brooklyn, etc., R. R. Co. 445.
25. The evidence in the case held to warrant the submission of the question
of defendant's negligence to the jury. Id.
26. Evidence was given sufficient to warrant a finding that defendant's track
was laid upon a public street. Held, that assuming S. was not attempting to
cross the track at the crossing, but was south of the line of the street upon
which he approached when struck; this did not prevent a recovery; that S. had
a right to go upon defendant's track south of the crossing if it was part of a
highway, and if killed while there by defendant's negligence and without any
want of care on his part, the action was maintainable.” Id.
27. It is the duty of the company on approaching a crossing to sound the
whistle or bell continuously. Id.
28. In this case the driver of a wagon was killed while attempting to drive
over a crossing. Held, that his not observing the train before reaching the
track, or, if he did see it, his proceeding on without stopping was negligence,
and a refusal to nonsuit error. Connelly v. New York Central, etc., R. R. Co.
459.
See MASTER AND SERVANT, 35.
1. In estimating damages for an injury, plaintiff's ability and skill may be
shown as a measure of his earning capacity. But the amount earned by him
the year previous cannot be shown. East Tennessee, etc., R. R. Co. v. White,
2. In an action for negligently causing an injury where there is no wilfulness
nor malice, the damages are merely compensatory. Nothing can be allowed for
the mortification endured by the plaintiff. Batterson v. Čhicago, etc., R. R.
3. In an action for personal injuries a party seeking to recover for medical
care and attendance must produce evidence as to the amount paid or liability in-
curred therefor. Reed v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. 180.
4. A person injured by the negligence of a railroad company is entitled to
damages to compensation for the bodily injury sustained, the pain suffered, the
effect of the injury on his health, according to its degree and probable dura-
tion, the expenses of his sickness resulting from the injury and of attempting to
effect a cure, and the pecuniary loss sustained by reason of inability to attend
to his business or profession. St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Cantrell, 198.
5. Where the injury occurs wholly through the agent's fault there can be no
recovery. If by the mixed fault of the agent and the company, there could be
a recovery, but diminished in proportion to the agent's fault; if wholly by the
fault or negligence of the company's agents, then there could be a recovery of
full damages. Atlanta, etc., R. R. Co. v. Wyly, 263.
6. In an action by a father against a person negligently causing a personal in-
jury to his child, he can recover such damages only as he has himself sustained;
leaving to the infant a further right of recovery of such damages as are personal
to himself. Durkee v. Central P. R. R. Co. 321.
7. In such case the father is not entitled to recover the amount which would
compensate the child nor for the child's pain, suffering and disfigurement. Id.
8. In the absence of gross negligence, recklessness, wilfulness, malice, insult,
or inhumanity, actual damages can only be allowed. Morse v. Duncan, 374.
9. No recovery can be allowed for inconvenience or even physical hardship
when the same are voluntarily undertaken. Pain of mind is only a subject of
damages when connected with bodily injury. Id.
10. Court will not interfere with verdict on the ground of excessive damages
unless the damages are so great as to appear to be outrageous, or such as indi-
cate that they were the result of partiality or prejudice, and not of deliberate
judgment. It cannot be said that the damages assessed in this case were exces-
sive. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Spanier, 453.
11. In an action for damages the judgment should be for the amount assessed
by the jury and interest thereon from the date of the judgment, and not from
the date of the verdict. Fowler v. Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. 480.
12. A corporation is as liable for vindictive damages for the wrongful acts of
its servants or agents as natural persons. Haley ». Mobile, etc., R. R. Co. 541.
DEATH.
1. A party is injured in a railroad accident, his injury brings on insanity, and
about eight months after this accident he commits suicide in a fit of insanity.
No action lies against the company for the death. Scheffer v. Washington, etc.,
R. R. Co. 59.
2. The right of action to recover damages for the death of a human being
given by the statute of one State may be asserted in the courts of another where
there is a coincidence of the statutes of the two States on this point. Chicago,
etc., R. R. Co. v. Doyle, 171.
3. Even where there is not such similar statute such action will lie if not op-
posed to the public policy of the State. Id.
4. The law of the place where the death has been occasioned governs in such
5. The right of action for causing death passes in Tennessee with all its inci-
dents to the personal representative, and must be treated as if the injured party
had brought it. Haley v. Mobile, etc., R. R. Co. 541.
THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES, 215.
See INTEREST.
6. In instructing as to the damages the court should call attention of the jury
to the declining years of the deceased and the probable decrease year by year of
his capacity to labor at his calling. Central R. R. and B. Co. v. Roach, 79.
7. Evidence that family of deceased were entirely dependent on his labor for
support is inadmissible. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Johnson, 225.
8. The necessary funeral expenses of the deceased are proper items of dam-
ages, where any of those for whose benefit the action is brought are legally bound
to pay such expenses. It is immaterial that all of those interested in the recovery
are not legally bound to pay such expenses. Murphy v. New York Central, etc.,
R. R. Co. 490.
9. A verdict for $1400 for death caused by gross negligence held not excessive.
Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Bonifield, 493.
10. In case of gross negligence, exemplary damages may be recovered. Haley
v. Mobile, etc., R. R. Co., 541.
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1. Evidence of bribery by clerk of company defendant is admissible. Chicago,
etc., R. R. Co. v. McMahon, 68.
2. On the trial of a case it may be shown that a party has destroyed or sup-
pressed material evidence, or has fabricated such evidence. Id.
3. All declarations made at the same time the main fact under consideration
takes place, and which are so connected with it as to illustrate its character, are
admissible as original evidence, being a part of the res gestæ. McLeod v. Ginther,
162.
4. Where the deposition of a witness was read to the jury for the purpose of
impeaching his testimony, which deposition was shown to the witness, held, that
no advantage was taken that could prejudice the defendant. Johnson v. Chicago,
etc., R. R. Co. 206.
5. Opinions of witnesses admissible on question of speed. Chicago, etc., R.
R. Co. v. Johnson, 225.
6. In an action for negligent killing of child engineer may testify that child
could not be on the track without his having seen it. Marcott v. Marquette, etc.,
R. R. Co. 306.
7. A witness may testify that the whistle could not have been blown without
her hearing it. Id.
8. An engineer may testify that the presence of strangers in his cab did not
interfere with the performance of his duties. Id.
9. Where the allegation is that plaintiff, a passenger on a steamboat, was in-
jured by the fall of a bale of cotton, evidence as to the steepness of the boat's
stairs is not admissible. Ohio and M. P. Co. v. McCool, 390.
10. How far in order to impeach credibility of a witness evidence of bad repu-
tation may be carried back. Id.
11. Where an accident having occurred at a railway crossing, the allegation
was that there had been no sufficient lights, evidence should be admitted as to
condition of lights on another occasion if there had been no material change
therein. Houston, etc.. R. R. Co. v. Waller, 431.
12. In an action for damages for injury to a horse, by reason of the negligent
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