It may be thought, moreover, that this view of oratory makes all discourse addressed to another, even familiar conversation, oratory. So indeed, the language of Theremin seems to imply, where, as already quoted,' he speaks of the exercise of the oratorical activity distinguished from the poetic and philosophical, as occurring in the relations of kindred and family, as well as in those of the state and the church. But, it should be remarked, he only indicates the oratorical activity as a specific form of this social life. Yet just so far as a moral effect in another mind is aimed at in discourse, even in conversational discourse, there is oratory. All conversation does not contemplate such moral effect. That, by the definition, is not oratory. But we may find true oratory, true eloquence in the retired circle as well as before the vast assembly; by the hearth as well as in the pulpit. The intercession of Effie Deans has thus been justly characterized as eloquent.

The third position which we take in the discussion of this question is, that every received canon of peculiarly oratorical criticism owes its validity to the assumption of the moral element in oratory.

Advancing negatively to the proof of this position, we may confidently ask, from what other source can such validity be derived? Not, from any science of logic, grammar or æsthetics. The principles given in these sciences, oratory must, indeed, observe. It must take the intellectual states given in logic,-conceptions and judgments, in their logical relations. It must observe the laws which control the incorporation of these states into verbal forms. It must not either violate the principles which our æsthetic nature prescribes. So the orator must not contravene the laws of his physical structure. But neither logic, grammar, æsthetics or physiology gives purely or peculiarly oratorical rules. Nor, farther, does the art of philosophical discourse give such rules. This art seeks as its end, the representation of the true for its own sake. The orator, on the other hand, uses the true for a higher moral end. If oratory were conformed to the same laws that control philosophical discourse then, as already observed, oratory would be identical with scientific essay; and a system of scholastic logic would be as eloquent as Patrick Henry's speech on the war of the revolution. Nor does the art of poetry give them. This art seeks as its end the representation of the beautiful for its own sake. It is only a degenerate, unworthy oratory that seeks admiration only. To subject oratory to the laws of poetry, leaving out only the outward form of poetry-the rhyme and metre, would give us instead of sound oratory, poetry run mad, as it is well called,-poetry demented or vapid declamation. And if not these arts, which have a common form or medium for their repreresentation with oratory, certainly no other arts. Indeed, all rules, all canons of criticism, derived from other sources, exclusive of

the moral are arbitrary, capricious, have no systematic connection, and consequently possess no philosophical validity. This will ap pear more conclusively from an examination of some specific canons of oratorical criticism which are generally received as of most importance and of highest validity.

It is a law of oratory consecrated by the assent of successive centuries, of rhetoricians and orators, not to say by the coinciding assent of common sense for that period, that the speaker must, in the judgment of the hearer, possess the several qualities of goodsense, good-will, and good principle. But why so? Is this a law applicable to any discourse not involving a moral element? Must the philosopher prove himself to be possessed of these qualities before we will regard with any favor his scientific treatises, assent to his reasonings, or accept his conclusions? Do we judge the poet by this law? Is a poem any less a poem, because the poet is not what he should be in mental furniture, in good feeling or right principle? Above all, must we know these facts of his personal character before we read or admire his poetry? We require this of the orator. It is stolidity or a crime to hear one whom we know to be a fool, a misanthrope or a knave in any proper oratory. Why is this? On what ground rests the validity of this rhetorical rule? Only on this; that the person in its concreteness, and therefore in its moral relations, must enter into all oratory.

It is another equally well-received rule in oratory, that the speaker respect the relations which he personally sustains to his hearers. The apostle Paul, in his instructions to Timothy as to the mode of his preaching, recognizes the authority of the rule when he says, "Rebuke not an elder, but entreat him as a father, and the younger men as brethen, &c." Why now, must the preacher, why must every public speaker recognize thus his relations to his hearers? What principle gives us this canon? Why will not the oration be just as good, just as perfect, if these personal relations be disregarded:—if the youth speak as a father, with the gravity, the cautiousness, the authority of age, or the hoary head with the vivacity and warmth and freshness of a stripling? These personal relations do not affect the quality of a poem or a philosophical essay. We never inquire for them when we discuss their merits, as we must when we criticise an oration. Why are they necessary in oratory, except on the ground that has been indicated?

Farther, it is an indispensable law of oratory that it respect the occasion. On what rests the validity of this canon? Not, certainly on any ground common to philosophy or poetry. We do not condemn the poems of Macpherson or Chatterton because their structure belies the age in which they were written. But let an orator address us in the language of former ages, and what

reception should we feel ourselves compelled to give to his declamation?

Another law of oratory equally imperative is, that the orator must ever conceive of himself as addressing in his own personality, his hearers who are likewise conceived in their distinct personality. He must appear as the person speaking, and they be addressed as persons spoken to. When he speaks of himself, he must use the first person singular; when he speaks of them he must use the second person. He cannot say, we have said"-"we must urge," meaning himself; for he then drops the orator, and becomes the mere essayist. How ridiculous would it appear in Demosthenes, Cicero or Chatham to substitute for the " ego" the "we" of our modern preachers? So if he talk of himself or his hearers as third persons;--if he should say "the speaker has presented," or "the hearers will judge," instead of "I have presented," "you will judge," as an essayist represents himself and his readers, he ceases so far to be an orator. Now on what ground rests this requisition unless on that indicated? Certainly not on any thing common to poetry and philosophical discourse. It is egotism in the poet, if it be not a mere figure; it is egotism in the essayist,to represent himself, unless the self be the matter of the representation. Neither can appear as the personal organ of the representation. But oratory requires this; and thus to represent himself is no egotism in him. He is not to shun the use of the first person singular, therefore, to avoid the imputation of egotism, if it be necessary to express the organ of the representation. He might as well seek to evade the charge by concealing his outward person behind a screen while speaking. He is only egotistic when the self is unnecessarily made the matter of the representation; not when other matter is represented through the self.'

