posed of feeling, knowledge, and act, and in this polemical reference, our position is still more accurately to be considered. Shall now piety consist in knowledge, then were it indeed pre-eminently the same knowledge wholly, or the substance of it, which is propounded as the contents of the doctrine of faith, or it must be thoroughly false, that we are here inquiring after the essence of piety, for the sake of such a doctrinal belief. Is now piety this knowledge, then the measure of this knowledge in a man must also be the measure of his piety. Because, that which in its rise and fall is not the measure of the perfection of an object, cannot constitute its essence. Therefore, under the proposed hypothesis, the best possessor of the Christian doctrinal system, would also always be at the same time, the most pious Christian. And this certainly no one will assume, even though we equally premised, that that best is only he who adheres also most to the essential, through all collaterals and outworks, but rather grant that with equal perfection of that knowledge, different degrees of piety can arise, and with equally perfect piety, very different degress of this knowledge. Still perhaps one objects, that the assertion that piety is a knowledge, means not so much the contents of that knowledge, as the certainty co-inhabiting the ideas, so that the cognition of the doctrines of faith, is piety only by reason of the certainty attributed to them, and therefore of the strength of the conviction; that a possession of the same without conviction is on the contrary no piety at all. In this case, therefore, were the strength of the conviction the measure of the piety; and this, indeed, is chiefly the idea of those, who prefer to explain the word faith by truth of conviction. But in all other peculiar spheres of knowledge, conviction itself has no other measure than the clearness and perfection of thought itself. Is it indeed so with this conviction; then we have certainly come back to the former consequent, that he who conceives of religious doctrines, in the clearest and most consistent manner, singly and in their connection, must also be the most pious man. Is this now to be rejected, and the supposition still to stand; then the certainty here spoken of must be of another kind, and have another measure. Let their piety be ever so closely connected with this certainty, it is not therefore united in the same manner with that knowledge. But is, however, the knowledge which forms the doctrinal of faith, still related to piety; then this is thus reconcilable, viz. that piety is certainly the end of that knowledge, but that this knowledge can be developed only so far as a certainty dwells in the determinings of the self-consciousness. On the contrary, does piety consist in action: then it is plain, that the act constituting it cannot be determined by its contents; for experience teaches, that side by side with that which is beautiful, what is also most hideous, and by that which is fullest of value, what is emptiest and most insignificant, is done as pious, and out

of piety. We are consequently only referred to the form, to the quality and manner of the act. But this is to be comprehended only from the two extremes—(viz. the terminus a quo, and the terminus ad quem.—Trans.), the impulse lying at the foundation as the point of commencement, and the result aimed at as final object. But now no one will call an action more or less pious on account of the greater or less degree of perfection with which the contemplated result is reached. But are we cast back upon the initial impulse then it is obvious, that there lies at the root of every impulse a definite state of the self-consciousness, be it now pleasure or pain, and that in this subject one impulse is in the clearest manner distinguishable from another. Accordingly, an act will be pious so far as the determinate state of the self-consciousness, the feeling which has become effect and has gone over into the impulse, is a pious one. Both suppositions therefore lead back to the same point, viz., that knowledge and action belong to piety, but that neither makes out the essence of the same, but they belong to it only so far as the awakened feeling now comes to rest in a thought that fixes it, now pours itself into an out-speaking act. Finally, no one will deny, that there are states of feeling, such as godly sorrow, contrition, confidence, joyfulness, which we call pious in and for themselves, without respect to a knowledge and action proceeding from them, although we certainly expect, both that they will exhibit it themselves in variously furthered activities, and will become subject to observation.

5. From what has been hitherto said, we are prepared to form a judgment upon the position that piety is a condition, in which knowledge, feeling, and action, are bound together. We, of course, refer them back to one another, when feeling is said to be derived from knowledge, in like manner as action from feeling. But is no subordination at all to be expressed: then it is just as well the description of every other quite clear and living moment, as of a pious one. For although the objective conception of an act goes before the act itself, it likewise attends it continually, and the proportion between both expresses itself likewise in the selfconsciousness by a greater or less degree of satisfaction and repose of mind, so that here too in the collective whole of the condition all three are combined. Just so it is with knowledge. Be-. cause as a happily ended operation of the thinking activity, it expresses itself in the self-consciousness as a confident certainty. But, at the same time, there will be a struggle to bind up the recognized truth with others, or to seek after cases for its application; and this is the ever similarly originated beginning of an act, which perpetually unfolds itself in the offered opportunity, and so we find here also in the aggregate condition, knowledge, feeling, and action together. But as now the first described condition is, notwithstanding, essentially an act, and the second a knowledge, thus

piety, too, in its different expressions, remains a state of the feeling. This, then, will also be taken up into the thought, but only in proportion as every one so determined in himself, is likewise inclined to thought and practised in it; and in the same manner only, and according to the same measure, this inward determination also comes forth in living movement and representative action. It also follows, from this view, that under feeling neither anything confused, nor anything unreal, is to be thought of, since on the one hand, it is strongest in the most living instants, and mediately, or immediately, lies at the ground of all expressions of the will, and on the other, can be grasped by observation, and conceived of as it is. But if others will exclude feeling entirely from our sphere, and therefore describe piety only as a knowledge, generating actions, or as an act proceeding from a knowledge; then would such be obliged not only at first to settle among themselves, whether now piety is to be said to be the knowledge or the act; but they must also show us, how then out of a knowledge an act can arise without a determination of the self-consciousness intervening. And, if they are compelled at last to grant this, then will they be convinced, from the foregoing, that if such an interweaving bears in itself the character of piety, then the knowledge therein is certainly not, and the action therein no more the piety, in and for itself, but this is exactly the determination of the inter-mediating self-consciousness. But this can also always be stated in a converse manner; action is not yet piety in all the cases in which a definite self-consciousness arises out of a previous knowledge, and knowledge is not any more piety, in and for itself, if it has no other contents than such determination adopted in the thought."

We close this article with the significant motto on the title-page of the work from which these extracts are taken, and from which we may present, in a future number of the Repository, Schleiermacher's views more fully and clearly. As we advance with him into the great field of thought, which he has labored upon with so powerful a hand, we shall find his peculiar obscurities, as a writer and a reasoner, lessening at every step, and his veil growing thinner. His motto, properly understood, contains, certainly, a great and divine principle. May it ever be ours, also, to adopt, and to apply, in asking the high and holy question, "What is truth?"

Neque enim quaero intelligere ut credam, sed credo ut intelligam. Nam qui nom crediderit, non experietur, et qui expertus non fuerit, non intelliget. Anselm. Prosol. 1. de fide trin, 2.

ARTICLE X.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

1.-Orators of the American Revolution. By E. L. MAGOON. New York: Baker & Scribner. 1848.

This is a book that will find many readers, and deservedly. What American patriot or Christian but that feels a deep interest in those great and noble men whose eloquence, wisdom, and energy, accomplished so much good for this nation during, and subsequent to, the war of the Revolution. Their virtues were great; their abilities superior; their sacrifices many; and ever precious be their memory to the great heart of this happy nation. We have here graphic sketches of Otis, Samuel Adams, Quincy, Hancock, Warren, John Adams, Patrick Henry, Lee, Hamilton, Ames, Pinkney, Wirt, Emmet, and Randolph, with a few specimens of their oratory. Nor are Davies, Caldwell, Clarke, Witherspoon, and other distinguished patriots of the Pulpit, forgotten. -The execution of this agreeable task is creditable to the Author. He has evidently a just appreciation of the characters and services of those great men, and gives, on the whole, fair and striking portraits of them. His style is a little too ambitious and ornate perhaps, but still it is lively, graphic, original, and energe tic. Our only regret in reading it-and it is one that is felt throughout, and we know not that the Author could have supplied the deficiency-is, that we have so few, and those imperfect and unsatisfying, specimens of their oratorical peculiarities and powers. Could more of these have been given, it would have added greatly to the value and interest of the work. But as it is, we heartily commend the book, believing that it will tend to inspire in the hearts of our citizens, a profounder reverence and regard for those patriotic orators and statesmen, to whom, under God, we owe our national liberty, and wise and beneficient form of government.