The orator must, moreover, appear ever in the present. It is a just rule that he never speak, as does the essayist, of what he has said, or is saying, or is to say, in any but the relations of time, past, present, and future. For, oratory is a transpiring event, a procedure in time, a progressive action, involving, consequently, a full concrete personality. Its parts must, hence, be measured in time, not in space. The orator must not, in denoting any of these parts, represent them as " above," as if they were higher up on a written page, or as "farther on," as if they were at a distance ahead in space on an extended surface. They are to him the already" spoken, the "hereafter" to be considered."

'A popular anecdote, whether true or not, well sets forth the absurdity of the use of the plural when only the speaker is intended, so common in the modern pulpit. A celebrated preacher, famous for the use of the "we," one summer afternoon, after worrying himself sometime with pulling and stretching his cravat, suddenly broke off his discourse, and proceeding to relieve his neck of the incumbrance, exclaimed, "our wife has tied our neck-kerchief too tight to-day." It would be pertinent to ask, how large a partnership there was in the preacher's conjugal interest?

All these canons of oratorical criticism rest on this ground, that oratory is a representation by a present, moral person to present moral persons, all appearing in the concrete fullness of their personal relations. They have no validity except on this ground. Poetry recognizes no such canons. The Iliad remains just as perfect a product of art, if judged separately from the person of the poet. The oration on the crown is nothing, except as the living Demosthenes, the Athenian citizen, statesman, leader, just as he was determined, in his personal character and relations, by the condition of Athens at that day, appears everywhere in it. This is why poetry of a remote age or clime commands admiration; while oratory, of perhaps a vastly superior order, is neglected or despised. The poem is complete in itself; since poetry has no exterior aim. Its whole beauty is contained in the product. We do not care for the producer, who or what he was. In oratory, on the other hand, the present living speaker being abstracted, and its very life is gone. Only, as this is supplied by an active, well-informed imagination, can the best oratory of another age receive anything of its merited admiration. Hence, to be truly ravished by written oratory imports a vastly higher culture than to be thus affected by poetry or the product of any other æsthetic

art.

It is precisely on the same ground that we are enabled to answer the question which perplexed the mind of Cicero so much; -why there have been so many good poets and so few good orators? It is, indeed, as he says, because of a peculiar difficulty in oratory. But that difficulty lies in this, that a perfect oratory imports a perfect man; for the living person that embodies in itself all oratorical representations, is ever a commanding, rather the commanding element; and only as that is perfect can the representation be perfect. Hence, even the recorded discourses. of Christ, if animated by a vivid imagination, with a full and complete conception of the person of Christ in its moral perfectness, and with a correct apprehension of the moral state of His hearers, will be ranked among the most perfect forms of oratory, and easily gain assent to the testimony respecting Him; "that never man spoke like that man."

But it should be remarked that the whole of virtue does not necessarily appear in every specific instance of oratorical discourse. The orator represents generally but a single virtue or grace as the prominent one, as that of patriotism, or a specific form of it, when he addresses the senate, or the love of what is just and equal when he addresses the judge, or the particular trait of character which predominates in the subject of panegyric, or constitutes the end of hortatory discourse. These specific forms of virtue may be in exercise in a high degree, while in the other elements of a virtuous character there may be defect; just as a

man may be brave, or generous, or just, while in other traits, or even in his general character, he may be deficient. This fact, however, does not prove bravery, generosity, or justice to be out of the moral sphere, or the exercise of these qualities to be subject to other than ethical principles. If the particular virtue shine out full and bright, then the oration by every principle of oratorical criticism, rises highest in merit as a product of art. It is because the moral sentiment of love of country shines out in such purity and strength in Demosthenes, in Chatham, in Henry, that their eloquence rises so near perfection. It is this which, more than anything else, constitutes the superiority of Demosthenes to Cicero as an orator. In the Grecian, patriotism was the master spirit; and his earnestness in winning his countrymen to measures or decisions which should advance the glory of Athens, carries him along with an almost superhuman, certainly a resistless power onward to his end. He has, indeed, furnished himself with matter; he is a thoroughly trained, a thoroughly informed statesman. He has disciplined his mind to thorough method. He has mastered by long training all the means of expression, so that they run in of themselves as they are needed for his firmly appre hended purpose. But it is his earnestness, arising from a noble sentiment and fastening on a corresponding noble end, that animates and wields these instrumentalities, which at the same time furnish the necessary body of the spirit's expression and are ennobled by its dignity and enlivened with its life. Cicero was inferior to his great rival in the strength of this sentiment; and his oratory is less vehement, less earnest, less commanding. It suffers him to run out more after form; to think more of his manner. It is hence less effective.

The stand-point in all oratorical 'criticism is, thus, the strength and elevation of the moral sentiment ruling in the speaker, and the force with which it bears him on towards the moral end which is the object of all oratory. Voice, words, images, are but the matter in which this sentiment inust, in expression, embody itself. They are necessary, indeed, but necessary only as instruments. Whether to be used at all and how-this is to be determined from the sentiment and the end of the discourse. No true criticism of style, thus, can proceed without regard to this essential element in all oratory. "True eloquence does not consist in speech. It must exist in the man; in the subject; and in the occasion. clear conception, outrunning the deductions of logic; the high purpose; the firm resolve; the dauntless spirit, speaking from the tongue, beaming from the eye, informing every feature, urging the whole man onward, right onward to his object;—this, this is eloquence."

The

The fourth position, which we assume in this discussion, is, that only upon the ground adduced, can a pursuit, the noblest and most