2.-Principles of the Interior or Hidden Life; designed particularly for the consideration of those who are seeking assurance of Faith and perfect love. By THOMAS C. UPHAM. Eighth Edition. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1848. This work of Professor Upham's, has already reached the eighth edition, showing that it is having an extensive circulation in the religious community. And we think it speaks well for our day, that a book of this character-eminently spiritual, and pervaded by the principles and spirit of holy living-should find so many readers. The truth is, there is a felt deficiency in the piety of the present day; and this feeling is limited to no class of Christians, to no schools or denominations: there is a longing on the part of thousands of God's people, for a higher development of holiness--a reaching forth to something above and beyond the present attainment of the church. It was this that led many devout persons to embrace the erroneous views of Prof. Finney, on the subject of Christian perfection; and the same inward conviction of the necessity of a purer and deeper piety, is creating a demand for Prof. Upham's works, all of which aim to illustrate and urge a life of holiness.-This work is divided into three parts: On the Inward Life in its connection with Faith and Love: The Life of Faith and Love followed by the crucifixion of the Life of Nature: On inward Divine Guidance. There is very much that is good in the book. It may be read by the soul that is hungering and thirsting after righteousness, with great profit. Its analyses of Christian experience, and its discriminations on many points of doctrine, are able, just, thorough, and instructive. We have read it with no ordinary interest, and we advise every Christian to read it, and weigh well its teachings. We by no means intend to endorse the peculiar views of Prof. Upham, as they are brought out with greater or lesser distinctness in all

his works, and we presume are well understood. He is one of those writers that needs to be read with watchfulness, and prayer, and rigid discrimination,— and being thus read, we know of few living writers from whom the soul is likely to receive more benefit.

3.-The Life of Faith; In three parts. By THOMAS C. UPHAM, D.D. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1848.

Another work by Prof. Upham on the same general subject, and to some extent, kindred in its nature, with his previous work on the Interior Life. "The leading object of both works," he tells us, "is the promotion of practical holiness. I have no doubt that the object will meet with favor; but have less confidence, that the manner of executing it will be approved." Both works maintain the same views; indeed the same religious ideas are reproduced, in one form or another, in all the Professor's religious writings. He evidently has one grand end in view, and is putting forth all his strength to gain it. The first part of this new work, embracing "Some of the Philosophical and Scriptural Principles and Doctrines of Faith," we regard as very able, discrimisating, and instructive. Part second traces "The Power or Effects of Faith in the regulation of man's Inward Nature." And part third shows "The relation of Faith to the Divine Guidance, or the operation of the Holy Ghost in the soul." We are far from subscribing to all the views he herein advances; we think some of them are "contrary to sound doctrine," and pernicious in their tendency; while the spirit and general tone of the work are eminently Christian. While we commend the religious writings of Prof. Upham, for very much that is eminently spiritual, and instructive, and promotive of holiness in the hearts and lives of Christians, we decidedly dissent from some of his favorite views, both of Christian doctrine and experience, believing that, while they may not embrace absolute errors, their tendency, especially on certain classes of minds, is to foster and develop a piety not in all respects scriptural.

4-Life of Madame Catharine Adorna. Including some leading facts and traits in her Religious Experience. Together with explanations and remarks, tending to illustrate the doctrine of Holiness. By THOMAS C. UPHAM, D.D. Third Edition. New York: Harper & Brothers.

ter.

1848.

We have here, though in a condensed form, the counterpart of Madame Guyon. The subject of this memoir, was an Italian, of the 15th century, generally known as Saint Catharine of Genoa. She was of the illustrious family of the Fieschi, and greatly distinguished for her holiness and active piety. She lived and died in the communion of the Romish church. There is nothing strange or of special interest in her memoirs, aside from her religious characShe is brought forward by Prof. Upham simply to illustrate the doctrine of holiness" as an instance of assurance of faith, and pure or perfect love." She was evidently a pure-minded and eminently devout Christian. That she was "perfect," we do not for a moment believe; indeed her Biographer does not insist upon our so regarding her. She belonged to the school of the Quietists, which Prof. Upham, we are sorry to say, looks upon with favor, and, as we think, distinctly advocates in this work. We think it the least valuable of any of his productions; and yet there is much in it to edify and urge to higher attainment, the discriminating reader.

5.-The Pilgrim's Progress from this world to that which is to come; delivered under the similitude of a dream. By JOHN BUNYAN. American Tract Society, New York.

This is certainly one of the most making that we have ever seen.

beautiful and splendid specimens of bookThe illustrations are striking and elegantly